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ABSTRACT
The th e s is  exam ines th e  ro le  o f m etaphor in  p o litic a l th o u g h t and, in
p a rticu la r, in  th e  work o f th e  B ritish philosopher Thom as Hobbes. . I t  is  
a rgued  th a t ,  co n tra ry  to  w hat many c n h c s  nave suggested , Hobbes's use
o f im ages, m e taphorical and o therw ise, fo rm ed  th e  basis fo r  much o f  his
p o litic a l philosophy. Indeed, i t  is  from a  c o r re c t  understanding  o f  th e
use o f  th e  m etaphoric  im age in  p o litic a l th o u g h t t h a t  v a rie d  Hobbesian
concerns such  a s  h is to ry , sc ience, geo m etry , op tics , p o e try , and
p o litic a l philosophy can  be united .
A ppropriately, c h a p te r  one n a rra te s  fo u r d is tin c t tra d itio n s  o f applying 
th e  su b jec t o f  m etaphor t o  philosophy. I t  i s  a rgued  th a t ,  f a r  from  
being m arginal to  p o litic a l though t, m etaphor p a r tia lly  fo rm s th e  basis 
fo r  much o f th e  a c t iv ity  o f  p o litic a l th ink ing . The second  c h a p te r  
develops a  th e o ry  o f th e  meaning o f p o litic a l m etaphors. I t  i s  argued  
h ere  t h a t  many tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  accounts o f  th e  m eaning o f  m etaphors 
a re  d e fic ie n t fo r  th e y  f a i l  to  acknowledge how m etaphorica l im ag es a re  
used in  p o litic a l though t; nam ely , to  u n ite  th e  populace in  a  com m on 
p o litic a l judg m en t.
The rem ainder o f  th e  th e s is  is  th e n  devo ted  to  th e  work o f Thom as 
Hobbes. Based upon an  understanding o f po litica l m etaphor a s  ou tlined  
in  th e  f i r s t  tw o  ch ap ters , i t  is  argued in  c h a p te r  th re e  t h a t  contem pory  
th e o ris ts  a re  wrong when th e y  suggest t h a t  Hobbes c o n tra d ic ted  him self 
when using m etaphors to  adorn his prose and  y e t, a t  th e  sam e tim e , 
condem ning th e i r  very  ex istence . On th e  co n tra ry , i t  is  a rg u ed  th a t  
Hobbes's t r e a tm e n t  and use o f  m etaphors w as highly consis ten t. More 
im p o rtan tly , once Hobbes's a lleged  co n trad ic tio n  has been  sa tis fa c to rily  
reso lved , we soon find  t h a t  th e  m etaphoric im age  w as to  p lay  a  la rg e  
rc le  in  a lm o st a l l  o f  h is work, from h is tra n s la tio n  o f G reek c lassics  
to  his th e o ry  o f rh e to r ic  and o f h istory . C h ap te r fo u r th e n  tu rn s  to  
Hobbes's o p tic a l th e o ry  o f  know ledge, fo r  i t  is  argued  h e re  t h a t  th e  
s ta rtin g  p o in t to  Hobbes's understanding o f sc ien ce , g eom etry , and, 
u ltim a te ly , knowledge is  p rim arily  visual. C hap ter f iv e  th e n  analyzes 
th e  m etaphorical im agery  o f Hobbes's m ost popular work, L ev ia than . From 
a  c lose look  a t  various a sp ec ts  o f th is  work we find  t h a t  th e  m etaphoric 
im age is  perhaps i t s  m ost co n stitu tiv e  e lem en t. F inally , c h a p te r  six 
analyzes th e  double-edged sw ord to  our po litica l im ages. From looking 
a t  th e  ro le  o f m etaphorical im ag ination  in  Hobbes's p o litic a l 
philosophy, including a  d iscussion o f th e  p o e tic  im ag ina tion  o f M ichael 
O akesho tt and M artin H eidegger, i t  is  argued  t h a t  th e  a c t  o f  im ag ination  
can  be e i th e r  p o litica lly  c re a tiv e  o r highly dangerous. This, indeed , 
is  th e  consequence o f  th e  m etaphoric im age  in  p o litic a l th o u g h t -  i t  has 
th e  pow er e i th e r  to  save o r enslave us.
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CHAPTER ONE:
FOUR TRADITIONS OF METAPHORIC THOUGHT
I  have no g re a t  opinion o f  d e fin itio n ...fo r when we defin e , we 
seem  in  danger o f c ircum venting  n a tu re  w ithin th e  bounds o f our 
own notions, which we o ften  ta k e  up by h aza rd , o r  em brace  on 
t r u s t ,  o r  form  o u t o f lim ited  and p a r tia l considera tion  o f th e  
o b je c t b efo re  us, in s te a d  o f ex tending  our id e a s  to  ta k e  in  a ll 
t h a t  n a tu re  com prehends, according  to  h e r  m anner o f  com bining.
—Edmund Burke
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Like a  sun refu sing  to  s e t,  m etaphor hovers ov er us, blinding us in to
fo rg e tfu ln ess  ab o u t i t s  unerring presence. We speak  in  m etaphors.
More im p o rtan tly , a s  N ietzsche rem inds us, we th in k  m etaphorically ,
borrow ing from  our vocabulary  o f sense experience  and tra n s la tin g  i t
in to  our m en ta l d iscourse. O ften  our understanding  o f  our fellow  man,
our env ironm ent, our in s titu tio n s  is  a r tic u la te d  by hidden m etaphors,
and no m ore so th a n  when we ponder on m a tte rs  ph ilosophical o r
p o litic a l. I f  one d ares  to  draw th e  c ircu m feren ce  w ider s til l,  th e n
consider th e  case  o f myths, parables, and sym bols, fo r  th e se , to o , a re
la rg e ly  m etaphorical- W hat follow s is  an  e n tre a ty  to  consider th e
ro le  o f  m etaphors in  po litical thought, from  th e  G reeks to  th e  p re se n t
day, b u t w ith p a r tic u la r  a tte n tio n  to  th e  work o f  one o f  th e  f i r s t
tru ly  m odem  p o litic a l th eo ris ts : Thomas Hobbes. Could m etaphor, t h a t
m ost sublim e veh icle  o f hum an understanding, illu m in a te  th e  th o u g h t of
Hobbes, one o f th e  m ost im p o rta n t p o litic a l th in k e rs  o f  any age? The
answ er is : m ost assuredly  yes. And w here do we go from  th is , perhaps
surprising, affirm atio n ?  To th e  realm  o f p o litic a l im ag ination , w here
dw ells th e  philosopher and th e  poet, th e  a r t i s t  and th e  p o litic a l
th e o ris t, which w ill be th e  th em e o f  th e  final c h a p te r  o f th is
d isse rta tio n .
L e t us f i r s t  begin w ith th e  ra th e r  anodyne defin ition  t h a t  th e
g o a l o f  po litica l philosophy is  to  d iscover th e  grounds on which th e  
s ta te  ju s tif ie s  i t s  au th o rity  over i t s  c itiz e n s . In  tu rn , th e
p o litic a l th e o r is t  a t te m p ts  to  provide th e  underpinnings fo r  various 
concerns such a s  p o litic a l obligation, ind iv idual r ig h ts  and 
lib e r tie s , th e o rie s  o f ju s tice , and o th e r  p rincip les o f  a
ju s tif ic a to ry  n a tu re . The aim o f a  p o litic a l th e o r is t  to  develop  a  
c o h e re n t -  t h a t  is , co n sis ten t -  philosophy o f  th e  s ta te ,  p o litic a l
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in s titu tio n s , and socie ty .
This defin ition  o f  po litica l philosophy would perhaps go 
unchallenged fo r  i t s  inoffensiveness; indeed  i t  fo rm s th e  s ta r tin g  
p o in t fo r  m ost o f th e  l i te r a tu re  o f p o litic a l th o u g h t from  P la to  
onwards. The above fo rm u la tion  o f th e  concerns o f  po litica l though t, 
how ever, does le a d  us to  n o tice  a  second c h a ra c te r is t ic  t h a t  u n til  th e  
l a s t  hundred y ea rs  has gone la rg e ly  unnoticed: t h a t  p o litic a l th o u g h t
is  in ex tricab ly  b u ilt in to  th e  language th a t  i t  uses.
This l a t t e r  observation  is  n o t as  in n o c en t a s  i t  may f i r s t  seem .
I t  i ts e lf  is  a  p ro d u c t o f th e  "linguistic tu rn"  made by many o f th e
hum an sc iences  over th e  l a s t  e igh ty  y ears  (variously: philosophy,
psychology, l i te ra ry  critic ism  and, o f course , p o litic a l th o u g h t) .1 
The in terd isc ip lin ary  ap p ea l o f th is  lingu istic  approach  to  hum an
knowledge lends c redence to  i t s  supposed insigh ts, covering a  wide
range  o f concerns from  th e  way we th in k  ab o u t ourselves and  our
c u rre n t condition to  how we "think" in  genera l. The o ff-sh o o t o f th e
lingu istic  tu rn , b e s t exem plified  by th e  an a ly tic  p o litic a l th o u g h t o f
T.D. Weldon and M argaret M acdonald, ta u g h t t h a t  s e v e ra l o f  th e
problem s perennially  encoun tered  by p o litic a l philosophers could be
resolved  by a  c lo ser exam ination  o f th e  language which was used. If
one w ere no lo n g e r "bew itched by language" (to  borrow  from
W ittgenstein) i t  was believed  t h a t  one would th e n  be ab le  to
re fo rm u la te  th e  p o litic a l and philosophical puzzles which have plagued
p o litic a l though t, and th u s  a rriv e  a t  a  c le a re r  understanding  o f  th e
tru e  n a tu re  o f th e  po litica l.
This in s ig h t t h a t  th e  ling u is tic  tu rn  prom ised, how ever, w as n o t
universally  accep ted . Tbs d e tra c to rs , n o tab le  GeHner and Mure, 
argued t h a t  th e  need  to  solve longstanding philosophical puzz les by
a tten d in g  to  th e  use  o f language was i t s e l f  a  p ro d u c t o f
psychologically  and  socially  insp ired  e rro rs  o f  th o u g h t. The
ling u is tic  tu rn  was a  sign o f a  creep ing  illn e ss  in  ra tio n a l
d iscourse, an  a t te m p t ,  a s  B ertrand Russell com plained, to  acqu ire  by
th e f t  w h a t one has fa iled  to  purchase by ho n est to iL  Today, perhaps
N orm an B arry  b e s t ty p ifie s  th is  a t t i tu d e  ag a in s t a  lingu istica lly  
based p o litic a l th o u g h t when he d ec la res  t h a t  " th e  dom inance o f th e
purely  lin g u is tic  approach  to  p o litic a l philosophy is  a t  an  end." In
B arry 's acco u n t, m odem  p o litic a l th o u g h t should be a b o u t th e  " tru th
and p red ic a tiv e  pow er o f p a rticu la r th eo ries"  and  n o t  ab o u t meaning,
which holds l i t t l e  re levance in  pol.iti.cal philosophy's m ore
"sc ien tific"  pu rsu its . 2
Y e t w h at ab o u t m etaphor? Should th e  study  o f  o u r m e tapho rica l 
u tte ra n c e s  a lso  be re le g a te d  to  th e  dustb in  o f  id e a s  m erely because 
th e y  do n o t speak  o f "science" o r "facts"  o r " tru th ?"  In  an  a t te m p t 
to  p rove o therw ise , th is  f i r s t  c h a p te r  a t te m p ts  t o  re -a lig n  th e  
su b je c t o f  ou r m e taphorical pronouncem ents on to  an  o rb it which 
inc ludes th e  physical sc iences as  w ell a s  th e  soc ia l. The following
hopes t o  show t h a t  th e  dom ain of m etaphor, p o litic a l and  o therw ise, 
can n o t b e  considered  to  be m ere poetry . As th e  f i r s t  sec tio n  o f th is  
p re se n t c h a p te r  a rgues, Barry and o th e rs  e r r  in  a r tic u la tin g  a  fa ls e
d ichotom y b e tw een  th e  rea lm s o f sc ien ce  and non-science. Indeed, 
m etaphoric  m odels form  a  crucial link be tw een  th e  w orld around us and 
our sc ie n tif ic  know ledge o f i t .
The second sec tio n  t ra c e s  many o f our c u r re n t p ronouncem ents upon 
m etaphor b ack  t o  th e i r  c lassica l G reek origins. By re -c a s tin g  th e  
long shadow o f m etaphoric  discourse back  to  i t s  o rig in a l postu re , th is  
sec tio n  show s t h a t  we a re  th e  p a r t ia l  in h e rito rs  o f th is  a n c ie n t
e
tra d itio n , and also  t h a t  som e o f ou r c u rre n t misevaluatLon o f  th e
su b je c t can  be t r a c e d  back  to  th e s e  Greek ro o ts .
The th ird  sec tio n  o ffe rs  a  r iv a l  tra d itio n  to  t h a t  o f  th e
classLcaL The R om antic m ovem ent which had, r a th e r  curiously , draw n
i t s  in sp ira tio n  from  P la to  considered m etaphor to  be in tim a te ly  linked  
to  th e  a r t  o f  im ag ination . To th e  c lassical schoo l which had 
a t te m p te d  to  ca rv e  up  experience  in  o rd e r to  s tudy  and understand  i t  
b e t te r ,  t h e  R om antics had responded by m etaphorically  re s tru c tu rin g  
man's p lace  in  th e  cosm os. Thus th e  R om antics saw  m etapho r a s  a  
bridge connecting  bo th  th e  a r t i s t  t o  h is w orld and  m an's own
ra tio n a lity  to  n a tu re 's  g rand  design.
The fo u rth  and concluding sec tio n  is  in  d i r e c t  response to  th e  
f i r s t  th r e e  s ince  th e  d eco n stru c tio n is t a cc o u n t o f  m etaphor p lays an  
essen tia lly  subversive ro le  in  th e  cause o f  p o litic a l philosophy. The 
d e co n s tru c tio n is t a c c o u n t o f m etaphor p rec ludes any  ta lk  o f  sc ie n tif ic  
o r o f  c la ss ic a l d ivisions o f experience , and spurns th e  R om antic 
notion o f im ag ination . I f  th is  f in a l sec tio n  sh ies aw ay from  som e of 
th e  m ore se v e re  conclusions t h a t  th e  d eco n stru c tio n ists  have to  o ffe r, 
i t  does so  only in  th e  b e lie f  t h a t  th e re  is  a  poe t, th e re  i s  a  
s c ie n tis t, th e re  is  a  p o litic a l philosopher who im  ag in a tiv e ly  c re a te s  
his m etaphors from  th e  s to ck  o f im ag es which surround him and, in  
dcdng so , e ffe c tiv e ly  changes our understanding  o f  th e  w orld, and  in  
p a r tic u la r  our p o litic a l im  agination .
F inally , in  h ighlighting fo u r  s e p a ra te  "trad itions" o f  m etaphoric 
th o u g h t I  do n o t  m ean t o  im ply  t h a t  th e se  a re  th e  only ones availab le  
t o  us. T here a re  coun tless  o th e rs , a s  any s tu d e n t o f m etaphor would 
r ig h tly  con tend . Indeed , I  use th e  word "trad ition"  a  b i t  h esitan tly , 
and when i t  is  used  i t  should only be understood  in  i t s  w eakest sense.
vyhat is  m ean t by a  tra d itio n  is  th a t  th e  au th o rs  concerned  sh a re  a  
com parable approach to  th e  prohLem of language. M etaphor is  th e  a r t  
o f com paring, a  calling  to  mind, a  coILectLon o f  resem blances. When 
we fu se  tw o  seemingLy unlike th in g s to g e th e r  and d e c la re  t h a t  th e y  a re  
id e n tic a l we do so, w ith a  nod and a  wink, knowing t h a t  th e y  a re  not. 
T radition, in  i t s  w eakest sense, need  do no m ore th a n  m etaphor in  th is  
regard : an  evocation  o f th in g s  in  com m on, a  co rrespondence o f
approaches.
Section 1:
Metaphor, Popper, and Social Science Explanation
In an in trigu ing  passage, Thom as Hobbes rem ark s  in  L ev iathan  t h a t  th e  
use  o f m etaphors in  sc ience  is  like  w andering am id  innum erab le
absurditi.es which can  only le ad  to  fa lse  know ledge and, worse s till,
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to  c iv il un rest. Hobbes's warning ab o u t m etaphors in  sc ien ce  is  
surprising because th e  passage i ts e lf  is  fu ll o f m e tap h o rica l im ages: 
th e  p u rsu it o f sc ien tif ic  knowledge is  likened  by Hobbes to  tra v e lin g
down a  p a th , and m etaphors a re  said by him to  be  "fa lse  fires"  t h a t
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mislead th e  sc ien tif ic  w anderer in  search  o f  th e  t ru th .  Although
alm o st a l l  com m en ta to rs  have m isunderstood Hobbes on th is  p o in t (a
m isunderstanding which w ill be c leared  up in  c h a p te r  th re e ) , i t  is  n o t
uncom m on to  find  Hobbes's overall m istru st o f m etaphors, p a rticu la rly
in  sc ience, echoed in  philosophic and sc ie n tif ic  c irc le s  even  t o  th is
day. I f  sc ience is  conceived as th e  p u rsu it o f  t r u th ,  th e  a rg u m en t
runs, th e n  i t  follow s t h a t  any language which i s  to  r e f le c t  th e
sc ien tif ic  endeavor m ust rem a in  f re e  from  rh e to r ic a l  flou rish . The
discourse o f  sc ience, including th a t  o f so c ia l sc ien c e , m ust alw ays 
s triv e  to  be l i te r a l  and n ev er m etaphorical.
1  o
An a c c o u n t o f social sc ience and sc ie n tif ic  exp lanation  in  
reg a rd s  t o  m etaphor, th e n , would have to  begin w ith  an  analysis of 
w hat i t  m eans t o  define  o r to  describe som ething. I f  p recision  in  
language is  t o  be our goal, th e n  w henever possible words m ust d ire c tly  
correspond to  th e i r  ob jects. Hobbes's com plain t a b o u t m etaphors in  
sc ien ce  w as t h a t  th e  meaning o f words outside th e  sc ie n tif ic  dom ain -  
in  p o e try , fo r  exam ple -  o ften  co n trasted  w ith how th e y  a re  used 
w ithin th e  sc ie n tif ic  disciplines, th e re b y  m aking th e  p u rsu it o f 
know ledge im possib le. In  short, fo r  many th in k e rs  above th e  doorw ay 
o f a  so c ia l sc ien ce  o r  sc ien tif ic  in s ti tu te  should ap p ea r a  sign t h a t  
reads: F o r N om inalists Only.
More re c e n tly , K arl Popper's in flu en tia l pronouncem ents on th e
m ethods o f  sc ien ce  have been a  p a r tia l r e s ta te m e n t o f Hobbes's own
concerns vo iced  th re e  hundred y ea rs  ea rlie r. F o r Popper, th e  language
o f sc ie n tif ic  defin itions should never s tra y  from  basic  nom inalism .
Popper d e c la re s  t h a t  th e re  a re  tw o  m ethods o f engaging in  defin ition :
th e  nom in a lis t m ethod and th e  e ssen tia lis t m ethod. 5 E ssentialism ,
accord ing  to  Popper, can  be described  as  th e  b e lie f  t h a t  o b jec ts
co n ta in  c e r ta in  essences o r  p ro p erties  and t h a t  th e se  a re  d is tin c t
from  th e ir  m a te ria l o r  observable ch a ra c te ris tic s . A ris to tle , fo r
in s ta n c e , be lieved  th a t  th e  defin ition  o f a  th ing  was an  ac c o u n t of 
i t s  essen ce  -  i t s  t ru e  in n e r substance r a th e r  th a n  i t s  acc id en ts . A
s im ila r ac c o u n t o f  th is  is  to  be found in  th e  P la ton ic  Form s o r  World
of Id eas  w here th e  t ru e  n a tu re  and descrip tion  o f  an  o b je c t can  be
found in  an  im  m ateria l realm  ra th e r  th a n  in  th e  world o f appearances.
Nom inalism , on th e  o th e r  hand, is  described  by Popper a s  having i t s
ro o ts  in  th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  em p iric is t th e o ry  o f sc ience.
Nominalism a s  a  sc ien tif ic  defin ition  is  simpLy an  ac c o u n t o f how an
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o b je c t can  be used. Thus th e se  tw o  r iv a l descrip tions o f  o b jec ts  -  
th e i r  e s se n tia lis t n a tu re  v ersus th e ir  no m inalistic  u se  -  i s  p resen ted  
by Popper a s  i f  th e re  w ere a  d e a n  break  be tw een  them  in  th e  f ie ld  o f 
so c ia l and physica l sc ien ce , th e i r  re sp ec tiv e  m ethodologies appearing 
to  be m utually exclusive.
I t  is  P o p p ers  con ten tio n  in  The Open S ocie ty  and I ts  Enem ies
t h a t  sc ien tif ic  pu rsu its  rem ain ed  la rg e ly  s ta g n a n t so  long  as
philosophers w ere s d e y  concerned  in  th e  "essential" n a tu re  o f
ob jects. 6 Y et, Popper a rgues, questions ab o u t th e  substan ce  and
m eaning o f th ings a re  u ltim a te ly  unansw erable. F or exam ple, we do n o t
know anything ab o u t th e  t r u e  substance and m eaning o f  th e  phenom enon
of "light," b u t we can  know som ething ab o u t how lig h t  behaves -  t h a t
is , we can  describe  th o se  fe a tu re s  w ith which a  no m inalistic  acco u n t
o f l ig h t is  ab le  to  provide us. C rucially  fo r  Popper, th e  
"backw ardness" o f  th e  soc ia l sc iences th ro u g h o u t h is to ry  is  due a lm o st
en tire ly  to  th e ir  re lian ce  upon e ssen tia lis t descrip tions. The deg ree
to  which th e  various sc ien ces  have been  ab le  t o  m ake progress, Popper
avers, depends upon th e  degree  to  which th e y  have fo rsaken
essentLalism and have adopted  nominalism as  th e ir  guiding m ethodology.
Insisting  t h a t  th is  d is tinc tion  betw een  r iv a l  descrip tions o f
ob jec ts  w ill u ltim a te ly  le a d  social sc ience , once i t  had  adop ted  th e  
c o r re c t nom inalist postu re , to  c re a te  a  sy s tem a tic  body o f know ledge, 
Popper c la im s t h a t  th e  d is tin c tio n  betw een  essen tialism  and  nominalism 
can  be recogn ized  by how th e  descrip tions a re  " re a d ." 7 An 
e ssen tia lis t, Popper explains, would f i r s t  s ta t e  th e  nam e o f  th e  
o b je c t to  be defined  on th e  l e f t  side o f th e  equation  and  th e n  
describe  th e  o b jec t's  p ro p ertie s  on th e  r ig h t side. The e sse n tia lis t 
descrip tion  th u s  read s  from  l e f t  to  r ig h t. F or exam ple, we can  define
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"man" a s  "a fe a th e r le ss  hiped w ith a  cap a c ity  fo r  speech , norm ally
consisting o f  tw o  a rm s and tw o  leg s..."  and so  on u n ti l  we grow tire d ,
fo r  th is  form  o f descrip tion  can  n ever be exhausted  s ince , i f  we chose
to  do so, we can  l i s t  an  endless num ber o f th in g s  which com prise  w hat
i t  means to  be hum an. On th e  o th e r hand, Popper po in ts  ou t, a
nom inalist's  descrip tion  is  re a d  from  r ig h t  t o  l e f t  and  con tains
l i t t l e  o r no in fo rm atio n  ab o u t th e  p ro p ertie s  o f th e  te rm  used. For 
exam ple, in s te a d  o f making a n  endless l i s t  o f  th e  p ro p e rtie s  o f  "man"
we can  in s te ad  ag ree  t o  use a  shorthand la b e l, say , th e  l e t t e r  'X1,
ju s t  to  save  tim e . The nom inalist's  r ig h t to  l e f t  descrip tion ,
according to  Popper, se rv es  only to  "in troduce new a rb itra ry  shorthand
labels ."  0
Now Popper m ight be c o r re c t in  proposing th e  paradigm  o f " le f t  to  
righ t"  a s  opposed to  "rig h t to  le f t"  a s  a  m eans o f  describ ing ob jects, 
o r even ourselves. However, to  say  along w ith  Popper t h a t  one form  o f 
descrip tion  is  sc ien tif ic  and  th e  o th e r  n o n -sc ien tific  is  to  f a i l  to  
understand  how language, spec ifica lly  m e tapho rica l language, is  used. 
F or exam ple, l e t  us consider an  a l te rn a te  paradigm  to  Popper's: a  
m odel o f sc ien tif ic  descrip tions w here th e  word on th e  l e f t  side o f 
th e  equation  is  defined  on th e  r ig h t side and  -  th is  is  th e  im p o rta n t 
p a r t  -  one w here th e re  is  a  sim ultaneous m ovem ent from  r ig h t  to  le f t .  
An in te rp lay  th u s  develops be tw een  r ig h t and  l e f t ,  w ith  th e  sc ie n tif ic  
descrip tion  resid ing  be tw een  th e  tw o  poles. W hat we a re  describ ing 
h ere , in  o th e r  words, is  a  m etaphor.
A m etaphorical descrip tion  is  a  com posite  co n ce p t whose m eaning is  
housed in  th e  space  be tw een  th e  su b je c t and  p re d ic a te , p a rtia lly  
ac tin g  a s  a  descrip tion  o f th e  underlying n a tu re  o f  an  o b je c t
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(Popper's essentialism ) and a s  a  shorthand descrip tion  o f  i t s  behavior 
(Popper's nom inalism ). M etaphor b ridges th e  gap be tw een  th e  
e ssen tia lis t and th e  nom inalist descrip tion  o f ou r w orld. When we 
describe 'x1 a s  being 'y \  which is  th e  s tan d ard  m etap h o rica l fo rm a t, 
w hat we a re  in  f a c t  saying is  t h a t  th e  p ro p ertie s  o f 'x ' and th o se  o f 
V  a re  shared . M oreover, th e se  p ro poerties  can  be com bined t o  c re a te
an  im age -  an  im age which is  n o t exclusively  com posed o f 'x ' o r  'y1
b u t is  made up o f bo th  'x ' and 'y* simUtaneousLy. The fam ilia r  
soc ia l sc ience m etaphor o f " the  s ta te  is  a  m achine" canno t, fo r
in s ta n ce , be adequa te ly  reduced , v ia  Popper, t o  e i th e r  essen tia lism  o r 
nom inalism . One o f th e  reasons why th is  p a r tic u la r  m etaphor has been  
so  com m on t o  p o litic a l th o u g h t since th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  i s  i t s  
privileged ab ility  seem ingly  n ev er to  ex h au st i ts e lf ;  ev en  to d a y  new 
in sigh ts  a re  being c re a te d  which seem  to  conform  to  th is  m etaphoric 
model o f so c ie ty . The c ru c ia l po in t is  th is: when a  s c ie n t is t  o r a
so c ia l s c ie n tis t  c re a te s  such m etaphors he is  n o t a tte m p tin g  to  
estab lish  an  e ssen tia lis t, m ystica l re la tionsh ip  be tw een  tw o  unlike
th in g s  in  o rd e r to  sow confusion, no r is  he sim ply o ffe rin g  us a
short-hand  la b e l w ith  which to  r e f e r  t o  a  p o litic a l so c ie ty . R ather, 
th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f a  m etaphoric descrip tion  by th e  social s c ie n tis t 
can  im bue th e  su b je c t w ith a  p a r tic u la r  c la r ity  to  which no nom inalist 
defin ition  could e v e r  hope to  a sp ire , and th e  sam e goes fo r  a
defin ition  th a t  is  so lely  essen tia lis t.
So with apologies t o  T.S. E lio t, we can  say  t h a t  b e tw een  th e
esse n tia lis t and th e  nom inalist, fa lls  th e  m etaphor.
Indeed, p ace  Popper, i t  is  d if f ic u lt to  conceive o f  any  ty p e  of 
s c ien tif ic  exp lanation  t h a t  does n o t a lread y  e x is t w ith in  som e s o r t  o f 
m etaphoric fram ew ork . Scien tific  models and s c ie n tif ic  te rm ino logy
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a re  hopelessly m etaphorical- For in s ta n ce , ou r understanding  o f
p a r tic le  physics is  p a rtia lly  based upon th e  im age o f p a r tic le s  in  
motion. We can  assum e th a t  a tom s sw irl around in  a  m olecule like  
p lan e ts  r o ta te  around th e  sun, b u t we do n o t know th is  fo r  a  f a c t .  I t
may be possible t h a t  gas behaves a s  i f  i t  w ere made up o f  p a r tic le s  in
m otion, bu t, ep is te  m idog ically  speaking, gas and  p a r tic le s  may be 
com posed o f tw o  en tire ly  d if fe re n t en titie s . Our d esc rip tio n  o f 
g en e ra l re la tiv i ty  which ta lk s  o f "worm holes" o r  o f  e lec tro n s
ex isting  in  "e lec tro n  clouds" o r o f a tom s in  "m in ia tu re  so la r  system s" 
a re  e n tire ly  m etaphorical, to  l i s t  b u t a  few  exam ples. As Rom H arre 
po in ts out, w ithou t a  m odel in  which to  dec ip h er in fo rm atio n , we have 
no m ethod in  which to  base our sc ien tif ic  exp lanations. A ccording to  
H arre,
"The k in e tic  th e o ry  o f gases is  nothing b u t th e  exp lo ita tio n  o f
th e  m olecular m odel o f gas, and th a t  m odel is  i t s e lf  conceived
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by re fe re n c e  to  th e  m echanics o f m a te ria l p a rtic le s ."
Now a  Popperian , o r even a  Hobbesian fo r  t h a t  m a tte r , m ight 
in s is t t h a t  th e se  m etaphorical descrip tions a re  m erely  e l l ip t ic a l -  
t h a t  is , th e y  a re  co lo rfu l expressions t h a t  c lev e rly  disguise th e  f a c t  
t h a t  a  more l i t e r a l  language can  be found to  describe  th e  sam e 
phenom ena. To th is  response som e philosophers o f sc ien ce  have rep lied  
t h a t  th is  position  does n o t explain  th e  in sig h ts  which th e  m etaphoric  
models suggest t o  th e  sc ien tis t, p a rticu la rly  when th e  d iscip line is  a  
young sc ience lik e  cognitive psychology. A ccording to  R ichard Boyd, 
such  m etaphoric models in  sc ience a re  " theory  co n stitu tiv e"  -  t h a t  is, 
th e  m etaphoric m odels determ ine and shape w h at th e  s c ie n tis t  d iscovers 
and how his d iscovery  is  to  be explained. "Even am ong cognitive 
psychologists who despair o f a c tu a l m achine sim ulation  o f  hum an
i s
cognition ,11 Boyd explains, "com puter m etaphors have an  indispensable
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ro le  in  th e  fo rm atio n  and a rticu la tio n  o f th e o re tic a l positions."
Again, our P opperian-H  obbesian friend  m ight stO l w an t to  rep ly  
t h a t  th e s e  m etaphors sim ply a c t  a s  exp lanato ry  models, pedagogical
dev ices which enab le  th e  re a d e r  more firm ly  t o  g rasp  w h at is  being 
d iscussed. Science and  social science use m etaphors, our frien d  may
continue, p rec ise ly  because our ab ility  to  understand  com plex
phenom ena is  heigh tened  by th e  use o f m etaphor o r  analogy, o r  by th e  
use o f easily  understood m etaphoric im ages on which to  m odel th e  
in fo rm atio n  we rece iv e . Once th is  im fo rm ation  is  p rocessed  by us, o r
once th e  m odel has served  i t  pedagogical purpose, s c ie n tif ic
exp lanation  can  sa fe ly  r e t r e a t  back in to  th e  world o f no m inalistic
d iscourse, happy in  th e  form ulation  o f  l i te ra l ,  sho rt-hand
descrip tions o f sc ien tif ic  phenom ena.
The main problem  with th e  above ob jection  is  t h a t  i t  does n o t
in v ite  to o  c lose  a  scru tiny  in to  how m etaphoric models a re  used  in
science. Thom as Kuhn, fo r  exam ple, po in ts o u t  t h a t  m etaphors a re
"essential... i n  estab lish ing  links betw een  sc ie n tif ic  language and  th e
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world." These m etaphoric models, Kuhn adds, c a n n o t be d iscarded  in
fa v o r  o f l i te r a l  descrip tions even a f te r  th e  supposed in s ig h ts  which
th e  models produce have been noted. F or exam ple, ta k e  Niels Bohr's
m etaphoric m odel o f a tom s. As Kuhn suggests, Bohr's m odel o f  a tom s 
rep laced  th e  "so lar system " m etaphoric m odel w hich had  previously  been
popular. Bohr's success was chiefly  due in  rep lac ing  one s e t  of
m etaphors w ith ano ther. "W ithout i t s  aid," Kuhn a rgues -  o r in  o th e r
words, w ithou t Bohr's m etaphoric model -  "one can n o t even  to d a y  w rite
down th e  Schrodinger equation fo r  a  com plex atom  o r m olecule, fo r  i t
is  t o  th e  model, n o t d irec tly  to  na tu re , t h a t  th e  various te rm s  in  th e
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12equation  re fe r ."  So m etaphoric models can n o t be th o u g h t o f a s  m erely 
pedagogic dev ices fo r  o ften , a s  w ith Bohr's own m odel, i t  i s  to  th e  
m etaphoric models th em se lv es  t h a t  th e  l i te r a l  d escrip tions in  sc ience 
re fe r ,  e i th e r  d ire c tly  o r  in d irec tly .
As is  com m only applied, m etaphor (from th e  G reek word metapheredn) is  
a  "figure o f  speech  in  which a  nam e o r  d escrip tiv e  te rm  is  tra n s fe rre d  
to  som e o b je c t d if fe re n t from , b u t analogous to ,  t h a t  which i t  is  
p roperly  applicable" [OED]. Beyond being ju s t  a  lingu istic  
expression, m etaphors also o ffe r  us an  im age  fo r  inspection . 
M etaphors su g g est t h a t  th e re  is  a  re la tionsh ip  be tw een  tw o  seem ingly  
unlike th in g s and t h a t  when th is  re la tionsh ip  is  understood (or once 
th e  im age is  grasped) th e  re s u lt  can  be a  profound in sigh t. As
A risto tle  says, " i t  is  from  m etaphor t h a t  we b e s t  g e t  hold o f
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som ething  fresh ."
I t  w ill hopefully  be d e a r  by now th a t  bo th  sc ien ce  and so c ia l 
sc ien ce  m ake heavy use o f m etaphoric models. The "body po litic ,"  fo r  
exam ple, is  a  com m only used m etaphor in  th e  so c ia l sc iences, joining 
individuals in to  a  single com m unity. As M ichael W alzer pcdnts out, 
th e  body-po litic  im age "provides th e  s ta r t in g  p o in t fo r  p o litic a l
th inking , [from  which] so  long  a s  i t  is  e f fe c tiv e , no o th e r  s ta r tin g
14p o in t is  possible." To p u t i t  qu ite  crudely , th is  po litica l m etaphor 
says t h a t  d e m e n ts  o f  th e  p o litic a l s ta te  behave a s  various e lem en ts  
o f a  single hum an body. Within th is  im age , W alzer continues, th e  king 
has no choice b u t to  a c t  o u t h is assigned position  a s  th e  "head" of 
th e  "body." I t  is  fo r  th is  reason , Eugene M iller suggests in  a  
c ritiq u e  o f  p o litic a l m etaphors, t h a t  "a dom inan t m etaphor th u s  te n d s  
to  becom e se lf-p erp e tu a tin g , although com peting  m etaphorical
1  7
defin itions o f p o litic a l re a li ty  can  arise  to  sup p lan t and c re a te  a
1 5new orthodoxy." The c o u n te rp a rt to  sc ien tific  language can n o t be  m ore 
c lea r. J u s t  a s  m etaphoric  models in  cognitive psychology and physics 
a re  indispensable in  fo rm ulating  and understanding  sc ien tif ic  
know ledge, so to o  th e  m etaphoric models in  th e  so c ia l sc ien ces  p lay  a  
governing ro le  in  a rticu la tin g  many o f our p o litic a l experiences.
Now p lacing  m etaphoric descrip tions on a  p a r  w ith  m ore l i te r a l
language has c re a te d  d ifficu ltie s  fo r  po litica l philosophers
th roughou t h isto ry . J u s t  a s  Popper has ignored  th e  ro le  o f  m etaphors 
in  a r tic u la tin g  sc ie n tif ic  descrip tions, many p o litica l th e o ris ts  have
been  unhappy w ith  anything th a t  is  n o t perceived a s  l i t e r a l  language.
While l i te r a l  propositions, i t  has been  argued , have th e  b e n e f it  o f
corresponding to  re a li ty  ( th a t is , th ey  can  be  te s te d  fo r  th e ir  t ru th
value ag a in s t th e  known world), figu ra tive  language can n o t be analyzed
by looking e i th e r  a t  th e  world o r a t  th e  d efin itions o f  th e  words
involved. The m eaning o f  a  m etaphor is  n o t th e  sam e a s  a  l i te r a l
meaning o f th e  words used. The s ta te  is  c lea rly  n o t a  m achine o r a
hum an body, though i t  m ight o p era te  lik e  one. F igurative  language has
th e  d e fe c t, i t  has fu r th e r  been  suggested , o f being am biguous and open
to  v a ried  in te rp re ta tio n s , w hilst th e  m eaning o f l i te r a l  p ropositions
is  a t  once d e a r  and, i f  i t  is  no t, can  be understood  by an  ap p ea l to
th e  l i te r a l  d efin itions o f th e  words involved.
Such has been  th e  a rg u m en t leve led  ag a in s t m etaphoric  d iscourse
in  p o litic a l th o u g h t, and fo r  th e  m ost p a r t  i t  i s  sLmpLy a  re s ta te m e n t
o f th e  Popperian view o f sc ien tif ic  language applied  to  p o litic a l
d iscourse. The d e fe c t o f th is  position, how ever, a s  was w ith  i t s  
app lica tion  to  th e  physical sciences, is  t h a t  i t  is  d if f ic u lt to
conceive o f  social sc ien ce  d iscovery  and exp lanation  ou tside o f a
1 8
m etaphoric fram ew ork . The ra th e r  s tra ig h tfo rw ard  defin itio n  o f  th e
c e n tra l  concerns o f p o litic a l philosophy which was en u n c ia ted  on  th e  
second page o f  th is  ch ap te r, fo r  in s tan ce , re v e a ls  th e  v e ry  problem
t h a t  po litica l philosophy has w ith m etaphorical language  fo r  em bedded
w ithin th e  defin ition  a re  m etaphorical te rm s  which a re  n o t
presuppositi onless. Talk o f  th e  "grounds" o f  p o litic a l th o u g h t and
th e  a t te m p t to  provide th e  "underpinnings11 o f a  th e o ry  o f  ju s tic e , fo r
in s ta n ce , r e v e a l an  in te rp re ta tio n  o f p o litic a l th o u g h t t h a t  is
p rim arily  fo undational -  in  o th e r  words, th e  d e fin itio n  a lread y
presupposes t h a t  th e re  is  a  s tru c tu re  o f th o u g h t which can  be easily
tra n s la te d  in to  grounded principles. A fte r a ll, i f  one presupposes in
one's defin ition  t h a t  such a  construction  ex ists , th e n  i t  hard ly  seem s
surprising th a t  t h a t  is  w h at one soon finds.
A r a th e r  r e c e n t  a t te m p t to  com e to  te rm s  w ith m etaphoric
d iscourse in  th e  soc ia l sc iences has been made by T.D. Weldon. Weldon
considered  t h a t  th e  a im s o f p o litic a l philosophy should be to  provide
th e  "grounds" fo r  i t s  philosophy and, p re fe rrin g  to  em b race  p o litic a l
philosophy's a rc h ite c to n ic  aspec ts, he em barked  upon an  en te rp rise  to
1 Bre v e a l w h at la y  hidden w ithin th e  s tru c tu re  he had encoun tered . 
Weldon ex cav a ted  th e  "foundations" o f p o litic a l th o u g h t in  o rd e r to  
expose th e  fa lla c ie s  t h a t  w ere hidden w ithin th e  s tru c tu re . The 
d iffe re n ce  is  t h a t  fo r  Weldon a  m e taphorical descrip tion  (like th e  
" s ta te  is  a  machine") is  n o t an  im age b u t a  l i t e r a l  descrip tio n  o f th e  
s ta t e  which can  be te s te d  fo r  i t s  accu racy , ju s t  a s  i t  would be in  th e  
physical sc iences. P o litic a l thought, Weldon argued, o f te n  ta lk s  a s  
i f  th e re  re a lly  a re  "grounds" and "foundations" to  i t s  s tru c tu re . If
ta k e n  li te ra l ly , th e se  m etaphors will r e v e a l th e  problem s t h a t
17p o litic a l th e o ris ts  c re a te  w ith th e i r  language. I t  i s  d iff icu lt,
how ever, to  ta k e  Weldon's in te rp re ta tio n  o f  p o litic a l d iscourse 
e n tire ly  a t  fa c e  value. If our "foundations" do n o t have a  
m e taphorical m eaning th e n  Weldon m ust be using them  in  som e sp ec ia l 
sense. As one com m en ta to r has rem arked , Weldon's claim  to  th e
lib era lity  o f p o litic a l m etaphors can  only be ta k e n  seriously , i f  we
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ta k e  th e  te rm  "liberal" m etaphorically .
M argaret M acdonald, on th e  o th e r hand, i s  w illing to  a d m it t h a t
m etaphors a re  n o n -lite ra l descrip tions o f a  p erce iv ed  p o litic a l 
re a lity  ("the s ta te  is  a  machine" th u s  o ffe rs  us a  p ic tu re  o f  th e  way 
in  which th e  s ta te  operates), y e t  she also  believes t h a t  m etaphors a re  
c re a te d  by p o litic a l th e o ris ts  la rg e ly  to  ju s tify  th e i r  philosophy. 19 
In  say ing  th is , Macdonald is  suggesting t h a t  th e s e  m etaphors a re
rh e to ric a l, t h a t  th e y  a re  used fo r  th e ir  persuasive  ab ility  r a th e r  
th a n  fo r  th e ir  sc ie n tif ic  tru th fu ln ess . Again, w hat M acdonald seeks 
to  avoid is  th e  bew itchm en t o f language -  in  th is  case  i t  is
m etaphorical language -  as  we fa l l  under th e  sp e ll o f  m echanistic  o r 
organic m etaphors o f th e  s ta te .  For M acdonald, th e  m etaphors o f th e
social sc ien ces  a re  a r t i f ic ia l  con trivances o r  p o e tic  analogies. R eal 
analogies, M acdonald argues, a re  re se rv ed  fo r  th e  physica l sc ien ces  a s  
a  m eans o f gaining knowledge. P o etic , po litica l m etaphors a re  th e
dom ain o f  opinion, a  fa lse  fro n t, a s  i t  w ere, persuading u s  t h a t  th e
im age p resen ted  is  re a l, and she posits t h a t  th e  tw o  uses o f  m etaphor 
-  t h a t  in  th e  so c ia l sc ience and th a t  in  th e  physica l sc ien ce  -  a re
d is tin c t because th e ir  applications a re  d iffe re n t.
The problem  o f assum ing th a t  th e  dom ain o f  sc ien ce  is  d is tin c t
from  t h a t  o f  th e  so c ia l science, a s  is  M acdonald's c la im , is  t h a t  i t  
n ea tly  avoids confronting  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  way in  w hich m etaphoric 
models o p e ra te  w ithin each  d iscip line may be e n tire ly  sim ilar.
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Indeed, M acdonald's position  ends up in  o v e rs ta tin g  th e  accu racy  o f 
sc ie n tif ic  m etaphors while underplaying th e i r  le g itim a c y  in  p o litic a l 
thought. M acdonald's b e lie f in  th e  suprem acy o f  sc ie n tif ic  m etaphors 
s te m s  from  a  m isconception o f w hat science does a s  opposed to  w hat 
po litica l philosophy does. As W.V. Quine te l ls  us, m etaphors a re
equally  fu n d am en ta l to  bo th  disciplines as  th ey  a re  " v ita l . . .a t  th e
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growing edges o f philosophy and science." M acdonald's e r ro r  i s  a
com m on one: th e  assum ption  th a t  th e  function  o f  sc ien ce  is  t o  p o s it
th e  t r u e  n a tu re  o f  th e  th ings which w ill req u ire  no fu r th e r
in te rp re ta tio n . Models and m etaphors in  sc ien ce  a re  e x a c t, o r  so  th e
arg u m en t goes, w h ilst th o se  in  p o litic a l philosophy a re  e i th e r
am biguous o r  rh e to r ic a l o r  fo rev e r requiring  fu r th e r  in te rp re ta tio n .
The fa llacy  o f th is  position is  n o t in  th e  b e lie f  t h a t  p o litic a l
philosophy's m etaphors a re  in e x a c t o r am biguous, b u t in  th e  b e lie f
th a t  m etaphors o f sc ience somehow correspond to  th e  " tru th ."
The Kuhnian response to  th e  be lie f in  th e  suprem acy  o f  th e
m ethods o f sc ience over t h a t  o f o th e r m ethods is  to  n o te  t h a t  sc ien ce ,
when i t  a c ts  a s  an  in s tru m en t o r method o f  m easurem en t, does ind eed
progress when i t  so lves various te ch n ica l problem s, b u t  th is  is  n o t to
say  t h a t  th e  on to log ical tru th  -  "w hat re a lly  e x is ts  in  n a tu re "  as
Kuhn says -  is  fin a lly  grasped by th e  use o f  s c ie n tif ic  m e ta p h o rs .21
D iffering o r  com peting  m etaphoric models do n o t  correspond to  "tru th"
b u t sim ply v ie  w ith  one an o th er a s  r iv a l d esc rip tio n s  o f  th e  world.
M etaphoric models a re  e i th e r  good o r bad, a p t  o r  poorLy fo rm u la ted , 
in dependen t o f  th e ir  re sp ec tiv e  disciplines. The m etaphors o f quantum
physics, f o r  exam ple, a re  n o t privileged o v e r th o se  o f p o litic a l
though t, though th e y  m ight have more ap p lica tion  in  an  in c reasing ly
sc ie n tif ic  age . When sc ien tis ts  rep laced  th e  "g eo -cen tric"  m odel o f
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th e  universe w ith  th e  "helio -cen tric"  m odel th e y  d id  n o t  a rriv e  a t
som e '‘tru th "  which only th e  m ethods o f sc ien ce  w ere ab le  to  d iscern , 
b u t r a th e r  sim ply found a  b e t te r  way in  which to  m easure and  describe  
w hat was a lread y  o u t th e re .  We can  conclude from  th is  t h a t  th e  
po litical th e o ris t 's  descrip tion  o f so c ie ty , successively , a s  a  
"beehive," an  "anthill," a  "hum an body" and  a  "m achine" works in  a  
sim ila r fash ion  to  t h a t  o f th e  physicist's m odel o f p a rtic le s ; w hat we 
have a re  only d iffe rin g  m etaphorical descrip tions which enab le  u s  to  
make b e t te r  m easurem ents. W hat we have succeeded  in  doing is  to  
su b s titu te  one ty p e  o f m etaphoric vocabulary in  p lace  o f ano ther.
This Popperian  im pulse w ithin p o litic a l philosophy to  m irror i t s
m ethods on th e  physical sc iences  can  be a t tr ib u te d , in  p a r t ,  t o  th e ir
com m on origins in  W estern philosophy. From th e  G reeks to  th e  l a te
n in e teen th  cen tu ry , p o litic a l th e o ris ts  th o u g h t o f them se lv es
p rim arily  a s  n a tu ra l philosophers, and  th e n  secondarily  a s
philosophers o f  c iv il soc ie ty . The im pulse w as to  lo c a te  a  single 
unifying cause  o f every th ing , w hether t h a t  th in g  was com posed o f
a tom s, monads, ra tiona lism , geom etry , o r  God, and  th e n  to  explain  th e
phenom ena o f th e  world which was governed by th is  s ing le  unifying
link. Although som e, lik e  A risto tle , c o n ten ted  th em se lv es  in
exp licating  a  world d ependen t upon th e  divisions o f  language and o f
th e  senses, o th e rs , lik e  Thom as Hobbes, s ta r te d  from  th e  p rem ise  t h a t
th e  w orld was com posed o f m a tte r  in  m otion, and th e n  derived  from  th is
sim ple p rem ise  an  e lab o ra te  th e o ry  o f  c iv il so c ie ty . F or a lm o s t a l l
o f th e se  th in k ers , m etaphor w as ch iefly  seen  a s  a  lin g u is tic  device;
fo r  A risto tle  i t  was p leasing to  lis te n  to ;  fo r  Hobbes i t s  excessive
use was q u ite  dangerous; fo r  Locke i t  was an  unpardonable absurd ity .
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Y et a s  we have seen , th e  co n cep t o f  m etaphor c a n n o t be easily  
d ivorced  from  e i th e r  sc ien ce  o r socia l sc ien ce , and  th u s  can n o t be 
sLmpiy th o u g h t o f  a s  a  rh e to r ic a l tr ic k  o f  speech . i t  ex is ts  a s  an  
a lte rn a tiv e  descrip tion  o f  ob jects, n e ith e r  wholly e sse n tia lis t nor
purely  nom inalist. W hilst in s tru m en ta l in  th e  ad v an cem en t o f  th e  
physical sc iences, m etaphor n everthe less  p lays a  c ru c ia l ro le  in  th e  
developm ent o f th e  so c ia l siences. We should no longer, th e re fo re , 
continue to  make th e  m istake o f dism issing th e  m etaphors o f  p o litic a l 
th o u g h t a s  u nsc ien tific , rh e to ric a l, o r sim ply  ir re le v a n t. A tten tion  
should now be paid  to  th is  r a th e r  curious figure o f speech .
Section Two:
The Ari^ntel-ian-Plagranal Tradition
The re a d e r  no doub t has no ticed  th a t  in  th e  p reced ing  sec tio n  th e  
te rm s  "m etaphor," "m odel," "analogy," "im age" and  even  "paradigm " w ere
used in terchangeab ly . C ertain ly , th e  re a d e r  m ight r ig h tly  com plain, 
n o t a l l  m etaphors a re  models o r  even im ages. The m etaphor o f "the 
legs o f  a  ta b le "  does n o t  o ffe r  us a  m odel on which to  base our
co n ce p t o f  " tab le ,"  fo r  i t  is  indeed  possible to  have a  le g le ss  ta b le .
In fa c t ,  although " the  leg s  o f a  tab le"  o ffe rs  us a  p a rticu la r , i f  
r a th e r  mundane, id e a  to  con tem p la te , th is  id e a  hard ly  se rv es  a s  a  
g en e ra l paradigm  fo r  w h at m ight considered to  be a  ta b le  and w hat 
m ight n o t. The world o f  ta b le s , leg less  and  o therw ise , is  to o  d iverse  
to  be cap tu red  by any one descrip tion , and  c e rta in ly  by any single 
m etaphor. Is  th is  no t, th e n , sim ply a  confusion o f te rm s?  Do 
m etaphors, models, analogies, im ages and parad igm s a l l  d en o te  th e  sam e 
th in g , o r  a re  som e im p o rta n t d is tinc tions  being lo s t  w henever th e se  
te rm s  a re  jo s tled  in  th e  sam e bag.
2 3
In  fa c t ,  many th e o ris ts  would claim t h a t  th e se  te rm s  can  be used
in terchangeab ly . The au th o rs  o f M etaphors We Live By, G eorge Lakoff
and Mark Johnson, argue th a t  sem an tica lly  th e s e  te rm s  sh a re  a  s trong  
sim ilarity , w hat th e y  r e f e r  t o  a s  a  "m etaphoric  concept*" "C oncepts,"
th e y  argue , "a re  n o t id en tified  solely  in  te rm s  o f in h e re n t
p rop erties ; in s te a d  th e y  a re  defined  p rim arily  in  te rm s  o f
22
in te ra c tio n a l p roperties ."  Read in  th is  way, m ost o f  th e  te rm s  c ite d  
above a re  'in te ra c tio n a l"  in  t h a t  th e y  depend upon a  conjunction 
betw een  tw o  d issim ilar th ings. In  his C ognitve Theory o f M etaphor 
EarL Mac C or m ac a rgues t h a t  d if fe re n t f ig u res  o f  speech  -  sim ile,
irony, m etonym y, synecdoche, person ification , and  ca ta c h re s is  -  can
a l l  be subsum ed under th e  broad um brella o f m etaphor fo r  much th e  sam e
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reason . A lm ost a l l  o f th e  au thors  included  in  tw o  fa ir ly  r e c e n t
anthologies on m etaphor, On M etaphor, ed ited  by Sheldon Sacks (1979), 
and M etaphor and Thought, ed ited  by Andrew O rtony (1988), also  speak  
a s  i f  any  figu re  o f speech  which succeeds in  coupling tw o  te rm s  in to  a  
single co n ce p t can  be applied  to  m etaphor.
This tra d itio n  in  Anglo-A m erican philosophy o f  assum ing th a t  
d iffering  fig u res  o f speech  can  be subsum ed under th e  g e n e ra l ca teg o ry  
o f m etaphor goes back  to  th e  Greeks, and in  p a rtic u la r , t o  A risto tle 's  
p ronouncem ents on th e  sub ject.
In L atin  th e  A ris to te lian  dictum  t h a t  man is  an im al ra tio n a le  was 
m ean t to  d istinguish  man, a s  th e  so le  possessor o f  reaso n , from  th e  
r e s t  o f th e  b ru tes . I f  we go back to  original G reek, how ever, we find  
t h a t  i t  re a d s  zoon logon echon which tra n s la te s  in to  an im al possessing 
logos. Reason is  ju s t  one o f th e  many possible m eanings o f  logos, th e  
o th e rs  being, variousLy, "word," "thought," "reasoned account,"
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"logic," and perhaps m ore usefully, "co h eren t speech ." 24 I t  i s  th is  
l a t t e r  defin ition  o f co h eren t speech th a t  A ris to tle  id e n tif ie s  as  
being logos in  his sh o rt tr e a tis e  on language, De Ih te rp re ta tio n e . 
F or th e  G reeks words w ere n o t m ere sym bols o r  sounds which po in ted  
to w ard s t r u th  o r  to  a  perce ived  rea lity , b u t w ere th e  p rim ary  b ea re rs  
o f  m eaning. As w ith th e  exam ple A risto tle  o ffe rs  us, th e  te rm  
"goat-stag" c lea rly  "signifies som ething b u t n o t, a s  y e t ,  anything 
t r u e  o r  fa lse  -  unless 'is' o r  *is n o t1 is  added  (e ith e r  sim ply o r 
w ith re fe re n c e  to  tim e)."25 The word "goat-stage ,"  th e n , has som e kind 
o f  m eaning fo r  A risto tle , and we could to d a y  add many o th e r  exam ples 
w ithin ou r own discourse o f words which b e a r  m eaning b u t  w ithou t 
having any  d ir e c t  re fe re n c e  ("unicorn" o r  "Santa Claus," f o r  exam ple). 
As A risto tle  rem inds us,
"Every sen ten ce  is  s ign ifican t (not as a  to o l  bu t, a s  we said, 
by convention), b u t n o t every  sen tence is  a  s ta tem en t-m ak in g  
sen ten c e , b u t only th o se  in  which th e re  is  t r u th  o r fa ls ity .
T here is  n o t t r u th  o r fa ls ity  in  a l l  sen tences: a  p ra y e r is  a
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sen ten ce  b u t is  n e ith e r  tru e  o r false."
Thus co h e re n t speech , lik e  an  o ffe red  p ray e r, need  n o t  r e f e r  to  
anything in  re a li ty  to  b e a r  meaning, and fo r  A ris to tle  and  th e  
c la ss ic a l tra d itio n  w hat was to  be avoided was in c o h e re n t speech  o r 
nonsense, which was th e  G reek negation of logos, alogos.
The sa lie n t p o in t in  A risto tle 's t r e a tm e n t  o f  language  fo r  our 
p re se n t purposes is  his suggestion th a t  th e  tw o  unlike te rm s  "goat" 
and  "stag" can  be  com bined in to  a  single co n ce p t and y e t  n o t be 
considered  to  be an  absurdity . The co n cep t o f  alogos only app lies i f  
th e  w ord's p resence  signifies t h a t  th e  o b je c t t ru ly  ex ists . Although 
knowing t h a t  th e re  w ere no exam ples o f  a  g o a t-s ta g  in  ex is ten ce ,
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A risto tle  n ev erth e less  knew th a t  to  have an  im age o f one was n o t an  
absurd ity . S im ilarly, in  Leviathan Thomas Hobbes d id  n o t consider his 
m etaphoric im age  o f th e  "a rtific ia l man" to  b e  an  absu rd ity , fo r
absurd ity  fo r  Hobbes was th e  domain o f nonsensical language r a th e r
27th a n  o f im ages, a s  fo r  in s ta n ce  a  "round quadrangle." W hat th is  m eans 
in  th e  A risto te lian -c lassical trad itio n  o f m etaphor i s  t h a t  any  figu re  
o f speech  (w hether is  be m etaphor, sim ile , synecdoche, o r  w hatever)
which is  com bined in  such a  way as to  re n d e r an  im age fo r  in sp ec tio n
becom es au to m atica lly  in te llig ib le  to  th e  p e rce iv er. I f  tw o  te rm s  a re  
com bined in  such  a  way a s  to  estab lish  in  im age o r  a  model, th e n  th e  
ru le  regard ing  alogos does n o t apply.
The b ias in  W estern philosophy ag a in st m etaphors seem s to  be
la rg e ly  d ire c te d  ag a in s t m etaphors a s  fig u res  o f speech  r a th e r  th a n  
ag a in s t th e i r  purely  im age-m aking capac ity . In  add ition  to  Hobbes's 
a t ta c k  ag a in s t absurd  speech (as a p a r t  from  im ages), Locke in  h is 
Essay Concerning Human U nderstanding d ec la res  t h a t  i t  is  " figu rative
speech" which le ad s  one "to  insinuate  wrong ideas"  which a re  "wholly
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t o  be  avo ided ...w here t r u th  and knowledge a re  t o  be concerned ." In
W estern philosophy, from  th e  Greeks onw ards, th e  challenge to
philosophers was to  c lean  up th e  language by avoiding tro p e s  in
philosophical o r  s c ie n tif ic  discourse. I t  was n o t  m an's im ag in a tio n
o r  im age-m aking  cap a c ity  which was under a t ta c k , r a th e r  i t  was h is use
o f language to  acc u ra te ly  describe h is surroundings which w as under
f ie rc e  scru tiny . The possibility  t h a t  words would n o t have a  fixed
m eaning, o r  t h a t  meaning could be tw is te d  to  som e devious purpose 
g re a tly  an im ated  th e  Greeks. Thucydides, who along w ith H erodotus was
th e  f i r s t  to  use th e  word m etapherein , com plained b it te r ly  ab o u t th o se
who used  words in  o rd e r "to  change th e i r  u su a l meanings." How could
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words correspond to  re a l i ty  when th e ir  m eaning f lu c tu a te d ?  In  th e  
T h ae te tu s  P la to  com plains t h a t  words, a s  th e  H erac le itans em ployed 
th em , n ev er had a  fix ed  meaning, fo r  "when you p u t a  question , th e y  
pluck from  th e ir  qu iver l i t t l e  o racu la r aphorism s to  l e t  fLy a t  you, 
and i f  you t r y  to  ob ta in  som e acco u n t o f  th e i r  m eaning, you w ill be 
in s ta n tly  tra n s fix e d  by ano ther, barbed  w ith  som e new ly fo rm ed  
m etaphor." 30
The G reeks m ade l i t t l e  a t te m p t to  g e t  behind th e  ontology of
co h eren t speech ; i t  was enough t h a t  words enjoyed a  fix ed  meaning,
t h a t  th e y  could be used  and understood in  o rd inary  d iscourse, and th a t
th e  ru le s  o f syn tax  and g ram m ar be applied  t o  avoid alogos. Although
logos d id  n o t necessarily  correspond to  th e  t ru th ,  i t  could
nev erth e less  se rv e  a s  a  m odel fo r  re a lity , fo r  in s ta n c e  in  P la to 's
Form s. The Form s fo r  P la to  w ere n o t phan tasm s o r  undefined concep ts
b u t w ere m irrors fo r  th e  in n e r s tru c tu re  o f c o h e re n t speech . The
world fo r  P la to  had  to  based upon logos o r  e lse  i t s  m eaning would
becom e nonsense. A ris to tle , although re je c tin g  th e  P la ton ic  ontology,
also  saw  th e  s tru c tu re  o f  language a s  resem bling  t h a t  o f  th e  known 
world. The problem  t h a t  language p resen ted  fo r  A ris to tle  was n o t i t s
app lica tion  to  th e  known world, how ever, b u t in  finding th e
ap p ro p ria te  expression  in  which to  describe  i t .  Knowledge consisted
in  lo c a tin g  th e  c o r re c t  language and  expressing  th e  in fo rm atio n  in  a
co h e re n t fashion.
Language describes th e  world, b u t only a  d iscourse t h a t  uses th e  
c o r re c t  lin gu istic  s tru c tu re s  can  be honored a s  em bodying c o r re c t  
know ledge. J u s t  a s  th e  world is  made up  o f  a  v a r ie ty  o f substances 
t h a t  a re  known th rough  th e ir  ca teg o ries , ways o f  ta lk in g  ab o u t th e se
substances a re  equally  d iverse. Now A ris to tle  d evo tes  se p a ra te
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tr e a tis e s  to  th e se  d iffering  fo rm s o f d iscourse, distinguishing th e  
m ethod o f  lo g ic a l d iscourse from  t h a t  o f th e  p o e tica l, th e  
m etaphysical, th e  p o litic a l and  th e  r h e to r ic a l  Given th e  Greek 
understanding  o f  language a s  n o t constitu ting  re a l i ty  b u t a s  a  m eans 
o f describ ing i t ,  e ach  m ethod o f describing can  only be  judged on i t s  
own te rm s  a s  being c o r re c t  o r  in c o rre c t. T h ere fo re  i t  would sim ply 
n o t do, a s  A ris to tle  w arned, fo r  a  log ician  to  use p o e tic  language in  
h is d escrip tion  o f  th e  w orld since p o e try  is  m ean t t o  charm  th e  
h eare r. As A ris to tle  explains, language
" ...m u st a lso  be app rop ria te , avoiding both  m eanness and undue 
evaluation ; p o e tic a l language is  ce rta in ly  f re e  from  m eanness,
b u t i t  is  n o t app ro p ria te  to  prose. C learness i s  secu red  by
using th e  words (nouns and verbs  alike) t h a t  a re  c u r re n t and
31
ordinary ."
Each use o f language, in  o th e r  words, w hether i t  be in  log ic , poetry , 
o rd inary  p rose , o r  rh e to r ic , m ust be  judged on i t s  own m erits. 
Although words do n o t have to  correspond to  th e  tr u th ,  th e y  may s t i l l  
becom e su sp e c t when th e y  s tra y  outside th e ir  re sp ec tiv e  d iscip lines.
The c la ss ica l b ias a g a in s t m etaphor, th en , has had  a  noble lin eag e , 
w ith ro o ts  s tre tc h in g  back  to  th e  G reek com pla in t ag a in s t th e  
Sophists, P la to 's  a rg u m e n t w ith th e  poets, and S o cra te s 's  reco rd ed  
tr iu m p h  o v er G orgias. Given A risto tle 's  in i t ia l  d is tin c tio n  betw een  
th e  lin g u is tic  s tru c tu re  o f discourse (logos versu s  alogos) and th e  
ap p ro p ria te  form  t h a t  a  d iscourse should have, th e  p la ce  t h a t  th e  
su b jec t o f  m etaphor holds in  such a  schem a would seem  m ost troub ling . 
M etaphor, by i t s  very  n a tu re , is  decidedly am biguous. M etaphor honors 
no sep a ra tio n  o f ca teg o ries , confusing q u a lity  w ith q u an tity ,
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substance w ith  acc id en t, genus w ith species. Y e t th e  G reeks also
a rgued  th e  m etaphor can n o t be ignored. A ris to tle  d ec la re s  in  h is
P o e tics  t h a t  " the  g re a te s t  th in g  by f a r  is  to  be  a  m a ste r o f  m etaphor.
I t  is  th e  one th in g  t h a t  can n o t be le a rn t  from  o th e rs ; and  i t  i s  a lso
a  sign o f  genius, since  a  good m etaphor im p lie s  an  in tu itiv e
percep tio n  o f th e  s im ila rity  in  dissimiLars." 32
A ris to tle  develops his id e a s  on m etaphor ch ie fly  in  Book n r  o f  
th e  R hetoric  and  in  se v e ra l ch ap te rs  o f  th e  P oetics . In  c h a p te r
tw en ty -o n e  o f  P o e tics  he  l is ts  fo u r ty p e s  o f  m etaphor fo llow ed by
exam ples o f how th e y  a re  used. "M etaphor," he te l l s  us, "consists in  
giving th e  th in g  a  nam e th a t  belongs to  som eth ing  e lse ; th e  
tra n s fe re n c e  being e i th e r  from  genus to  sp ec ies , o r  from  species  to
genus, o r  from  species  to  species, o r on grounds o f  ana logy ."33 In  
b rie f, th is  'tra n s fe re n c e "  can  be seen  in  such  sen ten c es  as: "H ere
stands my ship"; "Truly te n  thousand  good d eeds  has Ulysses w rought"; 
"Drawing th e  l ife  w ith bronze"; and in  th e  analogy " the  cup is  in
re la tio n  to  Dionysus w h at a  shield  is  to  A re s ." 34 In  th e  R hetoric
A risto tle  expands th e s e  c lass ifica tions  o f m etaphor to  inc lu d e  th e
tra n s fe re n c e  o f in an im ate  o b jec ts  in to  a n im a te  ob jec ts , and says t h a t
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Hom er's p o e try  is  fu ll  o f  such exam ples.
Given A ris to tle 's  exam ples o f m etaphor in  use , i t  is  n o t  hard  to
se e  why con tem porary  com m en ta to rs  con tinue t o  c lass ify  a  b road  ran g e  
o f d iffe rin g  fig u res  o f speech  a s  being m etaphorical. A ris to tle 's  own 
exam ples o f  m etaphor in  P o e tics  a re  more p roperly  cases  o f  hyperbole, 
m etonom y, and analogy. G ranted  a ll th e se  fig u res  o f speech  invo lve a  
" tran sference"  on som e le v e l, b u t th e re  can  b e  a  g r e a t  d e a l o f 
d iffe ren ce  betw een , say , an  analogy and a  hyperbole and th is  is  
u n fo rtu n a te ly  lo s t  in  A risto tle 's  accoun t.
2
In  spate o f A risto tle 's  in flu en tia l con tribu tion  to  th e  s tudy  o f
m etaphor, h is a cc o u n t is  d e fic ien t in  a t  l e a s t  one m ajor re sp ec t. 
Lacking in  A ris to tle 's  t r e a tm e n t is  a  c ritiq u e  o f  th e  m etaphoric  
im ag e . For A risto tle , m etaphors a re  words r a th e r  th a n  im ag es . This 
g la ring  om ission has un fo rtunate ly  co lored  a  g r e a t  many subsequen t 
c r itiq u e s  o f m etaphor, fo r  a l l  to o  freq u en tly  in  th e  l i te r a tu r e  of
p o litic a l th o u g h t m etaphors a re  dam ned fo r  being an  abuse o f  w ords and 
y e t  ignored  fo r  th e i r  im age-m aking cap ab ilitie s . C erta in ly  th is  is  
how Locke and freq u en tly  Hobbes have understood  m etaphor; a  case  o f 
m isleading th e  sc ie n tif ic  w anderer in  sea rch  o f  th e  t r u th  by misusing 
th e  language.
A ris to tle 's  own fa ilu re  to  no te  m etaphor's im age-m ak ing  cap ac ity  
can  b e  tr a c e d  back  to  th e  Greek in s is te n ce  t h a t  m etaphors a re  a  
tra n s fe re n c e  o f words. Within th e  ea rly  c la ss ic a l tra d itio n  m etaphors 
w ere seen  a s  ind iv idual words r a th e r  th a n  a s  com bined concep ts. 
Iso c ra te s , who is  th e  f i r s t  to  specifica lly  use  th e  word "m etaphor,"
a rg u es  in  th e  E ragoras t h a t  "the poets a re  conceded  many m ethods of
adorning th e ir  language, fo r...besides th e  use o f  n o rm al w ords th e y
ca n  also  em ploy fo re ig n  words, neologism , and  m etaphors" [em phasis
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added]. I t  d id  n o t occur to  A risto tle  t h a t  h is own exam ple  o f  a  
g o a t-s ta g  was a  m etaphorical concep t o r  t h a t  i t  was even  possib le to
e n te r ta in  an  im age o f  such a  beast. F or A ris to tle , "Every w ord m ust
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b e  a  c u r re n t te rm , a  s tran g e  word, o r  a  m etaphor." Im ages need  n o t 
apply.
The in s ig h t t h a t  m etaphors com bine th em se lv es  in to  m odels o r 
im ag es  d id  n o t o ccu r to  th e  Greeks u n til  around  th r e e  hundred  y ears  
a f t e r  A ris to tle . The anonymous au th o r o f th e  R heto rica  ad  H erennium , 
which appeared  around th e  y ear 86 B.C., in fo rm s u s  t h a t  a  m etaphor is
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used "fo r th e  sake o f c rea tin g  a  vivid m en ta l p ic tu re ."  Around 170 
A.D. H erm ogenes o f Tarsus argued  th a t  th e  im p o rtan ce  o f  m etaphor was 
n o t in  th e  A ris to te lian  "transference" o f w ords b u t  in  i t s  "com posit 
concep t."  According to  Hermogenes,
H  is  Oblique Language when a  te rm  n o t re le v a n t to  th e  su b je c t 
m a tte r  b u t signifying som e extraneous o b je c t o f re fe re n c e  is  
in troduced  in to  a  sen tence  so as  to  un ite  i t s  s ign ificance  in  
a  com posite concep t; th is  is  called  M etaphor by th e  gram  m arians, 
b u t i t  should n o t be considered, a s  th e y  av er, a s  a  tra n s fe re n c e  
from  life le ss  to  a live , e tc .,  fo r  rh e to ric  e n tire ly  avcdds
qq
busying its e lf  w ith such details."
So m etaphor began  to  live  a  double l ife .  As a  com bination  o f 
words m etaphor was ce rta in ly  A risto tle 's  "sign o f genius," b u t  t h a t  
m ean t t h a t  i t  was also su sp ec t when th e  words w ere used 
inapp rop ria te ly . However, in  th e  la te  c la ss ic a l period  m etaphor to o k  
on a  secondary  c h a ra c te r is tic  as  a  "com bined concep t" o r  im ag e . By 
i t s  innovative  use o f v isual im ages m etaphor cam e to  be considered  to  
be one o f  th e  ch ie f to o ls  o f persauslon. C icero  rem a rk s  in  De Q ratore 
th a t  "m etaphor has d ire c t appea l to  th e  senses, especia lly  th e  sense
An
o f s igh t. In  De Inventione he in s tru c ts  law y ers  who t r y  th e i r  cases 
befo re  th e  co u rts  to  "bring th e  ac tio n  a s  vividly a s  possib le befo re  
th e  eyes o f th e  judge...so  t h a t  a  sham efu l a c t  may seem  a s  sh am efu l as  
i f  he had  been  p re se n t and seen  i t  in  person." 41 Echoing C icero 's 
adv ice , Q uintilian com m ents upon th e  v isual-persuasive  ab ilitie s  of 
m etaphor in  th e  In s titio  O ratoria  by saying t h a t  i t  is  "designed to
move th e  feelings, give specia l d is tin c tio n  to  th in g s, and p la ce  them
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vividly befo re  th e  eyes."
When we jo in  A risto tle 's  analysis o f m etaphors a s  s ty lis t ic  w ords
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w ith th e  la te  c la ss ica l tra d itio n  th e o ry  o f m en ta l im ages, we th e n  
have a  highly charged  com bination  -  one t h a t  is  p o ten tia lly  dangerous
to  philosophy. The A risto te lian -c l assi cal a c c o u n t o f m etaphor is
th e re fo re  one t h a t  c e le b ra te s  i t s  genius while being a t  th e  sam e tim e  
w ary o f  i t s  pow er. I t  i s  a  t r ic k  o f  language, a  sublim e diversion, a  
mildly in s tru c tiv e  a r tfo rm , b u t i t  is  a lso  dangerous i f  ev e r misused.
P erhaps th e  b e s t sum m ary  o f th is  A rdsto te lian -c lassical ten sio n
w ith  reg a rd s  to  m etaphor is  re f le c te d  in  th e  pages o f th e  ad  Herrenium 
which w arns us: "They say  t h a t  a  m etaphor ough t to  be re s tra in e d  so as
t o  b e  a  tra n s itio n  w ith good reaso n  to  a  k indred  th in g , and n o t seem
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in d isc rim in a te , reck less, and p re c ip ita te  le a p  to  an  unlike th ing ."
Section Three:
The Platonic-Rom antic Tradition
I t  would be an  over-sim plification  to  view  th e  varying tra d itio n s  of
m etaphor a s  springing from  e i th e r  A ris to te lian  o r  P la ton ic  origins;
how ever, borrow ing from  C oleridge's d ic tum  t h a t  everyone is  e i th e r  an
A ris to te lian  o r  a  P la to n is t, th e re  is  much to  be  sa id  fo r  a ttr ib u tin g
th e  d iffe rin g  approaches to  e i th e r  cam p. The A ris to te lian  th e o ry  of
language is  one w here d iscourse is  ca rv ed  up in to  various com ponents, 
sep a ra tin g  th e  functions  o f language from  one an o th e r, favoring  th a t
d iscourse  which appea rs  to  be m ore a p t. In  th e  A risto te lian
fram ew ork , m etaphor ex is ts  only a t  th e  m argins, o r  r a th e r  re s id es  in
th e  m arginal functions o f th e  p o e tic  and th e  rh e to ric a l.
The P la ton ic  view  is  m ore am biguous. The su b je c t o f  m etaphor
does n o t  fig u re  in  th e  Dialogues, and  P la to 's  d iscussion o f  language
is  to o  vague to  en tire ly  a sc rib e  one c o h e re n t pcdnt o f  view.44 T h a t has
n o t, how ever, stopped  th o se  who have t r ie d  to  derive  a  co n s is te n t
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philosophy o f language from  P laton ic  th o u g h t o r have seen  in  P la to  a  
p a r tic u la r  s tra in  o f th o u g h t which has a t  le a s t  partiaJLy in fo rm ed  
subsequen t th e o rie s . Such has been  th e  ca se  w ith th e  R om antic notion 
o f  m etaphor and language, one which se e s  i t s  ro o ts  a s  springing from  
P la to n ic  philosophy.
The R om antic 's case  f o r  reading  P la to  a s  being sy m p ath e tic  to  
m etaphor is  a s  follow s:
T here a re  tw o  main modes o f experience  fo r  P la to , th e  p o e tic  and
th e  philosophical, and  th rough  them  m irror th e  p o la ritie s  o f opinion
(doxa) and know ledge (epdstem e), th e  w orld o f  ap p ea ran ces  and th e
world o f  th e  Form s, th o se  who dw ell in  th e  C ave and  th o se  who a re
priv ileged  to  w ander outside i t .  P la to  d raw s a  w ider c ircu m feren ce
around  th e  p o e tic  experience th a n  does h is pup il A risto tle , who 
re le g a te s  p o e tic  d iscourse and m etap h o r t o  th e  m arg ins o f everyday
life ; th e  vcdce o f p o e try  fo r  A risto tle  sim ply being one m ore in  th e
contending  vo ices o f rh e to r ic , log ic , m etaphysics, p o litic s  and
o rd in ary  p rose . In  c o n tra s t  P lato , by including  in  th e  p o e tic
exp erien ce  a l l  t h a t  is  opinion and  m ere ap p ea ran ce  -  and  consequently
condem ning p o e try  fo r  o ffering  only fa lse  know ledge -  succeeds by his
b la n k e t condem nation  in  e levating  th e  im p o rtan ce  o f p o e try  and
m etaphor beyond w hat th e  c lass ic is ts  would ad m it. I t  is  fo r  th is
reaso n  t h a t  a  p a r tic u la r  conception  o f  m etaphor (the  R om antic
tra d itio n ) h as  a risen  fro  m th e  unlikely sou rce  o f P la ton ic  though t;
th e  a t ta c k e r  o f th e  p o e ts  giving unw itting  b ir th  t o  a  renew ed  p o e tic
sp ir it .
P la to , though analyzing th e  re la tiv e  m erits  o f w riting versus 
sp eech  in  se v e ra l passages, ch iefly  lim its  th e  su b je c t o f  language in  
g e n e ra l to  one p a r tic u la r  dialogue, th e  C raty lus. In  th e  C raty lus we
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a re  given an  a rg u m en t fo r  th e  nom inalist version  o f  language; h e re
nam es signify  n o t th e  essence  o f  th in g s  b u t den o te  an  o b jec t's  ag reed
upon ( th a t is , conventional! descrip tion . The dialogue concerns a
d eb a te  be tw een  C raty lus, who believes t h a t  nam es a re  a  n a tu ra l
phenom enon ( th a t  is , t h a t  th e y  n a tu ra lly  correspond t o  t h a t  w hich th e y
signify) and H erm ogenes, who be lieves t h a t  nam es a re  chosen  by
convention, having no fix ed  meaning beyond w h at so c ie ty  d ec la res .
S ocrates, who o f te n  arg u es  on H erm ogenes's behalf, a c ts  a s  th e
m ediato r in  th is  d ialogue and th rough  i t s  course  i t  em erges th e
C raty lus is  inc reasing ly  unable to  defend  h is  e s se n tia lis t position
ag a in st a  barrag e  o f  S o cra tic  a tta c k s . A t f i r s t  C raty lus con tends
th a t  "he who knows th e  nam es also  knows th e  th in g s  which a re  expressed
by th em ,"  b u t soon he allow s th a t  th e  form  o f expression i s  d e te rm in ed
45by conven tional ag ree m en t on how th e  words used  a re  to  be understood. 
With th is  adm ission to w ard s  th e  end o f  th e  d ialogue, S o cra te s  is  a t
l a s t  ahLe to  d ec la re  h is b e lie f  th a t ,  while w anting to  a g ree  w ith 
C ratylus, he m ust re g re t ta b ly  side w ith H erm ogenes t h a t  " th e  
co rrec tn ess  o f a  nam e tu rn s  o u t to  be  convention, since le t t e r s  which
a re  unlike a re  in d ica tiv e  equally  w ith  th o se  which a re  lik e , i f  th e y
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a re  sanctioned  by custom  and convention." Thus words, in  th is  read ing  
a t  le a s t ,  a re  chosen by convention, th e  nam es o f th in g s  having no 
n a tu ra l o r  fixed  correspondence t o  t h a t  to  which th e y  r e fe r .
In  his o th e r  d ialogues P la to  does n o t  condem n th e  use o f m etaphor 
p e r  se  b u t he does condem n th e  philosopher's u se  o f  rh e to r ic , which he
reg ard s  a s  th e  ch ie f to o l  o f th e  Sophists. The n a tu ra l in fe re n c e  from
P la to 's  denunciation  o f  rh e to r ic  would be  t h a t  m etaphor, since  i t
p reys upon am biguity  and is  o f te n  concerned  w ith th e  ou tw ard  
ap pea rance  and  resem blance  o f  th in g s, becom es rh e to r ic 's
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fe llo w -trav e le r. When one ta k e s  in to  acc o u n t th e  w ell-know n P laton ic
a rg u m en t ag a in s t p o e ts  one could fu r th e r  in fe r  t h a t  m etaphor, th e  main
in s tru m e n t o f th e  p o e t's  a r t ,  is  equally  gu ilty  in  abusing th e
d is tin c tio n  be tw een  th e  worLd o f  appearance and t h a t  o f  th e  Form s.
The lo v e  o f  p o e try  masks and  even d is to r ts  a  t r u e r  devotion: th e
grounding o f  th e  so u l o f th e  pdlis upon th e  h igher c r a f t  o f 
philosophy.
The P la ton ic  th e o ry  o f language revo lves around th e  tw in  p illa rs  
o f  im ita tio n  (mimesis) and  im agination . For P la to  a l l  know ledge is  an  
im ita tio n  o f one s o r t  o r  ano ther. The p o e t a t te m p ts  to  im ita te  th e  
w orld o f  ap p earances and, when successfu l, ach ieves by th is  im ita tio n  
a  kind o f im p e rfe c t knowledge o r opinion (doxa). The philosopher, on 
th e  o th e r  hand, a t te m p ts  to  divine th e  c o n te n t o f th e  Form s from  which 
a  m ore p e r fe c t  kind o f know ledge can  be g leaned . T ru th  becom es th e  
a c c u ra te  re f le c tio n  -  th e  m im esis -  o f  th e  Form s, and in  an  id e a l 
s ta te  lik e  th e  Republic i t  is  th e  philosopher who should ru le  w hilst
th e  p o e t, th e  one who dw ells in  th e  Cave, who should be banished.
Underlying P la to 's  th e o ry  o f language was an  a t te m p t to  de th rone
Homer a s  th e  ed u ca to r o f  G reece. Although adm iring  th e  p o e t a s  th e
p rin c ip a l founder o f G reek cu ltu re , P la to  s tip u la te s  t h a t  "we m ust n o t
honor a  man above th e  tru th "  -  th e  tru th ,  in  th is  in s ta n c e , being th e
47philosophic mim esis and  n o t  th e  poetic . Ion, whose so le  know ledge o f 
th e  world seem s t o  con sis t in  th e  re c ita t io n  o f  H om eric ep ics, is
rid icu led  by S ocra te s  a s  being a  blind fo llo w er o f  th e  w orld o f
48ap pearance . A thens was a  so c ie ty  whose v e ry  so u l was possessed by 
H omer. The m im esis o f th e  ap p a re n t world r a th e r  th a n  th e  t ru e  one is  
a  "corrup tion  o f  th e  mind o f  a l l  lis te n e rs  who do n o t possess a s  an  
a n tid o te  a  know ledge o f i t s  r e a l  n a tu re ."  The m im esis o f  th e  p o e tic
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mode o f ex isten ce  m isleads th e  naive and is  lik en ed  by P la to  t o  th e
cas tin g  o f spells  o v e r th e  poJis which, once th e s e  fa lse  m etaphors a re
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s trip p ed  bare , a re  rev ea led  to  be em pty.
Since P la to 's  condem nation o f th e  p o e t seem s fairLy exhaustive, 
how th e n  was i t  possible fo r  th e  R om antics t o  re a d  in to  • P la to n ic
th o u g h t a  sym pathy  w ith th e  poetic  en te rp rise , and  in  p a r tic u la r
m etaphor? The answ er is  partia lly  found in  th e  P haedrus w here 
S o cra te s  proclaim s:
"Well, th e re  i s  one po in t a t  le a s t  which I  th ink  you will adm it, 
nam ely  t h a t  any discourse ought to  be co n stru c ted  lik e  a  liv ing 
c re a tu re , w ith i t s  own body, as i t  were; i t  m ust n o t  la c k  e i th e r
head  o r fe e t ;  i t  m ust have a  middle and e x tre m itie s  so
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com posed as  to  su it each  o th e r and th e  whole work."
W hat P la to  seem s to  be advocating h ere  is  t h a t  d iscourse should be 
c o n s tru c ted  a s  an  o rganic whole. Unlike in  A ris to tle 's  c a te g o rie s  o f 
d iscourse  w here each  expression m ust be  a p t  t o  th e  su b je c t a t  hand, 
P la to  is  urging t h a t  discourse be com plete , from  head  t o  fo o t, a s  i t  
w ere, so  a s  t o  le a v e  nothing out. Curiously, th is  o rgan ic p rincip le  
is  co n s is te n t w ith P la to 's  a t ta c k  upon po e try  w here only one form  o f 
d iscourse  (poetry) is  sa id  to  re v e a l th e  t ru th .  Read in  th e  R om antic 
fash ion , P la to  is  suggesting th a t  p o e try  is  dangerous b ecause  th e  
p o e ts  claim  to  have a  privileged link  to  th e  t r u th ,  w hereas no such 
d iscourse, a p a r t  from  th e  philosophical, can  e v e r  re a c h  such  d izzying  
he igh ts .
So th e  R om antics p re fe rred  to  re a d  in  P la to  a  k indred  sp irit. 
The reaso n s  fo r  th is  b e lie f w ere perhaps due t o  P la to 's  s tr e s s  on  th e  
pervasiveness o f th e  p o e tic  experience (even i f  th is  s tre s s  was m ean t 
t o  dam n r a th e r  th a n  to  p raise  poetry) coupled w ith  a  th e o ry  o f
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language which ta lk ed  o f i t s  unfixed, conventional/ o rganic c h a ra c te r .
C erta in ly  th e  R om antics to o k  to  h e a r t  P la to 's  suggestion  to  co n s tru c t
d iscourse lik e  a  liv ing  c re a tu re , believing, a s  C oleridge was to
believe, t h a t  th e  only th in g  t h a t  m a tte rs  t o  a  p o e t i s  language as
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experienced  in  a l l  i t s  fo rm s ra th e r  th a n  a s  d issected .
We com m only th in k  o f  th e  R om antic e ra  a s  beginning around 1770 and
52ending around 1850. I t s  e x a c t  origins a re  uncertain? w h at m ight be 
o ffe red  a s  a  p a r tia l exp lanation  is  t h a t  i t s  genesis was in  response 
to  various e lem en ts  o f th e  E nligh tenm ent and th e  r is e  o f ra tionalism  
and sc ien ce . P a r t  o f th e  problem  o f assigning a  single cause  t o  th e  
R om antic 's re v o lt  ag a in s t e lem en ts  o f th e  c la ss ic a l tra d itio n  was t h a t  
th e y  defined  th e i r  cause  a s  in  re a c tio n  ag a in st, variously , classicism  
and neo-dassLcism , th e  E nligh tenm ent and th e  Age o f Reason, sc ience  
and th e  m ethods i t  em ployed. Perhaps ty p ic a l o f  th is  need  to  define 
them selves  in  a  co n fro n ta tio n a l and d ra m a tic  m anner is  Shelley 's 
announcem ent in  h is p re fa c e  to  P rom etheus Unbound th a t  he would
" ra th e r  be dam ned w ith P la to  and Lord Bacon th a n  go to  Heaven w ith
53Paley  and  M althus." Thus, ju s t  a s  th e  H um anists had  defined  
them se lv es  a s  ex isting  in  s ta rk  c o n tra s t  t o  th e  p revailing  pow er
s tru c tu re s  o f  th e  Middle Ages, th e  R om antics o fte n tim e s  needed  to  to s s
54up so -ca lled  'E n ligh tenm en t values' a s  a  c a ll  t o  arm s. These 
E nligh tenm ent values which th e  R om antics saw  a s  th e i r  du ty  to  co m b at 
w ere exem plified  by la is se z -fa ire  philosophers and  u tilita r ia n s  whose 
econom ic egoism th re a te n e d  t o  ind iv iduate  m em bers o f so c ie ty  ju s t 
when, th e  R om antics had though t, soc ie ty  needed to  be harm onized?5
Isaac  N ewton's law s o f g rav ity  and m otion and  h is work on op tics  
had, fo r  th e  E n ligh tenm ent mind, proven t h a t  th e  s tu f f  t h a t  made up
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th e  world could be know able by reco u rse  to  th e  to o ls  o f ra tio n a lity  
and sc ience . F or th e  Rom antics, how ever, th e  w orld appeared
open-ended and organic , an  opaque p resen ce  which could  only be 
understood by t h a t  which was akin to  a  m ystical ex perience , and  th e y
consequently  accused  th e ir  enem ies o f  conjuring up a  s tag n an t,
c lin ica l world devoid o f  God. "We m urder to  d issec t,"  W ordsworth
w rote in  his a n ti- ra tio n a lis t poem "The T ables Turned," w hich ended 
w ith perhaps th e  b e s t  sum m ary o f  th e  R om antic a t t i tu d e  to w ard s  
sc ien tif ic  though t; "Enough o f sc ience  and  o f  a r t  /  C lose up  th o se  
b arren  leaves."  56
I f  th e  s in  o f  th e  E nlightenm ent world, a s  w ith th e  classical
w orld b efo re  i t ,  was an  over-re liance  upon rea so n  and an  unstoppable
need to  ca rv e  up language and th e  world in to  i t s  m ore e m p ir ic a l p a rts ,
th e n  fo r  th e  R om antics p roper d ispensation  could be had by p rac tis in g
th e  c u l t  o f im ag ination  -  and th u s  we com e fu ll  c irc le  t o  our 
discussion o f  m etaphor. "Reason," Shelley observes in  h is D efence of
P o e try , " re sp ec ts  th e  d iffe ren ces  and im ag in a tio n  th e  s im ilitude  o f
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th ings."  Im agination  h e re  does th e  sam e work a s  m etaphor; th e  ab ility  
to  n o te  resem blances. F o r th e  R om antics m etaphor b ecam e th e  way in  
which one could experience th e  world. As T erence Hawkes explains, fo r  
th e  R om antics m etaphor was n o t sim ply a  " fan c ifu l em bro idery  o f th e  
fa c ts ,"  which th e  A risto telian-cl assi c is ts  had  believed , b u t  was "a 
way o f  th ink ing  and liv ing; an  im ag in a tiv e  p ro jec tio n  o f  th e  tru th ."  58 
The R om antic ind iv idual achieves h is  genius by en te rin g  in to  th e  
world, p ro jec ting  h im self in to  n a tu re , and by th is  com bining th e  w orld 
w ith th e  se lf , th e  I  w ith  th e  Thou, and  a r t i s t  w ith  h is a r t ,  th e  
R om antic th in k e r was m etaphorically  ab le  t o  m ake sense  o f  h is own 
ex istence .
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This R om antic th e o ry  o f m etaphor and im ag ina tion  would have been 
a n t ith e t ic a l to  A ris to tle 's  o r  to  Hobbes's o r  even  t o  K arl Popper's
more c la ss ic is t b e lie f  in  th e  divisions w ithin  language. For Hobbes,
fo r  exam ple, im ag ination  was a  p ro d u c t o f  sense  p ercep tio n , and po e tic
m im esis was th e  a r t  o f cap tu ring  th e  tro p e s  t h a t  n a tu re  provided in  a
pleasing  fashion. The v ir tu e  o f hero ic  p o e try , A ris to tle  and  Hobbes
m aintained, was i t s  ab ility  to  give glory t o  th e  g r e a t  deeds perfo rm ed
by gods and by men. A esthe tic  experience could  be  found in  m an's more
d e lig h tfu l diversions: po e try , d ram a , m usic and  dance? m etaphors w ere
to  be designed fo r  a  sp ec ific  purpose: t o  s e c re tly  in s tru c t  th e  re a d e r
o r to  provide him w ith pleasing im ages to  engage his a tte n tio n .
C ontrary  to  th e  te n e ts  o f  th e  c lassica l tra d itio n , " the  pow er of 
poetry ," Coleridge w ro te  in  h is essay  on S hakespeare 's T em pest, "is,
by a  single word perhaps, to  s t i l l  t h a t  energy  in to  th e  mind which
59com pels im ag ination  to  produce th e  p ic tu re ."  T h a t p ic tu re  o f  th e  
world which th e  p o e t draw s m etaphorically  is  held  to g e th e r  by his 
im agination . I t  is  an  im ag ination  which m etaphorically  com bines th e  
o b jec ts  which p re se n t th em se lv es  in  th e  a r t is ts ' p a th . I t  is  only by 
th is  a c tiv e , m etapho rica l p a rtic ip a tio n  in  th e  world, a s  opposed to  
i t s  passive, c lin ica l descrip tion , t h a t  th e  m etaphoric  im age  becom es 
r e a l  and  th u s  fo rm s p a r t  o f man's f e l t  experience . In  th is  way th e
Rom antic ego becam e ob jec tified  by language -  t h a t  is  t o  say , language
was a t  once a  p a r t  o f man and y e t  also was ou tside th e  se lf, tu rn ing  
in to  th e  p rim ary  veh ic le  in  which th e  s e lf  was d iscovered . Through
m etaphor, th e  R om antic notion  o f  th e  se lf  becam e an  o b je c t to  be
pondered  and stud ied .
Section Four:
The D econstruction ist A pproach t o  M etaphor
The d eco n stru c tio n is t approach to  m etaphor is  e n tire ly  subversive to  
w hat has gone b efo re . We waHow in  m etaphors, th e  deco n stru c tio n ists  
claim , and  th e  divisions o f discourse in  which th e  c lassic is ts , 
em p iric ists , ra tio n a lis ts  and o th e rs  have philosophized should no 
longer be m aintained. The Popperian would lik e  to  argue  t h a t  th e re  
a re  c e r ta in  f a c ts  which can  be v erified  by a tten d in g  to  th e  accu racy
of ou r s c ie n tif ic  descrip tions; th e  c la ss ic is t would lik e  t o  believe 
t h a t  th e re  a re  d e a r  d is tinc tions  betw een  th e  form  o f th e  sen ten c e  and 
i t s  co n ten t, betw een  th e  l i te r a l  m eaning o f a  p roposition  and i t s
fig u ra tiv e  meaning; th e  Rom antic would lik e  t o  th in k  t h a t  th e  a r t i s t  
im bues an  o rd er on to  th e  cosm os by im ag ina tive ly  engaging w ith i t .  I t  
is  because  th e  d eco n stru c tio n ist d isag rees w ith a l l  th r e e  tra d itio n s  
t h a t  deconstruction ism  rem ains th e  m ost con troversia l o f th e  
approaches to  m etaphor so  f a r  encoun tered . Language, i t  is  sa id  by 
th e  deco n stru c tio n ist, is  b u t a  f ic tio n  o f  th e  tru th ;  th e  au th o r, th e
R om antic ego, is  b u t an  im ag inative  co n stru c tio n  which does n o t e x is t 
outside discourse; and m etaphor is  b u t a  to o l  t h a t  philosophers use to  
pave over th is  u n tru th  o f language and o f th e  se lf .
The in i t ia l  move th e  d econstruc tion ists  m ake is  t o  p o in t o u t t h a t
a l l  language  is  rh e to r ic a l. J u s t  a s  th e  p o litic a l o ra to r  m ay  overtly
seek  t o  persuade his audience to  follow a  p a r tic u la r  course  o f ac tio n ,
th e  p o litic a l philosopher covertly  t r i e s  t o  persuade h is re a d e rs  th a t ,
fo r  in s ta n c e , reaso n  and ra tio n a lity  a re  on h is side , o r  even  t h a t
reaso n  and  ra tio n a lity  com prise th e  litm u s  t e s t  o f  w hat i t  m eans to
engage in  philosophy. "W hat is  c a lled  'rhetorical* '" N ietzsche
argued, "as th e  dev ices o f a  conscious a r t ,  is  p re se n t a s  a  dev ice of
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unconscious a r t  in  language and i t s  developm ent." A ccording to  
N ietzsche,
"We can  go so f a r  a s  to  say t h a t  rh e to ric  i s  an  ex tension  o f
th e  dev ices em bedded in  language...no  such th in g  a s  u n rh e to rica l,
'na tu ra l' language ex ists  th a t  could be used a s  a  p o in t o f
re fe re n c e ; language is  its e lf  th e  re su lt  o f  pu rely  rh e to r ic a l
tr ic k s  and devices...T ropes a re  n o t som ething t h a t  can  be added
o r  a b s tra c te d  from  language a t  will; th e y  a re  i t s  t r u e s t  n a tu re ."  60
All language by i t s  v e ry  n a tu re  ca rr ie s  w ith  i t  a  rh e to r ic a l  e lem en t. 
M oreover, N ietzsche argued, th e  know ledge t h a t  language  conveys is
irred eem ab ly  m etaphorical: e i th e r  i t  is  based  upon old, fo rg o tte n
m etaphors o r  i t  is  em bellished with new tro p e s  t h a t  can n o t be  d ivorced
from  th e  language w ithou t a  lo ss  in  m eaning. The crux  o f  N ietzsche 's
arg u m en t r e s ts  on th e  observation t h a t
"T here is  no 'rea l' expression and no r e a l  knowing a p a r t  from
m etaphor. But decep tion  on th e  pcdnt r e  m ains... The m ost
accustom ed  m etaphors, th e  usual ones, now pass fo r  tru th s  and
as  s tan d ard s  fo r  m easuring th e  r a re r  ones. The only in tr in s ic
d iffe ren ce  h e re  is  th e  d ifference betw een  custom  and novelty /
R1frequency  and ra r ity ."
W henever we speak  o f tru th , N ietzsche po in ted  ou t, we do so by 
speaking in  old, dead  m etaphors, n o t rea liz in g  t h a t  th e i r  orig inal 
meaning has becom e e ffaced . Quentin Skinner may w rite  a  book e n title d  
The Foundations o f Modem P o litica l Thought b u t th is  is  t o  m ake heavy
on
use o f  th e  m etaphor o f  "foundationalism ." This old m etaphor em bedded 
in  th e  tifLe suggests  to  th e  re a d e r  t h a t  m odem  p o litic a l th o u g h t 
began, say , in  th e  th ir te e n th  cen tu ry  and t h a t  a  p a r tic u la r  th in k e r  o r  
m om ent can  m ark th e  t r u e  beginning o f  m odem  p o litic a l th e o ry . In  his
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Philosophical Investigations W ittgenstein  d istinguishes betw een  th e  
m etaphors o f  f  oundationalism  and  bedrock: we do in d eed  re a c h  a
foundation  to  our in v estig a tio n s  when we can  go back  no fu r th e r , 
W itttgenste in  po in ts  ou t, b u t th is  does n o t m ean t h a t  we have
discovered  th e  bedrock  o f our in qu iries  since  i t s  t r u e  o rig ins rem a in
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fo re v e r  beyond our grasp . i t  is  t o  th e se  m etaphors in  d iscourse t h a t  
N ietzsche observes t h a t  "knowing is  noth ing  b u t  a  working w ith th e  
fa v o rite  m etaphors, an  im ita tin g  which is  no lo n g e r f e l t  t o  be an  
im ita tio n ."  The P la ton ic  view t h a t  a i l  know ledge is  m im esis is  
th e re fo re  re in fo rced  by N ietzsche 's observations; we im ita te  knowledge 
by using m etaphors and  tro p es , a i l  th e  w hile fa lse ly  believing t h a t
th is  m im esis conveys a c c u ra te  know ledge. F or N ietzsche th e  m im esis 
o f philosophy is  th e  im ita tio n  o f th e  w orld o f  ap pearance , th u s
tu rn in g  P la to  on his head. So in tr in s ic  is  m etaphor t o  ou r concep tion  
o f ourselves, N ietzsche suggested , t h a t  "one can n o t fo r  a  sing le
in s ta n c e  dispense w ith [m etaphors] in  th o u g h t, fo r  one would th e re b y
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dispense w ith man him self."
I t  is  w ith th e  above in s ig h t t h a t  Jacq u es  D errida has m ore
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re c e n tly  a t te m p te d  to  "deconstruct"  ph ilosophical d iscourse. Since
th e  m etaphor o f f  oundationalis m has been  ca lc ified  in to  an
epistem ciogy, D errida concludes, th e n  th e re  can  be  no su re  ground on
which to  c r it ic iz e  philosophy t h a t  does n o t  i t s e l f  f a l l  p rey  to  a
fo undational m etaphor. I t  i s  fo r  th is  reaso n  th a t  D errida c la im s t h a t
deconstructionism  is  n o t a  ph ilosophical tra d itio n  a t  a l l  b u t m ore o f
an  a t t i tu d e  to w ard s  philosophical d iscourse  (which is  th e  reaso n  why 
th is  sec tio n  is  e n title d  "The D econstru c tio n is t A pproach t o  M etaphor11
ra th e r  th a n  th e  "D econstruction ist T radition"). The language o f
D errida's d eco n stru c tio n is t e f fo r ts  is  th e re fo re  fu ll  o f word p lay  and
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in d ire c t a t ta c k s  upon various philosophical tra d itio n s , fo r  t o  engage
d ire c tly  w ith philosophical d iscourse is  to  concede t h a t  i t s
m etaphors, th e  myth o f  "presence" a s  D errida ca lls  i t ,  c a n  n e v e r be
co n tested . As Derrida would no doubt d escribe  h is  approach , w hat he 
has a tte m p te d  to  d iscover is  how can  philosophy a s  such  ap p e a r  to  
i t s e lf  o th e r  th a n  its e lf ,  so  t h a t  i t  can  in te r ro g a te  and  r e f l e c t  upon
its e lf  in  an  orig inal m anner.
A ty p ic a l  exam ple o f D erridian th o u g h t is  to  be found in  his
essay  on H usserlian philosophy, "S ignature, E vent, and  C ontext."  66 
D errida a rgues t h a t  H usserl's b e lie f t h a t  philosophy m ust s t a r t  w ith
w hat is  im m ed ia te ly  aw are  bo our senses is  d e fe c tiv e  fo r  tw o  reasons.
The f i r s t  concerns th e  problem  o f p resence  -  t h a t  is , w h a t is
im m ed ia te ly  p re se n t t o  our senses. The p resen t, D errida observes, is  
a c tu a lly  a  com posite  o f  t h a t  which we a re  p resen tly  aw are  o f  coupled 
w ith ou r understanding  o f th e  p a s t and  ou r ex p ec ta tio n s  fo r  th e  
fu tu re . T herefo re , H usserl's iso la tio n  o f th e  p re se n t from  th is  
co n tex tu a liza tio n  le a v e s  us w ith a  d en a tu red  p re se n t, D errida
contends, shorn  from  i t s  fu ll meaning.
The second problem  t h a t  D errida finds w ith  HusserL's philosophy
is  w ith  his d is tinc tion  be tw een  "expressive signs" ( th a t  is , th o se
signs in  language which convey meaning) and  'in d ic a tiv e  signs" (which
do n o t convey meaning b u t in d ic a te  th o se  signs t h a t  do). W hat D errida 
a rgues is  t h a t  fo r  anything t o  be  considered  a  sign i t  m ust hav e  an  
app lication  which is  n o t found in  th e  sign i ts e lf .  The sign 's m eaning 
m ust p a r tia lly  re s id e  ou tside i ts e lf ,  ju s t  a s  any single w ord m ust 
necessarily  e x is t  in  c o n te x t w ith o th e r  w ords in  o rd e r to  have  any
m eaning. W hat th is  suggests in  reg a rd s  t o  m etaphor is  t h a t  language
does n o t  have a  "presence" in  th e  words th em se lv es , b u t  r a th e r  i t s
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meaning is  to  be  lo c a te d  ou tside i t s  own d iscourse. M eaning can  n ev e r 
find  a  "presence" in  any single word. The d is tin c tio n  b e tw een  l i te r a l  
and m etapho rica l co llapses because  th e  v e ry  no tion  o f lib e ra lity  o r 
p resence  ca n  no lo n g e r be m aintained. A ll language  po in ts  ou tside
itse lf ; a l l  language is , in  a  sense, f ig u ra tiv e .
To N ietzsche 's  suggestion  t h a t  one can n o t d ispense w ith
m etaphoric th o u g h t "fo r one would th e re b y  dispense w ith  man him self," 
D errida has a  co n tro v e rsia l rep ly : th e  a t te m p t t o  lo c a te  th e
ind iv idual ou tside o f language m ust n ecessarily  end in  fa ilu re . T here 
is  nothing in  th e  world e x c e p t language o r  th e  te x t ,  and  s ince , to  
borrow from  H eidegger, man is  fo rev e r housed in  language, no man's 
language can  be  e n tire ly  ca lled  h is  own. The a u th o r d isappears  w ithin 
th e  t e x t  -  o r  r a th e r  th e  t e x t  is  th e  only th in g  t h a t  ex is ts  -  and, 
w hat is  m ore, em bedded w ithin a re  th e  m etaphors and  o th e r  
inconsistenc ies  o f d iscourse t h a t  sow th e  seeds fo r  th e  te x t 's  
u lt im a te  unraveling. T here a re  tw o  co n tro v e rsia l c la im s, th e re fo re , 
o f deconstruction ism : f irs tly , t h a t  th e  m etaphors w ith in  th e  t e x t
b e tra y  th e  te x t 's  own ideology; secondly, t h a t  o f  th e  p ro c lam atio n  o f 
th e  'd ea th ' o f th e  au thor.
Now a  response to  th e  above d eco n s tru c tio n is t a cc o u n t o f  au th o rs  
and m etaphoric  te x ts  m ight ta k e  th e  follow ing lin e : t h a t  hidden w ithin 
th e  d eco n s tru c tio n is t approach  is  a  hidden id eo lo g ica l agenda. A fte r  
a ll, one can n o t c r it ic iz e  foundationalism  w ithou t stand ing  upon som e 
kind o f foundation  oneself. D eco nstruc tion ist d iscourse draw s upon an  
in te rp la y  b e tw een  th e  language o f th e  t e x t  u nder considera tion  and 
suggests t h a t  th e  rh e to r ic a l f la v o r o f  th e  t e x t  m asks a  p re fe ren c e  
fo r , say , th e  s ta tu s  quo o r  fo r  som e o th e r  world v iew . This position  
can  be  sa id  to  be ak in  to  a  kind o f c u ltu ra l m ateria lism . The t e x t  is
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considered by th e  deconstruc tion ists  to  b e  an  ideo lo g ica l t r a c t  which 
should oriLy be re a d  in  a  way th a t  th e  a u th o r had  n o t in ten d ed , and 
m etaphors a re  understood  a s  i f  th e y  w ere u n in ten tio n a l F reudian  slips. 
Read in  th is  fash ion , th e  explication  o f any t e x t  m ust su b v e rt th e  
au tho r's  in ten tio n , fo r  only th e  deconstructL onist can  tru ly  d e te rm in e  
w hat la y  hidden w ithin th e  au thor's  though ts. M oreover, m etaphors can  
only b e tra y  th e  au th o r's  in ten tio n  by revea lin g  th o se  th in g s  which he 
would n ev er d a re  acknow ledge w ith his supposed l i te r a l  language. B ut 
th is  is  to  presum e t h a t  th e  au thor is  n o t aw are  o f  th is  own in ten tio n s  
and t h a t  only th e  deconstructLonist diagnosis o f  h is language  can  be 
applicable. Such is  th e  dubious foundation  th e  deconstructL onist 
s tan d s upon when he c r it ic iz e s  m etaphoric te x ts  and foundationalism .
The second co n tro v ersia l claim  w ith  reg a rd s  to  m etaphoric
language concerns th e  supposed d ea th  o f  th e  au th o r, and  w ith i t  
presum ably  th e  dem ise o f th e  au thor's  im ag ination . In  th e  sam e m anner 
t h a t  N ietzsche p rocla im ed  th e  d ea th  o f God, D errida, P au l de Man and 
o th e rs  proclaim  th e  d e a th  o f th e  au th o r. To th e  m yth o f
'Togocentrism " -  th e  b e lie f  t h a t  th e re  is  m eaning, a  p resence , in  th e  
word -  th e  deconstructL onist responds, to  borrow from  G ertrude S tein, 
t h a t  " th e re  is  no th e re ,  th e re ."  Since a l l  read in g s  o f  th e  t e x t  a re  
n ecessarily  m isreadings -  t h a t  is , s ince  no fu ll and  f in a l 
understanding  o f th e  t e x t  can  be claim ed, th e n  th e re  is  no end to  w hat 
th e  deconstructL onist can  read  in to  th e  te x t ,  and hence th e  
p layfu lness o f  much o f d eco n stru c tio n ist p rose . A ris to tle 's  "zoon 
logon echon" becom es rep laced  by "homo ludens." This is  why th e  
d eco n stru c tio n is t im ag ination  is  usually  c e le b ra te d  to  th e  n e g le c t o f
th e  au tho r's  im ag ination  which is  being sc ru tin ized , why th e  m etaphors 
t h a t  deconstruction ism  em ploys a re  used  t o  d is s e c t th e  t e x t  while
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th o se  o f th e  t e x t  i ts e lf  a re  th o u g h t to  be confused and m isleading.
I  do n o t wish t o  dweU to o  long  h e re  on th e  su b je c t o f
im ag ination  (which is  th e  su b jec t o f th e  l a s t  chap te r), only to  p o in t 
o u t one s a lie n t fe a tu re  t h a t  rem a in s  unacknow ledged in  
deconstructLonist prose: t h a t  th e  au th o r o r  th e  a r t i s t  c re a te s  h is 
work in  response to  th e  world -  t h a t  is  t o  say , t o  th e  a lre ad y  c re a te d  
world which th e  a u th o r finds him self inhab iting , he responds by an  a c t  
o f co u n te r-c rea tio n  o f his own: nam ely , th e  t e x t .  The
deconstructLonist position  th a t  th e  au th o r is  m erely  th e  condu it in  
which th e  p re jud ices o f so c ie ty  express th e m se lv es  is  i t s e l f  blind to  
th e  p resence  o f  th e  "O ther" to  whom th e  au th o r add resses  his te x t .
The a r t i s t  and au th o r respond to  th e  world in  a  c e r ta in  way, and th is  
response is  a  r iv a l  c re a tio n  to  n a tu re 's  o r  to  God's. And although 
his response may in  la rg e  p a r t  consist o f  th e  d om inan t m etaphors o f 
his tim e , and hence displaying th e  dom inan t ideology in  which th e  t e x t  
was w ritten , th e se  m etaphors a re  n ev erth e less  th e  au th o r's  c re a tiv e  -  
ac tiv e  a s  opposed to  passive -  response to  t h a t  world.
There is  w hat can  be  generousLy d escribed  a s  "com m onsense
deconstruction ism ": a  b e lie f  th a t  th e  m eaning in  th e  word rev ea ls  a
d isp lacem en t o f  language, one where m eaning is  n ev e r housed in  th e
word i ts e lf  b u t co n tex tua lized , never fix ed  o r  even  re a d ily  ap p aren t.
Y et a t  th e  sam e tim e  our com monsense deconstruction ism  m ight a lso  w ant
to  hold t h a t  a l l  language is  in  essence  p layfu l, t h a t  words should
n ev er ta k e  them seLves to o  seriousLy, t h a t  d iscourse  should s tr iv e
n ever to  f a l l  in to  th e  t r a p  o f logocen trism . A fte r  a ll, i t  is  
possible t o  view  m etaphor both a s  a  to o l  o f  co n ce a lm en t and  a s  a
c rea tiv e  response to  th e  world. As th e  work o f genius, a s  A ris to tle
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recognized , m etaphor im ag inative ly  com bines th e  o b jec ts  o f  th is  world 
to  produce in s ig h t in to  how th e  world w orks and in to  how we perce ive  
th e  world working. Our com monsense th e o ry  o f d eco n stru c tio n  would 
th e n  view  m etaphor a s  p a r t  o f  our im ag in a tiv e  response  t o  th e  world. 
M etaphor should be seen  a s  som ething revea lin g  and  n o t  alw ays a s  
som ething  s in is te r.
The case  fo r  com monsense deconstructionism  can  be found in  
pockets  o f  th e  AngLo-American philosophical tra d itio n  and, in  
p a rticu la r, in  th e  work o f  W.V. Quine. In  h is a r t ic le  "Two Dogmas o f 
Em piricism " published w ith a  co llec tion  o f  essays e n title d  From a  
Logical P o in t o f View, Quine argues, w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  tra d itio n a l 
a n a ly tic /sy n th e tic  d is tin c tio n , t h a t  one can  no lo n g e r "hold th e
b elie f t h a t  each  m eaningful s ta te m e n t is  eq u iv a len t to  som e lo g ic a l
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c o n s tru c t upon te rm s  which r e f e r  to  im m ed ia te  experience."  Boiled
down, Quine's th e s is  m eans t h a t  th e  K antian  b e lie f  t h a t  som e
s ta te m e n ts  correspond to  re a li ty  (syn thetic  propositions) while o th e rs
re f e r  only to  th e  meaning o f  th e  te rm s  used  (analy tic  propositions)
can n o t be  adequa te ly  d iffe re n tia te d . S yn the tic  s ta te m e n ts  such  as
"B rita in  is  surrounded by w ater" can n o t be t r u e  sim ply by pointing o u t
how th e  world is  co n s tru c ted . The te rm s  "B rita in , "surrounded" and 
"w ater" a l l  have t o  be an a ly tica lly  explained  in  o rd e r  fo r  th is
s ta te m e n t to  m ake sense . So Quine's co llapse o f  th e
an a ly tic /sy n th e tic  d is tin c tio n  in  philosophy would su g g es t t h a t  a
purely  ra tio n a l o r  em p irica l form  o f d iscourse could n o t be said  t o  be
priv ileged  over o th e rs  a s  being necessarily  t ru e .  This would also
e n ta il t h a t  rh e to r ic  and p o e tic  language would n o t necessarily  be
in fe rio r  to  so -ca lled  l i te r a l  d iscourse.
A t th e  h e a r t  o f  Quine's philosophy is  th e  acknow ledgem ent t h a t
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th e re  is  no foundation  to  th e  meaning o f  words. In s tead  o f  being
fixed  in  th e i r  correspondence w ith th e  world, th e  m eaning o f  words can 
only be conventionally  ag reed  upon, o r r a th e r  f a i l  in to  an  in f in ite  
re g re ss  o f  p rio r m eanings and  p rio r co n tex ts . (We seem  to  have
red iscovered  h e re  th e  w orld o f P la to 's  C ra ty lu s.) W hat can  be
considered  t o  be l i te r a l  and  w hat can  be th o u g h t o f  a s  m e tap h o rica l is
only a  d iffe ren ce  o f  d eg ree  and n o t o f kind. " I t is  a  m istake, th en ,"
Quine arg u es  in  th e  b r ie f  a r t ic le  on th e  su b je c t o f  m etaphor
originally  published in  1978, " to  th in k  o f  lin g u is itic  usage as  
l i te ra l is t ic  in  i t s  main body and  m e tapho rica l in  i t s  trim m ing .
M etaphor, o r  som ething  lik e  i t ,  governs b o th  th e  g row th  o f  language
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and ou r acqu isition  o f f t."  A t th e  sam e tim e , how ever, Quine also
s tre sse s  th e  playfu lness o f  m etaphoric  language in  th e  sam e m anner 
t h a t  th e  C on tinen ta l deco n stru c tio n ists  do: m etaphor "flourishes in
p lay fu l p rose and high p o e tic  a r t ,  b u t i t  is  also  v i ta l  a t  th e  grow ing
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edges o f sc ien ce  and philosophy," Quine argues.
The deconstructLonist, N ietzschean , Q uinean p o in t t h a t  h as  been  
voiced  on bo th  sides o f th e  A tlan tic  is  t h a t  language is  hopelessly 
m etaphorical and, to  th is  end, i t  is  ex tre m ely  d iff ic u lt t o  m ain tain  
th e  cl a ss ic a l-  A risto te lian  d is tin c tio n s  be tw een  th e  form  and  th e  
c o n te n t o f sen tences , be tw een  th e  rh e to r ic a l and  th e  n o n -rh e to ric a l 
e lem en ts  o f  speech , be tw een  th e  m etaphorical and  th e  p u re ly  l i te r a l  
com ponents o f our language. R ichard R orty, fo r  in s ta n c e , h as  re c e n tly  
p laced  g r e a t  em phasis on th e  ocu la r m etaphors o f  philosophy, pointing 
o u t t h a t  th e se , to o , have a  hidden ep istem ic  purpose. Once th e se  
m etaphors have been  seen  fo r  w hat th e y  tru ly  a re , R orty suggests , th e n  
i t  m ight be possible to  e n te r ta in  a  non-foundational o r  ev en  a  
R aw lsian-style p o litic a l philosophy.70
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I t  is  beyond th e  scope o f th is  work to  ev a lu a te  such  c la im s fo r
fu tu re  po litical p ro jec ts , i f  only to  a s s e r t  t h a t  th e re  is  an  obvious
te n sio n  betw een  con stru c tin g  a  th e o ry  o f th e  s ta te  w ithou t also
providing th e  m etapho rica l grounds fo r  i t s  ex isten ce . On th e  o th e r
hand, a  purely  d e co n s tru c tio n is t c ritiq u e  o f, say , th e  m etaphors o f
Thom as Hobbes m ight be  f ru it fu l i f  done w ith  cau tion . The cau tio n  is  
n ecessary  because th e  d eco n s tru c tio n is t som etim es assum es t h a t  since
th e  s tudy  o f  ep is te m d o g y  has l i t t l e  m e rit fo r  th e  l a t e  tw e n tie th
cen tu ry  mind, th e n  th e  sam e holds t r u e  fo r  th e  se v en te en th  cen tu ry
philosopher a s  welL The fa lla c y  o f  th is  position  is  t h a t  fo r  th e
sev en te en th  cen tu ry  th in k e r  th e  su b je c t o f  being, which req u ired  a
co n stru c tio n  o r  foundation  o f  som e so r t ,  was in sep arab le  from  t h a t  o f
ep istem ology and o f language. F o r Hobbes and  o th e rs  th e  co n ce p t o f
mind could only be  made in te llig ib le  in  language . Logos could never
be d ivorced  from  nous because  t h a t  was w h at th e  logos was fo r.
O therw ise we w ere m erely bundles o f  sense  im pressions w ithou t any
cognitive know ledge o f w hat th e y  w ere. The su b je c t o f  m etaphors
simpLy cam e a s  an  a fte rth o u g h t. The tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  philosopher and
th e  sev en teen th  cen tu ry  th in k e r o p e ra te  in  tw o  d if fe re n t worlds. The
d eco n s tru c tio n is t a t te m p t  to  superim pose i t s  ph ilosophical view  onto
th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  m ight occasionally  end  up producing a rgum ents
th a t ,  fo r  exam ple, Hobbes, Bacon and  Locke w ere philosophically  naive
o r  w ere in c o n sis ten t w ith  w hat we now know to  be t ru e .  N o t t h a t  th e se
propositions a re  u n tru e , only t h a t  th e y  a re  n o t a lw ays th e  m ost
a rre s tin g  th ings t h a t  one can  say  ab o u t th e se  th inkers .
I t  m ight be ap p a re n t by now t h a t  m etaphor, tru ly  a  su b je c t o f  baroque 
com plex ity , has many d iverse  app lications. We have id e n tif ie d  fo u r
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d iffering  tra d itio n s  o f m etaphoric  th o u g h t, b u t  i t  should be made
d e a r  t h a t  th is  num ber can  easily  be quadrupled. Each o f  th e se  fo u r 
tra d itio n s  has been  id e n tif ied  because , i t  w ill b e  argued  a  l i t t l e  
la te r ,  eac h  to u ch es  upon som e a s p e c t o f  Hobbesian o r  o f  p o litic a l
though t. M oreover, th e se  approaches to  m etaphor speak  to  th e  la rg e r  
problem  o f  try in g  t o  c o n s tru c t a  system  o f p o litic a l know ledge which 
is  n o t m etaphorical, a  problem  t h a t  Hobbes h im self was to  confron t.
For th e  p re se n t l e t  u s  rem ind  ourselves o f  th e  ubiquitousness o f 
m etaphoric models in  bo th  sc ien ce  and  so c ia l sc ien ce , th e ir  genesis in  
G reek tho u g h t, th e i r  m etapho rica l im p o rtan ce  to  R om antic ideology, and 
th e ir  troub lesom e ex is ten ce  fo r  th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  th in k e r. I f  a l l  
th o u g h t is  m etaphoric , a s  N ietzsche suggests, th e n  i t  m akes l i t t le  
sense in  try in g  to  r id  language o f  i t s  m ost constituatLve e lem en t, 
p a rticu la rly  w ith re g a rd s  to  p o litic a l tho u g h t. Perhaps i t  is  th e  
im possib ility  o f our d iscovering a  pu rely  l i te ra l ,  log ica l, o r
ra tio n a l d iscourse which abandons im ag ina tion  and  c re a tiv e  in s ig h t 
th a t  p rev en ts  us from  consulting our d a rk e r  p o litic a l in s tin c ts . As 
long  a s  we a re  aw are  t h a t  m etaphor pervades our d iscourse th e n  no 
language can  claim  to  have a  monopoly on th e  tru th .  In  th is  way
m etaphor gives b ir th  to  p o litic a l and philosophical possib ility .
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CHAPTER TWO:
WHAT POLITICAL METAPHORS MEAN
M etaphor c re a te s  a  re a l ity  from  which th e  original appears  
to  be unreal. —W allace S tevens
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The tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  has w itnessed tw o  con flic ting  accoun ts  o f  
m etaphor and in  many ways th e se  tw o  acco u n ts  p a ra lle l th e  c lass ica l 
and R om antic d eb a te  ou tlined  in  th e  p rev ious ch ap te r. The f ir s t ,  w h a t 
can  be  ca lled  th e  o n to log ica l v iew , a rg u es  t h a t  m etaphor occasions 
m ost o f  our im ag in a tiv e  m en ta l p rocesses and  t h a t  th e  s e a t  o f m an's 
p o e tic  and  philosophic ex is ten ce  exp resses i t s e l f  in  m etaphor, 
bridging th e  gap be tw een  th o u g h t and speech . In  th e  "on to log icar1 
view , m etaphor is  n o t sim ply a  figu re  o f  speech  b u t an  em e rg e n t way o f 
being. The second a cc o u n t o f m etaphor, w hat can  be ca lled  th e  
" lite ra l"  v iew , a rg u es  t h a t  m etaphors m ean only w hat th e ir  l i te r a l  
in te rp re ta tio n s  mean, t h a t  a t te m p ts  to  philosophize usually  end  in  a  
b ew itch m en t o f  m etaphoric  expressions, and  t h a t  m etaphor is  a  
m ake-believe tr u th ,  dazz ling  us w ith i t s  b rilliance  lik e  shadow s 
dancing on th e  w alls o f P la to 's  cave . The follow ing is  only in ten d ed  
a s  a  sk e tch  o f th e s e  co n tra s tin g  view points. I t  is  argued  t h a t  th e  
on to log ica l v iew , although  im ag in a tiv e ly  a rre s tin g , fa ils  to  com m and 
th e  ground o f com m onsense. T here is  no reason  to  assum e th a t  som e 
m etaphoric  expressions a re  p riv ileged  ov er o th e rs  a s  in tim a tin g  w hat 
Hannah A rend t lab e ls  a s  th e  "ineffable" o f  th e  hum an condition. The 
l i te r a l  v iew , how ever, w ith i t s  focus on th e  language  t o  th e  n e g le c t 
o f  th e  m etaphoric  im ag e , equally  fa ils  to  o f fe r  an  ad eq u a te  acc o u n t o f 
w hat is  sp ec ia l ab o u t m etaphor.
A ppropriately , th e  o n to log ica l and th e  l i te r a l  view occupy th e  
f i r s t  tw o -th ird s  o f  th is  c h a p te r  and  an  a lte rn a tiv e  "com m on sensory" 
view is  te n ta tiv e ly  o ffe red  in  th e  l a s t  th ird . A lthough th is  l a s t  
se c tio n  may only be  p a rtia lly  successfu l, th e  hope is  t o  r e ta in  th e  
main s tren g th s  o f th e  on to log ica l and l i t e r a l  view s w hilst a t  th e  sam e 
tim e  le a v e  som e room  to  ap p re c ia te  m an's need  t o  o rd e r and c re a te  a
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p o litic a l re a l ity , even  i f  t h a t  re a li ty  is  u ltim a te ly  grounded upon 
m etaphor. I t  w ill be  a rgued  in  th e  n e x t c h a p te r  t h a t  th is  is  ind eed  
Hobbes's own program ; one t h a t  is  n e ith e r  on to log ica l n o r l i t e r a l  b u t  
a  com bination  o f th e  tw o . A t th e  h e a r t  o f  Hobbes's p o litic a l 
philosophy, i t  w ill be argued  th ro u g h o u t th e  rem a in d er o f  th is  th e sis , 
i s  an  acc o u n t o f  po litica l know ledge t h a t  m akes heavy use  o f th e  
m etaphoric  im ag e , occupying th e  middle ground be tw een  th e  tw o  r iv a l  
acco u n ts  o f  m etaphor b rie fly  sk e tch ed  in  th is  ch ap te r.
"F or every  r e a l  being," P la to  w ro te  in  his Seventh  E p istle , 
" th e re  a re  th r e e  th in g s  t h a t  a re  n ecessary  i f  know ledge o f  i t  is  to  be  
acquired : f ir s t ,  th e  nam e; second, th e  defin ition ; th ird , th e  im age."  
A lthough P la to 's  au thorsh ip  o f  th is  l e t t e r  has been  co n tes ted , th is  
t r i - p a r t i te  division o f  know ledge, i t  w ill be argued , is  Hobbesian to  
th e  co re , and i t  is  to  th e  th ird  p a r t ,  th e  im ag e  -  o r  more t o  th e  
po in t, th e  m etaphoric im age  -  t h a t  th e  follow ing addresses its e lf .
S ection  One:
The Ontnlogical-C ognitive View
The on to log ical-cognitive  view  o f  m etaphor holds t h a t  th is  p a r tic u la r
fig u re  o f  speech  h as  a  m eaning and  fu n c tio n  t h a t  goes beyond any
o rd inary  d iscourse. Indeed , i t  i s  th o u g h t by th e  holders o f  th is  view  
t h a t  m etaphor b e s t  cap tu re s  th e  essen ce  o f  w h at th e  hum an condition
en ta ils . A ppropriately , an  e n tire ly  new vocabulary  has been  c re a te d
in  o rd e r to  understand  i t s  use. The p io n eer o f  th is  new vocabulary
was LA . R ichards who suggested  in  h is The Philosophy o f R hetoric
th a t  in  m etaphor an  " in te rac tion" occu rs  be tw een  th e  "tenor" o f  th e
m etaphor and i t s  "v eh ic le ."1 Follow ing in  LA . R ichard 's fo o ts te p s ,
Max B lack has m ore re c e n tly  a rgued  t h a t  th is  ten sio n  be tw een  w h at
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Black a l te rn a te ly  lab e ls  a s  th e  "focus" and th e  "fram e" o f m etaphor,
c re a te s , w hat Black ca lls , a  "parallel im p lica tio n  com plex," one w here
th e  m etaphor's su b je c t and p re d ic a te  a re  com bined to  e s tab lish  an
e n tire ly  new m eaning. 2
W hat Black has a t te m p te d  to  do, follow ing R ichards, h as  been  t o
expand A ris to tle 's  c r i te r ia  o f  m etaphor t o  inc lude  a  th i rd  e lem en t.
As seen  in  c h a p te r  one, A ris to tle  believed  t h a t  m etaphor e i th e r
" tran sfe rred "  one te rm  fo r  a n o th e r (w hat B lack ca lls  th e
"substitu tion" theory ) o r  com bined unlike te rm s  which fo r  A ris to tle
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was a  "sign o f genius" (w hat B lack ca lls  th e  "com parative" th eo ry ).
Black has in s is te d  t h a t  i f  m etaphor i s  to  be ad eq u a te ly  understood ,
th e n  A ris to tle 's  c r i te r ia  needs to  be  am ended to  inc lude  a  th i rd
descrip tion  o f  m etaphor, w h a t B lack lab e ls  a s  th e  " in te rac tio n "
th e o ry . B lack's well-know n (and well-worn) exam ple o f a  m etaphor t h a t
fa lls  in to  n e ith e r  o f  th e  tw o  A ris to te lian  ca teg o rie s  is  "m an i s  a
w olf." H ere, B lack argues, th e  fo cu s o f th e  m etaphor ("man")
in te ra c ts  w ith  th e  f ra m e  ("wolf") so  t h a t  th e  h e a re r  is  th e n
in tro d u ced  to  a  new in sig h t. The te rm  "wolf," B lack con tends, can n o t
be red u ced  t o  a  m ore l i t e r a l  tra n s la tio n  w ith o u t a  subsequen t lo ss  o f
m eaning. I t  s tan d s  t o  rea so n  th e n , Black concludes, t h a t  th is
m etaphor has a  sp ec ia l cogn itive  m eaning t h a t  is  beyond a  m ere
4su b stitu tio n  o r  com parison o f  te rm s . Som ething cognitively  new  is  
c re a te d  by such m etaphors, B lack argues, and he  h as  suggested
elsew here  in  h is Models and M etaphors t h a t  th is  new m eaning explains
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th e  frequency  o f m etaphoric models in  sc ien ce .
Now s e v e ra l p o litic a l th e o ris ts ,  c itin g  B lack's c e le b ra te d  
exp lanation  o f  how m etaphors fun c tio n , have suggested  t h a t  p o li tic a l 
m etaphors a lso  have a  sp ec ia l cogn itive  m eaning t h a t  can n o t be  red u ced
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to  l i t e r a l  language. G ioseppa S accaro -B attdsti a rg u es  t h a t  p o litic a l 
m etaphors "have a  unique cogn itive  fu n c tio n  q u ite  d if fe re n t  from  th e
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lo g ic a l fu n c tio n  o f a b s tr a c t  concep ts."  This cogn itive  function , 
S accaro -B attd sti adds, se rv es  a s  a  "m ora lis tic  m essage" d irec tin g  
people t o  how th e y  ough t to  liv e .7 Zashin and Chapm an argue t h a t  in  
som e w ays B lack's a cc o u n t o f cognitive m etaphor does n o t go f a r  enough 
to  explain  w h at th e y  c a ll  m etaphor's "anom alous a sse rtio n  o f
g
id e n tity ," and  R ichard Brown su ggests  t h a t  so c ia l th e o ry  in  g en e ra l is
9
com posed o f  th e se  "cognitive ae s th e tic "  m etaphors. Cognitive 
m etaphors c re a te  po litica l re a l ity , th e  a rg u m e n t goes, since , a s  
M urray Edelm an d ec la res , "language does n o t m irro r an  ob jec tiv e  
re a li ty , b u t i t  r a th e r  c re a te s  i t  by organizing  m eaningful percep tio n s  
a b s tra c te d  from  a  com plex, bew ildering w orld."10 This presupposes t h a t  
th e re  is  an  in te llig ib le  s tru c tu re  t o  th e  po litical world, one t h a t  is  
u ltim a te ly  know ab le  t o  us, and which can  be deciphered  by m eans o f  
m etaphor.
As can  be  im agined , B lack's th e s is  would be a  boon to  p o litic a l 
th e o ris ts  fo r  i t  would necessarily  e n ta il  t h a t  fo r  each  and every  
p o litic a l m etaphor a  cognitive m eaning could be a tta c h e d , c rea tin g  a  
new po litica l r e a l i ty  t h a t  c a n n o t be red u ced  t o  l i te r a l  p ropositions. 11 
W hat e x a c tly  th is  new p o litic a l re a li ty  is  would be d if f ic u lt t o  
gauge, f o r  a s  Saccaro-B attistL  has a ffirm ed , " the  sam e m etaphor may
12acqu ire  various, even  co n tra s tin g  m eanings in  d if fe re n t w riters."  
N evertheless, f o r  th o se  who follow  in  th e  p a th  f i r s t  c le a re d  by 
R ichards and  Black, th e  id e a  t h a t  in te ra c tiv e  p o litic a l m etaphors 
c re a te  p o litic a l r e a l i ty  is  highly a t tr a c t iv e .  Monroe BeardsLey, 
though h im self n o t  a  p o litic a l th e o ris t,  suggests  t h a t  a l l  m etaphors 
a re  cogn itively  in te ra c tiv e , a lthough  som e a re  m ore in te ra c tiv e  th a n
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o th e rs  -  a  s ta te m e n t which, i f  ta k e n  t o  i t s  lo g ic a l conclusion, would 
m ean t h a t  th e  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  p o litic a l m etaphors could n ev er be 
exhausted .
The on to log ical-cognitive  view  o f  m etaphor, th e n , lik e  i t s  
R om antic c o u n te rp a rt, holds t h a t  th is  fig u re  o f  speech  a r tic u la te s  
m ore th a n  w h at o rd inary  discourse can , t h a t  deep  w ithin  th e  m etaphoric  
ph rase  r e s ts  an  irred u c ib le  in s ig h t, expressing  som eth ing  t h a t  can n o t 
be cap tu red  in  any o th e r  way. Colin M urray Turbayne, fo r  exam ple, 
groups p o litic a l m etaphors in to  a  b a sk e t which inc lu d es  m yths, fab les ,
a llegories, and parab les. They a ll, Turbayne a rgues in  h is Myth and
13
M etaphor, express w hat is  o therw ise  inexpressib le . "We can n o t say
w hat re a l i ty  is," Turbayne contends, "only w h at i t  seem s to  us,
14
im prisoned  in  P la to 's  cave." "C an we n o t say ," P au l R icoeur rep lie s  
to  Turbayne in  his Rule o f  M etaphor, and  echoing B lack's th e sis , " th a t  
th e  s tra te g y  o f  language a t  work in  m etaphor consists  in  o b lite ra tin g  
th e  lo g ic a l and th e  estab lished  f ro n tie rs  o f  language, in  o rd e r to  
bring  t o  lig h t new resem b lan ces  th e  prev ious c la ss ifica tio n  k e p t us 
from  seeing?" 15 R iceour, to o , w hole-hearted ly  a c c e p ts  B lack's th e s is  
t h a t  m etaphors express a  cognitive in s ig h t, a r tic u la tin g  t h a t  which 
l i te r a l  language lacks. 16
Now th e  philosophical p resum ption  t h a t  cogn itive  m etaphors 
somehow enab le  us t o  glim pse a t  th e  t r u th  o f  th e  p o litic a l world has 
had  a  nobLe lineage . Perhaps th e  m ost su c c in c t s ta te m e n t on th e  
singu lar fa ilu re  o f  sim ply  lex is  to  express w h a t l ie s  hidden in  hum an 
experience  belongs n o t  t o  a  philosopher b u t t o  V irginia Woolf who 
w ro te , in  t h a t  p e r f e c t  sen ten ce : "Words faiL " Woolf could n o t have 
w ritten  "Words f a i l  because ..."  since  t h a t  would be  th e  v e ry  d en ia l o f 
th e  fo rc e  o f th e  u tte ra n c e , whose m eaning, i f  i t  could be ad eq u a te ly
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spoken o f, is  t h a t  words alone a c t  a s  poor su b s titu te s  f o r  ou r
th o u g h ts , leav ing  u s  o f te n  in a r t ic u la te  in  th e  fa c e  o f ou r deep er
em otions. Language, a s  A rend t te l ls  us in  h e r  L ife o f th e  Mind, is
th e  medium th rough  which ou r m en ta l a c t iv it ie s  (nous) expresses i ts e lf  
17(logos). B ut since  our m en ta l l i f e  c a n n o t alw ays be  adeq u a te ly  
expressed  verbally , A rend t con tends, we m ust use  m etaphor in  o rd e r to  
express t h a t  which i s  "ineffab le ." 18 Where words alone may fa il , in
o th e r  words, m etaphors succeed . M etaphors bridge t h a t  gap  be tw een  our 
m en ta l d isourse and our so c ia l d iscourse, A rend t argues, revea ling  in  
our logos th e  t r u e  l ife  o f th e  mind. 19
This is  th e  im p lic it on to log ical a rg u m en t a t  work in  th e
cogn itive  a cc o u n t o f  m etaphor. "The p lace  o f  m etaphor," R icoeur would 
have us believe, " its  m ost in t im a te  and  u ltim a te  abode, i t  is  n e ith e r  
th e  nam e, n o r th e  sen ten c e , no r even  d iscourse, b u t th e  copula o f  th e
on
verb  to  be." Does th is  m ean t h a t  hidden w ithin  th e  m etaphor as an  
on to log ica l tru th ?  The answ er, in  th is  cogn itive  accoun t, would seem  
to  be "yes." A lthough M artin  H eidegger, fo r  in s ta n c e , m akes l i t t l e  
m ention o f  m etaphor, many th e o ris ts  lik e  A rend t and R iceour c e rta in ly  
ta k e  th e ir  cue from  H eidegger's th e s is  t h a t  propositions a re  n o t in  
th em se lv es  th e  custod ians o f t ru th ,  r a th e r  th e  essence  o f  t r u th
21
re s id es  w ithin, w h at H eidegger ca lls , a  fu ll  "on to log ical unfolding."
If , a s  H eidegger a sse r ts , man is  fo re v e r  "housed in  language" and i f  
"language is  th e  locus o f man's being," th e n  one is  le d  t o  ask , since
i t  is  a rgued  t h a t  propositions th em se lv es  do n o t  co n ta in  any  such
tru th ,  ju s t  w here in  langauge does th is  t r u th  o r  being em erge?
M etaphor seem s t o  be  th e  like ly  and  n a tu ra l can d id a te  h e re , th e
on to log ica l view m aintains, g iven  th e  n o ticeab le  in ab ility  o f
philosophers to  fo rm u la te  in  n o n -rh e to ria l language a  c o h e re n t
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m etaphysics. In  his a r t ic le  on p o litic a l m etaphors, Eugene M iller
con tends t h a t  " the  a n c ie n t question  t h a t  has been  ra ise d  anew by 
H eidegger -  W hat is  a  th ing? -  m ust ev en tua lly  be  ra ised  o f p o litic a l 
th ings."  22 This on to log ica l question , M iller m aintains, i s  answ erable 
in  m etaphor.
A rend t a rg u es  t h a t  th e  fa ilu re  o f  philosophers t o  com e to  te rm s
w ith philosophical d iscourse rev ea ls  t h a t  nous c a n n o t be  adequa te ly
expressed  in  logos e x c e p t by m eans o f  m etaphor. "The re su lts  o f
philosophy a re  th e  uncovering," A rend t quo tes  from  W ittgenstein 's
Philosophical Investigations, "of bum ps t h a t  th e  in te l le c t  has g o t by
running i t s  head  a g a in s t th e  l im its  o f  language." 23 M etaphor,
subsequently , is  th e  philosopher's way o f  running around th e  lim its  o f
language. A rendt also  rep roduces  N ietzsche 's  rem a rk  th a t  his
philosophy can n o t be  com m unica ted , a t  l e a s t  n o t  in  p r in t .24 This
in ab ility  to  describe  in  l i te r a l  language a  philosophy o f  being is ,
accord ing  to  A rendt, com m on t o  many philosophers, including h er
fa v o rite  th in k e r, Im m anuel K ant. "A ll th inking," K ant d ec la red  in  th e
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C ritique o f Pure Reason, is  a  m eans o f  reach in g  in tu itio n ."  T hat 
which we in tu i t  from  can n o t be g rasped  by th e  mind, K an t believed, 
since i t  "is an  a r t  concealed  in  th e  dep th s  o f  th e  hum an soul, whose 
r e a l  modes o f  a c tiv ity  n a tu re  is  hard ly  lik e ly  t o  e v e r  allow us to  
d iscover, and  to  have open to  our g a z e ." 26 I t  i s  by th e  m etaphoric 
im ag e , A rend t th e n  re a d s  in to  K ant's s ta te m e n t a s  m eaning, t h a t  th is  
in s ig h t is  g iven a  nam e, t h a t  i s  m ade v isib le  in  th e  world o f 
appearances.
How, th e n , does th is  on to log ica l in s ig h t work? W hat is  th e  mode 
in  which th e  m eaning o f  a  p o litic a l m etaphor re v e a ls  its e lf?  Assuming 
th a t  th e se  a re  n o t tw o  en tire ly  d if fe re n t questions, th e  on to log ical
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acc o u n t o f m etaphor holds t h a t  in  e i th e r  ca se  m etaphor functions by 
com m ittin g  a  c a teg o ry  m istake. Borrowing from  G ilbert Ryle's 
descrip tion  o f  a  ca teg o ry  m istake in  his C oncep t o f Mind (a co n ce p t 
which, loose ly  described , m eans t h a t  i t  is  a  fa lla c y  to  u se  langauge 
belonging to  one ca teg o ry  when ta lk in g  o f ano ther) th e  on to lo g is t 
m aintains, using th e  te rm ino logy  developed by B lack and  R ichards, t h a t
th e  ten sio n  c re a te d  by th e  fra m e  and focus o f  a  m etaphor springs from
27
th e  associa tion  o f  tw o  e n tire ly  d is tin c t in d e n titie s . In  th is  way
Turbayne is  ab le  to  proclaim  t h a t  th e  m eaning o f  m etaphors, m yths,
28
p arab les , and  fab le s  com es from  asse rtin g  a  "ca teg o ry  confusion," and
R iceour t h a t  " th e  id e a  o f  c a teg o ry  m istake brings u s  c lo se r t o  ou r
29
goal" o f understanding how m etaphors function .
While one may d oub t w hether Ryle would approve o f  th e  way in  
which his ph rase  has been  co -op ted , i t  can  be argued  t h a t  th e  id e a
t h a t  m etaphor co n sists  o f a  c ross-po llination  be tw een  ca teg o rie s  
ex is ted  even  p rio r to  Ryle's d escrip tion . One hundred y ea rs  ago  Max 
M uller w ro te  in  his L ec tu res  on th e  Science o f Language t h a t  " th e re  
was, necessarily  and  rea lly , a  period  in  th e  h is to ry  o f  ou r ra c e  when
a l l  th e  th o u g h ts  t h a t  w en t beyond th e  narrow  horizon  o f ou r everyday
30
l i f e  had  to  be  expressed  by m eans o f m etaphors." In  h is c r itiq u e  o f 
M uller's com m ents, E rn s t C assirer w ro te  in  his Language and  Myth t h a t  
m etaphor 'invo lves  n o t  m erely a  tra n fe re n c e , b u t a  r e a l  m etabasis e is
alio  genus; in  f a c t ,  i t  i s  n o t only a  tra n s itio n  to  an o th e r  ca teg o ry ,
31
b u t a c tu a lly  th e  c re a tio n  o f  th e  ca teg o ry  itse lf ."  C assirer's  
suggestion  h e re  is  th e  u lt im a te  on to lo g ica l argum ent: by c re a tin g  i t s  
own c a teg o ry  m etaphor g ives b ir th  t o  i t s  own descrip tions. The
in s ig h t o f  m etaphors, C assire r w ro te , i s  t h a t  we can  " thereby
reco g n ize  them  fo r  w h at th e y  re a lly  a re : fo rm s o f [ th e  mind's] own
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se lf-rev e la tio n ." 32 I f  we d escribe  th e  " s ta te  a s  a  m achine," in  o th e r
words, w hat we have c re a te d  is  th e  id e n tity  o r  th e  ca teg o ry  o f  th e  
m ach in e-s ta te . A m istake o r confusion o f ca te g o rie s  th e re fo re  becom es
one and  th e  sam e w ith th e  on to log ical a rgum en t, id e n tic a l t o  R iceour's
copula to  be. In  his Speaking and M eaning Ja m e s  Edie arg u es  th e
m etaphor is  t h a t  "which c re a te s  and  b rings s im ila ritie s  t o  be r a th e r
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th a n  m erely  fo rm u la tin g  th em ."  The o n to lo g ica l th e o ris t,  th e re fo re ,
a rg u es  t h a t  n o t only is  th e re  an  in te llig ib le  s tru c tu re  t o  th e
po litica l world, b u t  t h a t  th is  s tru c tu re  i s  com posed o f th e  
m etaphorical, o r a t  l e a s t  rev ea ls  i t s e lf  in  a  m e tapho rica l m anner.
In  th e  on to log ica l accoun t, m etaphor is  th e  n e a re s t  to o l  we have in
language  to  ex cav a te  th e  grounds on which we dw ell.
Now i t  would seem  t h a t  th e  on to log ical-cogn itive  a cc o u n t o f  m etaphor 
is  r e la te d  to  th e  R om antic no tion  t h a t  m an's t r u e  hom e is  in
n o n -lite ra l la n g u a g e .34 The on to log ical-cognitive  id e a  t h a t  we m ust 
e n te r  in to  -  t h a t  is , m etaphorically  p a r tic ip a te  in  -  th e  w orld in
o rd e r t o  understand  ou r p lace  in  i t  is  Rom anticism  redux . B lack's
th e s is  t h a t  m etaphor is  a  p riv ileged  d escrip tio n  o f  th e  w orld does 
no t, th e re fo re , con tend  w ith th e  o n to log ica l a rg u m e n t b u t re in fo rc e s  
i t ,  suggesting  to  p o litic a l th e o ris ts  lik e  Hannah A rend t t h a t  m etaphor 
is  th e  key  which unlocks th e  in e ffa b le  o f  th e  hum an condition. This
th e o ry  o f  m etaphor appea ls  to  o u r sense  o f  wonder; bo th  w onder o f
ourselves and o f ourselves-in -the-w  orld.
T here a re  serious  flaw s in  th e  on to log ical-cogn itive  acco u n t. I t
rem a in s  to  be seen  t h a t  th e re  is  som eth ing  "ineffab le" in  th e  hum an
condition , o r  w hether th is  cond ition  tru ly  m an ifests  i t s e l f  in
m etapho rica l d iscourse. E ver s in ce  th e  d iscovery  o f language
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philosophy th e o ris ts  have becom e en th ra lle d  w ith  th e  p ro sp ec t t h a t
35
language  may hold th e  key to  understanding  th e  mind. For in s ta n ce , a s  
John  S earle  po in ts  ou t, we know t h a t  th e re  is  som eth ing  ca lled  th e
,,unconscious,l b u t  we curiously  b elieve, w ith o u t any  evidence to
su p p o rt th is  view , t h a t  th e  unconscious i s  com posed o f language o r
language-like  a c tiv ity . In  re a li ty , S earle  argues, th is  can  only be 
an  ed u ca ted  guess fo r  i t  is  th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  unconscious n ev e r
d ire c tly  t o  re v e a l i ts e lf .  S im ilarly , i t  can  be said  h e re  t h a t  even
i f  we assum e th a t  th e re  is  an  " ineffab le” u n d e rcu rren t running th rough  
th e  hum an condition, th e re  is  no reaso n  t o  suppose t h a t  i t  m anifests
i ts e lf  in  m etaphor. By defin ition , th e  in e ffa b le , i f  i t  ex ists , m ust 
alw ays rem a in  s ilen t. The obverse o f  th is  may only be a  R om antic 
illusion.
A rendt's  con ten tio n  t h a t  th is  im pulse  h as  expressed  i t s e l f  
th ro u g h o u t th e  h is to ry  o f philosophy is  a lso  seriousLy flaw ed. 
M etaphor may sh are  w ith m yth, fab le , p arab le , and  a llegory  th e  sam e 
im pulse, a s  even  Turbayne av ers , b u t th is  in c lin a tio n  may sim ply be 
th e  philosopher's pedagogic dev ice , n o t an  expression  which can  fin d  
no hom e in  l i te r a l  d iscourse.
When A rendt po in ts  to  P la to , N ietzsche, and W ittgenstein  a s  
philosophers who have understood  th e  t r u th  which re s id e s  w ithin
m etapho rica l d iscourse she  is  engaging in  a  serious m isreading o f
th e se  th in k e rs . P la to , f o r  in s ta n ce , d id  n o t  hold t h a t  l i te r a l  
language w as su sp e c t and  f ig u ra tiv e  language se lf-ev id en tly  t ru e .  In  
f a c t ,  a  c lo se r  exam ination  o f  th e  P la to n ic  quo tes t h a t  A rendt 
rep roduces  rev ea ls  ju s t  th e  opposite . The re le v a n t passages a re  
th e se : "For th is  know ledge is  n o t som ething  t h a t  can  b e  p u t in to  words 
lik e  o th e r  sc ie n c e s ...[ it  is ]  lik e  l ig h t  flash ing  fo r th  when a  f ir e  is
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kindled, i t  is  bom  in  th e  sou l and s tra ig h taw ay  nourishes itse lf" ;
"On th is  a c c o u n t no sensib le  man w ill v en tu re  to  express h is d eep e s t
th o u g h ts  in  words, espec ia lly  in  a  form  which is  unchangeable, a s  is
36
t r u e  o f w ritten  ou tlines."  C on tra ry  to  A rendt's read ing , th e  a rg u m en t 
in  th e se  passages is  n o t d ire c te d  a t  language p e r  s e , and  th e re fo re
ag a in s t l i te r a l  d iscourse, b u t ag a in s t w ritten  speech  a s  opposed to
oraL In  P la ton ic  th o u g h t t r u th  w as logos which w as w ritte n  on th e
so u l r a th e r  th a n  on parch m en t. The d iffe re n c e  h e re  is  be tw een  liv ing
speech  and  th e  dead , o r  ca lc ified  speech  a s  found in  books, r a th e r
th a n  be tw een  l i te r a l  d iscourse and m etaphorical.
F inally, A rendt quo tes  N ietzsche a s  saying "my philosophy... 
can  no lo n g e r be com m unicated , a t  l e a s t  n o t in  p rin t"; h e re  she  
simila r ly  draw s th e  wrong conclusion. N ietzsche 's  p o in t was t h a t  his 
philosophy could be com m unica ted  b u t t h a t  books can  n ev er convey th e  
req u is ite  know ledge. 37As S ocra te s  a rgues in  th e  Phaedrus, th e  problem  
w ith w ritten  speech  is  t h a t  i t  is  im  possible t o  in te r ro g a te  books; 
when you ask  o f them  som ething th e y  ju s t  f a l l  s ilen t.38
I f  th e re  is  a  philosophic tra d itio n  in  reg a rd s  to  language i t  
would, perhaps, sound som eth ing  lik e  th is : t h a t  words, defin itions,
and im ages ru b  up ag a in s t one ano ther, and t h a t  know ledge is  th e  end 
p ro d u c t o f  th is  jo stling  back  and  fo r th  -  o r  w h a t is  known a s  th e  
d ia le c t ic a l p rocess. Philosophy, to  p araph rase  from  W ittgenstein  (who 
again  A rend t m iscontrues), is  had when th e  in te l le c t  bum ps up ag a in s t 
th e  lim its  o f  language, m etapho rica l language inc luded . This does n o t 
m ean t h a t  m etaphor by-passes th e  lim its  o f  d iscourse -  in  f a c t ,  
N ietzsche believed  t h a t  th e  philosophic en te rp rise  was - n e a r  im possible 
because th e  m etaphors ju s t  k e p t g e ttin g  in  th e  way.
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To conclude th e n , i t  may be possible t o  say , along w ith  Richards, 
B lack, Turbayne, A rendt, and  R iceour t h a t  m etaphor is  a  d is tin c tiv e  
form  o f  u tte ra n c e , b u t i t  seem s highly im plausib le , given th e  
arg u m en ts  p u t fo rw ard  so  fa r ,  t h a t  th e  on to log ical-cognitive  view  t h a t  
m etaphors cap tu re  som e specia l, in e ffa b le  e le m e n t o f hum an ex isten ce  
is  equally  c o rre c t.  The second  se c tio n  n a r ra te s  th e  ’l i te r a l"  
m anifesto  in  reg a rd  t o  th is  d eb a te , and suggests  t h a t  i t  to o  is  found 
w anting. I t  only rem a in s  fo r  th e  th ird  and f in a l sec tio n  on th e  
p o litic s  w ith in  m etaphor to  p iece  to g e th e r  t h a t  which is  sa lvageab le  
from  bo th  positions, and t o  a rg u e  fo r  a  r iv a l, "com m on sensory," 
acc o u n t o f p o litic a l m etaphor to  be considered.
Section  Two:
The L itera l Argum ent
A pro p er c ritiq u e  o f B lack's cogn itive  view  o f m etaphor has been  l e f t  
u n til now. The reaso n  is  t h a t  fo r  th e  re fu ta tio n  o f  Black's th e s is  
t o  succeed  th e  l i te r a l  a cc o u n t o f m etaphor needs to  be  enuncia ted . 
The m ost persuasive opponent o f  th e  cognitive view  is  Donald Davidson, 
who arg u es  t h a t  "m etaphors m ean only w hat th e  words, in  th e i r  m ost 
l i te r a l  in te rp re ta tio n , mean, and  noth ing  m o re ." 39 Davidson's position  
is  a  to n ic  to  th e  an ti-foundationa l is ts  in  p o litic a l tho u g h t. I f  a l l  
m etaphors can  be  re a d  li te ra lly , a s  Davidson suggests, th e n  th e re  
rem a in s  l i t t l e  im pulse to  d eriv e  philosophic p rem ises from  th e ir  
construc tion . R ichard R orty, fo r  exam ple , con tends t h a t  a  cogn itive  
acc o u n t o f  m etaphor is  sim ply an  a t te m p t  to  sm uggle m etaphysics back  
in to  philosophy a f te r  i t  had been  th ro w n  o u t?0 The g o a l o f philosophy, 
Davidson and R orty  bo th  ag ree , should s t i l l  seek  t o  d e a n  up  th e  
language, and i t  should begin by tre a tin g  m etaphors a s  m erely  p o e tic
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expressions t h a t  engage ou r im  ag ination , and n o t a s  f ig u res  o f  speech
which som ehow ca p tu re  th e  essen ce  o f know ledge (epistem ciogy) o r  o f
our ex is ten ce  (the o n to log ica l argum ent). The li te r a l is ts  and th e
c la ss ic is ts  th u s  have th is  id e a  in  com m on: i f  ou r "words fa il,"  th e n  
i t  can  only be because  we a re  n o t  th inking  c le a rly  enough o r  because  
th e re  is  nothing th e re  t o  be said .
As we have seen , B lack's th e o ry  is  t h a t  m etaphor can n o t be
red u ce d  to  l i te r a l  in te rp re ta tio n s  w ithou t a  subsequen t lo ss  in
m eaning and t h a t  th is  necessa rily  en ta ils  t h a t  th e re  m ust be  som e
cogn itive  c o n te n t t h a t  i s  p a r tic u la r  only t o  m etaphor. As Black 
argues, "One o f th e  po in ts  I  wish to  s tre s s  is  t h a t  th e  lo ss  in  such
cases  is  a  lo ss  in  cogn itive  co n ten t; th e  re le v a n t w eakness o f  th e
l i te r a l  parap h rase  is  n o t  t h a t  i t  may be tire so m e ly  prolix  o r  boringly
exp lic it; i t  fa ils  to  be a  tra n s la tio n  because  i t  fa ils  to  g ive th e
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in s ig h t t h a t  m etaphor did." The a rgum ent, th e n , i s  t h a t  m etaphors
co n ta in  a  sp ec ia l t r u th  o r in s ig h t t h a t  l i t e r a l  language does n o t 
possess, and  i t  is  th is  in sigh t, A rendt, R iceour and o th e rs  be lieve , 
which enab les us to  glim pse in to  w hat i t  m eans to  be-in -the-w orld .
Davidson's re fu ta tio n  o f th e  above held  view is  con ta ined  in  h is
essay  "W hat M etaphors Mean" p rin ted  in  th e  an thology On M etaphor. His
a rg u m en t th ro u g h o u t is  sim ply t h a t  m etaphors have no sp ec ia l m eaning
beyond w hat can  be  s ta te d  in  l i t e r a l  p ro p o s itio n s .42 This does n o t
mean, how ever, t h a t  m etaphors in  l i te r a tu re ,  sc ien ce  and  philosophy
se rv e  no purpose, only t h a t  l i te r a l  in te rp re ta tio n s  ca n  g e t  u s  t o  se e
th e  sam e th ings. Davidson's purpose is  to  e lim in a te  th e  m ystique t h a t  
m etaphor holds fo r  th in k ers . Where Black and  h is  ad h eren ts  e r r ,
Davidson w rites, is  t h a t  when " th ey  th in k  th e y  provide a  m ethod fo r
deciphering  an  encoded  co n ten t, th e y  a c tu a lly  t e l l  u s ...som eth ing
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ab o u t th e  e f fe c ts  m etaphors have on us." T heir e rro r , Davidson 
con tinues, "is t o  fa s te n  on th e  co n te n ts  o f  th e  th o u g h ts  m etaphor
provokes and  to  re a d  th e se  co n te n ts  in to  th e  m etaphor itse lf ."  43
M etaphor may provoke in  u s  a  p a r tic u la r  in s ig h t, th e n , b u t i t  is  fo lly  
to  assign  a  m eaning t o  m etaphor w here i t  m ore p roperly  belongs in  th e  
realm  o f ou r im ag ination . 44
A ccording to  Davidson, m etaphors can  be understood by an  ap p ea l
to  th e  m eaning o f  th e  l i te r a l  language  which th e y  em ploy. "We can
le a rn  much ab o u t w hat m etaphors m ean by com paring them  w ith sim iles,"
Davidson suggests, and  th e  "m ost obvious sem an tic  d iffe re n c e  be tw een
sim ile  and m etaphor is  t h a t  a l l  s im iles  a re  t ru e  and m ost m etaphors
a re  fa lse ."45 B ut beyond th is  d is tin c tio n , Davidson pcdnts ou t,
" c ritic s  do n o t su g g est t h a t  a  s im ile  says one th in g  and m eans an o th e r
-  th e y  do n o t  suppose i t  m eans any th ing  b u t w hat l ie s  on th e  su rface
o f th e  words." S im iles "m ay m ake us th in k  deep  though ts, ju s t  a s
m etaphor does," Davidson argues, b u t th e n  why is  i t  t h a t  "no one
appeals to  th e  'spec ia l cogn itive  co n ten t' o f  sim iles?"46 The answ er is
d e a r :  m etaphors th e  m se lves co n ta in  no sp ec ia l cognitive c o n te n t
because  th e  special, cognition  re s id e s  in  ou r im  ag ination  and n o t in  
th e  m etaphoric  s ta te m e n t. T here fo re , Davidson co n d u d es , " the
th e o r is t  who t r i e s  t o  exp lain  m etaphor by appealing  to  a  hidden
m essage, lik e  th e  c r i t ic  who a t te m p ts  t o  s ta t e  t h a t  m essage, i s  th e n
47fundam en ta lly  confused." No such m essage an th e  m etaphoric  expression 
ex ists .
Now i f  D avidson's c ritiq u e  o f  th e  cogn itive  th e o ry  o f  m etaphor is  
c o rre c t ,  th e n  i t  s tan d s  t o  reaso n  t h a t  th e  on to log ica l a ru g m en t p u t 
fo rw ard  by A rend t and  R iceour would equally  becom e im poverished. W hat 
Davidson adds t o  th is  d eb a te  i s  th e  acknow ledgem ent t h a t  no
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d escrip tion  o f th e  world, l i t e r a l  o r  m etaphorical, i s  p riv ileged  ov er 
o th e rs , and, m ore im p o rtan tly , ou r m etapho rica l descrip tions con tain  
no hidden s e c re ts  ab o u t how th e  world o r  th e  hum an mind works. All 
m eaningful language , Davidson argues, can  be f la t te n e d  o u t in to  
l i te r a l  propositions, a lth o u g h t th e  co n ce p t o f  t r u th  would s t i l l  be a s  
e lusive a s  ever.
In  h is book Philosophy and  th e  M irror o f N atu re  R ichard Rorty, 
follow ing Davidson, s ta te s  t h a t  po litica l and  philosophical th o u g h t 
have con tinually  been  bew itched  by m e taphorica l expressions, w ith th e  
u n fo rtu n a te  consequence fo r  th e  su b je c t o f  ep istem blogy t h a t  our
philosophical a t te m p ts  to  d iscover th e  "grounds" o r  "foundations" to
48
know ledge can  no lo n g e r be seriousLy en te rta in e d . As th e  philosopher
John Dewey po in ted  ou t, ou r 'th e o ry  o f knowing is  m odelled a f te r  w hat
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was supposed to  ta k e  p lace  in  th e  a c t  o f  vision." Subsequently, w hat 
R orty succeeds in  arguing in  his Philosophy and th e  M irror o f N ature 
is  t h a t  th is  ep istem ic  p rocess is  com posed e i th e r  o f one o r  tw o  
m etapho rica l d is tinctions. The f i r s t  is  th e  a p p ea ran ce /re a lity  
d is tin c tio n  which arg u es  t h a t  t r u th  is  d iscovered  th rough  p e rce p tu a l 
ex perience , ch iefly  th rough  th e  a c t  o f  vision. The second is  th e  
in n e r/o u te r  d is tin c tio n  which lo c a te s  t r u th  th ro u g h  m en ta l im ag es  and 
sense im pressions. Both d is tin c tio n s  se rv e  a s  "foundations" to  
know ledge, a s  th e y  e n tire ly  depend upon th e  m etaphoric  a c t  o f  how we 
"see" th e  world. 50
R orty d ec la res , w ith r e s p e c t  t o  philosophers a t te m p ts  to  uncover 
grounds o r  foundations t o  our know legdge, t h a t
" ...fo r  P la to  i t  was reach ed  by escaping  from  th e  senses and 
opening up th e  fa c u lty  o f  reaso n  -  th e  Eye o f  th e  Soul -  to  
th e  WorLd o f Being. F o r D escartes, i t  was a  m a tte r  o f tu rn ing
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th e  Eye o f th e  Mind from  th e  confused in n e r rep re sen ta tio n s  to  
th e  c le a r  and d is tin c t ones. With Locke, i t  was a  m a tte r  o f  
reversing  D escartes 's  d irec tio n s  and seeing 's ingu lar p re ­
sen ta tio n s  to  sense ' a s  w hat should 'grip ' us -  w hat we
should n o t escape from ." 51 
K ant was th e  f i r s t  philosopher, R orty  suggests, to  r e je c t  th is
v isu a l m etapho rica l vocabulary  a s  lead in g  to  know ledge. The K antian
"foundations" o f  know ledge a re  to  b e  found in  propositions and n o t  in
sensing o b jec ts  in  th e  Eye o f th e  Mind. F or R orty, K antian  t r u th  does
n o t in h e r  in  v isu a l im ages  and re p re se n ta tio n s  in  th e  mind b u t in
language, o r  r a th e r  in  "a sea rch  fo r  th e  ru le s  th e  mind had  s e t  up  fo r
i t s e lf ." 52 However, a s  we have seen  in  th e  l a s t  sec tio n  o f th e  p rev ious
c h a p te r , K ant's an a ly tic /sy n th e tic  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  propositions
has been  l i t t l e  c o m fo rt to  ep istem olog ists  s ince Q uine's
53deconstructLon o f a t in  th e  1950's. The re s u lt ,  R orty  contends, is  
t h a t  unless we wish to  be tra p p e d  in  th e  lim itin g  w orld o f  ocu lar, 
s p a tia l  and  foun d atio n al m etaphors, we m ust lo se  ou r obsession w ith 
estab lish ing  th e  grounds fo r  ou r know ledge. To choose one s e t  o f 
m e tapho rica l im ages  in  which t o  in te rp r e t  experience  is  to  presuppose 
t h a t  th e re  is  b u t one m ethod to  derive  a t  th e  " tru th ."  B ut th e  
eluslveness o f  th is  t r u th  soon becom es ap p a re n t when a  d if fe re n t s e t  
o f m etaphors is  chosen, rev ea lin g  th e  inadequacy  o f our e a r l ie r  
m etapho rica l descrip tions.
This sam e th e m e  o f  d isestab lish ing  th e  m etaphors o f p o litic a l and 
philosophical th o u g h t is  echoed  aga in  in  Rorty*s l a t e s t  book 
C ontingency, Irony and  S o lidarity . 54 In  i t  R orty  arg u es  t h a t  Davidson's 
th e o ry  o f  m etaphor "does fo r  th e  th e o ry  o f  c u ltu re  w hat th e  M endelian,
55m echanistic  a cc o u n t o f  n a tu ra l se lec tio n  did  fo r  evo lu tionary  th eo ry ."
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R orty  borrow s from  Davidson's a t ta c k  ag a in s t th e  cognitive th e o ry  o f 
m etaphor t o  su g g est t h a t  hum an h is to ry  should be  v iew ed a s  a  
succession  o f  m etaphors -  m etaphors t h a t  have been  e i th e r  c a s t  aside 
i f  th e y  a re  found to  se rv e  no function , o r  co -o p ted  in to  l i te r a l  
d iscourse i f  th e y  d o .56 "N eitzsche 's  h is to ry  o f  cu ltu re ,"  R orty w rites, 
"and Davidsonian philosophy o f  language , se e  language  a s  we now see  
evolu tion , a s  new fo rm s o f l i f e  co n stan tly  k illing  o ff  old form s." 57 
Again, th e re  is  no c o n ce p t o f  an  on to log ical t r u th  o r  in s ig h t h ere , 
only th e  g e n e ra l acknow legem ent t h a t  m etaphors con tinually  bew itch  us, 
so m etim es te m p o ra rily  lead ing  u s  a s tra y , o th e rtim e s  nudging us t o  m ake 
an  im ag in a tiv e  le a p  in  tho u g h t. The end p roduct, a s  f a r  a s  R orty  is  
concerned , is  a  t r e a tm e n t  o f  philosophy a s  l i te r a tu re  r a th e r  th a n  a s  a  
system  o f t ru e  p o s tu la te s  lead ing  to  know ledge.
This, th e n , is  th e  l i te r a l is t  a t ta c k  ag a in st th e  cognitive o r 
on to log ica l view : A rendt, R iceour, and o th e rs  c a n n o t be c o r re c t  in
th e i r  view  t h a t  p o litic a l m etaphors co n ta in  a  sp ec ia l m eaning o r 
hidden t ru th  ab o u t language o r  hum an ex isten ce . M etaphor may provoke 
u s  in to  making an  in s ig h t b u t t h a t  does n o t m ean t h a t  t h a t  in s ig h t 
re s id es  in  th e  m etaphoric  expression  its e lf .  S im ilarly , to  believe 
t h a t  som e fo rm s o f  expression can  be valued  over o th e rs  fo r  revea ling  
th e  in e ffa b le  is  equally  absurd. R orty 's c ritiq u e  o f  th e  in n e r/o u te r  
m e tapho rica l d is tin c tio n  n o t  only re v e a ls  t h a t  P la to , am ong o th e rs , 
had fa lle n  in to  th is  lin g u is tic  t r a p  b u t  t h a t  p o litic a l th e o ris ts  lik e  
A rend t have subsequently  ta k e n  P la to 's  m istake and, to g e th e r  w ith  a  
few  m isreadings, in f la te d  i t  in to  a  m e tap h o rica l th e o ry  o f  hum an 
p o litic a l ex istence .
3fc should be s tip u la te d  t h a t  th e  boundary lin e s  be tw een  th e  opposing
e  s
sides in  th is  d eb a te  a re  n o t a s  c lea rly  defined  a s  i t  h as  been  s e t  o u t 
h e re . For in s ta n c e , David Cooper, in  an  o therw ise  e x c e lle n t book 
sim ply e n title d  M etaphor, a rg u es  t h a t  Davidson's th e o ry  is  by f a r
su p erio r t o  B lack's acco u n t, b u t th e n  he  s tran g e ly  goes on t o  su g g est
th a t  H eidegger's co n ce p t o f  o n to log ica l t r u th  closely  re sem b les  t h a t
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o f  m etaphor's. Y et th e  issue  I  wish t o  address is  n o t  w hether th e
above held  v iew s a re  co n s is te n t w ith  one an o th er, b u t  r a th e r  w hether 
Davidson's l i te r a l  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  m etaphor is  e n tire ly  
sa tis fa c to ry .
The problem  w ith  Davidson's th e o ry  can  be  s e t  o u t by reproducing  
a  few  o f  th e  rem ark s  he  h as  m ade w ith re g a rd s  to  th e  su b je c t o f 
m etaphors versus sim iles. As th e  re a d e r  w ill re c a ll, Davidson
suggests  t h a t  a l l  m etaphors a re  absurd  and a l l  sim iles a re  t ru e .
M etaphors a re  absurd  because, to  borrow  from  Ryle, th e  sp eak e r is
making a  ca teg o ry  m istake. However, a l l  sim iles a re  tr iv ia lly  t r u e
because , a s  Davidson argues, "every th ing  is  lik e  every th ing , and  in
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endless ways." B ut beyond th is  d iscrepancy , Davidson con tinues, th e re
is  no reaso n  to  believe  t h a t  th e  tw o  se rv e  e n tire ly  d if fe re n t
fu n c tio n s  o r  have rad ica lly  d if fe re n t  m eanings. I t  i s  th is
Davidsonian position, I  sh a ll argue, which is  m isleading.
L e t us consider fo r  a  m om ent th e  exam ple t h a t  Davidson h im se lf
uses, nam ely  th e  m etaphor "Tolstoy is  a  g r e a t  m oralizing in fa n t .160
H ere, Davidson p rocla im s, th e re  is  a n  absu rd ity  a t  work, b u t one t h a t
nonethe less  enab les u s  to  make propositions on how Tolstoy m igh t be
lik e  a  g r e a t  m oralizing in fa n t. The m etaphor and  th e  sim ile in  th is
ca se  se rv e  th e  sam e function , and th e  m eaning behind th em  bo th  can  be
derived  from  w hatever th e i r  l i te r a l  in te rp re ta tio n s  m ean. We m ight be 
ahlfi t o  make a  l i s t ,  fo r  exam ple, o f ways in  w hich Tolstoy and a
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m oralizing in fa n t  m ight be  sim ilar. Now a s  f a r  a s  th is  goes Davidson 
is  c o rre c t ,  b u t th e re  is  one essen tia l e le m e n t th a t ,  f o r  th e  purposes
o f th e  n e x t few  ch ap te rs , needs to  b e  a r tic u la te d . W hat Davidson 
n eg lec ts  in  his l i te r a l  th e o ry  is  th e  ro le  o f  th e  m etaphoric im age .
The no tion  o f  absurd ity , a s  Thom as Hobbes would b e  th e  f i r s t  t o
61p o in t ou t, can  only be  a n  a t tr ib u te  o f  speech  and  n o t o f  th in g s. To 
claim  along w ith  Davidson t h a t  th e  proposition  'A ' is  'B' is  absurd  
is , on a  lin g u is tic  le v e l, probabLy tru e .  Thus th e  m etaphor "a ll 
p la n e ts  fLow in to  rivers"  s tr ik e s  us a s  a  lin g u is tic  absu rd ity  fo r  
th is  reason . On th e  o th e r  hand, i f  we w ere ab le  t o  v isua lize  th is  
m etaphoric  im ag e  -  i f ,  in  o th e r  words, th e  m etaphor w as to  have an  
ic o n ic  c o n te n t -  th e n  i t  rem a in s  t o  be seen  how th is  could a lso  be 
considered  to  be equally  absurd. I f  I  have an  im ag e  o f  an  "a rtific ia l
man" (Hobbes's m etaphor) on w hat a u th o rity  can  D avidson say  t h a t  i t  is
an  absurd  im ag e. Or to  borrow  from  an o th e r philosopher, A ris to tle , 
l e t  u s  say  t h a t  I  have an  im ag e  o f  a  "g o a t-stag ."  W hat A ris to tle
q u ite  r ig h tly  po in ts  o u t is  t h a t  th e  im ag e  o f a  "goat-s tag"  i s  n o t  an
6 2exam ple o f  alogos, which m eans nonsense o r  absurd  speech . Such im ag es
can  only be counted  a s  absurd, A ris to tle  argues, i f  we add "being" o r
"non-being" to  them  -  t h a t  is , i f  we m ake th e  m istake o f in fusing  th e  
im ag inary  im ag e  w ith  an  on to lo g ica l a rgum ent. Such im ages, a s
A ris to tle  rem inds us, a re  lik e  p ray ers ; th e y  a re  n e ith e r  t r u e  no r
fa lse . 63
R eturning th e n  to  D avidson's exam ple, i f  Tolstoy and an  in f a n t  
a r e  in  th e  sam e room  and  I  s ta t e  o u t loud  fo r  a l l  t o  h e a r  t h a t  th e y  
a re  one and th e  sam e, I  m ight, on a  purely  lin g u is tic  le v e l a t  le a s t ,  
b e  ta k e n  a s  som eone who is  p rone  to  making nonsensical u tte ra n c e s . 
However, and th is  is  th e  crucial d is tinc tion , i f  I  have in  my mind th e
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im age  o f a  Tolstoyian in fa n t, th e n  on w h at c r i te r ia  can  Davidson claim  
t h a t  th is  im age is  any m ore absurd  th a n  any o th e r  I  m ight cu rren tly  be 
en te rta in in g , say  th e  im ag e  o f  a  co ffee  cup re s tin g  on th e  ta b le ?  The 
answ er t h a t  Davidson invokes is  W ittgenstein 's c o n ce p t o f  Seeing As
w here we le a rn  to  see  one th in g  a s  ano ther, a s  in  th e  fam ous exam ple
64o f  a  duck-rabb it. (The re a d e r  w ill no d oub t n o tice  t h a t
W ittgenstein 's exam ple o f  a  d u ck -rab b it b ea rs  a  m arked s im ila d ity  to
A ris to tle 's  g o a t-s tag , a s  in  bo th  cases  we se e  one sp ec ie s  a s
belonging to  ano ther.) A ccording t o  Davidson, "M etaphor m akes u s  see
one th in g  a s  an o th e r by making som e l i te r a l  s ta te m e n t t h a t  in sp ire s  o r
65
prom pts th e  insigh t."  This is  no d oub t t ru e .  As we have seen , th e re
is  no th ing  w ithin th e  m etaphoric  expression  i ts e lf  which has a
cognitive m eaning, i t  is  only ou r im ag ination  t h a t  can  be sa id  to
possess th is  pow er. However, th e  problem  o f  invoking Seeing As a s  a
c r i te r ia  fo r  understanding  m etaphors i s  t h a t  by i t s e lf  i t  is
fundam en ta lly  d e fic ien t.
Now W ittgenstein 's well-known th e o ry  t h a t  th e  m eaning o f a  word
is  i t s  use in  th e  sen ten c e , and  v ice -v e rsa , n e c e ss ita te s  t h a t  language
be considered  a s  a  public phenom enon, opera tin g  lik e  th e  observab le
ru le s  o f  a  gam e. The problem  is  t h a t  th e re  can  be no appeals h e re  to
a  p riv a te ly  held  im ag e  fo r , a s  W ittgenstein  observes, "an in n e r
p ro cess  s tan d s  in  need  o f  an  ou tw ard  c r ite r ia ,"  and  a s  he  rem ark s
e lsew here , " the  c h a ra c te r is t ic  signs o f [ th e  gam e is ]  in  th e  p lay er 's
behavior." 66 I f  th is  is  in d eed  t r u e ,  th e n  i t  can  be  argued , pace
Davidson, t h a t  n o t a l l  m etaphors a u to m a tica lly  le n d  th em se lv es  to
psychologically  observab le  d a ta . How can  we ev e r in te rp r e t  such
p riv a te ly  held  im ages? We m ight, a s  Davidson avers , have a  way to
in te rp re t  m etaphors on a  lin g u is tic  le v e l  by ironing  them  o u t in to
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th e ir  l i t e r a l  in te rp re ta tio n s , b u t  we a re  s t i l l  l e f t  w ithou t a  
c r ite r io n , even  i f  we inc lude  Seeing As, fo r  eva lua ting  our m etaphors 
qua im ages.
I f  we w ere to  follow  th is  th re a d  a  l i t t l e  fu r th e r , we m ight w an t 
to  d if fe re n tia te  Seeing As from  Seeing T hat, a s  Davidson h im self does.
"Seeing As is  n o t Seeing That," Davidson p a in ts  ou t, by which possibly
h e  m eans t h a t  Seeing T h a t i s  pu rely  th e  lo c u s  o f  propositions, w hilst
R7Seeing As is  th e  dom ain o f im ages. Thus, m etaphors enab le  us to  m ake 
Seeing T h a t p ropositions even  though  th e y  th em se lv es  co n ta in  no 
propositional c o n te n t -  which i s  a  p o in t w ith which even  Max B lack 
concurs. 6% ere , how ever, Davidson's th e o ry  encoun ters  an o th e r problem , 
fo r  i f  we wish to  a d o p t Seeing As a s  a  c r ite r io n  fo r  understanding  
m etaphoric im ages, a s  Davidson w ants us to  do, th e n  we a re  le d  back  to  
th e  unhappy asse rtio n  t h a t  m etaphors co n ta in  cogn itive meanings. 
Davidson's orig inal in te n tio n  w as to  p rove t h a t  only l i te r a l
propositions can  be cogn itive, r a th e r  th a n  m e tapho rica l s ta te m e n ts .
But, a s  M arcus H este r observes in  h is d iscussion o f W ittgenstein 's 
th e o ry  o f Seeing As, "Seeing As is  a  cogn itively  s ig n ifican t ac t,"
w ith th e  m eaning o f th e  m etaphor resid ing  w ithin th e  Seeing As ob jec t. 69 
However, th is  is  to  deny th e  whole p o in t o f Davidson's c ritiq u e  o f 
th e  cogn itive-on to log ica l a rgum en t.
Davidson g e ts  in to  th is  muddle p rec ise ly  because  he  does n o t  
consider th e  r d e  o f  m etaphoric  im ages, only t h a t  o f m etaphoric  
expressions. Subsequently, his adop tion  o f Seeing As le a v e s  him a t  a  
dead  end. As W ittgenstein  s ta te s  r a th e r  crypticalLy, "You w ill see  i t  
th is , now th is?  W hat way? T here is  no fu r th e r  qualifica tion?"7 9 In  
o th e r  words, th e re  seem s to  be no way in  which t o  e lab o ra te  th e  Seeing 
As im ag e. Thus Seeing As does n o t  p reclude th e  possib ility  t h a t  we
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can  'cogn itively  se e 1 th e  m etaphoric  im ag e , only t h a t  we have no o th e r  
c r i te r ia  in  which to  qualify  th is  im age . By h is focussing  on 
m etaphoric  expressions r a th e r  th a n  im ages, Davidson le a v e s  room  fo r  
B lack, R iceour and  o th e rs  t o  a rgue  t h a t  th e  cogn itive-on to log ical 
e le m e n t o f m etaphor ac tu a lly  re s id es  in  th e  im ag es  them selves.
Davidson only addresses h im se lf t o  one h a lf  o f  th e  m etaphoric 
equation , t h a t  o f th e  Seeing T hat, th e  locus o f  propositions. W hat is  
missing from  Davidson's c r itiq u e  is  th e  understanding  th a t  im ages and 
words a re  n o t th e  sam e th in g . Words can  be lo c a te d ; th e y  r e f e r  to  
som eth ing . Im ages, on th e  o th e r  hand, can  only be  in fe rre d ; th e y  a re  
lik e  id e a s  o r  concep ts , th e y  a re  lo c a te d  only in  th e  mind. 
S ignificantly , i f  our im ag es  w ere lik e  words -  t h a t  is , i f  lik e  words 
our im ag es  could be pinned down along D avidsonian lin es  -  th e n  im ag es  
would no lo n g e r hold any in te r e s t  fo r  us. I t  is  p rec ise ly  due t o  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  understanding  im ag es is  much m ore p rob lem atic  th a n  t h a t  o f 
understanding  words t h a t  th e y  con tinue to  hold our a tte n tio n .
Could i t  be possible t h a t  ou r w ords may f a i l  and y e t  our 
m etaphoric  im ages s t i l l  succeed? If  so, th e n  Rorty*s deconstructLon 
of p o litic a l m etaphors on th e  basis o f th e i r  l i te r a l -  D avidsonian 
c o n te n t needs to  be  re -e v a lu a te d , which is  th e  th e m e  o f  th e  follow ing 
sec tion . Indeed, a l l  we a re  ab le  t o  sa fe ly  conclude so f a r  w ith  any 
assu ran ce  i s  t h a t  m etaphoric  expressions b e tra y  no 
in e ffab le -o n to lo g ica l id e n tity , w hich is  c e rta in ly  im p o r ta n t t o  b e a r  
in  mind when discussing p o litic a l m etaphors, b u t th is  alone does n o t 
com prise  th e  m ost in te re s tin g  th in g  one can  say  ab o u t p o litic a l 
m etaphors.
Section  Three:
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The Com mon Sensory A ccount: How P o litica l M etaphors Are U sed
P o ets  and  philosophers a lik e , when addressing  th e  co n te n ts  o f th e
mind, speak  in  m etaphor. The mind, G erald  M anley Hopkins w rites , is
com posed o f  "c liffs  o f f a l l /  F righ tfu l, sh ee r, no -m an-fa thom ed .11
In  th e  T h ea te tu s  S o c ra te s  in v ite s  us to  "suppose t h a t  ev e ry  mind
con ta in s  an  av iary  s to c k e d  w ith  b irds o f ev ery  so r t ,  som e in  fLocks
a p a r t  from  th e  re s t ,  som e in  sm a ll groups, and  som e so lita ry  and
71fly ing in  any  d irec tio n  am ong th em  alL" I t  was th is  cu rio sity  t h a t
le d  th e  cogn itive-o n to lo g ica l th e o r is ts  t o  conclude t h a t  m etaphor 
i t s e lf  con ta ined  th e  key  t o  unlocking th e  re c e sse s  o f  th e  mind, b u t 
th e  only th in g  th e y  had  m anaged t o  uncover, th e  l i te r a l is ts  have since
po in ted  ou t, i s  th e  e x te n t  in  which m etaphor perv ad es  our
philosophical discourse.
W hat rem ains  missing from  b o th  argum ents, how ever, is  th e  c e n tra l  
ro le  t h a t  th e  im age p lays in  bo th  ou r co n ce p t o f  know ledge and in  our 
understanding  o f p o li tic a l m etaphor. I f  m etaphor w ere only a  
ling u is tic  dev ice , th e n  i t  would b e  easy  t o  d ism iss i t  a s  a  ca teg o ry  
m istake o r confusion. B u t along w ith  th e  lin g u is tic  s ta te m e n t  t h a t  
m etaphor makes, i t  c a n  a lso  b e  said  to  co n ta in  an  a t te n d a n t im age, 
and i t  is  th e  im ag e , r a th e r  th a n  th e  m etaphoric  language, t h a t  has 
an im ated  philosophers s in ce  th e  G reeks. To understand  th is , we m ust 
a tte n d  to  how m etaphors a re  used  in  p o litic a l th o u g h t and  n o t t o  ju s t  
w hat th e y  m ight mean.
K nowledge, th e  a u th o r o f  P la to 's  Seventh  L e t te r  observed, is  n o t 
som eth ing  t h a t  can  b e  a r t ic u la te d  d ire c tly  in to  language lik e  th e  
o th e r  sc iences, b u t  i s  "like l ig h t  flash ing  fo r th  when a  f ir e  is
72kindled, i t  is  bo m  in  th e  so u l and s tra ig h taw ay  nourishes itse lf ."
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The im age o f a  f ir e  in side  th e  body is , o f course, a  m etaphoric  im age . 
So to o , we m ight add, is  th e  co n ce p t o f  souL Y et th e  in s ig h t h ere  is  
t h a t  th e re  is  a  foundation  o f  so r ts  to  our know ledge and th a t  i t  does 
n o t necessarily  re s id e  only in  language. "For every  r e a l  being," th e  
au th o r con tinues, " th e re  a re  th re e  th in g s  t h a t  a re  necessary  i f  
know ledge is  t o  be acqu ired : f ir s t ,  th e  nam e; second, th e  defin ition ; 
th ird , th e  im age ."  73 B ecause language alone i s  n o t  su ff ic ie n t fo r  
know ledge, language  and  im ages a c t  in  c o n c e r t w ith one an o th e r "making 
d e a r  th e  p a r tic u la r  p ro p erty  (to poion t i l  o f  each  o b je c t and  th e  
being (to  on) o f  i t ." 74 Our im ages  bum p ag a in s t language, in  o th e r  
words, and th e  ou tcom e, behaving lik e  th e  d ia le c t ic a l p rocess, serves 
us a s  know ledge.
A ris to tle , in  his De A nim a, a rgues t h a t  "w ithou t sensation  a  man
would n o t le a rn  o r  understand  anyth ing , so  a t  th e  v e ry  tim e  he is
75
ac tu a lly  th ink ing  he m ust have an  im age b e fo re  him ." We th in k  in  
language , o r  logos, A ris to tle  a ffirm ed , b u t even  ou r sim ple notions, 
n o em a ta , c an n o t be d ivorced  from  th e  im ag e . "I rep ly  t h a t  n e ith e r
th e se  n o r th e  r e s t  o f  our no tions a re  im ages, b u t t h a t  th e y  canno t
76 . . . .
dispense w ith im ages,"  A ris to tle  continued . Boethius w n le s  in  his
c ritiq u e  o f A risto tle , Librium De in te rp re ta tio n e  ed itio  secunda, t h a t
"fo r sense  and  im ag in a tio n  a re  c e r ta in  f i r s t  shapes [fiq u ra ] upon
which a s  a  kind o f  foundation  su p erv en ien t in te llig en ce  is  shone." 
Our language, B oethius procla im s, sharpens ou r im ages, which th e n
produces in  u s  know ledge.78 The analogy Boethius uses to  describe  how 
our im ag es  and language com bine to  form  th is  "superven ien t foundation" 
is  one o f pain ting :
"As p a in te rs  a re  used  to  ou tline  a  body and to  la y  in  th e  under­
pain ting  o f th e  body w here th e y  p o rtray  any fa c e  w ith co lors, so
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sense and im  ag ination  a re  naturaH y la id  in  lik e  co lors in  th e  
p e rcep tio n  o f th e  soul. For when anyth ing  fa lls  under sense o r 
th ink ing  [co q ito ], i t  is  f i r s t  o f a l l  necessary  t h a t  som e 
im ag in a tio n  be bom . A fterw ards th e  m ore co m ple te  in te l le c t  
supervenes, exp licating  a ll  o f i t s  p a r ts  which w ere ta k e n  up 
confusedly  by im  ag ination . W herefore im ag ina tion  is  som ething 
im p e rfec t."  79
The im ag es  com e f ir s t ,  sprung from  ou r im ag ination , Boethius suggests, 
and th e n  th e  in te l l e c t  fo llow s, tran sfo rm in g  our im p e rfe c t im ag ination  
in to  a  m ore p e r fe c t  know ledge. H ere, sense and  im ag ination  a re  used  
in te rch an g eab ly , and  o u r in te l le c t  is  com posed o f  reasoning , o r  
r a t io . Since we a re  o ften tim es  confused by our sense  and im ag ination , 
we need  our in te l le c t  t o  m ake a  th in g  in te llig ib le . This is  w hat 
A belard re fe re d  to  a s  "confusa an im ae perceptLo." f t  was only by th e
to o l  o f  r a t io ,  A belard believed , t h a t  th e  confusion be tw een  ou r senses
80
could be so rted  out.
Aquinas, believing t h a t  m e tapho rica l im ag es w ere com m on to  m ost 
d iscourse , a lso  th o u g h t t h a t  i t  was th e  in te l le c t 's  responsibility to  
make sense  o f  th e se  im ag es  and aw ard  them  th e ir  p ro p er p lace  in  
know ledge. Theology, accord ing  to  Aquinas, was th e  h ig h est form  o f 
know ledge sin ce  i t  "is n o t  ab le  to  deceive," w h ils t p o e try  fo rm ed  th e  
"low est o f  a l l  kinds o f  know ledge."81 Both, how ever, m ake heavy use o f 
m etaphoric  im ages. The ch ie f d iffe re n ce  b e tw een  th e  tw o , how ever, 
Aquinas m aintained, was t h a t  th e  im ag es  in  p o e try  w ere liab le  to  
confuse th e  re a d e r  w hile th o se  in  theo logy , since  theo logy  w as 
e n tire ly  lo g ica l, tra n sp o r ts  him in to  a  h igher p lane  o f  cognition. 82 
W hat a re  we to  conclude, th e re fo re , when we re p la c e  th e  
m etaphoric  expression  which may in d eed  b e  w ithou t any  "cognitive
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con ten t"  w ith  t h a t  o f th e  m etaphoric  im age  -  o r  w ith  im ag es  in  g en e ra l
-  which seem s t o  have an im a ted  th in k e rs  th ro u g h o u t th e  ages? F ir s t  o f
a il, we m ight a d m it t h a t  i t  seem s po in tless  to  t r e a t  m etaphoric  im ag es
a s  i f  th e y  alone expressed  an  on to log ica l s ta t e  o r  th e  in e ffa b le
since , i f  th e re  w ere such  a  condition  in  man, th e n , a s  th e  above
philosophers have suggested , i t  could only be  understood i f  th e  im age
a c te d  in  c o n c e r t w ith  language, and  n o t a p a r t  from  i t .  Secondly, i t
seem s equally  d if f ic u lt  t o  hold t h a t  th e s e  im ag es  a re  necessarily  
absurd, fo r  i f  p e rcep tio n  p reced es  cognition  -  o r  in  o th e r  words, i f
im ag es com e befo re  speech  -  th e n  th e  no tion  o f  absu rd ity  belongs to
th e  dom ain o f language. I t  is  only once we have ach ieved  a  ra t io n a l
d iscourse do we th e n  tu rn  to  our im ages  t o  decide  which a re  t r u e  and
which a re  fa lse , and t h a t  is  only i f  we add th e  no tion  o f  "being" o r
"non-being" to  th e m , a s  A ris to tle  po in ts  ou t. Thirdly, a  c r ite r io n
fo r  understanding  w h at m etaphors m ean, along D avidsonian lines, is  n o t
th e  sam e a s  understanding  how th e  m etaphoric im ages  a re  used. Indeed ,
th e re  probably  is  n o t  a  s im ple c rite r io n  t h a t  w ill enab le  u s  to
distinguish  t r u e  percep tio n  from  fa lse . As Hobbes pcdnts ou t, when we
a re  dream ing we th ink  t h a t  we a re  aw ake, and when we a re  aw ake we know
83
t h a t  we a re  n o t dream ing. T h a t is  a l l  we c a n  probabLy say  when 
disentangling  our conscious p ercep tions , un less th e  sc ien ce  o f
neurophysiology can  somehow develop  a  m ore sc ie n tif ic  c r ite r io n  fo r  
d iscerning t r u e  im ag es  from  fa lse . F o r many philosophers, how ever,
th is  was n o t such  a  problem . Im ages added to g e th e r  w ith language  and
th e n  mixed w ith  ou r in te l le c t  o r  reaso n , i t  w as though t, could s t i l l
do th e  job q u ite  n icely .
I f  I  have p re se n t in  my mind, say, a f te r  pondering th e  su b je c t o f 
hum an anatom y  and th e  inven tio n  o f  m achines, an  im age o f  an  a rtif ic ia l
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man, I  can  be sa id  to  be en te rta in in g  a  m e tapho rica l im ag e , H  is  from  
th is  im ag e  t h a t  I  can  proclaim  th e  m etaphor " th e  hum an body is  a
m achine," and th e n  from  th is  m etaphor deduce, a s  Davidson would have
us do, v a n o u s  propositions along th e  lin es  t h a t  "both bodies and
m achines fu n c tio n  on c e r ta in , know able law s" o r ,rlike a  m achine, th e
hum an body has in te rn a l  m ovem ents," and  so  on. H ere, i t  is  th e  im age
which is  a rriv ed  a t  f ir s t ,  fo llow ed by th e  a t te n d a n t m etaphoric
expression, and  th e n  la s t ly  by ou r l i te r a l  in te rp re ta tio n s  which c a ll
our a t te n tio n  to  w h atev e r in s ig h ts  th e  im ag e  may con tain . N ote t h a t
th e  genesis begins w ith th e  im ag e  and ends w ith th e  l i te r a l  p araph rase
of th e  m etaphoric  expression  -  o r  in  o th e r  words, i t  is  only once th e
im ag e  has  been  a r tic u la te d  in  language  t h a t  th e  t r u e  in s ig h t t h a t  our
im ag ina tion  l e t s  loose  begins to  do i t s  work.
Of course th e  genesis o f  th e  im age  t h a t  I  have p lo tte d  h e re  m ight 
be e n tire ly  d iffe re n t. One m ight begin, fo r  in s ta n c e , by positing  a  
ca teg o ry  m istake (say, " a ll p la n e ts  flow  t o  th e  sea") and  th e n  go on 
to  derive  w hatever p ropositional in s ig h t t h a t  th is  m etaphor may hold, 
e n tire ly  by-passing th e  issue  o f  im ag es a lto g e th e r . B ut i t  seem s ju s t  
a s  lik e ly  a s  n o t t h a t  w ithou t a  corresponding im ag e  binding in  som e 
way th e  tw o  c a te g o rie s  to g e th e r  (or m aintaining th e  req u is ite  
"tension," a s  B lack and  R ichards would say) we would be fo r tu n a te  i f  
we w ere to  derive  much sa tis fa c tio n  from  th is  m etaphor. I t  seem s 
equally  p ro b lem a tica l t h a t  our b e s t  m etaphors a re  c re a te d  in  th is  way, 
fo r  engaging in  th e  w illy-nilly com bination  o f  any tw o  unlike o b jec ts  
to  see  w h at m ight be g leaned  would be to o  haphazard  a  m ethod t o  be o f 
much use . Pure chance would th e n  be governing our cho ice  o f 
m etaphoric expressions. C on tra ry  t o  w h at Davidson and  R orty  would 
suggest, i t  is  th e  im age, a s  M ichael W alzer po in ts o u t, which
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84"provides th e  s ta r tin g  p o in t fo r  p o litic a l th inking ." The reaso n  why 
our im ag es  m ight com e b e fo re  th ink ing , a s  Susanne L anger p a in ts  o u t in  
Philosophy in  a  New Key, i s  t h a t
" ...if  th e  m a te ria l o f th o u g h t is  sym bolism , th e n  th e  th inking 
organism  m ust be fo re v e r  furn ish ing  sym bolic versions o f  i t s  
experience , in  o rd e r to  l e t  th ink ing  p roceed . As a  m a tte r  o f
f a c t ,  i t  is  n o t th e  e sse n tia l a c t  o f th o u g h t t h a t  is  sym boli-
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zation , b u t an  a c t  essen tial to  tho u g h t, and p rio r to  i t ."
From th is  we m ight conclude th a t ,  a lthough  n o t  a l l  im ag es  le n d
th em se lv es  to  m etaphors o r v ice  v e rsa , a  m etaphor jo ined w ith an  im age 
becom es a  highly charged  com bination , even  i f  th e re  m ight be som eth ing  
chicken  and eggish ab o u t which would com e f ir s t .
Indeed , i t  m ight be essen tia l t o  c la r ify  which does com e f ir s t ,
th e  im ag e  o r  th e  word, to  avoid  making th e  sam e philosophical
m istakes. The lu rk ing  danger in  accep tin g  th e  above a cc o u n t is  t h a t
i t  could  le a d  to  a  ra d ic a l ap rio riza tio n  o f  th e  im ag e . I f  sym bolic 
im ag es com e p rio r  to  th o u g h t, a s  L ang er av e rs , th e n  th e  very  
philosophy o f language which s itu a te s  d iscourse a t  th e  co re  o f hum an 
experience  would have to  be m arginalized . This dan g er can  be av e rted , 
I  b e lieve , by th e  underscoring  o f th e  follow ing tw o  points; f irs tly , 
th e re  is  no need  t o  shun th e  b e lie f  t h a t  ou r world is , above a l l  e lse , 
d iscursively  co n s titu te d  o r  t h a t  m an is  fo re v e r  housed in  language, a s  
th e  d eco n tru c ticn is ts  rem in d  us. B ut secondly , and  th is  i s  th e  
re le v a n t po in t, th e  language which man h as  a t  his d isposal is  n o t  
a lto g e th e r  g iven to  him , lik e  a  fam ily  tra d itio n  handed down from  age 
to  age . R ather, language is  lik e  a  to o l  which can  be im ag in a tiv e ly  
used  in  vary ing  ways. I f  we w ere only to  a c c e p t  th e  f i r s t  p roposition  
t h a t  ou r w orld w as d iscursively  co n s titu te d , a s  a  D errida o r  a  de Man
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would c laim , th e n  we would be fo rced  to  com e to  th e  unhappy conclusion 
t h a t  th e re  ex is ts  nothing in  th e  world e x c e p t language and  t h a t  man is  
only th e  passive re c e p to r  o f  th e  lin g u is tic  u tte ra n c e s  ov er which he  
has no  controL  T here is  no o th e r  way in  which t o  use  th e  to o ls  given
to  us, in  o th e r  words, o th e r  th a n  fo r  w h at th e y  w ere designed. B u t
th is  c a n n o t be th e  e n tire  s to ry . New ways o f looking a t  th e  world a re  
con tinually  being a r tic u la te d . New m etaphoric  models a re  being 
im ag ined , new languages a re  being bom . Now th e  s e a t  o f a l l  th is  
a c tiv ity  would have to  r e s t  in  th e  im ag in a tio n  -  t h a t  is , th e  
im ag in a tiv e  recom bining  o f  th e  d iscu rsive  u tte ra n c e s  and  p ra c tic e s  
th a t  may a lread y  ex ist. T here is  no ra d ic a l aprLorization o f  th e
im ag e  h e re , only th e  in s is te n ce  t h a t  in  add ition  t o  language th e re  is  
th e  sym bolic re p re se n ta tio n  from  which i t  is  im ag ina tive ly  bom  and 
which enab les man to  c re a te  new p o litic a l fo rm s o u t o f did.
Now we m ight ag ree  w ith  th e  s ta te m e n t t h a t  th e re  a re  no
foundations t o  our know ledge because  a) language  i ts e lf  is  n o t an
ad eq u a te  to o l  to  la y  th is  foundation , b) sense  o r  im ag e  p e rcep tio n
also  fa ils  t o  s a tis fy  th is  need , and  c) ra tio n a lity , o r  any  o th e r
m ethodological p rocedure , alone equally  does n o t secu re  a  foo tho ld  on
know ledge. I t  m ight be  argued , fu rth e rm o re , t h a t  th e  c lo se s t one may
com e to  estab lish ing  foundations t o  ou r th o u g h t m ight en ta il a
com bination  o f a ,  b , and c ,  b u t g iven Quine's and  D errida's
deco n stru c tio n  o f epdstem ology and  o f  Davidson's and R orty 's c ritiq u e  
o f  m etaphors in  o rd inary  langauge  such  an  a t te m p t  would also  faiL
The inadequacy  o f th e  m odem  w orld t o  secu re  foundations t o  ou r
th o u g h t m ay be no g r e a t  lo ss , in d eed , i t  m ay be only fo r  th e  good.
The c ru c ia l po in t, how ever, i s  th is : we c a n n o t begin  t o  understand
w hat p o litic a l m etaphors m ean un less we ta k e  th e  tro u b le  to
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in v e s tig a te  th e ir  use -  t h a t  is , th e ir  re la tio n sh ip  w ith  th e i r  m anner 
o f  expression , th e i r  a t te n d a n t im ages , and  th e  m ethod in  which th e y  
a re  a r tic u la te d . In  sh o rt, we m ust consider th e  com bination  o f  a, b, 
and c  above. T h a t we m ight n o t  to d a y  a c c e p t t h a t  th is  se rv es  a s  an  
ad eq u a te  grounding fo r  ou r b e lie fs  should n o t  co lo r ou r in te rp re ta tio n  
o f  th o se  th e o ris ts  who in  th e  p a s t  d id  in  f a c t  th in k  th is  way. The 
in s tin c tiv e  c u ltu ra l m a te r ia lis t im pulse in  us m ust b e  p u t in  check.
A ccording to  Davidson in  h is "W hat M etaphors Mean," th e re  ca n  b e  "no 
in s tru c tio n s  fo r  devising m etaphors; th e re  is  no m anual fo r  
de term in ing  w hat a  m etaphor ‘m eans' o r  'says'; th e re  is  no t e s t  fo r  
m etaphor t h a t  does n o t c a l l  fo r  ta s te ."  06 I f  m etaphor co n ta in s  an  
e le m e n t o f  su rp rise  o r  novelty , Davidson suggests, th e n  i t  is  due to  
i t s  "bu ilt-in  a e s th e tic  fe a tu re "  ak in  to  ou r joy in  hearing  a
R7symphony, w hether o r  n o t we have heard  f t  befo re . T aste , o f  course,
im p lie s  judgm ent, and i f  we can  ta k e  Davidson a t  h is word th e n  th e  
p ro p er exp lica tion  o f  a  m etaphoric  u tte ra n c e  would invo lve  our
cap a c ity  fo r  rendering  judgm ent. Now th e  l a s t  g r e a t  philosopher to
speak  seriousLy o f  judgm en t and  th e  p rocess o f  in tu itio n  was Im m anuel
K ant. In  invoking th e  nam e o f  K an t a t  th is  p o in t I  do n o t  wish to
im ply  t h a t  Davidson i s  by any  m eans a  K antian. As i t  is  t h a t  Davidson
aligns h is th o u g h t c losely  to  t h a t  o f  Quine's i t  would be absu rd  to
conclude t h a t  K ant's c ritiq u e  o f  judgm ent fu lf ills  th e  D avidsonian
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program  fo r  understanding  th e  m eaning o f  sen ten ces . H ow ever, th e  
prohLem o f  judgm ent in  reg a rd s  t o  understanding  m etaphor, a s  Davidson 
would ag ree , does p re se n t i t s e lf  h e re . I f  understanding  th e  m eaning 
o f  m etaphor ca lls  fo r  judgm ent, th e n  i t  m ight be  said  to  be  possible 
t h a t  we can  sh are  a  judgm en t on m etaphor -  o r  in  o th e r  words, t h a t  a
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shared  m e tapho rica l "com m on sense," although n o t  being a  foundation
its e lf ,  m ight s t i l l  a c t  in  th e  p lace  o f  a  foundation .
In  sec tio n  59 o f his C ritique o f Judgm ent, e n title d  "Of B eauty  a s
th e  sym bol o f  M orality," K an t d istingu ishes be tw een  tw o  fo rm s  o f
in tu itio n : one, t h a t  o f  em p iric a l co n cep ts  (w hat he ca lls  "exam ples")
and  th e  o th e r, t h a t  o f  U nderstanding, which he  c a lls  " sc h em ata ."99
W henever we a t te m p t to  m ake in te llig ib le  o r  i l lu s tra te  in  a  sensib le
form  th e  n a tu re  o f  ou r own in tu itio n , K ant believed , we do so  e i th e r
sch em atica lly , which is  t o  say  we have som e a  p r io r i in tu itiv e
understand ing  o f  w hat o u r exam ples a re , o r  we do so  sym bolically , 
which K an t says "a re  e i th e r  words, o r  v isib le  (algebraic , even
90m im eticaD  signs, a s  m ere expressions fo r  concep ts."  When we sp eak  o f
th e  d iscursive , th e re fo re , we do so  by e i th e r  pairing  i t  w ith  th e  
dem onstrab le  "exam ples" o r  w ith  th e  sym bolical signs t h a t  s ta n d  in  
p lace  o f  som e concep t. The a r t  o f in tu itio n  which enab les u s  to
glim pse som eth ing  b efo re  i t  is  p re s e n t to  ou r senses is  th e re fo re  one 
t h a t  is  a  p rio ri. A ccording to  K ant,
"A ll in tu itio n s, which we supply to  con cep ts  a  p rio ri, a re  th e re -  
fo re  e i th e r  sch em a ta  o r  sym bols, o f  which th e  fo rm e r co n ta in  
d ire c t,  th e  l a t t e r  in d ire c t, p re sen ta tio n s  o f th e  co ncep t. The 
fo rm e r do th is  d em o nstra tive ly , th e  l a t t e r  by m eans o f analogy
q a
. .a n  which judgem ent exoercases a  double function ."
The reaso n  why we req u ire  judg m en t t o  understand  w h at is  sym bolic,
accord ing  to  K ant, i s  t h a t  we m ust b e  ab le  t o  apply  th e  co n c e p t o f 
sensib le  in tu itio n  '‘to  a  q u ite  d if fe re n t  o b je c t o f  which th e  f i r s t  is
only a  sym bol." 92The exam ple K an t uses t o  i l lu s tra te  th is  p o in t is  one
of considering th e  s ta te  to  be a  m achine:
"Thus a  m onarch ical s ta t e  is  re p re se n te d  by a  living body, i f  i t
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is  governed  by n a tu ra l law s, and by a  m ere m achine Dike a  hand-
mill) i f  governed by an  ind iv idual abso lu te  will; b u t in  bo th
cases  sym bolically . F o r be tw een  a  despo tic  s ta te  and a  hand-m ill 
th e re  is ,  t o  be  su re , no sim ilarity ; b u t th e re  is  a  s im ila rity  in
th e  ru le s  accord ing  t o  which we r e f le c t  upon th e se  tw o  th in g s  and
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th e i r  causa lity ."
So co n tra ry  t o  w h at Davidson would allow , K an t d ec la red  t h a t  th e re  a re  
"rules" governing our sym bolic con cep ts  and t h a t  th e se  ru le s  could be 
d iscern ib le .
These ru le s  governing analogy, lik e  ru le s  governing th e  m eaning
o f m etaphor, a re  only sym bolic p re sen ta tio n s  -  w hat K an t ca lled
"hypotyposis" -  and  a re  n o t to  be ta k e n  lite ra lly . As K an t explains,
"Thus th e  w ords ground (support, basis), t o  depend (to be  held up  from
above), to  flow  from  som ething (instead  of, to  follow), substance  (as
Locke exp resses i t ,  th e  su p p o rt o f  acc iden ts), and  coun tless  o th e rs
a re  sym bolical hypotyposes and  expressions fo r  concep ts , n o t by m eans
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o f  d ir e c t  in tu itio n , b u t only by analogy w ith i t ."  I f  we w ere to  use  
th e se  te rm s  a s  i f  th e y  w ere l i te r a l ,  K ant w arns, th e n  our sym bolic
co n cep ts  lik e  "God" would la p se  in to  "anthropom orphism ...by which
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nothing a t  a l l  i s  cognised, n o t even  in  a  p ra c t ic a l p o in t o f view."
Judgm en t, o f  course, i s  a lso  req u ired  to  u nders tand  our 
non-sym bolic lang u ag e , b u t  K ant's  p o in t i s  t h a t  i f  we can  re n d e r  
judgm en t upon t h a t  which is  e v id e n t (the schem ata) we should a lso  be 
ab le  t o  do th e  sam e fo r  th e  sym bolic. F or exam ple, we can  judge an  
o b je c t t o  be b e a u tifu l and  we can  similarLy com e t o  som e understanding  
o r judgm en t on a  h igher p lane on th e  id e a  o f  th e  beau tifuL  "H ence," 
K ant p rocla im s,
" ...b o th  an  acc o u n t o f th is  in n e r  possib ility  in  th e  su b je c t and
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o f th e  e x te rn a l possib ility  o f a  n a tu re  t h a t  a g ree s  w ith i t ,
[judgm ent] finds i t s e l f  to  be re fe r re d  to  som eth ing  w ithin th e  
su b je c t as  weH as  w ithou t him , som ething  which is  n e ith e r  n a tu re  
no r freedom , b u t y e t  is  co n n ec ted  w ith th e  supersensib le  ground 
o f  th e  la t te r ."  96
K an t concludes by saying t h a t  th e  ru le s  governing th e  meaning o f
m etap h o rica l co n cep ts  such  a s  "grounds" and "substance" can  only be
97understood  on th e  sym bolic le v e l  and  n o t  on th e  l i te ra l .  T here as, 
th e re fo re , such  a  th in g  a s  a  sym bolical grounding, som eth ing  t h a t  we 
a l l  co n stitu tio n a lly  possess, t h a t  works on th e  "supersensLcal" leveL  
'Tn th is  supersensLcal ground," he observes, " th e  th e o re tic a l  fa c u lty  
is  bound to g e th e r  in  un ity  w ith th e  p ra c tic a l, in  a  way which though 
com mon is  y e t  unknown."
In  th e  K antian  schem e o f th ings, th e re fo re , i t  is  possible to  
re a c h  a  com m on sensory  a g re e m e n t ab o u t th e  foundations o f sym bolic 
form s. This com m on sensory  ex perience  would have t o  e x is t  in  th e  
noum enal world. A lthough th e  v eh ic le  in  which we can  sh a re  in  th is  
com m on judgm en t "is y e t  unknown," we can  n ev erth e less  claim  i t s  
ex isten ce , K ant argued , and  by th is  "supersensical" judgm ent bridge 
th e  gap  be tw een  th e  sensory  w orld and our e th ic a l  world. As K an t 
a rgues, "T aste  m akes possible th e  tra n s itio n , w ithou t any  v io len t 
leap , from  th e  charm  o f Sense to  h ab itu a l m oral in te re s t."
Now i t  would be  d if f ic u lt  t o  m ain tain  t h a t  K ant had m anaged 
sa tis fa c to r ily  to  e s tab lish  th e  foundation  o f com m on sensory  judgm ent, 
e i th e r  in  th e  sensory  rea lm  o r  th e  supersensory  re a lm , th e  noum enal 
world o r  th e  phenom enal one. A ll he had m anaged to  do, a f te r  pointing 
o u t t h a t  Locke and  o th e rs  had  used  sym bolic language which should 
n ev er be  ta k e n  li te ra lly , was th e n  to  su g g es t t h a t  i t  was s t i l l
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possible t o  ach ieve a g re e m e n t upon "supersensLcal grounds," which, f a r  
from  c la r ifying th e  problem , m erely  se rv es  fu r th e r  t o  obscure i t .  
K an t sim ply rep laced  one s e t  o f m etaphors fo r  ano th er. However, th e  
r e le v a n t p o in t o f h is c r itiq u e  is  th is : fo r  K ant i t  was possible to  
re n d e r  a  judgm en t a b o u t th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  w orld based  upon ou r 
in tu itiv e  understanding  o f  i t .  This in tu itiv e  in s ig h t is  som ething  we 
a l l  sh a re . A ll t h a t  rem ain ed  w as t o  estab lish  th e  ad eq u a te  "grounds" 
from  which ou r com m on sen s ib ilitie s  can  c o n fla te  w ith our "m oral 
in te re s t."
Now o f w h at can  th is  com m on sensory  ground consist?  With th e  
possible ex cep tion  o f  th e  sense  o f  sm ell, a l l  o th e r  senses a t  one tim e  
o r a n o th e r had  been  p u t fo rw ard  a s  can d id a tes  fo r  reach ing  a  com m on 
judgm en t on know ledge. A ris to tle , fo r  exam ple, in s is te d  t h a t  i t  was 
th e  sense  o f to u ch . In  th e  De Anima A ris to tle  a rgued  th a t  to u ch  "is
th e  m ost e x a c t  o f  m an's senses," w ithou t which " th e re  can  be no o th e r
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sense." "This may be  seen  from  th e  fa c t ,"  A ris to tle  w en t on, " th a t  i t  
is  th e  o rgan  o f  sense and nothing e lse  which m akes a l l  th e  d iffe re n ce  
in  th e  hum an ra c e  be tw een  n a tu ra l endow m ents o f  man and  man. F o r
hard-sk inned  men a re  d u lle r o f  in te l le c t ,  while th o se  who a re
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soft-sk inned  a re  g ifted ."  When Aquinas r e fe r s  to  th is  passage in  his
Sum man th eo lo q ica  he  re p e a ts  A ris to tle 's  a rg u m e n t t h a t  to u c h  governs
a l l  o f  th e  o th e r  s e n se s .100 From to u c h  we a re  ab le  to  d isc rim in a te
b e tw een  th e  an im a te  and  th e  in a n im a te , Aquinas argued , and  th u s
d if fe re n tia te  be tw een  various modes o f in te l le c t .  For P la to ,
obviousLy, th e  ch ie f sense  o f  understand ing  w as t h a t  o f  v ision  in
which th e re  w ere tw o  ty p es, t h a t  o f  ord inary  vision o f  th e  world o f
ap p ea ran ces  and  t h a t  o f  th e  ph ilosoph ical v ision  o f  th e  world o f  th e
Form s.
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In  th e  Old T es tam en t th e  com m on ground o f to u c h  o r  vision was 
th o u g h t o f  a s  being secondary  t o  th e  sense  o f  hearing , w here Yahweh 
was n ev e r seen  b u t only rev ea led  h im self by th e  sound o f h is voice ('T 
am Who I  Am" th e  burning bush to ld  Moses). In  passages in  th e  New
T estam en t, on th e  o th e r  hand, th e  com m on sense  o f  hearing  w as
occasionally  rep la c e d  w ith  t h a t  o f  t a s te ,  a s  in  b e lie f  t h a t  '*those who
w ere once en ligh tened , and have ta s te d  o f  th e  heavenly  g if t ,  and  w ere 
m ade p a r ta k e rs  o f  th e  Holy Ghost" [ H ebrew s 6:4], S a in t Antoninus, 
when he r e fe r s  to  th is  passage in  h is Sum m a  thectLoqica, po in ts  o u t
t h a t  t a s t e  is  linked  to  wisdom, th e  la t in  word f o r  t a s t e  being sapor
1 0 1from  which th e  I ta lian s  d e n v e  sa p e re , meaning to  know.
Of a l l  th e  m etaphors o f  knowing in  th e  W estern philosophical
tra d itio n , how ever, th e  s tro n g e s t concerns th e  com m on sense  o f vision,
e i th e r  th e  vision o f  o b jec ts  a s  th e y  ap p ea r t o  us, o r  th e  im aginary
vision o f  w h at ou r sense o f s ig h t does n o t im m ed ia te ly  p erce ive . The
use  t o  which v isu a l m etaphors a re  p u t in  p o li tic a l th o u g h t, th e n , is
freq u en tly  in  te rm s  o f estab lish ing  a  com m on sensory  basis fo r
understanding  know ledge. P o litica l know ledge, o f  course, m ust be a  
public know ledge. I t  is  possib le to  o b ta in  th is  know ledge,
philosophers have argued , p rec ise ly  because we a l l  sh a re  in  th e  sam e
c ap a c ity  fo r  sense . Our c o llec tiv e  ju dgm en t o f  sense  enab les us
co llec tiv e ly  to  "see" th e  t r u th  o f  a  p roposition , m oderating  w hat we
m ight fa lse ly  p e rce iv e  i f  a l l  ou r im ag es  w ere sim ply  p riv a te ly  held
ones. This, o f  course, i s  ex ac tly  w h at th e  L atins had believed . For
th e  Romans i t  w as im p o r ta n t t o  in s t i l  a  sensus com m unis in  th e
popula tion  -  t h a t  is , a  un iversally  sh ared  v ir tu e . Q uintilian even
suggested  th a t  a  young man's ed u ca tio n  be conducted  in  public, fo r  i f
he  w ere to  r e ta in  a  p riv a te  te a c h e r  he would n o t rece iv e  t h a t  "sensus
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a n n
which we c a ll  com m unis."
The im p o rta n t and obvious th in g  ab o u t com m on sense , th e n , is  t h a t
i t  is  publicly  shared . i t  is  th e  g a te  th rough  we com e t o  know one
a n o th e r  and  u ltim a te ly  ourselves -  a  public language gam e, i f  you
lik e . B u t fo r  th o se  philosophers who w ere n o t  c o n te n t t o  re a c h
ag re e m e n t on th e  w orld o f  ap pearances, how ever, an  a g re e m e n t on
an o th e r p lane o f  sensory  experience  was needed.
M etaphor is  th e  t o d  in  which our p o litic a l im ag in a tio n  m an ifests
its e lf ,  w here t h a t  which is  p re s e n t to  our senses is  tra n s fo rm e d  in to
a  d iscourse ab o u t th e  n a tu re  o f  p o litic a l know ledge. Locke, fo r
exam ple, po in ts  o u t t h a t  i f  we a re  t o  have a  co n ce p t o f  know ledge, we 
m ust a t te n d  to
"...how g re a t  a  dependence our words have on com mon sensib le 
id eas; and how th o se  which a re  m ade use  o f to  s tan d  fo r  ac tio n s  
and notions qu ite  rem oved  from  sense, have th e ir  r ise  from  
th e n c e , and  from  obvious sensib le  id e a s  a re  tra n s fe r re d  to  m ore 
obtuse sign ifications, and made to  s tan d  fo r  id e a s  th a t  com e n o t 
under th e  cognizance o f our sen ses ."103 
M etaphorically , th e n , many p o litic a l philosphers believed  t h a t  we m ust 
f i r s t  a scend  th e  la d d e r  o f com m on sense  in  o rd e r  t o  a r r iv e  a t  
p o litic a l know ledge.
The in s ig h t o f po litica l m etaphors, th e n , goes beyond th e i r  
l i te r a l  m eaning fo r  th e  purpose fo r  which th e y  a re  used  i s  o f te n  to  
in s ti l  and com m on sensory  ground fo r  understanding . In  th e  h is to ry  o f 
p o litic a l th o u g h t, th is  ground o r  foundation  was n ev e r th o u g h t t o  be 
su ff ic ie n t by i t s e l f  fo r  estab lish ing  know ledge, only in  con junction  
w ith language  and  th e  world could  t h a t  foundation  be  la id . Like in  
P la to 's  Seventh  L e tte r , many th e o ris ts  reasonab ly  be lieved  t h a t
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know ledge was com posed o f  th e  "word," " the  defin ition/*  and th e  
"im age" which, when once jo ined  to g e th e r , could be  sh if te d  by th e  
in te l le c t  to  re v e a l tru th .
Today i t  m ight seem  m ore reaso n ab le  t o  a c c e p t th e  l i t e r a l i s t  position  
w ith  re g a rd s  t o  th e  m eaning o f  m etaphor -  a  position  which con tends 
t h a t  our po litica l d iscourse would be doom ed to  fa ilu re  i f  we w ere to  
e v e r  ta k e  ou r f ig u ra tiv e  d iscourse  fo r  any th ing  o th e r  th a n  a  
re p la c e m e n t fo r  o rd inary  language. C onsequently, many th e o ris ts ,  lik e  
Davidson and  R orty, would consign to  flam es  o u r p resc rip tiv e , 
cogn itive , and  o n to log ica l m e tapho rica l u tte ra n c e s  in  d e fe re n c e  t o  a  
d esc rip tiv e , m ore tru th fu l, language . Indeed , th is  i s  e x a c tly  how 
William Ja m e s  d escribes pragm atism  a s  a  p u rsu it to  abandon a p n o i i  
reason ing . Y et th e  problem  w ith  th is  p ra g m a tis t response, a s  we have 
seen , is  th e  la c k  o f  ap p rec ia tio n  fo r  th e  rede o f th e  im ag in ary  o r  th e  
su p er sensory , t h a t  which ap p ea rs  a s  a  handm aiden th o u g h t, making 
th o u g h t possible.
We do n o t have to  conclude w ith th e  o n to log ica l cam p t h a t  
m etaphors express t h a t  in e ffa b le  condition  o f  hum an ex is ten ce . Nor do 
we have to  ag ree  w ith  th e  cogn itive  schoo l t h a t  m etaphoric  expressions 
a re  p riv ileged  over o th e rs . On th e  co n tra ry , m etaphoric  im ag es  re v e a l 
nothing e x c e p t ou r im ag ination  a t  p lay , and th e  m etapho ric  expression  
i t s e lf  may be noth ing  m ore th a n  a  p o e tic  response to  th is  im ag inary  
im ag e , an  expression which we a re  f re e  t o  in te rp r e t  l i te r a l ly  i f  we 
choose t o  do so. However, we would be  poor in te rp re te rs  in d eed  i f  we 
w ere to  dism iss m etaphor's p rev a lan ce  in  p o litic a l th o u g h t a s  fa n c ifu l 
em broidery . The p o litic a l th e o r is t  who c re a te s  a  m etaphor is  
p resen ting  us w ith  a  ground fo r  com m on sensib le  ag reem en t, inv iting  us
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to  sh a re  in  h is vision, nudging u s  c lo se r to w ard s  t h a t  realm  o f
po litica l know ledge which h is im ag ination  has p rep ared . Thus th e  
problem  w ith  procla im ing m etaphors to  be absurd  is  t h a t  th is  is  to o  
c ru d e  a  judgm en t t o  apply  t o  p o litic a l th o u g h t. Political
philosophers ca rv e  o u t  in  a  language -  a  language which i s  l i te ra l ,
f ig u ra tiv e , and im ag e-lad en  -  th e i r  c o n ce p t o f  th e  s ta te .  As we do 
n o t judge M ichelangelo a  fa ilu re  because  his s to n e  re fu ses  to  com e to  
l ife , so  to o  we m ight re f ra in  from  condem ning p o litic a l philosophers 
fo r  ch iseling  o u t th e o rie s  which seem  t o  con tinually  lim p  when th e y  
a re  s e t  a fo o t. Such is  th e  very  n a tu re  o f  s ta te c r a f t .
"When one looks a t  p o litic a l m etaphors, Ju d ith  Sklar w rites  in  
h e r  Men and  Ci-ri^ens, "one w ants to  know how th e y  work w ithin th e
c o n te x t o f  a  w rite r 's  g en e ra l purpose. One does n o t  w an t t o  judge
104th e i r  le g itim a c y  o r  va lid ity  o r  g ra m m a tic a l co rrec tn ess."  We m ight 
w an t to  add, th e n , t h a t  our a t te m p ts  t o  in te rp r e t  p o litic a l m etaphors 
should n o t  la p se  in to  sim ply a  d eco n stru c tio n is t a t ta c k  on how th e y  
b e tra y  th e  te x t .  We should re a d  th e  m etaphors o f  p o litic a l th o u g h t in  
te rm s  o f  how th e y  w ere w ritten  and, possibly, how th e y  w ere in tended , 
r a th e r  th a n  co n fla ting  them  in to  an  on to log ica l a rg u m e n t o r  reducing  
th em  in to  w hatever th e i r  l i te r a l  in te rp re ta tio n s  mean.
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CHAPTER THREE:
HOBBES'S GROUNDING OF METAPHOR
F or i t  is  n o t th e  b a re  words, b u t th e  scope o f th e  w rite r, t h a t  
g ive th  th e  t r u e  lig h t, by which any  w riting  is  to  be in te rp re ted ?  
and th e y  t h a t  in s is t  upon single  te x ts ,  w ithou t considering th e  
main design, can  derive  nothing from  them  c learly ; b u t r a th e r  by 
castin g  a tom s o f sc rip tu re , a s  d u s t befo re  men's eyes, make 
every th ing  m ore obscure th a n  i t  is . —Thom as Hobbes
9 > 0
Thom as Hobbes has been  ca lled  th e  f i r s t  m odem  p o litic a l philosopher,
a  rev o lu tio n ary  th in k e r, even  a  genius by th o se  who have s tu d ied  his
work; he has also  been  la b e lle d  a  m oral d e fe c tiv e , an  a th e is t,  an
a d v o c a te r  o f  ty ran n y , and, to  be lieve  T.S. E lio t, one o f  th e  m ost
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dangerous l i t t l e  men t h a t  h is to ry  has e v e r  p u t  fo rw ard . A lthough i t  
h a s  b een  ov er th r e e  hundred y ea rs  s ince  h is d ea th , Hobbes's th e o rie s  
a re  s t i l l  w idely d eb a ted , w ith  books and  a r t ic le s  con tinually  w ritte n  
o ffe rin g  new  in te rp re ta tio n s  o f  H obbesian th o u g h t. He was, am ong 
o th e r  th ings, a  philosopher and  a  p o litic a l th e o ris t,  an  earLy 
an th ropo log is t and  psycholog ist (in th e  m anner o f  m ost c o n tra c t
th eo ris ts ) , a  s c ie n tis t  and  a  h is to rian , a  sch o la r and  tra n s la to r  o f 
c la ss ic a l te x ts ,  and a  rh e to r ic ia n  a s  w ell a s  a  som etim es p o e t. I f  
one w ants to  be generous, his co n tro v e rsia l and s tim u la ting  a t ta c k s  
upon re lig ious m a tte rs  m ight a lso  qualify  him a s  a  theo log ian , a lb e it  
o f an  an ti-re lig io u s  d isposition . Hobbes also  considered  h im self to
be a  f i r s t - r a te  geom etric ian , a lthough  during h is own day many had
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cla im ed  o therw ise . In  sh o rt, th e re  w as hard ly  a  su b je c t t h a t  Hobbes 
d id  n o t  have som e ex p ertise  o r  opinion upon and  which did n o t p rove  to  
be in f lu e n tia l in  a t  le a s t  som e q u a rte rs . In  som e o f th e se  a re a s  his 
th e o rie s  w ere m ore su ccessfu l th a n  o th e rs , b u t in  a l l  th in g s Hobbes 
n ev e r lo s t  his p a r tic u la r  f la v o r  o f  w it and s ty le  fo r  which he  was 
renow ned.
Bom  in  England in  1588, th e  y e a r  o f  th e  Spanish A rm ada, Hobbes 
c la im ed  t h a t  he  e n te re d  in to  a  world fu l l  o f  fe a r , and  even  though  fo r  
th e  f i r s t  h a lf  o f  his l i f e  Europe enjoyed a  rem ark ab ly  p e a c e fu l spell, 
Hobbes n ev erth e less  was t o  w itness th e  te r r ib le  v io lence b rough t ab o u t 
by th e  English C ivil War, th u s  re in fo rc in g  h is b e lie f in  th e  f ra g ility  
o f  th e  com m onw ealth  and  th e  basic  con ten tiousness o f  th o se  who in h a b it
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f t .  IE f e a r  and re s tle ssn ess  w ere w h at p lagued th e  com m onw ealth  and 
th o se  who dw elled in  i t ,  Hobbes argued , th e n  a  p o litic a l o rd e r which 
gu aran teed  p eac e  and  secu rity  would provide th e  a n tid o te . W hat was 
n eeded , Hobbes p o stu la ted , was fo r  th e  su b jec ts  o f  th e  com m onw ealth  to  
ag ree  t o  su rren d er th e i r  r ig h ts  to  an  a ll-p o w erfu l sovereign  who, in  
exchange, would p rom ise th em  p eac e  and  secu rity . B ut b e fo re  arriv ing  
a t  th is , fo r  th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  a t  le a s t ,  rem a rk ab le  conclusion, 
Hobbes had  argued  t h a t  h is c iv il philosophy was sim ply th e  n a tu ra l 
ou tgrow th  from  a  s tudy  o f th e  n a tu ra l sc iences. He was, h e  claim ed ,
th e  f i r s t  philosopher e v e r  to  o f fe r  a  "c iv il sc ien c e ," th u s  unifying
4
a l l  o f hum an know ledge onto a  c o h e re n t whole. E m anating from  a  single 
p rem ise , lik e  th e  spokes o f a  w heel, w ere fo r  Hobbes th e  varied  
d iscip lines o f  op tics, astronom y, geom etry / e th ic s , lo g ic  and p o e try , 
t o  nam e ju s t a  few  exam ples -  in  sh o rt, a l l  t h a t  can  be subsum ed under 
th e  heading o f  hum an know ledge -  and  a t  th e  hub o f th is  w heel was 
Hobbes's m a te ria lis t claim  t h a t  th e  world consisted  o f  m a tte r  and 
motion.
W hat has an im ated  m ost th in k e rs  since  Hobbes's day has been  his 
p ronouncem ents upon c iv il philosophy, w ith h is o th e r  w ritings on 
op tics, geom etry , p o e try  and th e  lik e  t r e a te d  as  paro ch ia l in te re s ts .
Now Hobbes's "civiL sc ience"  d id  n o t  em erg e  g radually  ov er th e  sp an  o f 
his long  l i f e  (he d ied  in  1679 a t  th e  age o f n inety-one) b u t  seem ed  to  
have begun ea rly  in  h is in te l le c tu a l  developm ent. Thus we fin d  th a t  
in  1628 he engaged in  a  tra n s la tio n  o f  Thucydides's H istory  o f  th e  
Peloponnesian War because , he  had  said , he  w anted t o  w arn th e  English 
people a g a in s t th e  te m p ta tio n  t o  l is te n  to  rh e to r ic  and t o  fa v o r  
dem o cracy .5 With h is  scho larly , i f  n o t an ti-d e m o c ra tic  c re d e n tia ls  
firm ly  es tab lished , Hobbes tra v e lle d  fo r  th re e  y ea rs  around th e
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C on tinen t beginning in  1634 w here he  m e t G alileo and  various o th e r  
s c ie n tis ts  who w ere t o  g re a tly  in flu en ce  h is own work. So by th e  tim e  
Hobbes cam e t o  w rite  h is E lem en ts o f  Law N a tu ra l and P o litic  in  1640, 
m ost o f  h is  th e o rie s  on n a tu ra l and  c iv il sc ien ce  w ere  squarely  in  
p lace . He w rites, fo r  exam ple, in  his E p istle  D edicatory  to  th is  work 
t h a t  h is design was t o  la y  a  foundation  from  which t o  build th e  law s 
o f  n a tu re  and  o f po litics. His aim , he said , was sim ple:
"To red u ce  th is  d o c trin e  to  th e  ru le s  and in fa llib ility  o f 
reason , th e re  is  no way, b u t f i r s t  to  p u t such p rinc ip les  down 
fo r  a  foundation ,...and  a f te rw a rd  to  build th e re o n  th e  t r u th  o f 
cases  in  th e  law  o f n a tu re ..."  6
The foundation  which Hobbes c re a te d  was p a rtia lly  derived  from
his p rem ise  t h a t  th e  w orld consisted  o f m a tte r  and m otion, a  th e o ry
which was to  inform  a lm o s t a l l  o f  h is subsequen t works. Thus in  his
T ra c ta tu s  O pticus, published in  P aris  in  1644, he  re in fo rc e s  h is own
th e o ry  o f sense  im pressions which was ou tlined  in  h is E lem ents o f Law.
Hobbes had  in ten d ed  t h a t  his m ain body o f  work be p resen ted  in  th re e
se p a ra te  volum es, De C orpora, De Ho mine and De Cive, b u t th e  English
C ivil War u p se t th e  planned pub lica tion  o f  th e s e  books so t h a t  De
Cive, which was to  be  th e  cu lm ination  o f  h is w ritings, was ac tu a lly
published f i r s t  in  1642. L ev iathan , which is  gen era lly  reg a rd ed  a s  
h is  m asterp iece , was w ritten  b e tw een  1649-51 while he  was in  P a ris  and
is  in  many ways a  b r il lia n t r e s ta te m e n t  o f  w h at he had said  e a r l ie r  in
De Cive and  E lem ents o f Law. B ut along w ith a  synopsis o f  h is e a r l ie r
work, L ev iathan  also  con ta ined  a  m a ste rfu l rev iew  o f a lm o s t a l l  o f
hum an know ledge. Beginning w ith  th e  su b je c t o f  sense  im pressions,
which was explained by Hobbes in  a  su itab ly  m a te r ia lis t fash ion ,
Hobbes devo ted  th e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  L ev iathan  t o  th e  su b je c t o f man? th e
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second, th e  com m onw ealth; th e  th ird , th e  C hristian  soc ie ty ; th e  
fo u rth , a  c r itiq u e  on th e  fa lla c ie s  o f  re lig ious d o c trin e . Along th e  
way Hobbes m anaged t o  ta c k le  such  d iverse  su b jec ts  a s  th e  n a tu re  o f 
speech  and  language , reaso n  and  sc ien ce , im  ag ina tion  and  psychology, 
a s  w ell a s  an  ex tre m ely  c o n tro v e rsa l exegesis o f  th e  Old and New 
T estam en ts . W hat may su rp rise  th e  s tu d e n t o f  Hobbes is  n o t ju s t  his 
d iv e rs ity  o f  in te re s ts  -  he also  m anaged to  w rite  books on g eom etry  
(1656 & 1672), rh e to r ic  (1637) and  tr a n s la te  a l l  o f  Hom er (1675) -  b u t 
th e  consistency  o f  h is thought.7 F o r a  m an whose w ritten  work spans 
f if ty  years , such  a  consistency  o f  in te rlo ck in g  id e a s  can  only be 
m arvelled  a t .
R ecen tly  som e in te rp re te rs  o f  Hobbesian th o u g h t have begun to
lo o k  e lsew here  fo r  c lues  t o  m ore a c c u ra te ly  gauge h is c iv il
philosophy. R ichard P e te rs  and J.W .N . W atkins have w ritten  o f  Hobbes's 
grounding o f  c iv il philosophy upon a  sc ie n tif ic  reasoning,
p a rtic u la rly  upon th e  brand o f m ethodology o ffe re d  by G alileo and
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Harvey. Q uentin Skinner and R ichard Tuck have s tre ssed  th e  h is to ric a l
g
m ilieu o f  th e  la te  s ix te e n th  and  e a r ly  sev en te en th  cen tu ry . A ccording 
to  Skinner and  Tuck, Hobbes's c o n c e p t o f  p o litic a l ob ligation  should 
be v iew ed in  te rm s  o f  GrotLan th e o rie s  o f  n a tu ra l law  and o f th e  
s c ie n tif ic  p rincip les o ffe red  by th e  C o n tin en ta l a n ti-sc e p tic a l 
phUosphers. From a  s tudy  o f  th e  language o f o th e r  th in k e rs  o f 
Hobbes's day, Skinner and  Tuck su g g es t t h a t  Hobbes's p o litic a l
philosophy was f a r  from  unique. Leo S trauss, on th e  o th e r  hand, has
10w ritte n  o f  th e  evolving n a tu re  o f H obbes's philosophy. According to  
S trauss, Hobbes s tro v e  to  provide th e  grounds fo r  p o litic a l 
ob ligation , th ink ing  th a t ,  a t  f i r s t ,  th e  su b je c t o f h isto ry  could 
provide us w ith  an  exp lanato ry  sc ien ce  o f hum an behavior. Hobbes th e n
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abandoned th is  h is to r ic a l p ro jec t, accord ing  to  S trauss, in  fa v o r  o f a  
sc ien c e  o f  p o litic s  w ith which, in  tu rn , he  gradual] y  grew
disenchan ted . F inally, S truass con tends, Hobbes s e t t le d  fo r  a  
sy n thesis  o f  h is to ry , p o litic a l philosophy, and f ic tio n  a s  a  m eans o f
providing th e  grounds fo r  hum an behav ior and sc ie n tif ic  explanation .
In  add ition  t o  th e  above a t te m p ts  to  view  Hobbes's po litical
d o c trin e  in  te rm s  o f a  s c ie n tif ic  o r  a  h is to r ic a l se ttin g , o th e r
r e c e n t  th in k e rs  have s tre ssed  Hobbes's e th ic a l  d o c trin e , draw ing from
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a  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  n a tu ra l r ig h ts  and  m oral obligations. T heir 
a rg u m en ts  a re  bo th  su b tle  and persuasive , b u t by focusing  so lely  upon 
Hobbes's co n ce p t o f po litica l ob ligation  a  h o s t o f  o th e r  H obbesian
in te re s ts  re c e d e s  in to  th e  background. Hobbes's in te re s ts ,  a s  ju s t 
m entioned, w ere p ra c tic a lly  un iversal. He w as ju s tly  proud n o t only
o f  h is po litica l d o c trin e  b u t a lso  o f  h is th e o ry  o f  o p tics  and o f  his 
g e o m e tr ic a l d iscoveries. I t  is  th e re fo re  in  th e  s p ir i t  o f  Hobbes's 
w arning t h a t  unless one exam ines " th e  scope o f  th e  w riter...no th ing  
can  be  derived  c lea rly ” t h a t  th e  follow ing addresses i ts e lf ,  
a tte m p tin g  to  draw to g e th e r  som e o f Hobbes's o th e r  concerns. 12
One should n o t  be  to o  su rp rised  to  fin d  t h a t  th e  su b je c t o f
m etaphor fo rm s th e  basis fo r  much o f  w hat follow s. In  l ig h t o f  th e
ac c o u n t o f  p o litic a l m etaphor advanced  in  th e  prev ious ch ap te r, th is  
p re se n t c h a p te r  suggests  t h a t  m etaphor co n n ec ts  such  d isp a ra te  
H obbesian concerns a s  h is to ry , rh e to r ic , judgm en t and  even  p o litic a l 
ob ligation . M etaphor, th e  r e a d e r  w ill re c a ll, i s  th e  m eans by which 
th e  th e o r is t  t ra n s la te s  th e  vocabu lary  o f  ou r im  m ediate sensations
in to  a  super-sensory  rea lm ; co llec tiv e ly  we can  m etaphorically  "see" 
th e  t r u th  o f a  s ta te m e n t o r  o f a  s ta t e  o f a ffa irs , and we can  re n d e r  a  
com m on judgm en t upon som e f a c t  ev en  though  t h a t  f a c t  may n o t be
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im  m ediate ly  p re se n t b efo re  us.
Now th e  "standard  account"  o f  Thom as Hobbes's m eaning and use o f
m etaphor i s  one o f proclaim ing t h a t  Hobbes w as highly in c o n sis ten t in  
h is  denuncia tion  o f  m etaphor (considering h is  l ib e ra l u se  o f such 
tropes) and  t h a t  h is rh e to r ic a l flou rishes a re  le s s  re le v a n t when 
com pared  t o  h is to w erin g  p o litic a l and  philosophical ach ievem ents. 
This s tan d a rd  a c c o u n t h as  le d  t o  a  m arginalizing o f  Hobbes's 
m etaphoric  thoughts w henever th e  su b je c t is  spoken o f, a s  in  an  
occasio n a l a r t ic le  in  a  jo u rn a l o f  p o litic a l tho u g h t, th e  arg u m en t 
usually  ta k e s  th e  lin e  t h a t  Hobbes's t r e a tm e n t  o f  m etaphor a c ts  b e s t 
a s  a  h eu ris tic  dev ice . One r e c e n t  a t te m p t to  d ev ia te  from  th is  
s tan d a rd  acc o u n t can  be found in  David Johnston 's  The R hetoric  o f  th e  
L ev ia than , y e t  Johnston  m akes only a  passing re fe re n c e  to  m etaphor in
an  o therw ise  e x c e lle n t book dev o ted  t o  Hobbes's u se  o f  language.
13C learly  th is  is  n o t enough.
This s tan d ard  accoun t, i t  w ill be argued, is  in  e r ro r  w hen i t  
suggests  t h a t  Hobbes's m etaphoric  th o u g h t was in c o n s is te n t o r  even  
th a t  th e  su b je c t is  re la tiv e ly  u n im p o rtan t when co n tra s te d  to  Hobbes's 
co ncern  fo r , say , po litica l ob ligation . This is  to  p o s it a  fa lse  
d ichotom y be tw een  th e  c o n te n t o f  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f p o litic a l 
ob ligation  and  th e  fo rm  in  which i t  is  u tte re d . I f  we ta k e  th e  
tro u b le  to  re a d  Hobbes's th o u g h ts  on th e  su b je c t in  th e i r  p ro p er 
c o n te x t we soon d iscover t h a t  Hobbes was in  f a c t  la rg e ly  dependen t 
upon m etaphor a s  a  m eans to ,  f i r s t ,  derive  his p o litic a l philosophy, 
and, second, to  a r tic u la te  i t  t o  th e  g e n e ra l re a d e r. N ot 
surprisingly , we fin d  t h a t  Hobbes was t o  m ake co n tin u a l rem a rk s  
d ire c te d  to w ard  th e  read ing  o f m etaphors th ro u g h o u t his f if ty  y ea rs  o f 
w ritten  work, reg a rd less  o f  w h eth er h is su b je c t a t  th e  t im e  was
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concerned  w ith p o litic a l obligation , h isto ry , p o e try , sc ien ce  o r 
rh e to r ic . W hatever we m ight to d a y  be lieve , Hobbes h im self never 
considered  th e  su b jec t o f m etaphoric  th o u g h t to  be m arginal.
I t  is  a rgued  in  th is  c h a p te r  t h a t  th e  e r ro rs  o f  th e  s tan d ard  
ac c o u n t o f  Hobbes and  m etaphor a re  due to  a  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  
m isreading o f  po litica l m etaphor -  a s  in t im a te d  in  th e  previous 
c h a p te r  -  and th a t ,  consequently , Hobbesian m etaphor can  only be re a d  
a s  he  understood  and used  th e  te rm . Secondly, i t  is  suggested  t h a t  
from  th is  co n tex tu a liza tio n  o f H obbesian m etaphor a  h o s t o f  o th e r
Hobbesian concerns begin to  em erg e , nam ely  op tics , rh e to r ic , language, 
judgm en t and p o litic a l obligation.
F inally , i t  w ill be argued  t h a t  i f  th is  read ing  is  so  f a r  
c o rre c t, th e n  many o f our con tem porary  acco u n ts  o f  Hobbes's p o litic a l 
th o u g h t w ill th e re fo re  need  to  be  am ended, fo r  Hobbes's p o litic a l 
th o u g h t is  o ften tim es  erroneously  v iew ed th rough  a  le n s  t h a t  d is to r ts  
Hobbes's own p o litic a l and  philosophical in ten tio n s . The arg u m en t
freq u en tly  lev e led  ag a in s t Hobbes is  t h a t  he  "fails" to  convince us o f
th e  n eed  t o  su rren d er our r ig h ts  to  th e  sovereign  in  exchange fo r
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secu rity . From an  adeq u a te  understand ing  o f Hobbes's th e o ry  and use 
o f  m etaphor, i t  is  hoped t h a t  th is  r a th e r  re d u c tio n is t a t ta c k  on
Hobbes can  be co rre c te d . I t  is  argued  t h a t  Hobbes knew very  w ell t h a t
a rg u m e n t alone could n ev e r convince u s  t o  su rren d e r our r ig h ts  to  th e  
sovereign. He knew t h a t  n o t every  man was capab le  o f working o u t a  
th e o ry  o f  p o litic a l ob ligation  by h im self; he  needed  to  have help. A t 
th e  sam e t im e , how ever, Hobbes argued  t h a t  ind iv idual m em bers o f  a  
com m onw ealth  should n o t ta k e  i t  on  "au thority" t h a t  a  p a rtic u la r  
th e o ry  was c o rre c t. F o r to o  long  had  cdtzens sheepishly  follow ed th e  
d ic ta te s  o f  th is  o r  t h a t  p o litic a l, philosophical, o r  re lig ious
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"au thority" to  th e  d e tr im e n t o f  t ru th ,  Hobbes com plained. The problem  
fo r  Hobbes was th a t ,  since  n o t ev ery  man could work th e se  th in g s  o u t 
fo r  h im self, and sin ce  i t  w as to o  dangerous ju s t  to  a c c e p t a  claim  
based  upon th e  a u th o rity  o f  th e  c la im a n t, th e n  an o th e r to o l  w as needed  
by Hobbes t o  convince th e  people o f  th e  c o rrec tn ess  o f  h is p o litic a l 
d o c trin e . T h a t to o l, sim ply p u t, was m etaphor.
Section  One:
The S tandard  A ccount
The com m on lin e  on Hobbes's t r e a tm e n t  o f m etaphor has  been  to  p o in t 
o u t t h a t  while Hobbes expressLy argued  t h a t  m etaphors w ere dangerous 
to  th e  p ropagation  o f  sc ie n tif ic  and p o litic a l know ledge he 
n ev erth e less  found room  t o  m ake heavy use  o f  h is own m etaphors in  
o rd e r t o  g e t  his id e a s  acro ss to  th e  re a d e r. This m ost co n s is te n t o f 
p o litic a l th e o ris ts , i t  i s  o f te n  po in ted  ou t, was rem ark ab ly  
in c o n sisten t. In  an  a r t ic le  e n tit le d  "M etaphor and P o lit ic a l 
Knowledge" -  w here i t  is  observed  t h a t  m etaphors a re  ind ispensab le  to  
po.liti.cal th o u g h t -  Euegene M iller po in ts  o u t t h a t  one o f  th e  m o s t
s tr ik in g  exam ples o f m etaphoric th o u g h t can  be found in  Hobbes's
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L ev iathan . A ccording to  M iller, " th e  co n trad ic tio n  be tw een  Hobbes'
p rinc ip le  and h is p ra c tic e  [o f m etaphor] te a c h e s  an  im p o rta n t le sso n
ab o u t m etaphors and  models in  p o litic a l sc ien c e . " 16 M iller con tends 
t h a t  i t  rem a in s  u n c lea r w hether Hobbes had  ac tu a lly  in te n d e d  to
c o n tra d ic t h im self b u t  t h a t  in  e i th e r  e v e n t we should n o t  f a i l  t o
conclude from  Hobbes's g laring  "con trad ic tion" th e  c e n tra l im p o rtan ce
o f m etaphor in  a rtic u la tin g  p o litic a l know ledge. A nother ad v o ca te  o f
th e  s tan d a rd  a cc o u n t is  F red erick  Whelan who arg u es  t h a t  H obbes's
t r e a tm e n t  o f m etaphor was n o t co n sisten t. A ccording to  Whelan,
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"Hobbes h im self is  paradox ically  fo rced  to  r e s o r t  to  th e  
eloquence which he o therw ise  condem ns, and his observations
on language provide us w ith grounds fo r  doubts ab o u t th e
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su ccess  o f h is en te rp rise ."
In  o th e r  words, th e  v e ry  basis o f  Hobbesian th o u g h t is  su sp ec t, Whelan 
suggests , sim ply because  o f  th is  c e n tra l  rh e to r ic a l paradox  con ta ined  
in  his w ritings.
So com m on is  th is  read ing  o f  Hobbes and m etaphor t h a t  R ichard 
A shcraft, who o f te n  w rites  from  a  ra d ic a l p o litic a l p e rsp ec tiv e , has 
also w ritte n  o f  Hobbes's p a rad o x ica l p ro fessed  disdain fo r  m etaphors
which a re  n ev erth e less  coupled w ith h is f re q u e n t u se  o f  them
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th ro u g h o u t his work. "D espite  th e  f a c t  t h a t  Hobbes made ex tensive  use
o f  m etaphor in  th e  e lab o ra tio n  o f  h is own p o litic a l th e o ry ,"  A sh craft
argues, "he m ain tained  t h a t  th e  app lica tion  o f th e  p rincip les  o f
sc ien ce  to  p o litic s  d id  n o t re q u ire  th e  use o f 'd ecep tive ' language,
which he a t tr ib u te d  to  th e  th e o lo g ica lly  c e n te re d  p o litic a l th e o rie s  
advanced  by h is co n tem p o raries ."19 F or A shcraft, th e n , a s  fo r  M iller
and Whelan, Hobbes's f re q u e n t use o f  m etaphors, when com bined w ith his
p ro fessed  d isdain  fo r  th e i r  ex is ten ce  in  sc ien ce  and  philosophy,
p re sen ts  us w ith  a  rem ark ab le  paradox. W hilst fo r  M iller th is  paradox
o r  "con trad ic tion" m erely  h igh ligh ts th e  inva luab le  need  fo r  m etaphor
in  p o litic a l th o u g h t and  fo r  Whelan le ad s  us to  d o u b t th e  soundness o f
Hobbes's "en terp rise ,"  A sh cra ft s e e s  th is  Hobbesian paradox  a s  th e
basis fo r  th e  m odem  id eo lo g ica l b ias  ag a in s t c e r ta in  w ays o f
expressing  oneself. A ccording to  A sh craft,
" ...H o b b esis  a  fig u re  o f som e im p o rtan ce , since he asso c ia te s
th e  ten d en cy  to  em ploy m etap h o rica l language n o t only w ith
p o litic a l decep tion , bu t, more im p o rtan tly , w ith th e  making o f
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revo lu tion . This tend en cy , to  lin k  m etaphor, ideology, and 
rev o lu tio n ary  p o litic a l ob jectives, which, I  believe, co n s titu te s  
th e  u ltim a te  so c io -p o litica l s tan d a rd  fo r  th e  m odem  n egative  
a t t i tu d e  to w ard  such  language, has i t s  orig ins in  Hobbes' e f fo r ts
to  purge 'sc ien tif ic ' p o litic a l th e o ry  o f  socia lly  d isrup tive
20te rm ino logy ."
In  o th e r  words, A sh c ra ft con tends t h a t  Hobbes's anti.-m etaphori.cal
p ro c lam atio n s a re  p a r t  o f  th e  ideo log ica lly  tin g ed  language  o f
co n tro l, leg is la tin g  which lin g u is tic  u tte ra n c e s  a re  a c c ep tab le  to
p o litic a l th o u g h t and  which a re  dangerous t o  a  rece iv ed  po litical
p rogram . While M iller's, W helan's and  A shcraft's  conclusions from
Hobbes's u se  o f  m etaphor a re  w ildly d iv e rg en t, th e y  a l l  ag ree  t h a t
Hobbes had indeed  c o n tra d ic ted  h im self w ith  his use  o f  m etaphors in
o rd e r  t o  a r tic u la te  h is p o litic a l th o u g h t and  y e t, a t  th e  sam e tim e ,
w ith his dam nation  o f  m etaphor's  p rev a len ce  in  sc ie n tif ic  and
p o litic a l d iscourse.
Now many serious s tu d en ts  o f  Hobbes have no d oub t n o ticed  th is
seem ing  inconsistency  in  Hobbes's work, though  few  m ight, follow ing
A shcraft, conclude t h a t  Hobbes m arked th e  s in is te r  beginning o f  a
lingu is tica lly  co n tro lled  ideology. ' I t  is  s trik ing ,"  Don H erzog
dec la res , " th a t  Hobbes b it te r ly  condem ns m etaphor and  h im self develops
21
an  e la b o ra te  body-politic  m etaphor." P erhaps th e  m ost "striking"
H obbesian passage which b e s t  re v e a ls  th is  so -ca lled  co n trad ic tio n  is  
found in  c h a p te r  fiv e  o f  L eviathan  w here Hobbes a rgues t h a t
"To conclude, The L igh t o f  hum ane minds is  Perspicuous Words, b u t 
by e x a c t  defin itions f i r s t  snu ffed , and purged  from  am biguity ;
Reason is  th e  p ace ; E ncrease o f S cience, th e  way; and th e  B enefit 
o f man-kind, th e  end. And on th e  co n tra ry , M etaphors, and
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sensLesse and am biguous words, a re  lik e  iqnes  fa tu i; and
reason ing  upon th e m , is  w andering am ongst innum erab le  
absu rd ities; and th e ir  end, con ten tion , and sed ition , o r
22con tem pt,"
As M iller po in ts  ou t, d esp ite  th e se  harsh  w ords condem ning m etaphor
and linking th e i r  use  t o  tre a so n , "Hobbes does n o t h e s ita te  to  em body
23a  m etaphor in  th e  t i t l e  o f  L ev ia than ." M oreover, M iller continues, 
th e  above passage is  i ts e lf  s c a tte re d  w ith  m e tapho rica l allusions -  
nam ely, t h a t  th e  sea rch  fo r  sc ie n tif ic  t r u th  is  a  follow ing o f a  p a th . 
This, th e n , can  be said  t o  b e  th e  s tan d a rd  a cc o u n t o f  Hobbes and 
m etaphor -  one w here, on th e  su rface  a t  le a s t ,  Hobbes was f lag ra n tly  
fa ilin g  to  p rac tice  w hat he p reach ed , and  w here th e  im p lica tions  o f 
his fa ilu re  le a d  inexorab ly  t o  th e  underm ining o f a t  l e a s t  a  po rtion  
o f  h is o v e ra ll th o u g h t, i f  n o t  (via Whelan and A shcraft) o f his e n tire  
philosophic en te rp rise .
A ppealing a s  th e  s tan d ard  ac c o u n t m ight in itia lly  sound to  us -  
m ainly fo r  i t s  sim p lic ity  and, on th e  su rface , s e lf  ev id en t 
ju s tif ic a tio n  -  th e re  rem a in s  a  serious  obstacle : how could  a  man o f 
Hobbes's in te l le c t  f a i l  t o  n o tice  such  a  g laring  co n trad ic tion?  To 
th is  question  th e  ad h eren ts  o f  th e  s tan d ard  acc o u n t la rg e ly  rem a in  
s ilen t. Indeed , th e o ris ts  lik e  M iller, Whelan, and  p articu la rly  
A sh c ra ft have a  s ta k e  in  insuring  t h a t  Hobbes's supposed 
"con trad ic tion" is  n o t  reso lved , fo r  t h a t  would m ean a  re -ev a lu a tio n  
o f  th e i r  own p rim ary  concerns would be in  o rder. F o r A sh craft 
espec ia lly , since he  c la im s t h a t  Hobbes's inconsistency  on m etaphor 
fo rm s th e  s ta r tin g  p o in t fo r  subsequen t id eo lo g ica l p re jud ices a g a in s t 
various modes o f p o litic a l expression , a  reso lu tio n  o f  Hobbes's 
co n trad ic tio n  m ight jeopord ize  th is  very  p ro jec t. So i f  th e  p rice
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t h a t  th e  s tan d a rd  a cc o u n t pays fo r  i t s  accu sa tio n  is  th e  b e lie f  t h a t  
Hobbes was n o t e n tire ly  h o n es t -  e i th e r  w ith  h im se lf o r  w ith  h is
re a d e rs  -  th e n  so b e  i t  The c o s t i s  small* p a r tic u la r ly  i f  th e  
dividends in  holding such  a  view  se rv e  t o  re in fo rc e  one 's  own 
p o litic a l th eo ry .
The problem  w ith th e  above s tan d ard  acc o u n t is  t h a t  i t  re a d s  
Hobbes's p ronouncem ents upon m etaphor only th rough  a  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  
p e rsp ec tiv e . Since fo r  us th e re  ap p ea rs  to  be a  co n tra d ic tio n  be tw een  
using m etaphors in  po litica l d iscourse  and  th e n  claim ing  t h a t  such 
m etaphors a re  dangerous t o  p o litic a l stability* th e n  we assum e t h a t  
t h a t  co n trad ic tio n  would have been  ev id en t t o  th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry
re a d e r  a s  welL And in  A shcraft's  ca se , since  Hobbes's a t ta c k  upon
m etaphors is  in te rp re te d  a s  fo rm ing  th e  s ta r t in g  p o in t o f  an
ideo lo g ica l tra d itio n , th e n  Hobbes's t r e a tm e n t  o f  m etaphoric  language
is  ana lyzed  so lely  in  te rm s  o f  a  tra d itio n  o f which Hobbes h im se lf 
could n ev er have been  aw are .
Now th e  an tid o te  to  th is  ad  hoc th eo riz in g  is  a  good dose o f
h is to r ic a l c o n te x t, so  l e t  u s f i r s t  begin  w ith  th e  re le v a n t passages
w here Hobbes w rites  ab o u t m etaphor, and th e n  move on to  consider ju s t  
how th e se  p ronouncem ents m ight have been  in ten d ed  by  Hobbes and 
understood  during his own tim e .
In  th e  ea riy  1640's Hobbes w ro te  a  c r itiq u e  o f Thom as W hite's book De 
mundo d ia log i t r e s ,  which was w ritten  in  1642. W hite had m odeled h is 
book on t h a t  o f  G alileo 's work Dialr>go...sopra i  due m assim i s is te m i
d e l mondo, w ritten  te n  y ea rs  e a r lie r , and  w here G alileo had s e t  fo r th  
his th e o ry  regard ing  m a tte r  and m otion -  a  th e o ry  which Hobbes h im self 
found im pressive  enough to  borrow  a s  a  s ta r t in g  p o in t f o r  som e o f  h is
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own th e o rie s . A ccording to  W hite's De Mundo, hum an lib e r ty  is  caused 
by a  m otion from  which i t  i s  possible t o  move from  doub t to  c e r ta in ty  
on re lig ious and p o litic a l p rincip les. In so fa r a s  th is  goes, b roadly  
speaking , th is  was also  H obbes's p rogram , b u t White had  th e n  gone on 
to  a rgue  t h a t  i t  w as possib le t o  reco n c ile  th e  p rincip les  o f th e  
C atho lic  f a i th  w ith th o se  o f  G alilean sc ience , a  suggestion  which was 
a n t i th e t ic a l  to  Hobbes's own d o c trin e .
Hobbes's a t ta c k  upon W hite's book, e n tit le d  Thom as W hite's De
Mundo Exam ined, is  c e n te re d  upon W hite's claim  t h a t  i t  is  possible t o
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analy ze  philosophy w ithou t using log ic . F o r Hobbes, th is  erroneous 
d ism issal o f lo g ic  in  philosophy was due to  W hite's u n fo rtu n a te  
confusion be tw een  th e  d iscourse o f  sc ien ce  (or logic) and  theo logy . 
A ccording to  Hobbes, " if we a re  t o  judge w hether philosophy should n o t  
be  t r e a te d  log ica lly  i t  is  u se fu l t o  know w hat th e  follow ing a re :
philosophy, log ic , and th e  o th e r  a r t s  by which we expound upon, any
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kind o f  sub jec t."  Since W hite confuses th e se  ca teg o rie s  o f  d iscourse,
Hobbes argued , i t  is  n ecessary  fo r  us to  distinguish  th e  various
fu n c tio n s  o f  speech  from  one an o th e r and  describe  how each  is  used.
Logic, d ec la red  Hobbes, is  used " to  d em o n stra te  th e  t r u th  o f  som e
a sse rtio n  un iv e rsa l in  ch arac ter"?  h is to ry  is  used  " to  n a rra te
som ething"; rh e to r ic  a im s " to  move ou r h e a re r 's  mind to w ard s
p erfo rm ing  som ething"; finally , p o e try 's  purpose is  "to  gLorify deeds
and, by ce leb ra tin g  th e m , to  hand th em  down to  p o s te r ity ." 26 So much
fo r  th e  g e n e ra l purpose o f  eac h  fo rm  o f  d iscourse , b u t Hobbes th e n  
surprisingly  w en t on t o  su g g es t t h a t  th e  s a lie n t fe a tu re  in  each  form
of u tte ra n c e  is  how i t  u ses m etaphor.
Logic, Hobbes observes in  h is answ er t o  W hite, should be e n tire ly
f re e  o f  m etaphor "fo r every  m etaphor has by i t s  v e ry  n a tu re  a  double
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sign ificance  and  is  am biguous." I f  lo g ic  -  o r  a  philosophy which uses
lo g ic  -  w ere t o  use m etaphors, th e n  i t  would be  im possible t o  "proceed
from  d efin itions... which a re  em ployed d e lib e ra te ly  in  o rd e r to  avoid
equivocation  and  am biguity ." On th e  o th e r  hand, Hobbes s ta te s ,  i t  is
p e rfe c tly  a c c ep tab le  t o  use  m etaphors in  h is to rica l d iscourse so  long
a s  th e y  seek  "no t to  move th e  mind b u t t o  shape  i t ."  More app rop ria te
s t i l l  a re  th e  m etaphors in  rh e to r ic , Hobbes says, fo r  th e y  a re  "of
se rv ice  in  moving th e  mind." F inally , w ith  re g a rd  to  p o e tic
d iscourse, m etaphors a re  q u ite  su ita b le  a s  a  kind o f  "ornam ent." In
sh o rt, w hat d istingu ishes philosophy, h is to ry , rh e to r ic  and  p o e try  
from  one a n o th e r is  n o t  sim ply th e i r  su b je c t m a tte r  b u t  th e i r  use o f
m etaphor. 27
Now i t  is  n o t very  dif f ic u lt  to  understand  why Hobbes would 
outlaw  m etaphors in  lo g ic  o r  a  log ica lly  based  philosophy. W hat is  
s trik ing , how ever, is  th e  reaso n  why Hobbes would have i t  so: m etaphor 
occasions a  "double significance" o r  "am biguity" o f words. H ere 
Hobbes defines  m etaphor so lely  in  te rm s  o f  words and n o t o f im ages. 
F o r Hobbes, lo g ic  and  philosophy w ere im possible i f  th e  s ign ifica tion  
o f nam es w ere "equivocal." The su b je c t o f  m etaphor, th e re fo re , was 
understood  by Hobbes in  th e  1640's a s  a  confusion o f  nam es r a th e r  th a n  
o f im ages , borrow ing from  A ris to tle 's  descrip tio n  o f  m etaphor in
P o e tic s  a s  " th e  app lica tion  t o  one th in g  o f  a  nam e belonging to
28ano ther."  As th e  re a d e r  m igh t re c a ll,  i t  w as n o t  u n til se v e ra l 
hundred y ea rs  a f te r  A ris to tle , w ith  th e  R hetorica ad  Herrenium  and 
H erm ogenes o f  Tarsus, t h a t  th e  G reeks re a liz e d  t h a t  m etaphor c re a te d  a  
v ivid  m en ta l im age in  add ition  t o  a  tra n s fe re n c e  o f  nam es. Hobbes, 
th e n , in  h is answ er to  W hite's De Mundo w as sim ply re ite ra t in g  w h at 
A ris to tle  had said , only th is  t im e  he was adding th e  proviso t h a t
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m etaphor could also  be used  a s  th e  litm u s  t e s t  in  m easuring various
fo rm s o f  d iscourse.
In  h is E lem ents o f  Law, w ritten  a  couple y ea rs  b efo re  his a t ta c k
on W hite's De Mundo, Hobbes a rgued  t h a t  th e  grounds o f  hum an n a tu re  
c an n o t be  derived  i f  th e re  w ere an  equ ivocation  o f  nam es. Any
sc ie n tif ic  undertak ing  t o  u nders tand  hum an n a tu re , Hobbes declared ,
m ust be  f re e  o f m etaphor s in ce  "a ll m etaphors a re  by profession
equ ivocal." Since t r u e  ''ra tio c in a tio n 11 o r  reason ing  ca n  only be
ach ieved  once th e  e x a c t  m eaning o f  nam es a re  nailed  down, th e n
m etaphors in  th is  in s ta n c e  should be  avoided, he  in s is te d . B ut again,
Hobbes is  speaking h e re  o f m etaphoric  nam es and  n o t  o f  m etaphoric
im ages.
m th e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  h is De C orpore, o rig inally  published in
1655, Hobbes changes h is mind a b o u t th e  dan g er o f  m etaphor a s  an
equivocation  o f nam es. Hobbes a rg u es  in  his c h a p te r  "C om putation  o r
Logic" t h a t  sy llog istic  reason ing  may be  in  e r ro r  i f  th e  m eaning o f
nam es a re  n o t s e tt le d , b u t he th e n  goes on t o  su g g es t t h a t  m etaphors, 
since  th e y  w ear th e i r  equ ivocation  on th e i r  r iee v e , a s  i t  w ere, a re  
n o t as  dangerous as  a re  o th e r  fo rm s o f equivocation:
"And though  th e re  may be fa lla c y  in  equ ivocal te rm s , y e t  in  th o se  
t h a t  be m anifestly  such, th e re  i s  none a t  all; none in  m etaphors, 
fo r  th e y  p ro fess  th e  tra n s fe rr in g  o f nam es from  one th in g  to
an o th er. N evertheless, som etim es equivocals (and th o se  n o t very
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obscure) may deceive."
The s h if t  in  Hobbes th ink ing  a b o u t th e  dan g er o f m etaphor's 
eq lvocation  occu rred  so m etim e  e a r l ie r  -  t h a t  is , be tw een  th e  w riting  
o f his a t ta c k  on De Mundo and o f  th e  E lem ents in  th e  ea riy  1640's and 
h is  De C orpore in  1655 -  and probabLy to o k  p lace  around th e  tim e  he
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w ro te  h is L ev iathan . In  L ev iathan , published in  1651, Hobbes po in ts  
o u t t h a t  words such  a s  "fear,"  " justice,"  and "cruelty" have d if fe re n t 
m eanings dependen t upon th e  speaker, and he th e n  argues 
" ...th e re fo re  such nam es can  n ev er be t r u e  grounds fo r  
ra tio c in a tio n . No m ore th a n  can  m etaphors, and tro p e s  o f speech? 
b u t th e se  a re  le ss  dangerous, because  th e y  p ro fess  th e i r  in -
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constancy? which th e  o th e rs  do not."
T here fo re , in  th e  passages enco u n te red  th u s  f a r ,  spanning from  1640 to  
1655, Hobbes contLnually r e fe r s  t o  m etaphors only a s  "nam es" r a th e r  
th a n  a s  im ages. M o r ev e r, h is  only in consistency  in  th e se  passages 
ap p ea rs  t o  be a  w affling on w h e th er m etaphors equ ivocate  nam es and 
dece ive  th e  re a d e r  -  his position  p rio r  t o  L ev iathan  -  o r  w hether 
m etaphor's equ ivocation  is  so  obvious to  th e  re a d e r  t h a t  i t  poses no 
serious  th r e a t  t o  lo g ic a l th ink ing  -  h is post-L ev ia th an  position.
Now i f  we re c a ll  th e  s tan d ard  acco u n t's  a rg u m en t we soon re a liz e  
t h a t  i t  m ust th e re fo re  be  in  e r ro r , fo r  th e  s tan d a rd  acc o u n t holds 
t h a t  Hobbes a tta c k e d  m etaphors a s  being dangerous w hilst a t  th e  sam e 
tim e  using m etaphors to  d e c o ra te  h is d iscourse, p a rticu la rly  in  
L ev ia than . This is , a fte raU , Hobbes's supposed "con trad iction" which 
le a d s  t o  an  underm ining o f  h is e n tire  philosophic "en terp rise ."  B ut a  
c lo se r exam ination  o f  Hobbes's s ta te m e n ts  regard ing  m etaphor rev ea ls  
t h a t  Hobbes was rem ark ab ly  c o n s is te n t on th e  su b je c t -  t h a t  is ,  he 
con tinually  dam ned m etaphor scQely in  th e  A ris to te lian  sense  o f  nam es 
r a th e r  th a n  a s  im ages. I f  we ta k e  th e  tro u b le  to  re a d  Hobbes a s  he  no 
d o u b t in ten d ed  u s  to  re a d  him , th e n  his highly im age-laden  L eviathan  
is  n o t  a t  odds w ith h is p ronouncem ents upon m etaphor. Hobbes's 
supposed "con trad ic tion" is  only our tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  confusion t h a t  
since  we p resen tly  understand  m etaphors a s  bo th  words and a s  im ages,
o e
th e n  i t  m ust have alw ays been  understood  in  th e  sam e m anner. I f  we 
re tu rn  t o  th e  c e le b ra te d  passage in  L ev iathan  (quoted earlie r) which 
s ta te s  t h a t  m etaphors a re  lik e  iq n es  f a tu i  which m islead th e  
sc ie n tif ic  w anderer and le a d  t o  sed ition , we fin d  th a t ,  again , Hobbes 
is  speaking h e re  o f  m etaphors only a s  words. M etaphoric im ages, on 
th e  o th e r  hand, w ere n ev er considered  by Hobbes t o  be  dangerous, and 
he  would fre e ly  em ploy them  w henever he  wished u s  to  'see ' a  
p a r tic u la r  poin t.
A t f i r s t  g lance Hobbes's denuncia tion  o f  m etaphor a s  a  confusion 
o f  nam es m ight seem  to  be only o f  p aro ch ia l in te re s t ;  h is  concern  
f i t t in g  squarely  w ith  th e  c la ss ic a l in s is te n ce  t h a t  th e  m eaning o f 
words is  conventionally  ag reed  upon, having no r e a l  link  to  th e  world 
o th e r  th a n  a s  an  ind iv idual d en o ta tio n  o f an  o b jec t. Hobbes p reach ed  
t h a t  th e re  was nothing un iversal in  th e  world e x c e p t nam es and t h a t  in
re a li ty  each  nam e deno ted  only an  ind iv idual substance  r a th e r  th a n  a
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u n iv e rsa l con cep t. M oreover, Hobbes f e l t ,  i t  was ex trem ely  d ifficu lt.
to  f ix  th e  meaning o f nam es fo r  th e  sam e word which m ight b e  used
d iffe re n tly  by various sp eak ers . I f  p o litic a l philosophy w as to
becom e tru ly  s c ie n tif ic  th e n  a  p o litic a l, philosophical, and  lo g ic a l
language  m ust abandon words which had equ ivocal meanings, and i t  is
fo r  th is  reaso n  Hobbes occaslonaly  w ro te  t h a t  m etaphors w ere dangerous
to  h is  nom inalistic  sc ien ce  o f  philosophy. Again, th is  is  only  to
speak  o f  m etaphors a s  nam es r a th e r  th a n  a s  im ages. I f  we b ra c k e t w hat
Hobbes h as  t o  say  ab o u t m etaphors qua nam es, th e re fo re , we fin d  a
rem ark ab le  consistency  o f  th o u g h t. Y e t th is  is  only one h a lf o f  th e  
equation , fo r  w hat is  l e f t  e n tire ly  unresolved is  th e  s u b je c t of
Hobbes and m etaphoric im ages.
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Section  Two:
The Value of the Image
In  1637 Hobbes decided  t o  w rite  h is own t r e a t is e  on rh e to r ic , e n title d  
th e  Whole A rt o f R hetoric , which proved  surprisingLy popular a s  i t  was 
n o t  only published in  1637 b u t had  a  second p rin ting  in  1651 and was 
published again  sh o rtly  a f te r  h is d ea th . Hobbes's own R hetoric seem s 
to  be  a  sho rten ed  version  o f  A ris to tle 's  R hetoric  w ith  ad d itio n a l 
re fe re n c e s  a lso  t o  A ris to tle 's  P o e tics . In  h is  Whole A rt o f R hetoric, 
fo r  exam ple, we find  t h a t  Hobbes sh o rten s  A ris to tle 's  descrip tion  o f  
m etaphor:
"A risto tle , in  th e  tw e lf th  c h a p te r  o f his P oetry , defines  a  
m etaphor to  be th e  tra n s la tio n  o f a  nam e from  one sign ification  
to  ano ther; w hereof he m akes fo u r kinds, 1. From th e  g en e ra l to
th e  p a rticu la r . 2. From th e  p a r tic u la r  to  th e  genera l. 3. From
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one p a r tic u la r  to  ano ther. 4. From proportion."
Hobbes th e n  in s is ts  t h a t  fo r  m etaphors to  be "gracefu l" th e re  m ust be
an  ap tn ess  to  th e  su b jec t a t  hand, which i s  a  w arning t h a t  A ris to tle
a lso  m akes on th e  p ru d en tia l u se  o f m etaphor. However, having
re p rin te d  in  condensed form  A ris to tle 's  suggestions regard ing
m etaphor, Hobbes th e n  im m ed ia te ly  a rg u es  t h a t  m etaphors a lso  m ake
in a n im ate  o b jec ts  in to  an im a te  ones and  t h a t  th is  "an im ation  is  t h a t
3 3expression  which m akes us seem  t o  see  th e  th in g  befo re  our ey es ." In  
o th e r  words, Hobbes w as aw are , although A ris to tle  w as n o t, t h a t
m etaphor occasioned  a  v isu a l m en ta l im age  ( th a t which is  "before  our 
eyes") in  add ition  to  an  A ris to te lian  tra n s fe re n c e  o f nam es.
Hobbes d id  n o t ju s t  happen to  a lig h t on th e  vivid  m en ta l im age  
which m etaphor occasioned a l l  by h im self, no r w as he  even  rem o te ly  th e  
f i r s t  t o  n o tice  th is  phenom enon. In  th e  l a t e  s ix te en th  and  ea riy
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sev en te en th  cen tu ry  se v e ra l te x ts  appeared  on th e  su b je c t o f  rh e to ric , 
a lm o s t a l l  d iscussing m etaphor in  te rm s  o f  i t s  im ag e  m aking cap ac ity . 
M ost o f  th e se  w orks w ere loosely  based  on th e  G reek R heto rica  ad
Herennium o r  le a n e d  heav ily  upon C icero 's and  Q uintilian 's 
neo-classical acc o u n t o f rh e to r ic  and m etaphor, a s  d iscussed  in
c h a p te r  one. Q uintilian, fo r  in s ta n c e , rem a rk s  t h a t  " th e re  a re  
c e r ta in  ex p erien ces  which th e  G reeks c a l l  fa n ta s ia , and  th e  Romans 
visions, w hereby th in g s  a b se n t a re  p re sen te d  t o  our im ag in a tio n  w ith 
such e x tre m e  vividness t h a t  th e y  seem  ac tu a lly  to  be b efo re  our eyes." 34 
Indeed , Hobbes's fo ray  in  rh e to r ic a l s tu d ie s  can  be  seen  a s  p a r t  o f a
n eo -c la ss ica l re v iv a l o f  th e  su b je c t which w as la rg e ly  due to ,  and in
35
response  to ,  th e  p re -E lizab e th an  th e o ry  and  p ra c tic e  o f  rh e to r ic . In
w hat had  been  lab e lled  a t  th e  t im e  th e  "m etaphysica l conce it,"  th e
p re -E lizab e th an  p o e ts  o f  th e  fo u rte e n th  and  f if te e n th  ce n tu ry  had  used
m etaphors to  adorn th e i r  prose and  p o e try  w ithou t any th o u g h t, o r  so
i t  was argued , to  th e  ap tn ess  o f  th e se  im ages to  th e i r  d iscourse . The
a r t  o f p o e try  was considered  to  be  t h a t  o f  rev ea lin g  th e  p o e t's
im ag ina tion , even  i f  t h a t  m ean t using tro p e s  m ore fo r  th e i r  d ram a tic
and s ta r tlin g  im ag ery  th a n  fo r  th e i r  c la rify ing  o r  lo g ic a l co n ten t.
In  th e  la te  s ix teen th  cen tu ry , how ever, P e te r  Ram us had  persuasively
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argued  t h a t  p o e try  should have a  lo g ic a l p rem ise . No lo n g er, Ram us 
and  h is  fo llow ers argued , should  p o e try  be  based  upon th e  
free-assocdation  o f im ages, b u t should in s te a d  be d ire c te d  to w ard s  a  
p a r tic u la r  purpose, illum inating  t h a t  which m ight seem  a t  f i r s t
obscure, o r  sim ply rev ea ling  th e  o rd e r o f God's n a tu ra l  design.
I t  was w ith th is  in s ig h t t h a t  Hobbes and th e  o th e r  n eo -c la ss ica l 
rh e to ric ia n s  o f  th e  s ix te e n th  and  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  had  argued  t h a t
m etaphor, lik e  rh e to r ic , should se rv e  a  p a r tic u la r  fu n c tio n . The
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su b jec ts  o f  rh e to r ic  and  p o e try  w ere th u s  ca rv ed  up in  A ris to te lian
fash ion  and  divided in to  th e i r  various functions. The perenn ially
s tud ied  R heto rica  ad  H erennium , a  s t i l l  widely-nosed and  in f lu e n tia l
t e x t  a t  th e  tim e , had div ided  rh e to r ic  in to  th ir ty - f iv e  fig u res  o f
d ic tion , n in e teen  f ig u res  o f  th o u g h t, and  te n  tro p e s  a s  a n  "ornam ent"
t o  speech? by Hobbes's day  th e se  ca te g o rie s  w ere w h ittled  down to  th e
fiv e  e lem en ts  o f Invention , D isposition, E locution, Memory, and
37D elivery. The R am ists, s im ilarly , p roc la im ed  t h a t  various modes o f 
rh e to r ic  could  be fu r th e r  divided in to  tw o  sec tions: th e  D ia lec tic
(which inc luded  inven tion , d isposition  and  memory) and  th e  purely
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R h eto rica l (nam ely, th e  su b je c t o f  e locu tion  and  delivery). Of course
Hobbes, a s  we have seen  in  h is  a t ta c k  on Thom as W hite's De Mundo,
s im ilarly  d ec la red  t h a t  th e re  w ere fo u r  fo rm s o f d iscourse -  th e  
lo g ic a l o r  philosophical, th e  h is to rica l, th e  rh e to r ic a l, and th e  
p o e tic . Each, accord ing  to  Hobbes, can  be d iscerned  by how th e y  use 
m etaphor. The g is t  o f  th is  neo-classical re v iv a l o f  rh e to r ic  and 
m etaphor, th e n , broadly  speaking , was one o f  s tip u la tin g  t h a t  
m etaphors should be above a l l  a p t  expressions t o  th e i r  various modes 
o f d iscourse, and  t h a t  m etaphoric  im ages, used sparingly , could be 
used  to  p lace  vivid m en ta l im ages "before  th e  re a d e r 's  eyes."
This, indeed , w as th e  rh e to r ic a l  m ilieu in  which Hobbes w ro te .
T here was l i t t l e  o r  no a rg u m en t d ire c te d  ag a in s t m etaphors qua im ages
so long  a s  th e y  w ere a p t  to  th e  d iscourse a t  hand. M etaphoric im ag es
w ere v iew ed  a s  one o f  th e  b e s t  to o ls  a t  th e  w rite r 's  d isposal to  
inform  and  persuade his aud ience. More im p o rtan tly , a s  we sh a ll see , 
from  th e  v e ry  f i r s t  exam ple we have o f Hobbes's w ritten  work -  
s ta r t in g  w ith  his tra n s la tio n  o f  Thucydides in  1628, and finishing 
w ith h is tra n s la tio n  o f  H om er a lm o s t f i f ty  y ea rs  l a t e r  -  Hobbes would
a. i o
con tinually  co m m en t upon th e  im p o rtan ce  o f  th e  m etap h o rica l im ag e  in  
enabling  th e  r e a d e r  to  acq u ire  h is to rica l, p o litic a l and  philsophical 
know ledge. A lthough Hobbes s tre sse d  t h a t  a  m etap h o rica l equ ivocation  
o f  nam es may le a d  to  confusion, he  also  believed  t h a t  th e  u se  o f 
m e tap h o rica l im ag es  can  le a d  to  c la r if ic a tio n  and to  know ledge.
A lthough believing t h a t  his f l i r ta t io n  w ith  p o e try  and  th e  f in e  a r ts
during h is youth  w as a  w aste  o f tim e , Hobbes was ju s tly  proud o f his 
tra n s la tio n  o f Thucydides's H istory  o f  th e  Pelopennesian  War in  1628. 
Hobbes had  p rocla im ed  a  g r e a t  a ff in ity  f o r  Thucydides's work. His
purpose in  tra n s la tin g  th e  G reek had been, he c la im ed , tw o-fo ld :
f irs tly , so t h a t  Thucydides "should speak  to  th e  English in  th e i r  own 
tongue and  w arn them  a g a in s t te m p ta tio n  t o  l is te n  t o  rh e to ric ,"  and
secondly , so  t h a t  th e  English could com e to  know by read in g  Thucydides
"how stu p id  dem ocracy  is  and by how much one man is  w iser th a n  an
40assembLy." Some co m m en ta to rs  have questioned  w hether Hobbes's read ing
41of Thucydides in  th e se  tw o  re g a rd s  was e n tire ly  a c c u ra te . W hat does 
rem a in  c e r ta in  is  t h a t  th e  a n ti- rh e to r ic a l and  a n t id e m o c ra t ic  im pulse 
in  Hobbes's philosophy w as s tro n g ly  fe l t .  By th e  te rm  "rh e to ric"  h ere  
Hobbes m ean t sim ply th e  persuasion  o f  th e  populace by m eans o f
pandering to  th e ir  b a se r  in s tin c ts . A ccu ra te  p o litic a l reason ing  and 
know ledge, Hobbes believed , could  only be  ob ta ined  i f  th e  rh e to r ic a l 
a r ts  w ere com bined w ith th e  sea rch  fo r  th e  t ru th ,  and  t h a t  m ean t 
m arrying rh e to r ic  t o  som e s c ie n tif ic  m ethod. Thus, in  h is answ er to
W hite's De Mundo, Hobbes d ec la red  t h a t  while rh e to r ic  should seek  to
persuade th e  aud ience, in  h is to r ic a l d iscourse such  o v e r t  persuasion
should be  o m itted . Since h is to ry  a im s to  n a r ra te  p a s t  ev en ts, Hobbes 
argued , m etaphor should n ev e r b e  used  t o  "move" th e  h e a re r 's  mind -
or, in  o th e r  words, to  o v e rtly  persuade th e  aud ience. On th e  o th e r
hand, Hobbes believed  t h a t  m etaphor could be  used  t o  "shape" th e  mind
42o f th e  l is te n e r  in  h is to r ic a l w riting.
Now th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  re a d e r  m ight w an t t o  quibble over 
Hobbes's d is tin c tio n  be tw een  th e  "moving" o f  th e  mind o f  th e  h e a re r  
and  th e  "shaping" o f  i t  in  h is to ric a l d iscourse , y e t  th e  d is tin c tio n  
fo r  Hobbes was o f som e im p o rtan ce . By "shaping" th e  mind o f  th e  
re a d e r  Hobbes m ean t t h a t  i t  was im p o rta n t fo r  th e  re a d e r  to  se e  shapes 
and im ag es  in  his mind's eye  in  o rd e r to  understand  how th e  h is to r ic a l 
ev en ts  unfolded. The m ost im p o rta n t to o l  a t  th e  h is to rian 's  disposal, 
fo r  Hobbes, was his ab ility  to  enab le  th e  re a d e r  t o  p ic tu re  th e  ev en ts  
n a rra te d . N ot only was th is  c ru c ia l fo r  th e  understanding  o f  h isto ry , 
b u t i t  w as also in s tru m e n ta l in  th e  read ing  o f  p o e try  and philosophy 
a s  w ell. I t  was f o r  th is  reaso n  th a t  m etaphor becam e such  an  
im p o rta n t to p ic  fo r  Hobbes, fo r  although m etaphoric  language m ight 
le a d  t o  an  undesirab le  equivocation  o f  nam es, i t  could a lso  enab le  th e  
re a d e r  to  p ic tu re  ev en ts  in  his mind and, in  doing so, le a d  th e  re a d e r  
more a c c u ra te ly  to  judge h isto ry , po litic s  and philosophy.
Returning to  his tra n s la tio n  o f Thucydides, i t  is  d e a r  t h a t  th e  
m ost p rom inen t fe a tu re  in  h is to r ic a l d iscourse  fo r  Hobbes was th e  
h is to rian 's  ab ility  to  c re a te  m en ta l im ag es in  th e  re a d e r 's  mind. 
A ccording to  Hobbes, th e  d istinguishing fe a tu re  o f  Thucydides's 
H istory was t h a t  he "so c lea rly  s e t  b e fo re  th e  m en's ey es  th e  ways and 
ev en ts  o f  good and  e v il counsels, t h a t  th e  n a rra tio n  do th  s e c r e td y  
in s tru c t  th e  read e r."  In  his P re face  to  th e  tra n s la tio n , Hobbes even  
quo tes  P lu ta rch 's  observation  t h a t  "Thucydides a im e th  alw ays a t  th is ;
to  m ake his au d ito r a  sp e c ta to r , and to  c a s t  his re a d e r  in to  th e  sam e
44passions t h a t  th e y  w ere beholders." The h is to rian , accord ing  to
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Hobbes, should o f fe r  th e  re a d e r  a  p ic tu re  o f  h is to r ic a l ev en ts, 
" se c re tly  in s tru c tin g 11 him on th e  t r u th  o f  w hat tra n sp ire d . N ot only 
was th is  Thucydides's own purpose, Hobbes had c la im ed  in  his P re fa c e , 
i t  was a lso  h is own. "And i f  a  man consider w ell th e  whole d iscourse
o f [Thucydides]," Hobbes d ec la res , "he sh a ll p la in ly  p e rce iv e  th e
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im ag e  o f  th is  p re se n t h isto ry ."
I t  is  n o t surprising  t o  fin d  Hobbes h e re  echoing th e  c lassical
rh e to r ic a l  tra d itio n  o f  C icero , Q uintilian and P lu ta rch  fo r  a l l  th re e  
o f th e se  th in k e rs  had  w ritte n  o f  th e  need  t o  o f fe r  im ag es  fo r  th e  
re a d e r  and  lis te n e r  to  co n tem p la te . M ost im p o r ta n t o f  a l l  was fo r  th e  
sp eak er t o  use v ivid  m en ta l im ag es  in  a  c o u r t  o f  law , th e  c la ss ic a l
schoo l held , fo r  th e n  th e  c o u r t  could v isualize  and  u nderstand  th e  
ev en ts  n a rra te d  and com e to  som e kind o f  judgm en t upon th e  case  under 
rev iew . M etaphor, because  o f  i t s  s tro n g  im ag inary  co n ten t, th u s  was 
th e  m ost pow erfu l to o l  a t  th e  speak er's  disposal, and Hobbes had 
vociferousLy concu rred  w ith  th is  n eo -c la ss ic is t a c c o u n t o f  th e  
m e tap h o ric  im ag e .
A lm ost f i f ty  y ea rs  a f te r  his tra n s la tio n  o f  Thucydides Hobbes
decided  to  em bark  upon a  fre sh  tra n s la tio n  o f H om er because , he  had 
cheek ily  claim ed , in  his old age  he  had  "nothing e lse  to  do." 46In his
P re fa c e  to  th e  re a d e r  Hobbes com m ented  t h a t  th e  p o e t 's  use o f  m etaphor
was one o f th e  ch ie f v ir tu e s  o f p o e try . But, Hobbes w arned, because
o f m etaphor's trem en d o u s v isu a l pow er i t  should be used  by th e  p o e t
sparingly. "A m etaphor also," Hobbes w ro te , " . . i s  n o t  unp leasan t;
b u t when th e y  a re  sh arp  and  ex trao rd in ary , th e y  a r e  n o t f i t  f o r  an
hero ic  p o e t, no r f o r  public  consu lta tion , b u t  only fo r  an  acc u sa tio n
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o r  d efence  a t  th e  bar."  In  h is old age, th e n , Hobbes becam e even  m ore
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aw are  o f  th e  v isu a l pow er o f m etaphor, p a rtic u la rly  a s  a  pedagogic 
dev ice . The ’sharper ' th e  m etaphoric im age, th e  m ore p o te n t i t s  use.
In  h is tra n s la tio n  o f Thucycides, we fin d  Hobbes suggesting  t h a t  
i t  is  th is  v isu a l m en ta l im age which had  b een  m ost lack in g  in  ea rly  
tra n s la tio n s  o f  th e  G reek. R eferring  to  th e  F rench  and  I ta lia n  
versions o f  th e  work, Hobbes com plained t h a t  th e y  fa iled  to  allow  th e
re a d e r  to  "continually  see  his way befo re  him , and by t h a t  which goeth
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b e fo re  e x p e c t w hat is  t o  follow ." Hobbes even  in c luded  in  his
tra n s la tio n  "conven ien t p ic tu re s  o f th e  co u n trie s  involved" -  ie .
d e ta ile d  maps o f  G reece and Sicily -  so  he could help  th e  re a d e r
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p ic tu re  in  his mind th e  ev en ts  t h a t  th e  H istory  n a rra te d . The o v era ll
e f f e c t ,  Hobbes in ten d ed , was to  echo  th e  g r e a t  ach iev em en t o f
Thucydides's H istory in  allow ing th e  re a d e r  to  see  "before  h is eyes" 
th e  t r u th  o f  w hat tran sp ire d . According to  Hobbes,
"Thucydides a im e th  alw ays a t  th is ; to  make his au d ito r a
sp e c ta to r , and to  c a s t  his re a d e r  in to  th e  sam e passions t h a t
th e y  w ere in  t h a t  w ere b eho lders...these  th ings, I  say a re  so
described  and  so ev iden tly  s e t  b efo re  ou r eyes, t h a t  th e  mind
o f th e  re a d e r  is  no le ss  a f fe c te d  th e re w ith  th a n  i f  he had been
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p re se n t in  th e  actions."
Ten y ea rs  a f te r  com pleting  his tra n s la tio n  o f  Thucydides's 
H istory  Hobbes had  w ritten  in  h is  Whole A rt o f R hetoric  o f  th e  
v isual-persuasive fu n c tio n  o f m etaphor which "m akes us seem  to  se e  th e  
th in g  b e fo re  our eyes." B ut i t  i s  n o t  u n ti l  we tu rn  t o  Hobbes's
highly m e taphorica l work L eviathan  (which i s  th e  su b je c t o f  th e  
c h a p te r  five) t h a t  we d iscover th e  c e n tra l  im p o rtan ce  o f  m en tal im ag es  
in  his p o litic a l philosophy, fo r  h e re  aga in  Hobbes ex p lic itly  te l ls  us 
t h a t  h is g o a l was to  p o s it im ages  fo r  th e  re a d e r  t o  co n tem p la te .
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O ften  overlooked, fo r  exam ple, is  th e  f a c t  t h a t  Hobbes ends his
L ev iathan  w ith th e  com m en t t h a t  h is only purpose was "to  s e t  befo re
51
m ens eyes" th e  t r u e  n a tu re  o f  th e  com m on w ealth . I f  t h a t  was indeed
h is  purpose behind th e  design o f  L eviathan , a s  w ell a s  h is design fo r
many o f his o th e r  w ritings -  t h a t  is , t o  s e t  th e  m etaphoric  im age
"befo re  mens eyes" -  th e n  he  was c e rta in ly  su ccessfu l a s  w ell a s
co n sis ten t. W hat is  puzzling is  why so  many c o m m en ta ta to rs  have
m isunderstood Hobbes's v isu a l and  m etaphorical th e o ry  o f  d iscourse,
o f te n  erroneously  claim ing t h a t  he  had co n tra d ic ted  him self.
Section  Three:
Hobbes and  th e  Ju d g m en t o f  Sense 
As d iscussed  e a r l ie r  in  th e  second  ch ap te r , m etaphors a re  com m only 
based  upon our p rim ary  senses, and in  p a r tic u la r  o u r sense  o f vision. 
B ut because th e  n a tu re  o f p o litic s  is  t h a t  i t  be a  public phenom enon -  
t h a t  is , because  a  p o litic a l com m unity  (a lm ost by defin ition) m ust be 
m ore th a n  sim ply a  g a thering  o f ind iv iduals -  th e n  th e  p o litic a l 
th e o r is t  needs to  e s tab lish  a  com m on sensory  grounding fo r  a  c iv il 
associa tion . As i t  is  t h a t  ev ery  person 's  sense  experience  is
d if fe re n t from  everyone e lse 's , th e n  an o th e r  le v e l  o f sensory  
experience  needs to  be es tab lished  in  o rd e r to  c re a te  un ity .
P o litic a l d iscourse is  o f te n  d ire c te d  to w ard s  m em bers o f  a  
com m unity , even  i f  t h a t  com m unity  is  m ade up  o f  w arring fac tio n s . The 
p o litic a l philosopher succeeds i f  he is  ab le  t o  m ake th e  co llec tiv e  
m em bers o f  a  com m unity  'see ' th e  d es irab ility  o f  engaging w ith  his 
th e o rie s . And i t  is  la rg e ly  fo r  th is  reaso n  t h a t  p o litic a l 
philosophers freq u en tly  la p se  in to  m e taphorica l descrip tions, fo r  when 
a  com m unity  is  divided o r  when a  new p o litic a l o rd e r c r ie s  o u t t o  be
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estab lished , th e n  one o f  th e  m ost p o te n t lin g u is tic  weapons th e
philosopher h as  a t  h is d isposal is  t h a t  o f  m etaphor. The su b jec t o f 
understanding  p o litic a l m etaphor, th e re fo re , c a n n o t b e  divorced  from
th e  problem  o f judgm ent. In s tead  o f  an  ind iv idual judgm en t which is  
based  upon our p r iv a te  sensations, how ever, m etaphor in v ite s  a  public 
judgm en t t o  be made on a  super-sensory  le v e l  (w hat Boethius ca lled  a  
"superven ien t foundation," K an t " th e  supersensica l ground," and Locke 
"obtuse sign ifications"). As Hobbes would say , how could we e v e r 
igno re  t h a t  which is  "before ou r eyes?" We can  only do so, Hobbes
w arns, a t  our p eril.
I f  th e re  w as a  chink in  Hobbes's m ethodolog ical a rm or, how ever, 
i t  was in  finding a  way in  which t o  convince o th e rs  o f  th e  t r u th  o f 
w h at he  w ro te . Hobbes even  r e fe r s  to  th e  minds o f com m on people a s  a  
p ie ce  o f  "clean  paper" w aiting fo r  som e im p rin t t o  be p laced  upon
th e m . N ot only m ust h e  persuade o th e rs , th e re fo re , b u t th e y  m ust also
52be ab le  to  'see ' th e  t r u th  fo r  th em se lv es . This w as n o t sim ply a  
m a tte r  o f being e lo q u en t fo r  Hobbes knew t h a t  th o se  who f e l t
d iffe re n tly  could be equally  e lo q u en t in  arguing  th e i r  case  ag a in st 
his. Hobbes c e rta in ly  endeavored  to  make his re a d e r  see  th e  t r u th  o f  
th e  m a tte r  "before his eyes," b u t i t  was equally  im p o r ta n t to  him th a t  
th e  re a d e r  a rr iv e  a t  a  s im ila r judgm en t on his own. "Words a re  wise 
mens coun ters,"  Hobbes observed  in  L eviathan , " they  do b u t reck o n  by 
them ."  "But," Hobbes quick ly  added, "[words] a re  th e  money o f fooles,
t h a t  va lue  th em  by th e  au th o rity  o f  an  A ris to tle , a  C icero, o r  a
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Thom as, o r  any  o th e r  D octor w hatsoever, i f  b u t  a  man." This 
"au th o rity  o f .. .a  Thomas" which Hobbes sco rns probably  r e fe r s  to  
Thom as Aquinas, b u t Hobbes m ight a lso  have b een  re fe rr in g  to  h im self 
in  a  je stin g  m anner. Do n o t ta k e  even  w hat I  have  t o  claim  a s  th e
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gospel t ru th ,  Hobbes is  saying, b u t  see  fo r  yourself th e  t r u th  o f  w h at 
I  am saying by using your own judgm ent.
Hobbes a c c e p te d  th e  sc e p tic 's  a rg u m en t t h a t  sensory  experience 
d iffe re d  am ong indiv iduals, b u t  th e  problem  rem ain ed  t h a t  since  his 
ico n o c las tic  a t t i tu d e  to w ard s  a u th o rity  p rev en ted  him from  proclaim ing 
t h a t  o th e rs  should follow  h is le a d  so lely  based  upon w hat h e  had 
discovered , th e n  a  com m on judgm ent, lead ing  o f  course  t o  th e  sam e 
conclusions a s  h im self, was req u ire d  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  populace -  
t h a t  is , a  judgm en t based  upon ou r com m on conceptions. "Judgm ent," 
Hobbes s ta te d , is  used  "to  d isce rn  w hat m eans t o  conduce an  end, which 
is  g o tte n  by ex p erien ce .1' 54 B u t exp erien ce  w ill alw ays v a ry  depending 
upon th e  ind iv idual (or, a s  Hobbes s ta te s ,  "E xperience co n d u d e th  
nothing universally") so  th e  only way to  avoid fu r th e r  co n ten tio n  was 
to  rem ind  people o f t h a t  which th e y  can n o t deny: nam ely , t h a t  we do 
sh are  in  our having com m on concep tions o f  o b jec ts  which ap p ea r befo re  
us and  which seem  to  be con tinually  in  m otion.55
As we have seen , o th e r  philosophers have spoken s im ilarly  ab o u t a  
judgm ent springing from  sense  experience , and  ab o u t so c ie ty 's  need  to  
es tab lish  a  sensus com m unis. C icero , fo r  in s ta n c e , rem a rk s  on th e  
ab ility  o f  men t o  d isc rim in a te  b e tw een  o b jec ts  which a re  b efo re  th e m , 
and po in ts  o u t t h a t  th is  g i f t  is  even  m ore p re v a le n t w ith  words "since 
th e se  a re  ro o te d  in  com m on senses and o f  such  th in g s  n a tu re  has w illed
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t h a t  no one should be  a lto g e th e r  unable t o  sense  and experience  them ."  
K ant, likew ise, speaks o f  a  sensus com m unis where "we m ust inc lude  th e  
id e a  o f  sense com m on to  a ll, ie .  o f  a  fa c u lty  o f  judgm en t w hich, in  
i t s  re f le c tio n , ta k e s  acc o u n t o f  th e  m ode o f  re p re se n ta tio n  o f  a l l  
o th e r  men in  th o u g h t.. . ." 57 Hobbes's p ronouncem ents upon judgm en t a re  
n o t in  th e  sam e flav o r o f e i th e r  o f  th e se  tw o  th in k e rs . Y et although
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Hobbes does n o t sp ec ifica lly  co m m en t upon th e  need  to  estab lish  a  
sensus com m unis, he n ev erth e less  t ie s  th e  fa c u lty  o f  judgm ent d ire c tly  
to  th e  ab ility  to  have v isu a l sensa tions ab o u t th e  world around us.
Hobbes a rgues t h a t  our c a p a c ity  fo r  sense  and  ou r ab ility  to  
re n d e r  judg m en t a re  th e  sam e fo r  in  bo th  in s ta n c e s  we m ust distinguish 
o b je c ts  which ap p ea r b e fo re  us. This c ap a c ity  to  re n d e r  a  judgm ent on
sense experience  f i r s t  ap p ea rs  in  th e  Bible, Hobbes explains in
5 BL eviathan , when Adam and  Eve e a t  th e  fo rb idden  f ru it .  A ccording to
Hobbes, by disobeying God's judg m en t and by tak in g  upon th em se lv es  th e
ab ility  to  judge good and ev il, Adam and  Eve a re  fo rced  to  exerc ise
th e ir  own judgm ent, how ever fa u lty . B ut because  sense  experience
v arie s , ind iv iduals w ill n o t  a lw ays a g ree  w ith  one an o th e r. Mankind
th u s  finds i t s e l f  in  a  hind. Since men have re fu sed  God's governm en t
in  fa v o r  o f  th e i r  own, th e y  a re  l e f t  to  fen d  fo r  th em se lv es  outside
Eden, w ith th e  unhappy re s u lt  o f con ten tion , sed ition  and  w ar. On th e
o th e r  hand, Hobbes suggests, by opting  fo r  th e  s a fe ty  o f an
a ll-p o w erfu l sovereign, man can  re p la c e  his im p e rfe c t judgm ent w ith
t h a t  o f  th e  sovereign 's , th e  m o rta l god who re p la c e s  th e  God o f
G enesis. U ntil we ca n  re a c h  t h a t  s ta g e  o f having th e  sovereign  decide
upon th e  va lue  o f o u r re sp e c tiv e  judgm ents, we m ust fen d  fo r
ourselves; we m ust b e  ab le  t o  re n d e r  a  judgm en t based  upon our
im p e r fe c t  sense  ex perience . In  sh o rt, Hobbes's program  is  one o f 
try in g  to  convince u s  to  judge fo r  ou rselves th e  need  to  su rren d er our
co llec tiv e  judgm ent t o  th e  sovereign , who is  th e  only one who can
provide us w ith ind iv idual secu rity  and p o litica l s tab ility .
Hobbes believed  t h a t  i f  i t  w ere possible t o  re n d e r  a  com m on 
judgm en t on ou r concep tions th e n  i t  m ight be possib le fo r  u s  t o  sh a re  
a  com m on judgm ent o r  v ision  on th e  n a tu re  o f  p o litic s . Now Hobbes
i  e
o ffe rs  u s  s e v e ra l d escrip tions o f judgm ent. Som etim es he speaks o f 
judgm ent a s  t h a t  which "is n o t  d is tin c t from  sense  o r  p ercep tion  
p roperly  so  c a l le d /1 so m etim es he  d e fin es  ju dgm en t a s  " th e  v ir tu e  o f 
th e  mind w hereby men a t ta in  t o  e x a c t  and  p e r f e c t  know ledge," and o th e r
tim e s  h e  r e fe r s  to  judg m en t a s  t h a t  w hich "finds o u t th e  d iffe re n ces
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in  th in g s  lik e  ano ther."  W hat th e se  d iffe rin g  pronouncem ents upon
judgm en t sh a re  is  th e  b e lie f  t h a t  from  o u r sense  o f  v ision  we can
d istinguish  o b jec ts  from  one an o th e r, even  though  th e se  o b je c ts  may be
nothing m ore th a n  phan tasm s occurring in  th e  mind. Hobbes th o u g h t t h a t
th e  a b ility  t o  s e e  c le a rly  was th e  ab ility  t o  se e  d is tin c tio n s. This,
how ever, does n o t  by  i t s e l f  le a d  t o  a  com m on vision  -  in  f a c t ,  i t
m ight even  le a d  t o  fu r th e r  co n ten tio n  a s  th e  m em bers o f th e
com m onw ealth  may 'see ' th in g s  d iffe re n tly  and  th u s  m ake e n tire ly
d iv e rg e n t d is tin c tio n s. Hobbes th e re fo re  had  t o  occasionally  tu rn  to
a  com m on, super-sensory  f ie ld  o f vision in  o rd e r t o  u n ite  th e  populace 
in  a  com m on judgm ent. I t  was n o t  enough t o  simpLy d e c la re  som e
philosophical t r u th  o r  o th e r; t h a t  t r u th  had  to  be adorned  in  som e
visually  a rre s tin g  s im ila rity  o r  m etaphor.
Hobbes te l l s  u s  in  h is P re fa c e  t o  Thucydides's H istory  t h a t  th e  
genius o f  th e  G reek h is to rian  was h is  ab ility  t o  c re a te  m en ta l im ages  
so t h a t  his re a d e rs  could re n d e r  a  p ro p er ju d g m en t on th e  t r u th  o f  th e  
e v en ts  n a rra te d . ObviousLy i f  th e re  i s  t o  be  judgm en t th e r e  m ust be 
som ething  th e re  to  be  judged, w h e th er i t  be a  m e n ta l im ag e , a  
descrip tion , a  p ic tu re , an  analogy, o r  w hatever. Thucydides show s 
good judgm ent, Hobbes s ta te s ,  when he  o rd e rs  h is n a rra tio n s  in  such  a  
way a s  t o  m ake them  in te llig ib le  t o  th e  re a d e r. B ut i t  is  a n  e r ro r  o f 
judgm ent when we assum e t h a t  o th e rs  w ill se e  th e  sam e w orth  in  th e  
H istory a s  we do ourselves. Hobbes does n o t  conce rn  h im se lf w ith
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th e se  people fo r  he says th e ir  judgm en t is  poor; n ev e rth e less  he
p ro cla im s t h a t  in  o rd e r t o  a id  th e  judgm ent o f  th o se  who re a d  th e
H istory he has a tta c h e d  maps o f th e  p laces m entioned by Thucydides. 60
By focussing  our judgm ent o f sense  experience  upon th e  p la ces  (ie.
maps) described  by Thucydides, Hobbes hoped t h a t  we can  m ore read ily
a g ree  w ith th e  observations made in  th e  H istory.
Since i t  is  th e  genius o f m etaphor t o  "m ake u s  seem  t o  se e  th e
th in g  b efo re  ou r eyes," a s  Hobbes d ec la re s  in  h is Whole A rt of 
R heto ric , i t  would s tan d  to  reaso n  t h a t  th is  g i f t  would s im ilarly  be
u se fu l in  binding a  populace to g e th e r . The ab ility  t o  c r e a te  a
publicly  shared  im ag e  is  one o f th e  m ost pow erfu l to o ls  a t  one's
disposal.. When th e  m etaphoric im age  is  p a rticu la rly  "sharp," as
Hobbes w rites  in  his P re fa c e  to  Hom er, i t  is  b e t te r  used fo r  d e fen ce
a t  th e  b a r. In  o th e r  words, a  p a rtic u la rly  s tro n g  m etaphoric  im age
req u ire s  a  superio r judgm en t o f th e  kind t h a t  only a  Judge can
d eliver. B ut th is  is  n o t th e  only way in  which m etaphor and judgm en t
a re  com bined. I f  we define  judgm ent, a s  Hobbes does, a s  tak in g  th in g s
a p a r t  to  observe th e  d iffe re n ces  in  th in g s, th e n  in  a  com m on judgm ent
i t  is  req u ired  t h a t  th e se  s im ila ritie s  and  d iffe re n c e s  be tw een  th in g s
be observed by alL  I f  we re a d  Hobbes's program  in  th is  m anner, th e n
m etaphor, being th e  to o l  which d raw s o u t th e  s im ila ritie s  b e tw een
ob jec ts , becom es ind ispensable in  th e  p u rsu it o f  a r tic u la tin g  th is
com mon p o litic a l judgm ent.
In  c h a p te r  e ig h t o f  L eviathan, e n tit le d  "Of th e  V irtues Com m only
C alled In te l le c tu a l and  T heir C ontrary  D efects,"  Hobbes w rite s  t h a t
th o se  who a re  ab le  t o  "observe d iffe re n c e s ...a re  sa id  t o  have good
judgm en t," while th o se  who "observe th e i r  sim ilitudes" have "good
61fancy ."  [H ere fan cy , accord ing  to  Hobbes, is  an  im age in  th e  mind
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which springs from  sense .] Hobbes p re fe rs  judgm ent to  fancy , c laim ing  
t h a t  th e  ab ility  t o  judge c le a rly  does n o t n ecessarily  e n ta i l  adorning
th e  p rose  w ith fa n c ifu l im ag es and  m etaphors. On th e  o th e r  hand,
Hobbes a rg u es  t h a t  im ag es  should be  re g u la te d  w ith good judgm en t o r
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e lse  one would g e t  c a rr ied  aw ay in  a  "kind o f  madness." When im ag es
and  ju d g m en t a re  com bined, how ever, t h a t  is  b e s t o f alL  In  po e try ,
fo r  exam ple , "good judg m en t and  fan cy  a re  requ ired ,"  Hobbes claim s. 
S im ilarly  is  fa n c y  and  judgm en t req u ire d  in  h is to ry , p rovided t h a t  th e  
fan cy  i s  k e p t  to  a  minimum and used "only in  adorning sty le ."  In  w h at
he  c a lls  "o ra tions  o f  p ra ise"  and  "h o rta tiv e s  and pleadings," Hobbes
arg u es  t h a t  im ag es  and  ju d g m en t a re  bo th  n ecessary  t o  e d u ca te  th e
re a d e r . F inally , Hobbes w rites, in  th e
"...rigo rous sea rch  fo r  th e  t ru th ,  judgm en t does a ll, e x c e p t 
so m etim es  th e  understand ing  have need  to  be opened by som e 
s im ilitude; and  th e n  th e re  is  so much use o f fancy . B ut fo r  
m etaphors, th e y  a re  in  th is  case  u tte r ly  excluded. For seeing  
th e y  openly p ro fess  d e ce it; to  ad m it them  in to  counsel, o r
R Rreason ing , w ere m an ifes t fo lly ."
I f  we w an t t o  engage in  a  "rigorous sea rch  o f  th e  tru th ,"  i n  o th e r
words, we m ust u se  ou r judgm en t in  o rd e r to  d istingu ish  words and 
o b je c ts  from  one an o th e r. B u t i f  we w an t to  convey th is  in fo rm atio n  
t o  o th e rs , th e n  we should  b e  p rep a red  t o  o f fe r  s im ilitudes to  th e  
re a d e r  f o r  him to  com prehend  th e  su b je c t m a tte r . Hobbes's warning 
a b o u t m etaphors h e re  is  one o f  adm onishing u s  t h a t  m etap h o ric  words 
c a n n o t be used  in  "reasoning" a s  th e y  "openly p ro fe ss  d ece it,"  but,
aga in , th is  is  an  in ju n c tio n  ag a in s t m etaphoric  w ords r a th e r  th a n
im ages. W hat we have in  Hobbes's acc o u n t o f  judgm ent, th e re fo re , is  
th e  a d m itta n c e  o f  m etaphoric  im ages  (or fancy) in  a l l  fo rm s o f
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discourse in  o rd e r  to  persuade th e  aud ience, and provided t h a t  th e y  
a re  a p t  to  th e  d iscourse a t  hand.
In  h is Review and Conclusion to  L eviathan  Hobbes is  m ore ex p lic it 
in  h is en d o rsem en t o f com bining fan cy  w ith judgm ent in  o rd e r  to  make 
th e  reasoning  m ore p a la tab le . A ccording to  Hobbes,
"The S everity  o f  Judgm ent, th e y  say, m akes men Censorious, and 
u n ap t to  pardon th e  E rrours and In firm itie s  o f o th e r  men: and 
on th e  o th e r  side, C elerity  o f  Fancy, m akes th e  th o u g h ts  le sse  
steddy  th a n  i s  n ecessary , to  d iscern  e x a c tly  betw een  R ight and 
Wrong. Again, in  a l l  D eliberations, and in  a l l  P leadings, th e  
facu lty  o f solid  Reasoning, i s  necessary : fo r  w ithou t i t ,  th e  
Resolutions o f  men a re  ra sh , and th e i r  Sen tences unjust: and 
y e t i f  th e re  be n o t p o w e rfu l E loquence, which p rocu re th
64a tte n tio n  and  Consent, th e  e f f e c t  o f Reason w ill be l i t t l e ."
Here Hobbes beg ins by pointing o u t t h a t  ju dgm en t and  fan cy  a re  
s e p a ra te . Ju d g m en t d iscerns th e  d iffe re n ces  be tw een  th in g s  and  fancy  
com bines them  in  an  im age. B u t having n o ted  t h a t  judgm ent and  fancy  
have tw o  d if fe re n t ro le s  to  p lay , Hobbes th e n  po in ts  o u t t h a t  th e  oriLy 
way in  which one is  ab le  convince o th e rs  o f  one's "solid reasoning" is  
by com bining th e  tw o . This com bination, m oreover, n o t only cap tu re s  
th e  people 's "a tten tio n "  b u t also th e i r  "consent."
T herefore fo r  Hobbes th e  im p o rtan ce  o f  judging im ages w orks on 
tw o  levels: th e  f i r s t  a s  a  m eans fo r  v isualizing  o b jec ts  w hich a re  
d issim ilar; th e  second , a s  a  m eans fo r  in s tru c tin g  o th e rs  so  t h a t  th e y  
to o  can  v isualize  th e  t r u th  o f  th e  m a tte r . Our im ag es  should be 
publicly  shared  t o  p re v e n t d isharm ony from  erup ting  in  th e  
com m onw ealth. The s ta r tin g  p o in t in  escaping  from  scep tic ism , fo r  
Hobbes, was in  finding an  im ag e  o r  a  proposition  t h a t  we a l l  can  ag ree
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upon, w hether i t  be th e  artdflcdal-m an o r  th e  p roposition  t h a t  ‘i t  is  
wrong t o  ta k e  an o th er 's  l i f e 1 o r  t h e  world consists  o f m a tte r  in  
m otion.1 Working from  th e s e  im ag es  and  f i r s t  p rincip les, Hobbes 
believed , we could  be  sp a red  from  th e  s c e p tic a l onslaugh t t o  our 
sc ie n tif ic  and  c iv il law s. The h isto rian , th e  philosopher, th e  
rh e to r ic ia n , th e  p o e t a s  w ell a s  th e  t r i a l  law y er, m ust alw ays 
endeavo r t o  s e t  th e  im ag e  "before  m en's eyes." W hat s e ts  each  
d iscip line a p a r t  from  th e  o th e rs  is  how i t s  im ag es a re  used . Only 
once we a re  le d  by th e  philosopher and  th e  sc ie n tis t, Hobbes argued , 
to  'see ' fo r  ourselves w hat th e  t r u th  o f  how th in g s  a re  can  we th e n  
re n d e r  a  com m on judgm en t upon th e i r  w orth.
Section  Four:
The Sovereign, Ju d g m en t, and  P o lit ic a l Vision
As po in ted  o u t a t  th e  s t a r t  o f  th is  ch ap te r , Hobbes derives h is c iv il
philosophy from  his m a te r ia lis t p rem ise  t h a t  th e  w orld co n sists  o f
m a tte r  and m otion. J u s t  a s  th e re  a re  e x te rn a l m otions -  t h a t  is , we
can  observe t h a t  th e re  a re  o b jec ts  a b o u t u s  which tra n s p o r t  th e ir
im ag es  th rough  th e  a ir ,  th u s  s tim u la tin g  our senses -  th e re  a r e  also
in te rn a l  m otions. An exam ple o f an  in te rn a l  m otion i s  th e  blood which
c irc u la te s  tho rough  o u r bodies, b u t  equally  o u r passions and  d esires
a re  noth ing  b u t in te rn a l  m ovem ents w ith in  us, Hobbes argues. "There
is  no such  th in g  a s  p e rp e tu a ll T ranquility  o f  mind," Hobbes explains,
"because li f e  i t  s e lfe  is  b u t  M otion and  can  n ev e r be w ith o u t D esire,
n o r w ithou t F ea r, no m ore th a n  w ithou t sense." 65 We a re  governed by
th e se  m ovem ents: we re ly  upon th e  e x te rn a l m ovem ents o f  sense
ex perience  to  fe e d  u s  in fo rm atio n  and  we depend upon th e  in te rn a l
m ovem ents to  d ic ta te  ou r d es ire s  and passions. The l a t t e r  kind we can
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do l i t t l e  about. I t  is  p a r t  o f  th e  basic  psychology o f man t h a t  he
su ffe rs  from  passions. The rea so n  why man su ffe rs  from  th e se  passions 
r a th e r  th a n  enjoys th em  is  that*  fo r  Hobbes, th e y  can  be p a rticu la rly  
d es tru c tiv e . These in te rn a l, psychological m ovem ents a re  p a r t  o f "a 
g e n e ra l in c lin a tio n  o f  a l l  mankind, a  p erp e tu a l!  and  re s tle s s  d esire
R Ro f  Pow er a f te r  pow er, t h a t  ce a se th  only in  D eath." We becom e th e
v ic tim s o f  ou r own desires. We co m p ete  ag a in s t our fellow  man fo r
pow er, w ealth , fam e  and  honor. M oreover, th is  c o n te s t is  n o t lik e  th e
one t h a t  th e  Dodo p resided  o v er in  A lice and W onderland -  w here i t  was
d ec la red  t h a t  "everyone wins and  a l l  m ust have p rizes" -  th is
p a r tic u la r  hum an ra c e  t h a t  Hobbes has in  mind h e re  is  one w here th e re
a re  few  w inners and a  g r e a t  many unhappy lo se rs . This, th e n , i s  man
in  his n a tu ra l s ta te ;  a  s ta t e  w here ou r com peting  a p p e tite s  a re  in
p e rp e tu a l co n flic t.
Hobbes's d escrip tio n  o f th is  s ta t e  o f  n a tu re  in  L ev iathan  is
ju s tly  fam ous: 'Tn such  cond ition , th e re  is ...n o  know ledge o f  th e
fa c e  o f th e  E arth ; no a cc o u n t o f  Tim e; no A rts; no L e tte rs ; no
Society ; and which i s  w orst o f  a ll, co n tin u a l fe a r , and  d an g er o f
v io len t d ea th . And th e  l i f e  o f  man, so lita ry , poore, nasty , b ru ttish ,
6 7and  sh o rt."  Since i t  is  im possib le t o  change hum an n a tu re , Hobbes 
suggests  t h a t  th e  only escape  from  th is  b leak  p red ic am en t i s  fo r  man 
t o  acknow ledge t h a t  i t  is  in  h is b e s t  in te r e s t  to  o p t f o r  p eac e  and 
secu rity , and  t h a t  e n ta ils  e re c tin g  a  c iv il so c ie ty  which would be 
governed  by an  a ll-p o w erfu l sovereign . Since " i t  is  n o t possib le t h a t  
th e re  can  be  a  g rea te r"  b e n e f it  th a n  " th e  p eac e  and  p rese rv a tio n  o f 
ev e ry  p a r tic u la r  man," a s  Hobbes d ec la res  in  th e  E lem en ts o f Law ,
th e n  a  sovereign  w hich g u aran teed  such secu rity  is  in  everyone 's  b e s t
6 8in te re s t .  This i s  w h at can  be ca lled  Hobbes's p ru d en tia l argum ent:
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t h a t  ev ery  p ru d en t man, when fa c e d  w ith  th e  s ta rk  re a l i ty  o f 
ex isten ce , would, i f  g iven th e  chance, gladly su rren d er hds r ig h ts  to  
be his own sovereign  in  exchange fo r  p eace  and a  l i f e  f r e e  from  fe a r .
B ut Hobbes is  n o t  c o n te n t t o  l e t  i t  r e s t  th e re?  o th e r  a rgum en ts
a re  sum m oned to  th e  cause . The problem  w ith th e  p ru d en tia l a rg u m en t
is  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t a lone a  su ff ic ie n t reaso n  to  su rren d er one’s  righ ts.
T here a re , a f te r  a ll, many exam ples o f  individuals who would gladly
ta k e  th e i r  chances  in  a  H obbesian s ta t e  o f n a tu re . A re lig ious
zea lo t, fo r  exam ple, m ight w an t t o  d ic ta te  his b e lie fs  t o  o th e rs , o r  a
C rom w ell m ight happily  engage in  a  c iv il w ar i f  he  th o u g h t t h a t  his 
ch ances o f  succeeding  w ere high. Our ind iv idual a p p e tite s  and  d esires
a re  som etim es to o  stro n g  t o  l e t  us a c t  in  ou r own ra tio n a l
se lf - in te re s t. T h a t i s  why Hobbes em ploys a  second a rg u m en t in
add ition  to  th e  p ru d en tia l one b rie fly  described  above: th e  a rg u m en t
from  ord inary  language.
Hobbes in s is ts  t h a t  th e  basic  con ten tiousness o f  mankind is  n o t 
only re f le c te d  in  th e  language which is  used, b u t t h a t  t h a t  language 
is  i t s e lf  th e  cause  o f  fu r th e r  s tr if e .  We misuse words, Hobbes
m aintains, and  because we can n o t ag ree  on th e  s ign ifica tion  o f  te rm s  
our in te re s ts  w ill alw ays com e in to  co n flic t. This is  th e  reaso n  why 
Hobbes m akes co n tin u a l a t ta c k s  ag a in s t m etaphors. M etaphors a re  an  
equ ivocation  o f  nam es w hich, when used  in  philosophy and sc ie n tif ic  
reason ing , c a n  be dangerous (although in  De C arpore he d ec la re s  t h a t  
m etaphor's equ ivocation  is  harm less because i t 's  equ ivocation  is
se lf-ev id en t). Thucydides in  h is H istory m akes a  s im ilar co m pla in t 
a b o u t th e  m isuse o f  words, and Hobbes, since  he had tra n s la te d  th e
t e x t ,  was no d oub t w ell aw are  o f  th e  G reek h is to rian 's  co n te m p t fo r  
th o se  who m isused words. A ccording to  Thucydides, a s  " ...revo lu tions
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broke o u t in  c ity  a f te r  c i ty .. .to  f i t  in  w ith  th e  change o f ev en ts,
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words, to o , had to  change th e i r  l i te r a l  m eanings." Hobbes tra n s la te s
th e  above passage on th e  misuse o f  words a s  " the  c i t ie s  being now in  
sed ition ,"  sed itio n  being fo r  Hobbes th e  w orst t h a t  can  b e fa ll a  c iv il
s o c ie ty .70 Likew ise, in  his E lem en ts  o f  Law Hobbes sp ec ifica lly  links 
sed itio n  w ith th e  misuse o f  language:
"The au th o rs  o f sed ition  be such, a s  nam es th in g s  n o t according  
to  th e i r  t r u e  and genera lly  agreed-upon  nam es; b u t c a ll  r ig h t 
and wrong, good and bad, accord ing  to  th e ir  passions, o r accord ­
in g  to  th e  a u th o ritie s  o f such  a s  th e y  adm ire  a s  A risto tle ,
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C icero , Seneca, and o thers."
In  h is  Philosophical R udim ents concerning G overnm ent and Society ,
which was Hobbes's own English tra n s la tio n  o f  De C ive, he  s tren g th en s  
h is claim  t h a t  c iv il u n re s t is  caused  by misusing words. In  th is
passage Hobbes drops th e  p ru d en tia l a rg u m en t and c laim s t h a t  a l l  hum an
disco rd  springs from  th is  lingu istic  abuse:
"A ll con trove rsies  a re  b red  from  hence , t h a t  th e  opinions o f 
men d if fe r  concerning meum and tu u m , ju s t and un just, p ro fitab le  
and un p ro fitab le , good and evil, h o n es t and d ishonest, and th e
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like; which every  man e s tee m s accord ing  to  h is own jid g m en t."
H ere Hobbes d ec la re s  t h a t  th e  reaso n  why men misuse words is  t h a t
th e i r  "judgm ent" v arie s . Now judgm ent, a s  we have seen , is  defined  by 
Hobbes a s  being no d if fe re n t th a n  "sense o r  p e rcep tio n  p roperly  so 
called ."  Our ab ility  t o  judge springs from  ou r cap a c ity  t o  sense  
d issim ilarities. Since our sense , and  th e re fo re  ou r experien ce , 
v a rie s , we end  up using words which m ay have th e  sam e sound b u t  ca rry  
an  en tire ly  d if fe re n t m eaning, th u s  lead ing  to  sed ition .
Hobbes's answ er to  th e  problem  o f  o rd inary  language is  to  c re a te
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an  a rb it ra to r  who w ill d ic ta te  th e  e x a c t  m eaning o f words. Indeed, in  
h is Philosophical Rudim ents Hobbes has a  se c tio n  e n tit le d  ' I t  p e rta in s
to  th e  c iv il au th o rity , to  judge (when need  requ ires) w h at defin itions
73and w hat in fe re n c e s  a re  tru e ."  In  o th e r  words, since  o u r ind iv idual 
judgm ents d iffe r , we m ust su rren d e r ou r co llec tiv e  judgm ents  t o  a  
sovereign  who w ill do th e  judging fo r  us. A ccording to  Hobbes,
" It belongs to  th e  sam e ch ie f pow er to  make som e com mon ru les  
fo r  a l l  men, and to  d ec la re  them  publicly, by  which every  man
may know w h at may be ca lled  his, and w h at ano ther's , w hat ju s t,
74and  w hat unjust, w hat good, w hat eviL"
Hobbes th e re fo re  o ffe rs  us tw o  se p a ra te  reaso n s why we should 
su rren d e r our r ig h ts  t o  th e  d ic ta te s  o f  a  sovereign: th e  basic
pyschology o f man m akes i t  n ecessary  t h a t  every  person  is  p ro te c te d  
from  m ankind's excessive a p p e tite s  and desires; men can n o t com e t o  any 
ag re e m e n t on th e  s ign ifica tion  o f words. In  f a c t ,  Hobbes a rg u es  t h a t  
i f  we w ere t o  use words a s  th e y  a re  p roperly  defined , th e n  we would 
have no choice b u t  to  ag ree  to  c re a te  an  a ll-pow erfu l sovereign; a  
"sovereign," p roperly  defined , accord ing  to  Hobbes, i s  necessarily  
som eone who has  com p le te  au th o rity  ov er h is sub jec ts . A nything less , 
in  Hobbesian te rm s , could no lo n g e r c o rre c tly  b e  ca lled  a  "sovereign." 75 
Hobbes re p e a ts  th e  above sam e arg u m en ts  in  his f i r s t  tw o  books o f 
L ev iathan . Again we a re  t r e a te d  to  a  descrip tio n  o f  th e  s ta t e  o f 
n a tu re  and  a re  o ffe red  a  com pelling reaso n  why th e  ty p e  o f  secu rity  
g u a ren teed  by a  sovereign  can  be  th e  only rem edy . In  add ition  we a re  
to ld  t h a t  th is  v e ry  sam e sovereign  can  p re v e n t u s  from  misusing words, 
th u s  free in g  u s  from  unnecessary  fu tu re  co n flic t. In  th e  beginning o f 
th e  th ird  book o f  L eviathan  he sum m arizes th e se  tw o  a rg u m en ts  by 
saying:
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'1  have derived  th e  R ights o f Sovereigne Pow er, and th e  du ty  o f 
Subjects h ith e rto , from  th e  P rincip les o f  N ature onely; such a s  
Experience has found tru e , o r  C onsent (concerning th e  use o f 
words) has m ade so; t h a t  is  t o  say , from  th e  n a tu re  o f Men, 
known to  us by E xperience, and from  D efinitions (of such words 
a s  a re  EssentLaU to a i l  Political! reasoning) un iversally  
ag reed  on." 76
Now I  do n o t w an t to  go in to  to o  much d e ta il  h e re  on w hether o r
n o t Hobbes's a rg u m en ts  a re  e n tire ly  sa tis fa c to ry . Suffice i t  t o  say
th a t  th e  p ru d en tia l a rg u m en t does n o t  com pel us to  su rren d er ou r
rig h ts  to  a  sovereign  because  we m ight sim ply decide to  ta k e  our
chances in  th e  s ta te  o f n a tu re . S im ilarly , th e  a rg u m en t from  ordinary
language  is  n o t en tire ly  persuasive . I t  seem s r a th e r  dubious to  say
t h a t  by leg is la tin g  language one i s  ab le  to  end  co n flic t. Our
ex p erience  has been  t h a t  O rw ellian so c ie tie s  a re  n o t  p a rticu la rly
p ea c e fu l and, in  any ev en t, th e y  do n o t  la s t .  M oreover, Hobbes's
ap p ea l t o  using e x a c t defin itions is  unim pressive: i f  one w ants to
define  a  sovereign  in  a  H obbesian sense th e n  t h a t  is  ju s t  fin e , b u t we
can  equally  define  a  sovereign  in  a n o th e r  m anner which does n o t  make
him o u t to  be an  a ll-p o w erfu l m o rta l god. In  f a c t ,  i f  Hobbes w ere to
re ly  so lely  upon th e  p ruden tia l and  o rd inary  language  arg u m en ts  th e y
would n o t g e t  him v e ry  fa r ; n o t  only fo r  th e  reaso n s ju s t  m entioned
b u t because , a s  Hobbes h im se lf po in ts  ou t, o u r judgm en t co n flic ts .
Assuming th a t  Hobbes was n o t  ju s t  proposing som e e lab o ra te  th o u g h t
ex p erim en t, how could he  e v e r  hope co llec tiv e ly  t o  persuade u s  o f  th e  
c o rrec tn ess  o f his view s? The answ er, n o t surprisingly , concerns th e
use  o f th e  m etaphoric im age.
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The word vision h as  tw o  p rim ary  u se s .77 The f i r s t  is  on th e  o rd e r o f 
re p o rtin g  w hat our ey es  t e l l  us, and i s  o f te n  accom panied  by som e 
d escrip tion  o f  w h at th e  p rocess o f  vision en ta ils , lik e  Hobbes's own 
work in  o p tics . F o r Hobbes, th e  co lo r and  shape o f  o b je c ts  a re  
tra n sp o rte d  th rough  th e  a ir  and  th e n  im p a c t  upon ou r re tin a ,  which 
th e n  enab les us t o  assum e t h a t  w hat we a re  see ing  ac tu a lly  corresponds 
to  w h at th e  o b je c ts  a re  th em selves. D esca rte s  had a  s im ila r th e o ry  o f 
v ision  o r  o p tics , b u t  Hobbes c la im ed  to  have  im proved  upon th e  
C artesian  a c c o u n t by suggesting  t h a t  th e se  o b je c ts  send  o u t w aves o r 
pu lses to  th e  hum an eye, which o f  cou rse  re in fo rc e s  h is  m a te ria lis t 
th e o ry  o f m a tte r  and  motion. On occasion Hobbes ca lls  th is  f i r s t  ty p e  
o f  v ision  "n a tu ra l v ision," th e  im p o rtan ce  o f which w ill b e  seen  
shortly .
The second ty p e  o f  v ision  is  o f an  a l to g e th e r  d if fe re n t o rd e r and
so m etim es c a rr ie s  w ith  i t  th e  synonym s o f  "dream s," "fancy" and
"im agination." Loosely defined , th is  kind o f  v ision  is  th e
visualizing  o f a  s ta te  o f  a f fa ir s  o th e r  th a n  w h a t th e y  ap p ea r t o  be to
th e  senses. Hobbes, fo r  in s ta n c e , o f te n  rid icu les  th eo log ians fo r  
believing in , and  encouraging o th e rs  t o  be lieve  in , phan tasm s and
g hosts  -  n o t t h a t  th is  kind o f  v ision  does n o t  o ccu r, bu t, accord ing
to  Hobbes, i t  is  noth ing  b u t th e  inw ard  m otions o f  th e  b ra in  and is
n o t caused  by som e ou tw ard  o b jec t. The re le v a n t p o in t h e re  is  t h a t
when Hobbes v isualized  and  described  th e  s ta t e  o f  n a tu re  a s  a  w ar
am ongst men he w as n o t rep o rtin g  w h at h is  senses t d d  him (which is
n a tu ra l vision), r a th e r  he w as im agin ing  w h a t such a  s ta t e  o f  a f fa irs
would look  lik e  and  th e n  draw ing from  th i s  im ag e  th e  n ecessary
conclusions (ie. he was engaging in  p o litic a l vision). P la to 's
rep u b lic , Rousseau's G eneral Will, and  Locke's so c ia l c o n tra c t  a re  a l l
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fa m ilia r  exam ples o f philosophers describ ing a  s ta te  o f a f fa ir s  o th e r  
th a n  w h at th e y  a p p ea r to  be t o  th e  senses, w ith th e se  p o litic a l 
v isions fo rm ing  th e  foundation  o f  th e ir  po litica l tho u g h t. This, 
th e n , is  a  v ision  o f  a  po litica l o rder, v ita lly  n ecessary  to  th e  a r t  
o f po litica l th eo riz in g . W hat would a  P la ton ic  repub lic  look  like?  o r  
how did  Rousseau view  th e  workings o f  th e  G eneral Will? a re  questions 
we freq u en tly  ask , o fte n  ignoring th e  f a c t  t h a t  w h a t we a re  discussing 
is  th e  philosopher's im ag ina tion  and n o t som e physical e n t ity  which he 
has co n stru c ted . This i s  w h a t Hobbes ca lled  "p o litica l vision" (as 
opposed to  n a tu ra l vision); i t  is  th e  philosopher's second  sig h t, a s  
i t  w ere.
The b e n e f it  t o  Hobbes o f  holding th is  d u a l d is tin c tio n  be tw een
n a tu ra l v ision  and  po litica l v ision  is  q u ite  sim ple. F irs tly , i f  
Hobbes was only to  em brace  a  th e o ry  o f  n a tu ra l vision th e n  he would be 
unable t o  o f fe r  u s  an  acc o u n t o f  th e  s ta t e  o f  n a tu re  o r even  o f 
p o litic a l obligation. Given only his th e o ry  o f  o p tic s  and n a tu ra l
v ision, a l l  Hobbes could p rovide u s  w ith  would be b e t te r  descrip tions 
o f ou r po litica l selves. I t  is  d e a r ,  how ever, t h a t  Hobbes's 
p o litic a l philosophy is  a s  much norm ative  a s  descrip tiv e . By
hypothesizing a  s ta t e  o f  n a tu re  a s  a  w ar am ongst men, Hobbes was 
in fo rm ing  u s  how we ough t t o  liv e  given th is  r a th e r  b leak  v ision  o f
th e  world. Secondly, given th e  co n s tra in ts  p laced  upon n a tu ra l vision 
-  t h a t  is , i t  sim ply re p o r ts  w hat i s  b e fo re  one's eyes -  th e  
sovereign 's  m ain tainance and defen se  o f  th e  com m onw ealth  would 
n ecessa rily  be  im paired . P u t sim ply, he  would be  no w iser th a n  th e  
com m on man. The ch ie f d iffe re n ce  be tw een  n a tu ra l and p o litic a l vision 
is  t h a t  th e  fo rm e r  can  n ev er g ive th e  sovereign  th e  know ledge 
n ecessary  to  re n d e r  p ru d e n t judgm ent; i t  can  n ev e r inform  him how he
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o ugh t to  ru le  o r  w hat would be  th e  b e s t m ethod fo r  th e  p rese rv a tio n  o f
th e  s ta te .  Only a  p o litic a l vision can  do th e se  th ings.
Now one m ight argue t h a t  i t  is  n o t necessary  fo r  th e  sovereign  to
a c t  p ruden tly , no r does he  have to  be a  p a rticu la rly  w ise judge. AIL
t h a t  i s  req u ired  is  t h a t  he ru le  and  t h a t  h is su b jec ts  obey. B ut
rem em b er, Hobbes has a lre ad y  to ld  u s  t h a t  th e  sovereign  m ust "judge
(when need  requires) w h at defin itio n s  and  w h at in fe re n c e s  a re  tru e ."
We can n o t do i t  fo r  ourselves fo r  c iv il w ar would e ru p t. M oreover,
som ething  e lse  is  req u ired  o f  th e  sovereign , fo r  n o t  only m ust he
judge b u t  he  also  is  sadd led  w ith  th e  defense  o f  th e  com m onw ealth .
Hobbes pcdnts o u t t h a t  th e  sovereign  can n o t judge and defend  th e  s ta te
by using n a tu ra l vision. Hobbes is  v e ry  d e a r  on th is  po in t: i f  th e
com m onw ealth  is  to  be p reserved , th e n  only po litica l vision would do.
A ccording to  Hobbes in  th e  Philosophical R udim ents,
lfEt is  th e re fo re  necessary  to  th e  defense  o f th e  c ity , f ir s t ,
t h a t  th e re  be som e who may, as  n e a r  a s  may be, sea rch  in to  and
discover th e  counsels and  m otions o f a l l  th o se  who may prejudice
i t .  For d iscovere rs  to  m inisters o f s ta te ,  a re  lik e  beam s o f th e
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So fo r  Hobbes th e  defense  o f th e  s ta t e  depends upon th o se  who c a n  p e e r  
in to  th e  m otives o f  th o se  who a re  i t s  enem ies. However, one can n o t
slmpLy observe th e se  enem ies o f  th e  s ta te  by em ploying n a tu ra l vision, 
fo r  one m ust be  ab le  t o  see  in to  th e ir  v ery  "souL" Hobbes th e n  
con tinues in  an  illum inating  passage:
"And we m ore tru ly  say  in  vision p o litic a l th a n  n a tu ra l, t h a t  
th e  sensib le and in te llig ib le  sp ec ies  o f ou tw ard  th ings, n o t 
w ell considered  by o th e rs , a re  lik e  a ir  tra n sp o rte d  to  th e  
soul; t h a t  is  to  say , to  th em  who have suprem e au th o rity : and
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th e re fo re  a re  th e y  no le ss  necessary  to  th e  p reserv a tio n  o f 
th e  s ta te ,  th a n  th e  ra y s  o f l ig h t a re  to  th e  conservation  o f 
man." 79
This is  n o t a  l i te r a l  descrip tion  o f an  o b je c t sending o u t an  im age 
t o  th e  re tin a , th is  is  a  m e tapho rica l descrip tion  o f how th o se  in  
charge o f th e  com m onw ealth  m ust "search  in to"  th e  "soul" o f  th o se  who 
would be  th e  com m onw ealth 's enem ies. N a tu ra l v ision  can n o t t e l l  th e  
sovereign  o r  his m in isters w h a t t o  do, only p o litic a l vision can  do 
th is . A lthough po litica l vision o p e ra te s  upon th e  sam e p rinc ip les  as  
n a tu ra l vision -  lik e  n a tu ra l vision, p o litic a l vision is  
" transported" th rough  th e  a i r  -  i t  is  n ev e rth e less  re se rv e d  fo r  only a  
specia l few . This in s ig h t is  n o t  given, lik e  i t  i s  fo r  L ear's  Fool, 
t o  a l l  who have th e  eyes t o  see , b u t is  g ran te d  only to  th o se  who a re  
"necessary  to  th e  p rese rv a tio n  o f  th e  s ta te ."  This is  th e  c lo se s t 
Hobbes e v e r  g e ts  to  th e  ro m an tic  no tion  o f m etaphor. In  o rd e r fo r  th e  
sovereign  and his m in isters to  p ro te c t  th e  c ity  th e y  m ust 
m etaphorically  p ro je c t th em se lv es  in to  th e  sou l o f  th e i r  enem ies. Or 
to  p u t  th e  m a tte r  an o th e r way, th e y  m ust b e  p rep ared  to  v isualize  and 
im ag ine  a  s ta t e  o f a f fa irs  o th e r  th a n  w hat i t  would ap p ea r t o  be to  
th e  im m ediate  senses.
Now Hobbes's a c c o u n t o f  n a tu ra l and  p o litic a l vision i s  in s tru c tiv e  
fo r  tw o  reasons. The f i r s t  is  t h a t  i t  is  v ita lly  n ecessary  fo r  Hobbes 
t h a t  we v isualize  along w ith him th e  s ta te  o f n a tu re  -  t h a t  is , t h a t  
we sh a re  in  h is p o litic a l vision. By using o u r own p o litic a l v ision  
we to o  can  observe Hobbes's m y th ica l s ta te  and  we can  be persuaded  by 
h is argum en ts  p rec ise ly  because we a re  ab le  to  "see b efo re  ou r eyes" 
th e  tr u th  o f  w h a t he  says. We c a n n o t ta k e  w h a t he has to  t e l l  us
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so lely  on au th o rity , no r can  we be  persuaded  by his rh e to r ic . O ther 
a u th o ritie s  w ill d if fe r ,  and  o th e r  speak ers  w ill be m ore e loquen t, 
b u t we can  see  fo r  ourselves th e  im ag e  o f  th e  w orld he has c re a te d  and 
th e n  follow  closely  h is a rgum en ts  which prove th is  o r  t h a t  f a c t .
So when Hobbes's c r i t ic s  p o in t o u t t h a t  he  "fa ils  t o  ju s tify  his 
conclusions" th e y  do so  under th e  assum ption  t h a t  Hobbes's p ru d en tia l 
a rg u m en t and th e  a rg u m en t from  ord inary  language can  be iso la te d  from  
one a n o th e r and  th e n  analyzed  purely  on a  lo g ic a l basis. This is  only 
p a rtia lly  c o rre c t. Hobbes n o t only o ffe rs  u s  th e se  tw o  arg u m en ts  he 
com bines th em  w ith a  th ird  a rg u m e n t which su p p o rt th e  f i r s t  tw o: th e  
a rg u m en t from  im ag ination . We a re  co n stan tly  being bom barded w ith 
im ages , Hobbes te l ls  us, w ith no m ethod fo r  distinguishing t r u e  im ages 
from  fa lse , l i t e r a l  im ag es  from  m etap h o rica l ones. However, i f  we can  
sh a re  in  th e  sam e im age i t  m ight b e  possible t o  make th e  sam e com m on 
sensory  judgm en t upon i t s  w orth.
The second reaso n  why i t  is  in s tru c tiv e  t o  se p a ra te  n a tu ra l from  
po litica l v ision, a s  Hobbes h im se lf does, i s  t h a t  a lthough  our
co llec tiv e  sensory  judgm en t is  v ita l t o  convince us o f  th e  t r u th  o f 
h is a rgum en ts  b efo re  we have o p ted  fo r  th e  sovereign , i t  n ev erth e less  
becom es u n im p o rtan t a f te r  we have done so. Once we have ach ieved  our 
s e c u re  and  p e a c e fu l s ta tu s  in  th e  com m onw ealth , p o li tic a l o r 
m e tapho rica l vision is  no lo n g e r req u ired  o f us. P o litic a l vision, 
t h a t  which is  n ecessary  t o  th e  d efense  o f  th e  com m onw ealth , is  only 
req u ired  o f th e  sovereign  o r  o f  h is m in isters o f  s ta te .  Along w ith
a l l  ou r rig h ts , th e re fo re , we su rren d e r ou r cap a c ity  t o  engage in  a
com mon sensory  judgm ent.
I f  ou r judgm en t is  based upon sense  ex p erien ce , a s  Hobbes te l ls
us, and i f  ou r sense  experience  is  un reliab le , th is  would n ecessarily
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c re a te  a  sev e re  hardship  fo r  any  sc ien ce  o f  po litics. So Hobbes does
n o t re ly  so le ly  upon im ag es t o  convince u s  o f th e  t r u th  o f  w hat he
says. Along w ith  th e  im ag es which he p re sen ts  us w ith  a re  th e o rie s  o f
language , psychology, sc ien ce , o p tics , and  a  geom etrica l m ethod which
a re  m ean t to  convince us o f  th e  c o rrec tn ess  o f  h is view s. B u t th e
im ag e  rem a in s  p rim ary . N a tu ra l v ision  o ffe rs  u s  im ages o f  th e  world
around us. A lthough we can  be foo led  a b o u t th e  c o n te n t o f  th e se
im ag es, we a re  n ev erth e less  c e r ta in  t h a t  th e y  e x is t e i th e r  in te rn a lly
o r ex te rn a lly . Our m etaphoric  im ag es  a re  an o th e r  m a tte r . We know
t h a t  th e y  do n o t ex ist, b u t th e n  again  we have no fo rm a l way o f
distinguishing th e  im ag e  o f, say , an  a rtif ic ia l man from  a  r e a l  one.
Although th e  m etaphoric  im ag e  is  troub lesom e in  d iscourse , a s  th e
"standard  account"  avers , i t  can  also  " se c re tly  in s tru c t  th e  read e r."
The im age  enab les u s  t o  see  th e  th in g  b efo re  our eyes, i t  d raw s o u t
sjmi.lariti.es w hich would have gone unnoticed , i t  c re a te s  a  com m on
concep tion  which we can  co llec tiv e ly  se e  and  re n d e r  a  judg m en t upon,
and i t  can  p ro p e l u s  o u t o f th e  s ta t e  o f  n a tu re  and  in to  a  H obbesian
c iv il so c ie ty . And once we a r e  in  t h a t  c iv il so c ie ty , by doing
doub le-tim e a s  p o litic a l vision, i t  can  help  us rem a in  th e re .  This is
th e  rea so n  why Hobbes concludes h is L ev iathan  w ith  th e  follow ing
rem ark :
And th u s  I  have b rough t to  an  end my D iscourse o f C ivill and 
E cc les ia s tica l G overnm ent, occasioned  by th e  d iso rders  o f th e  
p re se n t t im e , w ithou t p a r tia li ty , w ith o u t app lication , and 
w ithou t o th e r  design, th a n  t o  s e t  befo re  mens eyes th e
Of)
M utuall re la tio n  b e tw een  P ro te c tio n  and O bedience."
I f  we jo in  in  Hobbes's v ision o f th e  p o litic a l world, i f  we to o  a re  
ab le  to  see  b efo re  our ey es  th e  t r u e  n a tu re  o f  mankind and  o f th e
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com m on w ealth , th e n  we 
con ta in ed  in
can n o t help  b u t a g re e  w ith  th e  arg u m en ts  
h is p o litica l philosophy.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
HOBBES'S VISUAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
The f i r s t  p rincip le  o f know ledge is  t h a t  we have such and 
such  concep tions... —Thom as Hobbes
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The l a s t  c h a p te r  has shown t h a t  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  d iscourse, w hether 
i t  was h is to rica l, fo ren sic , philosophical, rh e to r ic a l o r  p o e tic , had 
been  p a r tly  d riven  by th e  n ecess ity  to  c re a te  v ivid  m en ta l p ic tu re s  
fo r  th e  re a d e r, th row ing  him in to  s itu a tio n s  a s  i f  he w ere a  sp e c ta to r  
o f th e  e v en ts  being n a rra te d . This is  th e  reaso n  why Hobbes em ployed 
m etaphors so  free ly , and  why he m ade con tin u a l rem ark s  to w ard s  th e  
read ing  o f  m etaphors although, a s  we have also  seen , Hobbes's com m ents 
on m etaphor have been  freq u en tly  m isunderstood.
Hobbes's o v er-re lian ce  upon th e  im age could, o f  course, prove to
be a  highly dangerous m ethod o f  in s tru c tio n . The conveyance of
know ledge along p ic to ra l grounds can  m islead th e  populace by
con stru c tin g  a  fa lse  im age  o f ev en ts , and a  population governed by
opinion r a th e r  th a n  knowledge could easily  f a l l  p rey  to  relig ious
su p ers titio n  o r  to  th e  cap tiv a tin g  charm s o f  a  dem agogue. In to  a
world covered  in  such language, unanchored by th e  c e r titu d e s  o f tru th ,
Hobbes f e l t  he had been  bom . T ruth  and ju s tice  had been  words
p arried  back  and fo r th  in  so many d if fe re n t co n te x ts  t h a t  i f  th e y  had
held  any m eaning th e n  i t  would only be  lo c a te d  in  conventional
ag reem en t. Y e t Hobbes also knew t h a t  th e  d o c trin e  o f nominalism alone
could have no purchase on a  p o litic a l o rd er which had c ried  o u t fo r
s tab ility . The ground o f c e r ta in ty , th e  foundation  o f  knowledge
r a th e r  th a n  opinion, had  t o  be  es tab lished  befo re  a  new p o litic a l
o rd e r could be co n stru c ted , and t h a t  m ean t n o t ju s t  finding any im age
by which th e  popula tion  could re n d e r  a  judgm ent upon, b u t lo c a tin g  th e  
c o r re c t  one. Like th e  m onarch in  Dryden's Absalom and A ctitophel,
Hobbes understood th e  n ecess ity  t o  " s c a tte r  h is M aker's im ag e  th rough
th e  land," b u t Hobbes also knew t h a t  i f  i t  was to  be a  t r u e  foundation
1
o f know ledge th e n  th a t  im age had to  be sc ien tif ic .
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Those who w ere ab le  to  es tab lish  a  so c ie ty  t h a t  was based  upon
know ledge r a th e r  th a n  opinion ( th a t is , th e  s c ie n tis ts  and
philosophers) w ere a  s e le c t  few . N ot a l l  in  th e  com m onw ealth  would
have th e  a p p e tite  o r  th e  ab ility  fo r  th e  sc ie n tif ic  m ethod, b u t ye t,
although la rg e ly  ig n o ra n t o f  th o se  sc ie n tis ts  and  philosophers who had
th is  a p titu d e , th e  popula tion  could n ev erth e less  be ru led  by th e
princip les es tab lished  by th e se  se lf  chosen de liverers , o f whom Hobbes
considered  h im se lf t o  be a t  l e a s t  a  m em ber, i f  n o t th e  only one. New
p ic tu re s  had to  be c re a te d  in  o rd e r fo r  o th e rs  to  g rasp  th e  im p o rtan ce
o f w hat he was try in g  to  say: th e  a r tif ic ia l man, th e  L eviathan , th e
Behem oth, to  nam e ju s t  a  few  exam ples. The f i r s t  p rincip le  o f
know ledge, a s  Hobbes w ro te  in  h is E lem ents o f Law, was t o  have th e
2ap p ro p ria te  conception . But, a s  i f  echoing th e  rem ark s  con ta ined  in  
P la to 's  Seventh L e tte r , th e  in itia l im age  would n o t su rv ive  a s  a  
foundation  o f know ledge i f  i t  w ere n o t accom panied  by th e  app ro p ria te  
vocabulary  and sc ie n tif ic  m ethod. Hobbes d e a r ly  th o u g h t t h a t  he
could la y  th e  foundation  fo r  know ledge. The m etaphor o f a  
foundationalism  in  te rm s  o f  know ledge and  t r u th  was one t h a t  Hobbes 
to o k  seriousLy. A foundation  is  som eth ing  which is  m an-m ade and, 
above a ll, is  v isib le  to  a l l  th o se  who can  se e , even  to  th o se  who a re  
n a tu ra lly  "m istrusting ." From w hat would th is  foundation  be 
con stru c ted ?  Or t o  p u t th e  question  in  an o th e r  way: a  foundation  is  
only a  m etaphor f o r  fo rm , so  th e n  w h at could  be sa id  t o  be i t s  
co n ten t?
I t  is  argued  in  th is  c h a p te r  t h a t  th e  c o n te n t o f  H obbes's th e o ry  
o f know ledge was p rim arily  v isual. I  re a liz e  t h a t  in  argu ing  such  a  
case  I  am sailing  ag a in s t a  fa ir ly  s trong  and wide c u rren t. M ost
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com m en ta to rs  on Hobbes, when speaking o f h is th e o ry  o f know ledge,
fo cu s  on h is s c ie n tif ic  m ethod, h is th e o ry  o f  p rep o sitio n a l t r u th ,  his
3
nom inalistic  vocabulary , and so  on. B ut few , i f  any, e v e r  m ake th e  
connection  be tw een  th e  a c t  o f  v ision  and  sc ie n tif ic  t r u th ,  a
connection  th a t ,  I  be lieve , Hobbes im p lic itly  i f  n o t ex p lic itly  m akes 
in  h is th e o ry  o f  know ledge. Consequently, th e  f i r s t  sec tio n  s itu a te s  
Hobbes's th e o ry  o f know ledge w ithin  th e  g e n e ra l c o n te x t o f th e
"post-scep tica l"  philosophers. 2t is  a rgued  h e re  t h a t  th e  ab ility  to  
have concep tions is  w h a t d if fe re n tia te s  Hobbes and o th e r  C on tinen ta l 
th e o r is ts  from  th e ir  s c e p tic a l co u n te rp a rts . The second sec tio n  
re tu rn s  to  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f op tics, fo r  i t  is  argued  t h a t  his 
t r e a tm e n t  o f n a tu ra l vision fo rm s th e  s ta r t in g  pcdnt o f  h is th e o ry  of 
know ledge. The th ird  sec tio n  analyzes Hobbes's th e o ry  o f "knowledge 
o f fa c t ,"  which, again , is  p rim arily  v isual; th e  fo u rth  h is  th e o ry  o f 
" sc ien tific  know ledge." The f i f th  and f in a l sec tio n  i s  m ore o f a  
sp ecu la tiv e  v en tu re . Could i t  be  t h a t  Hobbes em ployed h is g eo m etric  
m ethod o f ph ilosophical reasoning  because  i t ,  to o , was p rim arily  
v isual?  I f  so , th e n  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f know ledge has a  s tro n g er 
v isu a l c o n te n t th a n  has y e t  been  rea lized . I t  m ight be argued  th e n  
t h a t  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f know ledge begins w ith  th e  ind iv idual having 
concep tions o r  im ages, re f le c tin g  th e se  im ages in  a  no m inalistic  
vocabulary , and th e n  sh iftin g  bo th  im ag es and language to g e th e r
th rough  a  g e o m e tric a l m ethod which is , again , an  e la b o ra te  system  o f 
im ages.
S ection  One:
H obbes's Response t o  th e  S cep tics
Every age has i t s  scep tics ; th is  p re se n t one is  no excep tion . A naly tic
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philosophers a re  sc e p tic a l -  in  f a c t ,  a re  highly dism issive -  o f
sp ecu la tiv e  m etaphysics, a s  a re  many d eco n stru c tio n ists  o f  much of
4tra d itio n a l Anglo-A m encan  though t. One c o u n te rp a r t to  our p re se n t 
t im e s  ocurred  in  th e  la te  s ix te en th  and e a iiy  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  when 
a  troub ling  scep ticism  em erged  which th re a te n e d  th e  v e ry  foundations 
o f  hum an know ledge. This, in d eed , was p a r tly  th e  reaso n  why Hobbes 
em ployed m e tapho rica l im ag es  in  h is discourse: in  o rd er to  co m b a t th e  
s c e p tic a l (dare one say , d eco n stru c tio n ist? ) im pulse during t h a t  tim e ; 
w here H obbesian m etaphor e s tab lish es  a  com m on sensory  ground fo r  
judg m e n t, sc e p tic is  m m u s t  r e t r e a t .
A t th e  s t a r t  o f  th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry , philosophy w as a t  a
cross-roads. On th e  one hand th e re  was th e  th eo lo g ica l schoo l m ade up
o f C atho lic  sch o lastic  philosophers who held  t h a t  f a ith  com bined with
reaso n  rev ea led  a  ch ris tian ized  tr u th ,  and  th e y  w ere jo ined  w ith th e
even  m ore dogm atic  P ro te s ta n t m ovem ents founded by Calvin and L u ther
which argued  t h a t  t r u th  d id  n o t need  th e  handm aiden o f lo g ic  o r
n a tu ra l sc ience  fo r  i t  to  be conveyed. For th e  P ro te s ta n t dogm atists ,
t r u th  was a  rew ard  from  God delivered  un to  th e  t r u e  b e lievers  by
divine rev e la tio n . On th e  opposite  spec trum , how ever, th e re  w ere th e
sc e p tic s  who, borrow ing from  th e  G reek philosopher Pyrrho, believed
th a t  no single c r ite r io n  o f know ledge, e i th e r  o f  th e  n a tu ra l w orld o r
o f th e  th eo lo g ica l, could e v e r  be estab lished . These sev en teen th
cen tu ry  Pyrrhonians argued  th a t  th e  c o n ce p t o f  t r u th  was sim ply  an
in f in ite  re g re ss  o f  p rio r  causes, w ith no firm  foundation  o f know ledge
e v e r  being a tta in a b le . These tw o  wildly d iv e rg en t schools o f tho u g h t, 
th e  dog m atis ts  and  th e  scep tic s , w ere n o t  only poles a p a r t
philosophically  b u t th e ir  m utually  exclusive c laim s w ere p a rtly
le g itim a te d  by w hat th e y  w ere arguing against; a s  P asca l observed, as
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long a s  th e re  w ere dogm atists , th e  sc e p tic s  should be considered  to  be 
rig h t. N ot surprisingly , to w ard s th e  f i r s t  q u a r te r  o f  th e  sev en teen th  
cen tu ry  a  new schoo l o f  th o u g h t began  to  em erge which o ffe red  a  
com prom ise be tw een  th e  d o g m atis ts  an d  th e  scep tic s , and  am ong th e  
ad h eren ts  o f  th is  "post-scep tica l"  m ovem ent, fo r  w an t o f  a  b e t te r  
ph rase , was Thom as Hobbes.
Following th e  d ea th s  o f  P la to  and A ris to tle , th e  te n e ts  o f
scep tic ism  began to  seep  in to  th e  G reek academ y, beginning w ith  th e
philosophy o f Pyrrho in  th e  th ird  cen tu ry  B.C. and  th e n  continuing
much l a t e r  w ith t h a t  o f Sextus Em piricus in  th e  second  c en tu ry  A.D.
H  can  be said  t h a t  th e  scep tic s1 m ain p o in t o f  co n ten tio n  concerned
th e  A ris to te lian  claim  ab o u t th e  acc u racy  o f sense  ex p erience  a s  a
ground fo r  know ledge. In  his De Anima A ris to tle  spoke o f  a  sense
experience  in  which "no e r ro r  is  possible" and t h a t  "each  sense  has
one kind o f o b je c t i t  d iscerns, and n ev e r e r rs  in  rep o rtin g ...."  5 To
th is  p o sitiv is tic  claim  th e  sc e p tic s  rep lied  t h a t  sense  experience
v aried  w ith each  ind iv idual and  th a t ,  th e re fo re , no com m on judgm en t
upon sensory  experience  could ev e r be reac h ed  am ong men. In  1601, fo r  
exam ple, P ie rre  C harron asked  in  his t r e a t is e  Of Wisdom, since
sensa tio n s  v a ry  depending upon th e  age  o f  th e  re c e iv e r  and  his m en tal
and physical h ea lth , "in th is  d iv e rs ifie  and  c o n tra r ie tie  w h at sh a ll
we hold fo r  ce rta in ?"  Charron's answ er, unsurprisingly, was t h a t
" ...th e re  is  no opinion held  by a ll, o r  c u r re n t in  a l l  p laces,
none t h a t  is  n o t d eb ated  and d ispu ted , t h a t  ha th  n o t an o th e r
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held  and m ain tained  qu ite  c o n tra rie  un to  i t . . . ."
In  o th e r  words, since  th e re  can  be no c e r titu d e  o r  ag re e m e n t on sense
experien ce , th e n  th e  sam e would hold t r u e  fo r  so c ie ty  a s  w ell since
eac h  m em ber o f  a  so c ie ty  would oriLy 'see ' th e  sam e th in g  d iffe re n tly .
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This s c e p tic a l rep ly  to  th e  arg u m en t fo r  com m on sensory  judgm ent and 
know ledge had th e  in i t ia l  m e rit o f appealing  t o  com m on experience. 
Indeed, few  n a tu ra l philosophers e v e r  t r ie d  to  d ire c tly  d ispu te  th e  
sc e p tic a l con ten tio n  t h a t  sense  experience  would v a ry  among 
individuals. On th e  o th e r  hand, to  conclude w ith th e  sc e p tic s  t h a t  no 
know ledge could e v e r  be possible was an a th em a t o  th o se  v e ry  sam e 
th in k e rs  fo r  i t  would m ean t h a t  estab lish ing  th e  foundations o f 
n a tu ra l sc ien ce  and, in  Hobbes's case , c iv il sc ien ce  would th e n  prove 
im possible.
In th is  p o s t-sc e p tic a l p ro je c t to  estab lish  a t  le a s t  a  m inim al
a g ree m en t upon sensory  know ledge th e  fig u re  o f M artin M ersenne ranks 
o f som e im p o rtan ce . M ersenne was a  highly in f lu e n tia l F rench
philosopher who, a p a r t  from  publishing som e works on op tics , had an
in fo rm a l en tou rage  o f fo llow ers which inc luded  th e  lik e s  o f D escartes,
G assendi, Galileo and, m ost im p o rtan tly  fo r  our purposes, Thom as
Hobbes. M ersenne's c la rion  c a l l  t o  co m b a t th e  sc ep tic s  f i r s t  appeared
in  1625 in  a  book en title d , ap p rop ria te ly , La V erite  des Sciences
C ontre  le s  Sceptigues ou Pyrrho miens. In  his book M ersenne argued
th a t ,  co n tra ry  to  C harron's c laim ,
" . . i t  does n o t m a tte r  t h a t  th e re  a re  d iffering  opinions
concerning th e  p rincip les o f n a tu re , fo r  a l l  con ta in  som eth ing
tru e , even though th e y  have n o t considered  a l l  th e  causes,
c ircu m stan ces  and e ffe c ts ."  7
In o th e r  words, w hat m a tte rs  is  n o t t h a t  th e re  is  an  in f in ite  reg re ss
o f causes b u t t h a t  th e re  is  "som ething tru e "  which is  p re se n t and
which we can  a l l  observe. What, th e n , is  th e  e x a c t n a tu re  o f our
observations? M ersenne suggested  t h a t  while we may n o t know fo r
c e r ta in  w hether w h at we see  a c tu a lly  corresponds to  w hat is  o u t th e re ,
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we n ev erth e less  can  claim  t h a t  we do 'see ' som eth ing . According to  
M ersenne,
"Physics, which seem s to  be one o f th e  sc ien ces  m ost in fe c te d  by
doubt, has i t s  known su b je c t-m a tte r : f o r  who can  deny t h a t  th e re  
a re  bodies and m otions? Are th e re  n o t lig h t, q u an titie s , causes,
and a  thousand  o th e r  th in g s  which a re  availab le  to  th e  senses,
B
and which physics t re a ts ? "
For M ersenne and th e  o th e r  p o s t-scep tic s , th e  study  o f o p tics  (or 
"physics") enab les us t o  m ake re p o r ts  a b o u t ou r sensa tions even  though 
th e se  sensations th e m se lv es  do n o t n ecessa rily  have to  correspond to  
th e i r  o b jec ts  fo r  us t o  have som e lim ited  know ledge o f  th e m . Indeed, 
fo r  M ersenne is  was s t i l l  probable, a s  he suggested  l a t e r  in  1636, 
t h a t  our sensations a re  in  e r ro r  when th e y  describe  w hat is  sim ply on 
" the  su rface  o f n a tu re ,"  b u t  w ith  God's help  we s t i l l  m ight be ab le
“to  open our eyes by m eans o f  th e  l ig h t t h a t  He re se rv e s  fo r  h is t r u e
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adm irers."  In  sh o rt, th e  sc e p tic s  w ere wrong p rec ise ly  because  we a re  
ab le  to  observe o b jec ts  which a re  around  us. These im ag es m ight be
tru e  o r  th e y  m ight be fa ls e , b u t in  any  e v e n t we know t h a t  we a re
sensing som ething .
In  1637 we find  D escartes  a rriv ing  a t  th e  sam e conclusion a s  he 
s im ilarly  in s is te d  t h a t  th e  middle ground be tw een  scep tic ism  and 
dogm atism  was possible. 3h his D iscourse on M ethod, D escartes  argued  
"Though we see  th e  sun very  c lea rly , we should n o t fo r  t h a t  
reason  judge th a t  i t  is  o f th e  s ize  o f which i t  ap p ea rs  to  be...
F or Reason does n o t in s is t  t h a t  w h atever we see  o r  im agine th u s  
is  a  t ru th ,  b u t i t  te l ls  us c lea rly  t h a t  a l l  our id e a s  o r notions 
m ust have som e foundations o f tr u th .  F o r o therw ise  i t  could n o t 
be possible t h a t  God, who is  a ll p e rfe c tio n  and tru th ,  should
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have p laced  them  w ithin us."
This middle way betw een  dogm atism  and scepticism  looked prom ising
to  th e  p o s t-sc e p tic a l philospohers fo r  while th e  c e n tra l  c la im s of
bo th  schools had been  co -op ted  th e re  was n ev erth e less  room  to  argue
t h a t  th e re  w ere som e kind o f, w hat D escartes  ca lled , "foundations o f
tru th "  which w ere avaiLale fo r  us t o  build a  body o f know ledge. For
exam ple, from  th e  sc ien ce  o f op tics  we can  know t h a t  th e re  a re  ob jects
in  th e  world and t h a t  th e se  o f o b jec ts  a re  con tinually  in  motion.
The p o s t-sc e p tic a l philosophers n ev e r denied  t h a t  ou r judgm ents
upon sense  experience  v aries. Their only claim  was t h a t  ou r ab ility
to  have sense  experience  n ev e r varie s. E m bedded w ithin th e ir
co n ten tion  was th e  possib ility  t h a t  we can  com e to  som e com m on
understanding  o r  judgm ent upon our sensory  experience . Thus P ierre
Gassendi, an o th e r pupil o f M ersenne, argued  in  his Syntagm a t h a t
th rough  our experience  o f  th e  worLd we can  com e to  som e com m on
11judgm ent upon w hat our senses t e l l  us. While we may n o t know
every th ing  ab o u t an  o b je c t our sense  o f  v ision can  give us som e tru th s  
ab o u t how we perce ive  th ings. W hat is  needed, G assendi argued , is  a  
ra tio n a l and sc ie n tif ic  m ethod w ith which to  uncover th e se  t r u th s  and 
which can  be coupled w ith  a  no m inalistic  vocabulary  which a c c u ra te ly  
describes ou r sensations. M oreover, G assendi th o u g h t i t  possible to  
draw from  our com m on sensa tions  in fe re n c e s  to w ard s  a  m oral sc ience . 
Gassendi's in sp ira tio n  cam e from  th e  G reek philosopher Epicurus who 
had argued  t h a t  s in ce  man su ffe red  from  f e a r  and could also  observe 
o th e rs  su ffe rin g  from  th e  sam e, th e n  i t  was n a tu ra l fo r  men t o  band 
to g e th e r  fo r  m u tual p ro tec tio n . Thus, accord ing  to  G assendi, th e re
a re  som e t ru th s  which our sense  experience te l ls  u s  th a t  a re  com m on to
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bo th  n a tu ra l and to  m oral sc ience .
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This was also  GrotLus's rep ly  to  th e  scep tic s . GrotLus argued  in
h is  De lu re  Belli Pacds in  1625 t h a t  th e  sc e p tic s  w ere c o r re c t  to
p o in t o u t t h a t  d if fe re n t so c ie tie s  had d iffering  p ra c tic e s  and
belie fs , bu t, G rotius w en t on, th is  d id  n o t necessarily  p rec lude  th e
possib ility  t h a t  various com m unities m ight sh a re  som eth ing  in  com m on
13from  which a  m oral sc ien ce  could  be  b u ilt. According t o  G rotius, a l l  
men and a l l  t im e s  have com m only judged t h a t  th e re  is  a  u n iv e rsa l r ig h t 
t o  s e lf  defense  and  t h a t  th e re  is  a  g e n e ra l ag re e m e n t t h a t  i t  is  
m orally  wrong capriciously  t o  in f l ic t  pain  on fellow  hum an beings. 
"If I  c an n o t o therw ise  sav e  my life ,"  G rotius observed, 'T may, by any 
Force w hatever, r e p e l  him who a tte m p ts  i t ,  th o , perhaps, he who does
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so is  n o t any  ways to  b lam e." This r ig h t, G rotius argued , is  g ran ted
by n a tu re  because  i t  "does n o t  p roperly  a r ise  from  th e  o th e r 's  C rim e,
b u t from  th e  P re ro g a tiv e  w ith  which N atu re  has in v e s ted  me, o f 
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defending m yself." So co n tra ry  to  th e  s c e p tic a l a cc o u n t o f  th e  
im possib ility  o f m oral sc ien ce , G rotius rep lied  t h a t  from  basic 
un iv e rsa l p rincip les  i t  is  possible to  c o n s tru c t a  m o ra l philosophy 
based upon n a tu ra l righ ts.
Now Hobbes w as n o t im m une to  th e  ea rly  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  d eb a te
surrounding th e  te n e ts  o f scep tic ism ; in d eed , th e  re a d e r  m ay have
already  n o ticed  c e r ta in  s im ila ritie s  be tw een  Hobbes's p ronouncem ents
upon sense  experience  and m oral philosophy and th e  p o s t-sc e p tic a l
com m ents upon th e  sam e. Hobbes's invo lvm en t w ith  th is  school probably
sprung from  th is  tr a v e ls  around th e  C on tinen t be tw een  1634 and  1637
w here he m e t som e o f th e  v e ry  sam e th in k e rs  ju s t  m entioned. In  fa c t ,  
Hobbes had com m ented  t h a t  during his tr a v e ls  he was b e se t w ith som e o f
th e  claim s m ade by th e  sc e p tic s  and  t h a t  he had  t r ie d  to  reaso n  o u t a
1 4 5
middle  course  t h a t  also s te e re d  c le a r  o f scepticism  and  dogm atism . 
Hobbes w rote t h a t  while trav e llin g  th rough  th e  C ontinen t
'1  th o u g h t continually  ab o u t th e  n a tu re  o f th ings, w hether I  was 
trav e lin g  by b o a t o r coach, o r  on horseback. And i t  seem ed to  me 
th a t  th e re  was only one t ru e  th ing  in  th e  whole world, though 
fa ls ified  in  m any ways: one t r u e  th ing , which is  th e  basis o f a l l  
th o se  phenom ena which we wrongly say  a re  som ething (such a s  we 
g e t  fLeetdngly in  sleep , o r  w ith th e  a id  o f len ses  can  m ultiply 
as  we choose) -  th e  phenom ena o f sense im pressions, which a re  th e  
offspring  o f our skull* w ith nothing ex te rn a l. And in  th o se
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in te rn a l regions, th e re  could be nothing b u t motion."
The grounding o f  our know ledge -  th e  "one t r u e  th ing" fo r  Hobbes -  is
th e  "phenom ena o f  sense im pressions," accord ing  to  Hobbes. We m ight
be in  e r ro r  when we describe  w hat our sense  im pressions a re , fo r
in s ta n ce  when we "sleep" o r when we use "lenses" which a l te r  our
p ercep tion , b u t we can n o t be in  e r ro r  when we say  t h a t  we a re
v isualizing som ething . C h arac te ris tica lly , Hobbes does n o t c re d it
M ersenne, Gassendi* o r G rotius fo r  having a rriv ed  a t  a lm o s t id e n tic a l
conclusions m ore th a n  te n  y ea rs  e a r lie r . A fte r  all* M ersenne had 
tw elv e  y ea rs  e a r l ie r  posited  th e  a n ti-s c e p tic a l repLy t h a t  th e
ex isten ce  o f bodies and m otion was bo th  ir re fu ta b le  and irred u c ib le .
We m ight a lso  w ant to  add t h a t  Hobbes's in s is te n ce  upon using th e
m ethod o f nominalism to  a c c u ra te ly  describe  "sense im pressions" seem s
to  echo  Gassendi's own advocacy fo r  th e  sam e.
The p rec ise  c o n te n t o f th e  "phenom ena o f sense  im pressions" did
n o t ex c ite  Hobbes fo r  he believed  t h a t  i t  was im possible to  com e to
any understanding  on th e  o b jec ts  which surround us. Hobbes
consis ten tly  re fu se s  to  se p a ra te  th e  im ages  which ap p ear b efo re  our
4 e
eyes from  th o se  phantasm s t h a t  we ju s t  im agine we a re  seeing . There
was no sim ple c r i te r ia  t o  distinguish  t r u e  im ages  from  fa lse , Hobbes
in sis ted . The only ir re fu ta b le  s ta te m e n t t h a t  one can  make is  t h a t  we
do p e rce iv e  im ag es and  t h a t  th e re fo re  th e re  is  som ething  which causes
th e se  concep tions in  ou r mind. The cause  o f a l l  our concep tions was
th e  m otion o f  th e  o b je c t trav e llin g  th rough  th e  a i r  and im p ac tin g  upon
our senses. This was th e  co re  o f  Hobbes's re fu ta tio n  o f  th e  scep tic 's
philosophy. Y et equally  our concep tions could a lso  be caused  by th e
in te rn a l  m otions in  our mind, making u s  be lieve  t h a t  ou r m en ta l im ages
a re  t r u e  ones. Hobbes does n o t invoke divine guidance a s  a  y ardstick
to  m easure our im pressions by, a s  M ersenne, D escartes , o r  even
G assendi had done, fo r  he fu r th e r  believed  t h a t  th e  m a tte r  o f  divine
in te rv en tio n  could also  be su b jec t to  doubt. B ut lik e  G assendi befo re  
him , Hobbes m aintained th a t  t r u e  know ledge could be a tta in e d  i f  we
com bined th e  p ro p er understanding o f bodies in  m otion w ith a
nom inalisilic  vocabu lary  shorn  from  am biguity . Thus in  De Ho mine
(1658) Hobbes argued t h a t  our
"...concep tions o r apparitions a re  nothing rea lly , b u t motion in
som e in te rn a l  substance o f th e  head; which m otion n o t stopping
th e re ,  b u t proceeding to  th e  h e a rt, o f n ecc es ity  m ust e i th e r  help
o r h inder t h a t  m otion which is  ca lled  v ita l; when i t  helpeth , i t
is  ca lled  DELIGHT...but when such m otion w eakeneth  o r h indreth
th e  v i ta l  m otion, th e n  i t  is  ca lled  PAIN." 17
In o th e r  words, a  p ro p er understanding o f our language en ta ils  t h a t  we
re ta in  a  nom inalistic  vocabulary  which sim ply re p o r ts  ou r conceptions,
even  i f  th o se  concep tions a re  b u t in te rn a l motions.
Hobbes clearLy did  n o t  a lign  h im self w ith  th e  d o g m a tis t position
th a t  our senses n ev e r dece ive  us because God would n o t have i t  so.
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Hobbes considered  th e  A ris to te lian  claim  t h a t  ou r senses "never e r r  in
repo rting"  a s  being se lf-ev id en tly  absurd , fo r  he freq u en tly  pa in ted
ou t, lik e  D escartes  had done, t h a t  i t  is  m erely  illu so ry  t h a t  th e  sun
and  th e  moon ap p ea r to  us a s  being o b jec ts  which a re  o f  a  c e rta in
size , shape and d is tan ce . Even by glancing a t  th e  sun 's re f le c tio n  in
th e  w ate r, he  po in ted  ou t, ou r sen ses  give us e n tire ly  d if fe re n t 
im fo rm ation . 10
I f  a l l  our im ages a re  phantasm s, o r  i f  a l l  our sensations a re  b u t 
inw ard  m otions occuring  only in  th e  mind, a s  Hobbes argued , th e n  i t  
would be im possible to  con tend  along w ith th e  d o g m atis ts  t h a t  th e y  a re  
t r u e  im ages. Y et Hobbes's position  a lso  m eans t h a t  no one im ag e  can 
e v e r  be p riv ileged  over o th e rs . A m etaphoric  im ag e  can  be no le ss  
t r u e  th a n  a  r e a l  one. Indeed , i t  m ight even  be  p ro fitab le  to  p o s it a
m etaphoric  im ag e , fo r  in s ta n c e  an  a rtif ic ia l man, in  p lace  o f  a  r e a l
o b je c t s ince any concep tion  could be  used  a s  a  s ta r t in g  p o in t fo r
know ledge. The only e s se n tia l com ponen t to  im ag es  is  t h a t  th e y  be 
im agined , and th e  m ore t h a t  th e y  a re  im agined  by o th e rs  th e  b e t te r .
As i t  is  t h a t  a l l  men can  reco g n ize  t h a t  th e y  perce ive  o b je c ts  which 
a re  con tinually  in  m otion, th e re  is  no need  t o  fu r th e r  exam ine th e  
e x a c t  c o n te n t o f  th o se  im ages. W hat is  know ledge, a f te r  a ll, Hobbes 
asked , i f  i t  is  n o t a  p rocess o f  com bining im ag es w ith a  nom inalistic  
vocabulary  in  o rd e r to  c re a te  t r u e  propositions. Sh ifted  to g e th e r , 
th e  im age , th e  nam e and  th e  defin ition  w ill re v e a l  know ledge. As 
Hobbes procla im s in  his E lem ents o f  Law,
"The f i r s t  p rincip le  o f  know ledge is  t h a t  we have such and such  
conceptions; th e  second, t h a t  we have th u s  and th u s  nam ed th e  
th in g s  w hereof th e y  a re  conceptions: th e  th ird  is , t h a t  we have 
joined th e  nam es in  such a  m anner, a s  t o  make t ru e  propositions;
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and fo u rth  and l a s t  is , t h a t  we have jo ined th o se  propositions in
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such  a  m anner a s  th e y  be concluding."
V ita l to  Hobbes's a cc o u n t o f know ledge, th e re fo re , is  t h a t  we 
m ust orig inally  sh are  in  th e  sam e conceptions, w hether th e y  be
m etapho rica l im ag es  o r  so -ca lled  r e a l  ones. O therw ise we m ight find  
ourselves m aking e n tire ly  d if fe re n t, perhaps even  co n trad ic to ry , 
conclusions.
In  c h a p te r  fo u r o f  L ev iathan  Hobbes te l ls  u s  t h a t  speech  is  used 
t o  re g is te r  and  com m unica te  ou r tho u g h ts, tu rn in g  ou r m e tn a l d iscourse 
in to  verbaL  Knowledge and understanding  is  ach ieved  by a  c o r re c t  
o rdering  o f words. Words correspond n o t t o  th in g s, we a re  to ld , b u t 
to  though ts. Our th o u g h ts  -  which m ight a lso  inc lude co n cep ts  and 
id e a s  -  com e b efo re  language, making judgm ent possible. As we saw in  
c h a p te r  th re e , in  th e  H obbesian s ta te  o f  n a tu re , th e re fo re , th e  tw o
t r a i t s  t h a t  m an  holds in  h is possession a re  th o u g h ts , which a re  fired  
by th e  im ag ination , and words. When Hobbes w rite s  o f  m etaphors in  
th is  ch ap te r , th e n , he  com dem ns m etaphors a s  words, n o t a s  tho u g h ts  
o r im ages. M etaphors eq u ivocate  nam es, Hobbes in s is ts , and th u s  fouls 
up th e  p ro cess  o f  c o r re c t  understanding . B ut i f  we assign th e  dom ain 
o f m ethaphoric  im ag es t o  th o u g h ts  r a th e r  th a n  to  words, th e n  i t  is  
d e a r  t h a t  fo r  Hobbes th e  genesis o f  know ledge begins w ith  th e  
consequence o f though ts, concep ts, o r  th e  " tra in  o f  im  agination."
Of course Hobbes also  arg u ed  t h a t  m etaphors and am biguous words
could n ev e r s a tis fy  a s  re p o r ts  o f  our sensations. As i t  is  t h a t  th e
re lia b ility  o f w hat is  "before  mens eyes" is  su b je c t t o  doubt, a  
coupling o f th e se  im ag es w ith an  unreliab le  vocabulary  would le a d  us 
fu r th e r  aw ay from  know ledge. But, again , th is  is  t o  speak  o f 
m etaphors a s  words r a th e r  th a n  a s  im ages. The sc e p tic s  a re  wrong,
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Hobbes and  th e  p o s t-scep tic s  argued , p rec ise ly  because we do have 
concep tions, w hether o r  n o t th e y  a re  t r u e  im ages o r  fa lse , and  th is  
was th e  "one t r u e  th ing" which he had d iscovered  during his t r ip  to  
th e  C ontinent.
Section  Two:
Hobbes's Theory o f  O ptics 
Hobbes had alw ays been  proud o f  his work on op tics, claim ing  th a t  his 
d iscovery  o f  th e  m echanics o f v ision  was n o t  only superio r to
D escartes 's  own e ffo r ts , b u t was second only in  im p o rtan ce  to  his
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philosophical d iscoveries. Given th e  c e n tra l  im p o rtan ce  o f  th e  a c t  o f 
vision in  d iscourse a s  ou tlined  in  th e  p revious ch ap te r, Hobbes's 
b o a s t was m ore th a n  sim ply hubris on h is p a r t .  Vision f o r  Hobbes did 
n o t ju s t  en ta il th e  com m unication  o f  in fo rm atio n  to  th e  read e r, 
although  he had considered  such  com m unication  to  be  im p o rtan t. 
Vision, a s  Hobbes understood  i t ,  p a rtia lly  underscored  th e  th e o ry  o f 
know ledge which was to  be th e  foundation  to  his p o litic a l o rder.
Hobbes co n sis ten tly  argued  th a t  a l l  know ledge w as orig inally
sense  -  " the f i r s t  beginnings o f  a re  th e  phan tasm s o f  sense  and
21im agination ." T here may be e x te rn a l bodies, Hobbes in sis ted , b u t any 
know ledge o f  th e i r  ex isten ce  only o ccu rs  in  th e  b rain . The co lo r and 
shape o f th e  e x te rn a l body, a s  w ell a s  th e  l ig h t  which th e  o b je c t 
th ro w s o ff , tr a v e ls  th rough  th e  a i r  "pressing upon th e  p ro p er organ." 
However, w hen we th in k  th a t  we see  an  ob jec t, Hobbes m ain tained , a ll  
we a re  re a lly  doing is  im agining t h a t  we have such  a  vision. In  o th e r  
words, once th e  sensory  organs have been  s tim u la ted , th e  in te rn a l  
m otions o f th e  b ra in  a c tiv a te  th e  senses so t h a t  we a re  le d  to  believe 
t h a t  a  vision which is  ac tu a lly  occurring  in te rn a lly  ap p ea rs  to  us to
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e x is t ex te rn a lly . From a ll  'lu c id , shinning and illu m in a te  bodies,"
Hobbes argued , " th ere  is  m otion produced t o  th e  eye, and, th rough  th e
22eye , to  th e  op tic  n erve , and  so in to  th e  b ra in ." Having described  
th is  m ethod t h a t  ou tside  ob jec ts  in te r a c t  w ith th e  senses, Hobbes th e n
argues, in  a  r a th e r  good m etaphor, t h a t  " th e  b ra in  is  th e  fou n ta in  fo r
23
a l l  sense."
The obvious question  to  ask  th e n  is  how can  th e  b ra in  be th e  
"foun ta in  o f  a l l  sense" when we have ju s t  been  to ld  t h a t  our senses 
can  som etim es be a c tiv a te d  by e x te rn a l bodies? I f  his a cc o u n t o f 
o p tics  appea rs  to  be a  case  o f  a  c irc u la r  defin ition  th e n  i t  can  only 
be sa id  in  his defense  t h a t  Hobbes may have in ten d ed  i t  t o  be so. One 
o f th e  g r e a t  triu m p h s o f  s c ie n tif ic  p rogress, accord ing  to  Hobbes, was 
H arvey's th e o ry  o f th e  c irc u la to ry  system  which Hobbes may have used 
a s  a  m odel fo r  h is th e o ry  o f  op tics . The m odel o f th e  c ircu la to ry
system  w here th e  h e a r t  pumps o u t blood w hilst a t  th e  sam e tim e  is  fed
by bLood flow ing back  in to  i t s  cham bers m ight, i f  one w ere to  be 
generous, be sa id  to  be analogous to  an  acc o u n t o f o p tic s  w here th e
b ra in  is  bo th  s tim u la ted  by th e  senses and is  a lso  th e  "fountain" of
24
a ll  sensation .
Hobbes's m etaphor th e  "brain  is  a  fountain" m ight app ea r
s ta r t l in g  to  th e  w ary re a d e r  who m ight re c a l l  Hobbes's b i t te r
denunciation  o f  m etaphors in  sc ien ce . Taking in to  acc o u n t th e
prev ious ch a p te r 's  d iscussion o f  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f m etaphor in
d iscourse, i t  is  w orthw hile rem em bering  th a t  fo r  Hobbes th e  dan g er o f
m etaphor lie s  in  i t s  equ ivocation  o f  nam es. As a  pedagogic dev ice , on
th e  o th e r  hand, th e  m etaphoric  im age  is  a lm o s t unrivalled; w h a t is
req u ired  is  t h a t  th e  im age  be  a p t  to  th e  d iscourse a t  hand. H ere th e
proposition  t h a t  th e  "brain  is  th e  fo u n ta in  o f  a l l  sense" cap tu res ,
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fo r  Hobbes, an  a c c u ra te  p ic tu re  o f how th e  sc ien ce  o f  op tics  works. 
M etaphors and p ic tu re s  a re  only t o  be despised when th e y  a re  fa lse . I t  
should also  be po in ted  o u t h e re  t h a t  on occasion  Hobbes f e l t  t h a t  
m etaphoric  im ag es could be dangerous, a s  when he in s is ts  t h a t  "sharp" 
m etaphors only be used  in  a  c o u r t  o f  law . I t  seem s t h a t  th e  ch ief
d anger o f  th e  m etaphoric im ag e  fo r  Hobbes was in  i t s  ab ility  t o  o f fe r  
a  r iv a l  d escrip tion  o f an  o b je c t -  r iv a l, t h a t  is , t o  a  m etaphoric  
d escrip tion  grounded in  sc ience . R em em ber t h a t  Hobbes was to ta lly  
d ism issive o f th o se  who p rac tised  th e  "m etap h o rica l conce it."  The 
only s tip u la tio n  t h a t  Hobbes m akes in  re g a rd s  t o  m etaphoric  im ag es  is  
t h a t  th e y  be a p t  to  th e  d iscourse a t  hand.
T here a re  a  few  obvious problem s w ith Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  op tics , som e
o f which Hobbes succeeds in  ignoring and an o th e r o f  which he is  
fo re v e r  having tro u b le  overcom ing. F irs tly , n o t having reco u rse  to  a
th e o ry  o f l ig h t  and  sound w aves, Hobbes's acc o u n t o f  o p tic s  is  l e f t
fundam en ta lly  d e fic ien t. Hobbes n ev er m anages to  explain  to  us ju s t
w hat th is  "m otion" t h a t  is  tra n sp o rte d  from  e x te rn a l bodies t o  th e
organs o f  sense  is . The second  problem , one which Hobbes was well
aw are  o f, was t h a t  i f  a l l  know ledge o f  th e  e x te rn a l w orld had  i t s
sou rce  so lely  in sid e  th e  mind, th e n  how could one distinguish  betw een
a  dream  and re a lity ?  A lthough th e  issu e  o f d ream s ap peared  in  a lm o st
a l l  o f  h is  m ajor w orks in  one form  o r  an o th e r, Hobbes never
sa tis fa c to r ily  explained  how one could distinguish  d ream s from  
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re a li ty . The b e s t  t h a t  he  could do was to  a rgue  th a t  when a  person  is
dream ing  he believes t h a t  his visions a re  re a l ,  b u t when he is  aw ake
he knows t h a t  his waking visions a re  r e a l  because  he is  n o t dream ing.
Y et Hobbes read ily  a d m itted  t h a t  'T know n o ...m ark  by which he can
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d iscern  w hether i t  w ere a  dream  o r n o t, and th e re fo re  do le ss  w onder
to  h e a r  a  man som etim es to  te ll, h is dream  fo r  a  tr u th ,  o r  t o  ta k e  i t
26
fo r  a  vision." This problem  t h a t  Hobbes had w ith d ream s did  a ffo rd
him am ple scope, how ever, to  apply h is  th e o ry  o f  o p tics  to  relig ious
su persitition . Religious visions, accord ing  to  Hobbes, happened only
in side  th e  mind, having no d ir e c t  link  to  p hysica l bodies, and  were
lik e  th e  dream ing o f d ream s o r th e  viewing o f ghosts.
Thirdly, i t  would seem  t h a t  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f op tics  would
necessarily  th row  in to  in c red u lity  any th e o ry  o f  know ledge which was
to  spring from  i t .  A fte r  a ll, how could one e v e r  d if fe re n tia te
betw een  th e  propositions " la s t n ig h t I  had  a  dream  th a t  God spoke to
me" and  ' l a s t  n ig h t God spoke t o  me in  a  dream ?" Although Hobbes
would claim  t h a t  a l l  in s ta n c e s  o f th e  l a t t e r  p roposition  w ere re a lly
exam ples o f  th e  fo rm er, he would s t i l l  have no firm  basis, g iven only
his th e o ry  o f op tics, fo r  asse rtin g  ju s t  why th is  was th e  case . W hat
was needed  by Hobbes, th e re fo re , was a  com plem en t to  his th e o ry  o f
op tics  t h a t  d id  n o t ju s t  d escribe  e x te rn a l o b jec ts  a s  " fac ts"  which
m ight be m isconceived, b u t a  th e o ry  o f  know ledge which would em brace
th e  re la tio n sh ip  be tw een  f a c ts  as  th e  c r ite r ia  fo r  t ru th .
Section  Three:
N atural Vision as th e  K nowledge o f F act
In  c h a p te r  n ine o f  L ev iathan  Hobbes te l l s  u s  th a t ,  although  th e  
su b jec ts  o f  know ledge may be "severall,"  th e y  n ev erth e less  f a l l  in to
tw o  broad  ca teg o rie s : th e  f i r s t  is  th e  know ledge o f  f a c t ,  th e  second
2 7os w h a t i s  ca lled  th e  know ledge o f  sc ien ce . Knowledge o f  f a c t ,  
accord ing  to  Hobbes, is  "nothing e lse  b u t Sense and  Memory, and is  
A bsolute Knowledge; as  when we see  a  F a c t  doing, o r rem em b er i t  done:
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And th is  is  th e  Knowledge req u ired  o f a  WdJtnesse." Knowledge o f  fa c t ,  
th e re fo re , s te m s  from  th e  a c t  o f n a tu ra l vision, and th is  is  connec ted
to  a  p ro p er understanding  o f o p tics  o r  e lse  we would th e n  be red u ced
to  tak in g  our d ream s and fa n c ifu l im ages a s  fa c ts .
B ecause o f a  th e o ry  o f  o p tics  which had  le d  him to  conclude t h a t  
vision  was sim ply a  m a tte r  o f  observing m otion, Hobbes couLd no lo n g er
argue t h a t  f a c ts  sim ply ex ist, ly ing m otionless on th e  ground w aiting
to  be observed. F a c ts  had  t o  be  a c t iv e  and could  n ev er be  passive.
By observing an  o b je c t "doing," a s  Hobbes ca lls  i t ,  one can  procla im ,
say , t h a t  th e  book one is  read in g  has a  re d  co v er o r, based  upon
mem ory, t h a t  w hat one had fo r  d inner th e  n ig h t befo re  was veaL
On se v e ra l occasions, a s  in  th e  above passage, Hobbes com pares 
th e  know ledge o f f a c t  w ith a  w itness 's te s tim o n y . A w itness, o f 
course, is  sim ply ca lled  upon t o  r e p o r t  a s  exp lic itly  a s  possible on
th e  e v e n t he has observed. He is  seldom , i f  ev er, asked to  re n d e r  an  
opinion o r  in te rp r e t  th e  f a c ts  which he  p re sen ts  b efo re  th e  co u rt. A 
know ledge o f f a c t  is  n o t dem onstrab le , nor is  i t  th e  s o r t  o f p o litic a l 
know ledge o r  vision a s  d iscussed in  c h a p te r  th r e e  which th e  sovereign  
needs in  o rd er to  defend  th e  s ta te .  I t  is  alw ays p a rticu la r , n ev er 
un iversal, and in  th e  p o litic a l w orld which is  co n s tru c ted  from  
propositions and  g e n e ra l p rincip les th e  know ledge o f f a c t  has a  m eager
ex isten ce . As Hobbes explains, know ledge o f  f a c t ,  o f  which n a tu ra l
vision can  be  sa id  to  be a  p rim e com ponent, i s  e n tire ly  c ircum scribed
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by "sense, and  e v e r  a f te r  m em ory." I t  is  p a r t  o f  ou r day -to -day  
ex perience , an  ex perience  which "concludeth  no th ing  universally" and 
is  non-transferahL e to  th e  world o f  po litic s. A lthough p o litic a l o r 
m e tapho rica l vision may make use o f f a c ts  such a s  " the  enem y is  w ell 
arm ed ,"  th e  f a c t  by i t s e lf  c a n n o t d ic ta te  t o  th e  sovereign  w hat he
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should do in  such a  c ircu m stan ce . Knowledge o f  f a c t  is  only a  r e p o r t  
t h a t  our senses, given a  p roper understanding  o f op tics , t e l l  us.
Hobbes is  o fte n  described  a s  an  e m p iric is t based  upon his 
a sse rtio n  t h a t  a l l  knowledge is  derived  from  sense  experience , b u t 
unlike som e o th e r  em p iric is ts  o f th is  t im e , Hobbes's b rand  o f
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em piricism  is  in  r e a l i ty  a  th in  end  o f a  v e ry  th ic k  wedge. The f a c t  
o f w h at one had fo r  d inner th e  n ig h t b e fo re , fo r  exam ple, would be 
ex tre m ely  d if f ic u lt  to  p rove given only Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  f a c ts .  One 
may be in  e rro r; th e  know ledge o f w hat was once a  f a c t  may succum b to  
a  s e a  fu ll  o f  fa u lty  m em ories. M oreover, in  th e  p o litic a l world, a  
population  whose so le  know ledge is  derived  from  "sense, and e v e r  a f te r  
memory" is  in  c o n s ta n t danger o f g e ttin g  i t  wrong. One answ er t o  th is  
problem , in  reg a rd s  to  th e  g e n e ra l population, m ight be to  g u a ren tee  
t h a t  th e  o b je c t o r  im age  is  a lw ays p re se n t to  th e  observer, t h a t  i t  is  
n ev er allow ed to  la p se  in to  th e  m orass o f  m em ory, th a t ,  in  o th e r  
words, th e  im age  o f  th e  p o litic a l world is  alw ays b efo re  one's eyes. 
B ut to  w hat d eg ree  th e  average  man could a t ta in  th e  knowledge o f f a c t  
did n o t  concern  Hobbes. Opposed to  a  sc ie n tif ic  know ledge t h a t  only a  
handfu l could e v e r  ach ieve , th e  know ledge o f  f a c t  would seem  to  be 
availab le  to  a l l  who w anted i t .  A ll t h a t  was req u ired  was th e  ab ility  
to  s e t  down an  a c c u ra te  descrip tion  o f  w hat was befo re  one's eyes.
When th e  know ledge o f f a c t  is  reco rd ed  i t  becom es h is to ry . Hobbes 
s ta te s  t h a t  th e re  a re  tw o  kinds o f  h isto ry : n a tu ra l h is to ry  which has
"no D ependance upon mans Will" and  "C iv ill H istory; which is  th e
anH istory o f th e  V oluntary A ctions o f  men in  C om m on-w eallhs. In  bo th  
case s  a l l  t h a t  is  req u ired  is  a  t r u e  re c o rd  o f  sense experience. But 
although Hobbes th o u g h t t h a t  men could le a rn  from  h isto ry , and in  
p a r tic u la r  le a rn  th e  much valued  a r t  o f  p rudence , he n ev erth e less  also
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th o u g h t t h a t  th e  su b je c t o f h is to ry  held  lim ite d  le v e rag e  in  
tran sfo rm in g  so c ie ty . N atu ra l h is to ry  could only be  used  to  ca ta logue  
th e  h is to ry  o f "M etals, P lan ts, Animals, Regions, and  th e  like" and so 
in c re a se  th e  s to re  o f know ledge t h a t  one had o f one 's  surroundings; 
c iv il h is to ry  could only ch ron ic le  m an-m ade ev en ts . 31 The b e s t  c iv il 
h is to ry , a s  we saw in  th e  p rev ious ch ap te r , was Thucydides's w rite-up  
(the G reek "syngraph") o f  th e  Pelopennesian War. The genius o f  th is  
kind o f  h is to ry , accord ing  t o  Hobbes, was i t s  a b ility  t o  tran sfo rm  th e  
re a d e r  in to  a  sp e c ta to r  o f th e  ev en ts  which w ere n a rra te d . Any man 
who was th u s  a  re a d e r  could own th is  h is to r ic a l v ision, reg a rd less  o f 
t e  m peram en t o r in te llig en ce .
Hobbes's claim  t h a t  th e  know ledge o f  f a c t  is  a  re g is te r  o f
n a tu ra l and  c iv il h is to ry  begs th e  question  o f  w hether th is  is  any
kind o f  know ledge a t  alL Given t h a t  th e  know ledge o f  f a c t  re lie s
upon rep o rtin g  sense  experience , g iven a lso  t h a t  v ision  is  only an
in te rn a l  m otion in  th e  mind, and given t h a t  sense experience  can
e i th e r  be decep tiv e  o r  su b je c t to  a  fa u lty  m em ory, one would be  hard
pressed  to  make any g r e a t  c laim s fo r  i t s  app lication . I t  can  be
argued  t h a t  th e  b e s t books, lik e  Thucydides's h is to ry , which a re  th e
reco rd  o r  th e  re g is te r  o f  fa c ts , a re  in  re a l i ty  nothing o th e r  th a n
v isib le  o b jec ts  which m ight simpLy be th e  o b jec ts  o f  fan cy . W hat is
m ore, Hobbes ex p lic itly  w arns us e lsew here  ag a in s t tak in g  th e  
te s tim o n y  o f books a s  fa c ts :
"N or t h a t  which is  g o tte n  by Reasoning form  th e  A uthority  o f
Books? because i t  is  n o t by Reasoning from  Cause to  th e  E ffec t;
nor from  E ffe c t to  Cause? and is  n o t knowledge b u t F aith ."  32 
In  o th e r  words, i f  th e  in fo rm atio n  con ta ined  in  books is  n o t a rriv ed  
a t  by som e o th e r  c r ite r ia ,  o r  i f  i t  i s  m erely  a  jum ble o f re p o rte d
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"fac ts" , th e n  th e  knowledge con ta ined  th e re in  soon la p ses  in to  opinion 
and  fa ith . IE Thucydides escaped  th is  in ju c tio n  h e  d id  so  only 
because  he v en tu red  to  co n jec tu re  upon th e  causes o f m en's m otives and 
ac tio n s  in  h is h isto ry , and no doub t Hobbes would add t h a t  th e  b e s t 
books on n a tu ra l h is to ry  sp ecu la te  upon n a tu ra l causes and  e ffe c ts .
The pcdnt how ever is  t h a t  books, th o se  'reg is te rs1 o f  th e  know ledge of
fa c t ,  m ust conform  to  a  c r ite r io n  o th e r  th a n  th e  s tra ig h t  fo rw ard  
rep o rtin g  o f  sense  d a ta  i f  th e y  a re  to  c a rry  th e  valued  cu rren cy  o f 
know ledge.
The lim its  o f  h is to r ic a l know ledge, o r  th e  know eldge o f  f a c t ,  fo r
Hobbes a lso  becom es m an ifest when one considers t h a t  i t  is  som ething
t h a t  a l l  men possess. Even an im als have sense  experience  and
th e re fo re  could be sa id  t o  "know" o r a t  l e a s t  understand  som eth ing  on
som e sensory  lev e l. All c re a tu re s  can  be sa id  to  possess th e  fa c u lty
o f  n a tu ra l vision, o r  a s  Hobbes says, "Sense and  Memory o f  th ings
[are] com m on to  man and a l l  liv ing  c rea tu res ."  ^kut w ithou t th e  m ethod 
o f  reason ing  from  cause  t o  e f fe c t ,  o r  v ice v ersa , a l l  th is  is  m erely a
d escrip tio n  o f  ap pea rance  r a th e r  th a n  o f  re a l ity . I f  th e  t r u th  o f
propositions can n o t be d em o n stra ted  th e n  one can  only ta k e  th em  to  be
tru e  on t r u s t ,  b u t th e n  again  th is  is  how Hobbes defines  th e  word
"belief."
In  sh o rt, in  sp ite  o f Hobbes's d ec la ra tio n  t h a t  a  w itness 's
te s tim o n y  is  a  know ledge o f f a c t ,  g iven h is th e o ry  o f  o p tic s  and  th e  
lim its  t h a t  he p laces  upon sense  experien ce , i t  would be d if f ic u lt to  
im ag ine  t h a t  th e  know ledge o f  f a c t  could  e v e r  p lay  a  s ig n ifican t ro le  
in  th e  l i fe  o f  th e  com m onw ealth . The popula tion  which re lie s  upon th e
know ledge o f f a c t  can  be said to  b e  no d if fe re n t from  th o se  who dw ell
in  P la to 's  in fam ous Cave.
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This is  th e  l im it  o f Hobbes's so -ca lled  em piricism , and is  th e  
reaso n  why h is know ledge o f  f a c t  has  such  a  m eager ex is ten ce . In  
sp ite  o f  Hobbes's a t te m p ts  to  th e  co n tra ry , th e re  can  be no th e o ry  o f 
know ledge which re lie s  so lely  upon p ercep tions. I f  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f 
know ledge is  to  rem a in  co h eren t, th e n  th e  s e a t  o f  know ledge w ill have 
to  be founded upon som e o th e r  p rem ise .
S ection  Four:
Hobbesfs Theory o f S c ien tific  Knowledge
The f i r s t  th in g  one n o tice s  when exam ining Hobbes's a c c o u n t o f
sc ie n tif ic  know ledge is  t h a t  sc ien ce  does n o t  hold th e  sam e meaning 
fo r  Hobbes a s  i t  would fo r  u s  to d ay . As we have ju s t  seen  Hobbes
d escribes th e  know ledge o f  f a c t  a s  including  th e  h is to rie s  o f "m etals,
p lan ts , an im als, regions, and th e  like" -  su b jec ts  which to d a y  m ight 
en cap su la te  a  p lu ra lity  o f  w hat we m ean when we use th e  word "science"
-  and  y e t  fo r  Hobbes th e se  a re  th e  su b jec ts  which a re  c re a te d  by God
35and hence a re  u ltim a te ly  unknow able to  mankind. Science, a s  Hobbes 
understood  th e  te rm , applies t o  th e  know ledge o f  th o se  th in g s  which 
m an c re a te s , a  th e o ry  which som etim es le a v e s  him w ith a  r a th e r  curious 
and occasionally  unbalanced  l i s t  o f  s c ie n tif ic  to p ics . Philosophy is  
th e re fo re  a  sc ien ce  which was u ltim a te ly  know ab le  because , Hobbes
believed , i t  was c re a te d  by man, and so i t  can  be sa id  fo r  
a rc h ite c tu re , nav igation , m a them atics, geography, and  m eteorology. A t 
th e  sam e t im e , how ever, th e  su b jec ts  o f  op tics , music, po e try ,
rh e to r ic  and lo g ic  a l l  f a l l  under th e  um brella  o f  sc ien ce  fo r  th e  sam e 
reason , a lthough few  m ight to d a y  fin d  i t  easy  t o  describe  ju s t  w h at 
e lse  nav igation  and p o e try  have in  com m on. Hobbes was ab le  t o  ach ieve 
th is  mixed-m a rria g e  o f o b jec ts  o f  s c ie n tif ic  understanding by arguing
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t h a t  som e w ere concerned  w ith q u an tity , lik e  m athem atics, and stiU
o th e rs  w ere concerned  w ith quality , which fo r  Hobbes encom passed th e  
study  o f th e  v a ria tio n s  in  a  single body.
T here a re  h in ts  h ere  o f  F rancis  Bacon's id e a  o f  sc ien ce  echoing
th ro u g h o u t Hobbes's acc o u n t o f  s c ie n tif ic  know ledge fo r  Bacon had
urged , in  h is De A ugm etis S cien tiarum , t h a t  " i t  [was] th e  d u ty  and
v ir tu e  o f  a l l  know ledge to  abridge th e  c irc u its  and language o f
ex p erience ...by  co llec tin g  and  w riting axiom s o f  sc ien ce  in to  more
36
g en e ra l ones, and  such a s  may com prehend a l l  ind iv idual cases." F or 
Hobbes th is  m ean t co llec ting  and  co lla tin g  a l l  th e  su b jec ts  which can  
be sa id  to  be m an-m ade in to  th e  tw o  broad and n o t ve ry  w ell d e lin ea ted  
ca te g o rie s  o f q u an tity  and  quality . B ut th e re  is  an o th e r com parison 
which we can  m ake h e re  fo r  Bacon had  also  urged  t h a t  "knowledge is  
w o rth ie s t which le a s t  burdens th e  in te l l e c t  w ith m ultip licity" -  o r  in  
o th e r  words, r a th e r  th a n  w ielding a  s c ie n tif ic  O ckham 's R azor th e
s c ie n t is t  should seek  to  prov ide a  g e n e ra l exp lanation  fo r  a l l
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sc ie n tif ic  phenom ena. I t  was th is  t h a t  Hobbes believed  to  be his 
ch ie f  con trib u tio n  t o  th e  su b jec t, fo r  th e  sc ien ce  o f  a l l  th in g s, he 
argued , could be explained by th e  u n iversa l p rincip le  o f causation .
Hobbes defines th e  know ledge o f  sc ien ce  a s  th e  "knowledge o f  th e  
Consequences o f  one A ffirm ation  t o  ano ther."  Science is  th e re fo re  
"conditional" (as opposed to  "absolute") because  i t  re lie s  upon man's 
ab ility  to  reaso n  properly . This also  s e p a ra te s  th e  s c ie n t is t  from
h is fellow  man since  few  would be  ab le  t o  m aste r th is  "sm all pow er" o f
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th e  know ledge o f  sc ie n tif ic  causa tion . Science is  ca lled  th e  
"knowledge o f consequences" because
"...w hen we see  how anything com es about, upon w hat causes, and 
by  w hat m anner; when th e  like  causes com e in to  our pow er, we see
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how to  make i t  produce th e  like  e ffe c ts ."
Thus i t  is  th e  s c ie n tis t  who alone can  delve in to  th e  causes o f  th ings 
and, based  upon th is  know ledge, r e - c r e a te  th e  o b je c ts  o f sc ience . 
M oreover, Hobbes thoroughly  p o litic izes  th is  sc ie n tif ic  know ledge as  
he in ten d s  th e  sc ie n tis t, a rm ed  w ith th is  "sm all pow er," to  in c re a se  
th e  Sovereign's pow er by adding t o  th e  sovereign 's  in s tru m e n ts  o f war
and to  his ab ility  to  reaso n  e ffec tiv e ly . This know ledge o f 
causa tion , in  o th e r  words, a c ts  a s  th e  p o litic a l v ision  which th e  
Sovereign uses to  p ro te c t  th e  s ta te .
Hobbes believed  t h a t  " the  causes o f un ive rsa l th in g s...h av e  a l l  
b u t one u n iv e rsa l cause , which is  motion" and  so  we com e fu ll  c irc le  
to  th e  id e a  t h a t  th e  world so lely  consists  o f bodies in  m otion . 40 
However, Hobbes occasionally  o ffe rs  con flic ting  acco u n ts  o f  th e  m ethod 
one uses t o  re a c h  th is  conclusion: on th e  one hand he arg u es  t h a t  th e  
search  fo r  causes can  be c a rried  o u t by an a ly tica lly  breaking  down an
a ff irm a tio n  and  th e n  sy n th e tica lly  rec o n s titu tin g  i t ,  and  on o th e r  
occasions he a rgues t h a t  " ra tio c in a tio n ," o r  reason ing  from  
d efin itions w ill le a d  to  th e  sam e re su lt . The l a t t e r  tech n iq u e  is  
som etim es re fe r re d  to  by Hobbes a s  sim ply th e  "M ethod" and b ea rs  a
s trik in g  resem b lan ce  to  th e  m ethod used  in  geom etrical, reasoning . 
A lthough Hobbes was a  l i t t l e  in c o n s is te n t in  h is m ethodological 
te ch n iq u es  th e re  was no inconsistency  in  w hat he  c la im ed  a s  t o  th e ir  
im p ortance : sim ply p u t, th e  s c ie n tif ic  know ledge o f  causation ,
to g e th e r  w ith a  ra t io n a l  m ethod o f uncovering th e  m eaning o f  words and 
th e ir  app lica tion , would o f fe r  a  t r u e  sc ien ce  bridging a l l  th e
su b jec ts  which can  be said to  be m an-m ade. 41
I t  would be d if f ic u lt to  describe  Hobbes's knowledge o f sc ien ce  
a s  s tem m ing  so le ly  from  th e  a c t  o f  vision in  th e  n a tu ra l sense . Here
o
th e  senses p lay  a  lim ite d  ro le . U nravelling th e  s trin g  o f causa tion  
ca lls  fo r  m ore o f a  ra tio n a l m ethod th a n  o p tica l accu racy . And y e t  
th e  a c t  o f vision in  th e  second sense o f  th e  word is  s trong ly  im plied  
in  h is a cc o u n t o f  sc ien ce  -  t h a t  is , a  po litica l o r  im ag inary  vision 
which th e  sovereign  uses to  defend  th e  com m onw ealth . The sc ie n tis t, 
a f t e r  a ll, im  ag ina tive ly  se e s  th e  connec tion  be tw een  th in g s  t h a t  a  
m ere o p tic a l a c c o u n t -  " the  know ledge o f  fa c t"  -a lo n e  c a n n o t reco rd . 
G ilbert Ryle, fo r  exam ple, in  h is C oncep t o f Mind suggests  t h a t  w ith  
G alileo's and  D escartes 's  m echan ical world-view  in fluencing  so many o f 
th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  th in k ers , a  new  vocabu lary  o f "consciousness" 
was c re a te d  which was "to  p lay  in  th e  m en ta l w orld th e  p a r t  p layed  by 
l ig h t in  th e  m echan ical world." M etaphorically  th e n , Ryle continues,
" the  co n te n ts  o f th e  m en ta l w orld w ere th o u g h t o f  being self-lum inous
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o r  re fu lg en t."  This, o f  course, is  th e  p ic tu re  o f  s c ie n tif ic  
knowledge based  upon o p tic a l m etaphors, o r  v ision in  th e  second sense 
o f  th e  word, and was occasionally  adop ted  by Hobbes. In  c h a p te r  five  
o f L ev iathan , fo r  in s ta n c e , which is  d evo ted  to  reaso n  and  sc ien ce , 
Hobbes com pares th e  workings o f  th e  mind to  th e se  sc ie n tif ic  
illum inations:
"To conclude, The L ight o f  hum ane minds is  Perspicuous Words, b u t
by e x a c t  def in itions f i r s t  snuffed , and purged  from  am biguity ..."
H ere th e  word "perspicuous" m eans " tran sp aren t,"  so  one m ight say , to
p araph rase  Hobbes, t h a t  th e  l ig h t  o f  hum an minds i s  o p tica lly
tra n s p a re n t  words (or to  p u t i t  le ss  fo rm ally , w hat illu m in a tes  th e  
workings o f th e  mind fo r  Hobbes a re  words easily  understood).
C rucially , Hobbes's a rg u m en t is  t h a t  words should be m ade to  be
visually  c lea r . Only th e n  can  we p roceed  in  a tta in in g  know ledge.
S c ien tific  know ledge, in  o th e r  words, was likened  by Hobbes t o  e i th e r
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a  t r u e  o r  a  fa lse  illum ination  in  th e  mind. How th e n , one may ask , 
was one ev e r to  know th e  d iffe ren ce?
The d iffe re n ce  betw een  a  t r u e  and a  fa lse  sc ie n tif ic  illum ination  
is  ak in  to  t h a t  o f  a  t r u e  and  a  fa lse  o p tic a l vision, o r  even  th e  
d is tin c tio n  betw een  dream ing and  observing re a lity . In  a l l  th r e e  
cases  th e  only d is tin c tio n  t h a t  one can  m ake is  w ith th e  m ethod one 
uses in  acquiring  and dem onstra ting  th e  t r u th  o f  th e  m en ta l im ag e . I f  
th e  m ethod em ployed can  le a d  one t o  "dem o n stra te  th e  t r u th  th e re o f  
perspicuousLy to  an o th er11 th e n  th e  know ledge which is  deriv ed  
necessarily  becom es "c e rta in  and  in fa llib le ."  The equation  t h a t  one 
is  th e re fo re  l e f t  w ith in  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  know ledge looks som eth ing  
lik e  th is : P ercep tio n  + th e  S c ien tific  M ethod = Knowledge.
Section  Five:
The "Knowledge" o f G eom etry
For Hobbes a l l  know ledge is  th u s  orig inally  sense  appearing  only in
th e  mind. T h e re a fte r , he argued , i t  is  only m em ory and, because  o f 
th e  lim its  o f our c ap a c ity  to  rem em b er th ings, our know ledge, lik e  our
m em ories, fad es . Since our experience  o f  th e  world is  only our m em ory
of i t ,  and s ince , a s  Hobbes te l ls  us, experience concludes noth ing
universally , th e n  i t  is  only lo g ic a l to  conclude t h a t  a l l  our
know ledge be o f a  lim ited , p a r tic u la r  -  r a th e r  th a n  un iv e rsa l -
cap a c ity . Y et th is  was n o t Hobbes's e n tire  position  on th e  m a tte r ,
fo r  he also believed  t h a t  th e re  could be foundations to  ou r know ledge,
t h a t  one could b reak  o u t o f  th e  v ic ious cyc le  o f sensations -
phan tasm s -  m em ories, clim bing o u t o f  th e  C ave, a s  i t  w ere, to  s tan d
on th e  firm  foundation  o f  tr u th .  This was th e  reaso n  fo r  Hobbes's
com m ents in  De Cive t h a t  th e re  w ere "p rinc ip les...fo r a  foundation"
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which could  be "bu il[t] th e re o n  on t r u th . " 45 I t  w as a  foundational
m etaphor which Hobbes to o k  lite ra lly : our various t r a in s  o f  though ts
can  be reg u la ted , can  be o rdered , i f  th e y  w ere based  upon th e  m ethods
t h a t  g eo m etry  had  to  o f fe r  us. The m ethods o f  geom etry , lik e  th e
foundations o f a  building, le a d  d ire c tly  to  know ledge and tru th .
The m ost valuab le  in s ig h ts , N ietzsche once observed, a re  a rriv ed
a t  la s t ,  bu t, he quickly  added, th e se  m ost va luab le  in s ig h ts  a re
m ethods. The in s ig h ts  t h a t  th e  g eo m etric  m ethod had o ffe red  to
philosophers a re  a  case  in  po in t. Hobbes was n o t  th e  f i r s t  to  see  th e
possib ilities t h a t  geom etry  had fo r  philosophy and sc ien ce , no r was he 
th e  l a s t  to  do so. The f i r s t  G reek g eo m etric ian , P ythagoras, who
H erodotus te l l s  u s  le a r n t  h is t r a d e  from  th e  Egyptians, a rgued  th a t
th e  m ethods o f g eom etry  could form  an  um brella  m ethod fo r  th e  o th e r
d iscip lines, and  in  A ris to tle 's  acco u n t, P y thagorian  g eo m etry  was
closely  re la te d  to  a  P y thagorian  system  o f  e th ic s . The id e a  o f
s tru c tu rin g  a  system  o f  e th ic s  along th e  g eo m etric  m ethod also
appealed  to  Spinoza who, perhaps borrow ing from  th e  s tru c tu re  o f
Euclid 's E lem ents, a lso  began  h is E th ics w ith  a  s e r ie s  o f
propositions, fo llow ed by a  num ber o f  re la te d  axiom s, and concluded
w ith dem onstrab le  p roo fs  -  a l l  echoing th e  g eo m etric ian 's  t r a d e . T hat
a  ra tio n a lis t  lik e  Spinoza and an  alleged  e m p iric is t lik e  Hobbes had
bo th  becom e en ch an ted  w ith  th e  id e a  o f  s tru c tu rin g  a  system  o f
know ledge along th e  m ethods o f g eo m etric  reason ing  te s t i f ie s  t o  th e
pow er t h a t  g eo m etry  had held  fo r  th e  se v en te en th  cen tu ry  mind. But
perhaps th e  ch o ic e s t com parison w ith Hobbes's c la im s fo r  geom etry  is
to  be m ade w ith  D escartes 's  own claim s. A ccording t o  D escartes ,
"Those long chains o f reason ing ...o f which geo m etric ian s  make use
in  o rd e r to  a rr iv e  a t  th e  m ost d if f ic u lt dem onstra tions, had
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caused  me to  im agine t h a t  aU th o se  th ings which f a i l  under th e
cognizance o f man m ight very  likely  be m utually re la te d  in  th e
46
sam e fash ion ...."
H ere D escartes 's  claim  is  a  rep rise  o f Py thagoras 's  own hopes: t h a t  
th e  g eo m etric  m ethod could a c t  a s  an  um brella  m ethod fo r  o th e r
discip lines. Both D escartes  and Hobbes believed  t h a t  th e  problem  o f
causa tio n  could  be understood  by exam ining th is  m etaphor o f, w hat
D escartes  ca lled , "chains o f reasoning;" t h a t  is , t h a t  th e re  is  a
fu n d am en ta l link  t o  every th ing  and th a t  th e  g eo m e tric  m ethod would be
ab le  to  d iscover th o se  links in  th e  long chain.
This is , o f course , a  c lass ic  exam ple o f th e  m etaphor o f
47
causation . The very  c o n ce p t o f cau sa tio n  is  i t s e lf  an  a t te m p t to  
im p a r t  a  s e r ie s  o f  links t o  ev en ts, o r  t o  w hat i s  o f te n  p erce iv ed  a s  a  
chain  o f  ev en ts. D escartes 's  b e lie f t h a t  "a ll th o se  th in g s  which f a l l  
under th e  cognizance o f  men" could be fina lly  understood  by f i r s t  
b reaking  down each  e v e n t in to  i t s  ind iv idual com ponents, and th e n  
rebu ild ing  th e se  ite m s  in to  building bLocks o r  links in  a  long  chain  
is  m an's m e tapho rica l way o f  s tru c tu rin g  re a lity . Hobbes also 
believed  t h a t  fo r  know ledge t o  b e  derived  one had t o  b reak  down th e  
com ponents o f a  proposition  an a ly tica lly  and  th e n  rebu ild  th e se  
building bLocks o f  know ledge again  in to  a  sy n th e tic  whole. "In
search ing  o u t o f  causes," Hobbes dec la red , " th e re  is  need  p a r tly  o f
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th e  an a ly tic  p a r tly  o f  th e  sy n th e tic  m ethod." Hobbes's r a th e r  curious
in s is te n ce  t h a t  one could add  and s u b tra c t  propositions is  a n o th e r
exam ple t h a t  one could "add on" o r  build th e  com ponents o f  sen ten ces
49
in to  t r u e  propositions. In  f a c t ,  th is  m etap h o rica l way o f  building o r
break ing  down propositions was th e  way Hobbes m arks th e  d iffe re n ce  
b e tw een  opinion and know ledge a s  "knowledge slow ly ad m its  a
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proposition  a f te r  i t  has been  broken in to  p ieces  and  chew ed, fa ith
50
sw allow s a t whole and en tire ."
B ut th e re  is  a  double m etaphor involved  h ere , fo r  th e  m ethod o f
g eo m etry  is  c la im ed  t o  be tra n s fe ra b le  t o  an  a l to g e th e r  d if fe re n t
d iscip line. A ccording t o  Hobbes, geom etry , to g e th e r  w ith  astronom y,
is  " the  m other o f  a l l  sc ien ces11 and  a l l  "n a tu ra l philosophy m ust begin 
51w ith geom etry ."  N ot only does n a tu ra l philosophy conform  t o  th e  
m ethods o f  g eom etry  b u t a lso  m oral philosophy, fo r  why e lse , Hobbes
asks, "have th e  w ritings o f  g eo m etric ians in c re ased  sc ien ce , w hilst
52th o se  o f  e th ic a l  philosophers have in c re a se d  words only?" If , a s  
A ris to tle  suggests, m etaphor involves a  " tran sfe ren ce"  from  one nam e 
to  an o th e r, th e n  a  tra n s fe re n c e  o f  th e  vocabu lary  and  m ethods o f 
geom etry  to  m oral and c iv il philosophy can  also be said  to  be 
m etaphorical.
In  s ta rk  c o n tra s t  to  th e  Hobbesian and C artesian  claim  t h a t  most, 
i f  n o t a ll, know ledge could be m etaphorically  illu m in a ted  by g eo m etric  
reasoning  is  A ris to tle 's  so b er w arning. A ris to tle  argued  in  his 
P o s te rio r A naly tics t h a t  "one can n o t p rove by g eo m e try ...th e  concern
of a  d if fe re n t [sub ject]"  un less t h a t  su b je c t w as a lread y  c losely
53re la te d  t o  geom etry . Perhaps sign ifican tly , th e  exam ple t h a t  
A ris to tle  gave o f  w here g eom etry  could be app lied  to  a  c losely  re la te d  
su b je c t was th e  d iscip line o f  op tics. Indeed , t o  re a d  Hobbes on th e  
su b je c t o f o p tics  is  to  re a d  a  se rie s  o f  g e o m e tr ic a l proofs. Hobbes's 
T ra c ta tu s  O pticus is  a  p rim e exam ple o f  reason ing  f i r s t  from  
defin itions, th e n  propositions, th e n  g e n e ra l axiom s, and th e n
concluding w ith  g eo m etric  dem onstra tions o r  p roo fs  o f  th e  v a lid ity  o f
54
propositions.
P aren th e tica lly , th is  fu n d am en ta l d iffe re n c e  be tw een  Hobbes and
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A ris to tle  on th e  app lica tion  o f g eom etry  to  o th e r  d iscip lines is  a  
te llin g  a rg u m en t ag a in s t th e  g en e ra l th e m e  o f Thom as Spragens's 
o therw ise  in te re s tin g  book The P o litics  o f  Motion: th e  World o f  Thomas 
Hobbes. 55 Spragens arg u es  t h a t  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  sc ien ce  moved w ithin 
th e  A ris to te lian  "paradigm " o f sc ien ce  (Spragens borrow s from  Kuhn's 
u se  o f  th e  word) even  though  Hobbes freq u en tly  renounced  a l l  th ings 
A risto te lian . Spragens quo tes Hobbes a s  saying in  De Ho mine t h a t  "by 
th is  we may understand , th e re  be tw o  kinds o f  know ledge, w hereof th e
one is  noth ing  b u t  sense , o r know ledge o rig inal,...and  rem em b ran ce  o f
56
th e  sam e; th e  o th e r  is  ca lled  sc ience ."  Spragens c la im s t h a t  th is  is  
n o t very  f a r  from  th e  A ris to te lian  fo rm u la  fo r  know ledge. "Hobbes's 
a cc o u n t o f  th e  n a tu ra l h is to ry  o f  sc ience,"  accord ing  to  Spragen, "his
g en eric  epistem ology, a s  i t  w ere, i s  v irtu a lly  id e n tic a l to
57
A risto tle 's."  The problem  w ith th is  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  Hobbes's th e o ry
o f know ledge is  t h a t  i t  does n o t ta k e  in to  acc o u n t Hobbes's c la im s fo r
his g eo m etric  m ethod. Hobbes m ain tained  t h a t  only th e  m ethod of
g eom etry  could produce r e a l  sc ience . In  f a c t ,  he was r a th e r  dubious 
o f  th e  c la im s made by th o se  who ad v o ca ted  an  ex p erim en ta l m ethod fo r  
sc ience . "N ot ev ery  one th a t  brings from  beyond th e  sea s  a  new gin
[engine], o r  o th e r  jau n ty  devise, is  th e re fo re  a  philosopher," Hobbes
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rem ark ed  r a th e r  caustica lly . In  a c tu a li ty  Hobbes th o u g h t t h a t  
g eo m etry  would p rove to  be th e  basis fo r  sc ie n tif ic  and  philosophic
know ledge, w hereas A ris to tle  d e a r ly  th o u g h t t h a t  g eo m etry  could only
59
be applied  to  v e ry  s im ila r d iscip lines, like  op tics .
A ccording to  Hobbes, " the  G reeks and L atins ap p ea r to  have held  
th a t ,  e x c e p t in  geom etry , th e re  was no reason ing  c e r ta in  and  ending in
science."  60 This was, o f  course , a  m isreading o f th e  Greeks.
A ris to tle , a s  we have ju s t seen , had a  r a th e r  narrow  opinion o f  th e
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uses o f geom etry , and he com plained o f th o se  s tu d e n ts  o f sc ien ce  who 
n ev e r lis te n  t o  th e i r  te a c h e rs  un less th e y  sp eak  m a th e  m atLcaUy. 
Hobbes was perhaps m ore aligned to  th e  P la to n is t response  to  geom etry . 
As S ocra te s  s ta te d  during h is a rg u m en t w ith G laucon, when geom etry  
concerns i t s e lf  w ith th e  "knowledge o f  th e  e te rn a l"  i t  w ill be ab le  to
61"draw th e  so u l to w ard s  tr u th ,  and c re a te  th e  s p ir i t  o f philosophy." 
B ut unlike th e  S ocra te s  o f  P la to , Hobbes f e l t  t h a t  g eo m etry  could be 
used  in  th e  d ay -to -day  world o f ap p ea ran ces  r a th e r  th a n  be  consigned 
to  som e v au lted  plane untouched by th is  world.
Hobbes orig inally  f e l l  in  love  w ith geom etry , accord ing  to  Aubrey, 
when he found h im self in  a  gen tlem an 's lib ra ry  w here Euclid 's E lem en ts 
la y  open
"...and  t 'w a s  th e  47 ELlitari L ..B y G—, sayd h e ...th is  is  
im possible 1 So he read s  th e  dem onstra tion  o f i t ,  which re fe r re d  
him back  to  such a  proposition, which proposition  he re a d . T h a t 
re fe r re d  him back  to  ano ther, which he  a lso  re a d . And so  on, 
[until] a t  l a s t  he was dem onstra tive ly  convinced  o f  th e  tru th .
R 7This made him in  love  w ith G eom etry."
The reason  fo r  Hobbes's love  a f fa ir  w ith g eo m etry  is  n o t hard  to
fa th o m . As we have seen , p e rce p tu a l know ledge (or n a tu ra l vision) fo r
Hobbes had sev e re  lim ita tio n s , b u t to  t h a t  o th e r  s tra in  in  philosophy
which had a rgued  a g a in s t sense  experience a lto g e th e r  Hobbes believed
to  be  th e  sin  o f  e x tre m e  ra tionalism . The g eo m etric ian 's  m ethod, on
th e  o th e r  hand, o ffe re d  a  middle course  -  n e ith e r  re je c tin g  p e rc e p tu a l
know ledge e n tire ly  n o r to ta l ly  em bracing  e x tre m e  ra tio n a lism . The
g if t  o f  th e  sc ie n tif ic  m ethod fo r  Hobbes was i t s  ab ilty  to  reaso n  from
shapes and  figu res, deriv ing dem onstrab le  and  ra tio n a l conclusions
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based upon m art-m ade, v isib le  p ic tu res . T h a t g eo m etric  shapes and
fig u res  w ere in s ta n tly  v isib le  and  recogn izab le  a s  such m ean t t h a t
reason ing  from  th em  could  n ev er s tra y  in to  th e  im ag iner's  fancy ; t h a t  
a  seem ingly  ra tio n a l m ethod could be  ou tlined  m ean t t h a t  v isib le
conclusions could  be reac h ed  and th e  t r u th  o f  propositions easily
d em o n stra ted .
C o n tra s t th is  w ith Hobbes's understanding  o f  a lg eb ra  and  one 
im m ed ia te ly  se e s  why th e  v isu a l e le m e n t g eo m etry  is  so  im p o r ta n t to  
Hobbes. When Hobbes described  th e  su b je c t o f a lg eb ra  he sa id  i t  was 
"to  th e  th e o ry  w hereof tw o  o r th re e  Days a t  m ost a re  req u ired , though
to  th e  P rom ptitude o f Working, perhaps th e  P ra c tic e  o f  m onths is
63
necessary ."  F a r from  being in s ta n tly  recog n izab le , a s  g eo m etry  was to  
Hobbes when he d iscovered  Euclid, a lgeb ra  m ight ta k e  m onths to  m aster.
A lgebra p resen ted  no im ages fo r  th e  re a d e r  to  ponder, b u t was a  "slab
o f sym bols" which looked to  Hobbes "as i f  a  hen had been  scraping
64th e re ."  So ju s t a s  know ledge was defined  by Hobbes a s  o rig in a l sense, 
i t  ap p ea rs  t h a t  g eom etry  o ffe red  v isu a l know ledge o f th e  m a th em a tic a l 
world, o r  a s  he describes th e  su b je c t o f  g eom etry , " the philosophy o f 
figures." 65
This g e o m e tric a l m ethod was also em ployed by Hobbes, lik e  i t  was 
by Spinoza, in  th e  p re sen ta tio n  o f  h is  works. N ot only do many 
ind iv idual works by Hobbes begin  by th e  s ta tin g  o f propositions, 
fo llow ed by axiom s, and  th e n  w ith a  dem o n stra tio n  o f  th e  proposition 's 
v a lid ity , b u t th e  o v e ra ll p roduction  o f  Hobbes's opus conform ed  to  
th e se  very  id e a ls . Hobbes com plained th a t  "m ost men w ander o u t o f th e
way, and  f a l l  in to  e r ro r  fo r  w an t o f  m ethod" and  so  he  s e t  o u t to
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publish his m ajor works in  a  p a ra lle l g eo m etric  o rder. De C orpore (on 
bodies) w as th u s  published f i r s t  w ith th e  d ec la ra tio n  th a t  i t  was th e
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f i r s t  e v e r  exam ple o f th e  philosophical m ethod in  p ra c tic e .
A fterw ards, Hobbes in ten d ed  his work on bodies to  be foUowed by t h a t
on man (De Ho m ine) and th e n  to  re a c h  a  crescendo  w ith a  t r e a t is e  on
so c ie ty  (De Cive). As rem ark ed  e a r l ie r  in  th e  prev ious c h a p te r , th is
p a t te rn  flow ed from  th e  id e a  t h a t  once a  foundation  had  been  built, 
lo g ic a l sc ie n tif ic  p roo fs  could th e n  be d iscovered . U nfo rtunate ly  fo r
Hobbes, th e  English C ivil War p rev en ted  him from  publishing th e se
th r e e  works in  such  a  n e a t  g eo m etric  o rder, fo rc in g  him to  publish De
Cive soon a f te r  De C orpore and leav ing  De Homine to  ap p ea r much la te r .
The defin ition  t h a t  a l l  know ledge was o rig inally  sense  doveta ils
q u ite  n icely  w ith Hobbes's defin ition  o f  g eom etry . Indeed, w ith  a  few
s w if t ling u is tic  moves Hobbes was abLe t o  p rove t h a t  g eo m etry  was
in tim a te ly  connec ted  w ith his th e o ry  o f  know ledge o f  sense
im pressions, o r  m ore to  th e  po in t, was even  id e n tic a l w ith i t .  Since
th e  world was made up o f m a tte r  in  m otion and sin ce  sc ien ce  was a
se a rc h  in to  causa tion , Hobbes m ain tained  t h a t  g eom etry , p roperly
in d en tified , rev ea led  th e  underpinnings o f s c ie n tif ic  know ledge.
Thus, Hobbes defined  a  geo m etric  lin e  a s  sim ply being " the  m otion o f a
point" and argued  t h a t  th e  g eo m e tric a l su rface  o f  an  o b je c t w as " the
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m otion o f  a  lin e . S c ien tific  know ledge, th e re fo re , was n o t j j s t  a  
m a tte r  fo r  Hobbes o f  adopting th e  m ethods o f geom etry . Since geom etry  
i t s e l f  was now defined  by Hobbes a s  i f  i t  w ere m a tte r  in  m otion, th e  
m etaphor o f sc ie n tif ic  know ledge a s  th e  g eo m etric  m ethod could now be 
ta k e n  li te ra lly . D ecartes 's  d iscovery  t h a t  g eo m etry  was "m utually  
re la te d  in  th e  sam e fashion" w ith  th e  s c ie n tif ic  and philosophical 
d iscip lines w as th e re fo re  s tren g th en ed  by Hobbes. F or Hobbes, 
g eom etry  was n o t  ju s t  re la te d  to  th e  o th e r  sc ien ces  b u t was w h at a l l  
th e  sc ie n tif ic  d iscip lines had had in  com mon. A ccording to  Hobbes,
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"The sc ience  o f  every  su b je c t is  derived  from  precogn ition  o f  th e  
causes, genera tion , and co nstruc tion  o f th e  sam e; and 
consequently  w here th e  casues a re  known th e re  is  p lace  fo r  
dem onstra tion , b u t n o t...w here  th e  causes a re  to  seek  fo r .
G eom etry  is  th e re fo re  dem onstrab le , fo r  th e  lin es  and fig u res
from  which we reaso n  a re  draw n and described  ourselves; and  c iv il
philosophy is  dem onstrab le , because we make th e  com m onw ealth
68
ourselves."
"The sc ien ce  o f  every  sub ject,"  i f  i t  is  dem onstrab le , can  th e re fo re  
be  sa id  to  be a  geom etry . B ut in  th e  above passage Hobbes also  makes 
i t  p la in  t h a t  th is  holds t r u e  in  c iv il philosophy a s  w ell since  i t ,  
to o , can  be said  to  be m an-m ade.
I f  a l l  know ledge is  "orig inal sense," i t  m ust be asked  th e n  from  
w here does th e  know ledge o f geom etry  spring? Hobbes d id  n o t sh a re  in  
th e  C artes ian  in tu ition ism  t h a t  hum an beings 'ju s t  know1 t h a t  th e  
g e o m e tric a l shapes and p a tte rn s  w ere t r u e  ones, o r  in  K ant's be lie f 
t h a t  th e  p rinc ip les o f  m a them atics  a re  known to  us as  sy n th e tic  
ap r io r i tru th s .  Hobbes dearL y  s ta te s  t h a t  g eo m etry  is  m an-m ade, 
a c c u ra te ly  re f le c tin g  th e  world. G eom etry  com es a f t e r  man, n o t 
befo re , and n e ith e r  is  i t  p a r t  o f w hat i t  m eans to  be  hum an, fo r  
Hobbes, since  n o t  a l l  men w ander around n a tu ra lly  knowing g eo m etric  
th e o re m s. A t th e  sam e tim e  th e  m ethods o f  g eo m etry  w ere fo r  Hobbes 
th e  t r u e  foundations o f  know ledge, w ith  d ir e c t  ap p lica tion  to  th e  
n a tu ra l and  m oral sc iences. No lo n g e r d id  one have to  con tend  w ith 
th e  d e fe c ts  o f  n a tu ra l vision in  o rd e r t o  a rr iv e  a t  a  r a th e r  lim ite d  
know ledge o f f a c t .  The g eo m etric  m ethod could o f fe r  t r u e  know ledge to  
th e  philosopher and th e  sc ien tis t. Y e t th e  very  basis fo r  concluding 
t h a t  g eo m etry  rev ea led  sc ie n tif ic  know ledge is  l e f t  unresolved.
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Hobbes's c la im s fo r  geom etry  only looked c o r re c t  to  him because  th e re  
seem ed  t o  be a  d ir e c t  correspondence be tw een  g eo m etric  p a tte rn s  and 
th e  problem  o f causa tion  in  sc ien ce . On w h at basis, th e n , d id  Hobbes 
a lig h t upon Euclidean geom etry  a s  a  m odel fo r  a l l  th e  sc iences?
On th is  question  one can  only sp ecu la te  -  b u t th e  s trong  
likelihood is  t h a t  g eo m etry  conform ed to  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  sc ien tif ic  
know ledge p rec ise ly  because i t  was a  v isu a l medium when o th e r  sy stem s 
o f  m a th em atic s  and lo g ic  w ere n o t. In  ev e ry  sense  o f  th e  word, 
g eo m etry  o ffe red  Hobbes a  "p ictu re" o f  know ledge. G eom etry , indeed , 
was " the  philosophy o f figures." Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  o p tic s  l e f t  him
w ith th e  "knowledge o f fa c t"  which was, a t  b est, in co m p le te  a s  i t  was 
im possib le t o  d em o n stra te  a  p roposition 's t r u th  t o  an o th e r person  by 
pointing to  an  in te rn a l  p ic tu re  o f  a  f a c t '  in  one's mind. One could, 
how ever, d em o n stra te  a  t r u th  which corresponded to  a  v isu a l g eo m etric  
im age  which was to  be shared  by a ll know ledgeable men.
Hobbes th e o ry  o f know ledge is  an  a c t  o f  double v ision. The equation
t h a t  ended th e  previous sec tio n  sa id  t h a t  fo r  Hobbes "P ercep tion  + th e
S c ien tific  M ethod = Knowledge." Y et, a s  we have seen , th e  c o n te n t of
th e  sc ie n tif ic  m ethod -  o r  g eo m etric  reason ing  -  was i t s e l f  p rim arily
v isual, th u s  ren d erin g  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  know ledge in  d is tin c t v isua l
sensations. In  th e  p rim ary  sense  his th e o ry  o f o p tics  had  le d  him to
conclude t h a t  n a tu ra l v ision, o r  th e  know ledge o f  f a c t ,  c a n n o t be
dism issed from  c la im s o f  know ledge. To se e  som eth ing  is  a t  le a s t  to
know t h a t  one is  see ing  som ething , a s  Hobbes and h is fellow
p o s t-scep tic s  av erred , although i t  m ight only be a  phan tasm . B u t in
th e  m ore e la b o ra te  second sense, in  th e  ab ility  to  se e  causa l
connections be tw een  th ings, th e  a c t  o f  vision becom es equally
1 7 1
fundam ental.
Based upon th e  in sigh ts  t h a t  th e  g eo m e tric  m ethod had  o ffered ,
Hobbes f e l t  t h a t  th e  com ponents o f  o b jec ts  in  m otion could be  broken
down in to  th e i r  c o n s titu e n t causes and th e n  g eo m etrica lly  syn thesized
again  back  in to  a  whole. This was th e  purpose o f  sc ience: t o  show th e
consequence o f  one a ff irm a tio n  to  ano th er. B ut th e  m odel used  in  th is
second  sense  o f know ledge was also  v isual. G eom etry  is  nothing more
th a n  reason ing  from  v isib le  shapes and  figu res. I t  is  s ig n ifican t, in
t h a t  re sp e c t, t h a t  Hobbes did n o t  claim  t h a t  m athem atic s  alone was th e
algorism  o f a l l  our sc ie n tif ic  know ledge. During his days in  Oxford
Hobbes would have been  in tro d u ced  to  e lem en ta ry  m aths, b u t he  c lea rly
did n o t 'see ' th e  possib ilities t h a t  m a th em a tic s  could have u n til  he
was visib ly  s tru c k  in  t h a t  gen tlem an 's  lib ra ry  by th e  fig u res  and
shapes o f Euclid 's geom etry . For Hobbes, g eom etry  r a th e r  th a n
m athem atics, held th e  key to  know ledge. G eom etry  can  be t ie d  down to
physica l shapes and fig u res  w hilst m a th em a tic s  m ight f ly  o f f  in to  th e
sp h eres  o f absurd  fan cy  lik e  th e  lo g ic  fo r  which th e  ra tio n a lis ts  and
th e  sch o lastics  w ere renow ned. B ut geom etry  was " th e  philosophy o f
figures" and i t  was im possible to  co n d u c t n a tu ra l philosophy w ithou t
i t .  And c iv il philosophy, since i t  was c re a te d  by man lik e  th e  
g eo m etric ian 's  shapes and figu res, a lso  fa lls  p rey  to  th e  g eo m etric
m ethod.
M oreover, i t  can  fu r th e r  be sa id  t h a t  Hobbes uses th e  study  o f
o p tic s  and  o f  g eo m etry  a s  m etaphors fo r  hum an know ledge. In  th is
reg a rd  Hobbes was n o t  ve ry  d if fe re n t from  som e o f his sev en te en th
cen tu ry  b re th re n , many o f whom also  believed  t h a t  d iv e rse  fie ld s  o f
s tudy  had a  sing le  unifying, g e o m e tric a l th e m e  -  a lb e it  a  th e m e  
com posed o f m etaphoric  n o tes  and phrases. This is  n o t m ean t t o  be  a
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claim  t h a t  Hobbes believed  t h a t  aH know ledge w as a t  r o o t  only visual. 
Hobbes ex p lic itly  s ta te d  t h a t  only one form  o f know ledge was visual: 
th e  know ledge o f  f a c t .  B ut th is  should n o t  p re v e n t u s  from  noticing  
th e  im p lic itly  s tro n g  v isu a l and  even  m etap h o rica l basis o f much o f 
Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  know ledge.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE IMAGES OF LEVIATHAN
By his m etaphor o f th e  L eviathan  he provided an ingenious 
fram ew ork  on which th e re  was som e peg o r o th e r  to  hang every  
question  o f philosophy, psychology, governm ent, and  econom ics.
—T.S. E lio t
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The follow ing exam ines th e  c o n te n t and form  o f  som e o f  th e  im ages 
con ta in ed  in  Hobbes's L eviathan . I t  i s  a  highly m e tapho rica l work;
indeed , an  e n tire  th e s is  could successfu lly  focus  so lely  upon th e
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im ag es  con ta ined  in  L ev iathan . Since tim e  and sp ace  do n o t allow  fo r  
th e re  to  be a  l i s t  o f  a l l  o f Hobbes's m etap h o rica l im ag es -  which 
seem ingly  le a p  from  every  page o f  L eviathan  -  a  few  rem ark s  to w ard s 
th e  read ing  o f  th e se  im ag es  w ill have to  su ffice . Since any s tu d e n t 
o f  Hobbes could se e  fo r  h im se lf th e  highly m e tapho rica l c h a ra c te r  o f 
th e  w ork, a  d e ta ile d  descrip tion  h e re  o f  every  m e tapho rica l p h rase  in  
th e  book would n o t  be a  v e ry  p ro fitab le  v en tu re . And though  th is  
should in  no way be ta k e n  a s  an  exhaustive s tudy  o f th e  m eaning behind 
th e  m e tapho rica l im ag es  con ta ined  in  L eviathan , th is  c h a p te r  a t te m p ts  
to  h igh ligh t w h at may n o t be im m ed ia te ly  e v id e n t to  th e  in i t ia l  re a d e r  
o f Hobbes's work.
Ideally  we w ill have by now a lread y  com e som e way in  
understanding  th e  use  o f  m etaphor in  p o litic a l tho u g h t; th e  need  to  
c re a te  a  com m on sensory  p o litic a l judgm ent; th e  n ecess ity  o f  adorning 
l i te r a l  p ropositions w ith im  ag inative ly  a rre s tin g  im ages (thus 
persuading th e  populus); a s  a  m eans o f th row ing  th e  re a d e r  in to  th e  
sam e passions and s itu a tio n s  a s  i f  we w ere a  sp e c ta to r  o f  th e  even ts  
being n a rra ted ; a s  a  p a r t ia l  response t o  th e  sc e p tic s  and  th e  s ta r tin g  
p o in t fo r  a  th e o ry  o f know ledge -  t o  nam e ju s t  a  few  o f  th e  th e m e s
alread y  covered  in  th e  l a s t  few  chap te rs .
A ccordingly, th e  sec tio n s  which follow  o f fe r  som e co n c re te
exam ples o f Hobbes's m etaphoric  im ag es  in  use and explains how th e y  
d o v e ta il in to  various e le m e n ts  o f h is p o litic a l philosophy, making 
m an ifes t som e o f his concerns expressed  above. The f i r s t  sec tio n  
exam ines th e  biblical th e m e  o f  L eviathan  in  acco rdance  to  Hobbes's
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desire  t o  o f fe r  new im ages, borrow ing from  th e  dom inan t C hristian
orthodoxy. H  is  argued  t h a t  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f im ag es  and  id o la try
which is  expressed  in  L eviathan  sheds som e l ig h t on why Hobbes chose
L eviathan  a s  a  t i t l e  fo r  his work and n o t o th e rs . The second sec tio n
exam ines th e  co n ten ts  o f  th e  t i t l e  page th e  L ev iathan  and  argues,
f irs tly , t h a t  Hobbes had  to  be th e  designer o f  th e  illu s tra tio n , and
secondly , th e  t i t l e  page  re in fo rc e s  Hobbes's th e o rie s  o f  o p tic s  and
p o litic a l judgm en t a s  ou tlined  e a rlie r . The th ird  sec tio n  looks a t
Hobbes's use  o f  th e  word "soul" in  re la tio n  to  th e  im ag e  o f th e
a rtif ic ia l man. This sec tio n  suggests t h a t  Hobbes's im age o f th e  sou l
o f  th e  com m onw ealth  was in ten d ed  a s  a  reb u tta l, t o  o th e r  popular
th e o rie s  o f th e  so c ia l c o n tra c t. The fo u rth  sec tio n  b rie fly  sk e tch es
Hobbes's u se  o f  th e  im ag e  o f  th e  a r tif ic ia l man th ro u g h o u t th e  book.
The p en u ltim a te  sec tio n  exam ines m ore closely  th e  m etaphor o f  bonds
and  chains, which, fo r  Hobbes, co nnec ted  h is c o n ce p t o f  lib e r ty  w ith a  
th e o ry  o f obligation. F inally , th e  l a s t  sec tio n  addresses th e  l a s t
book o f L eviathan. A lthough n o t o f te n  re a d  by s tu d e n ts  o f  Hobbes,
th is  l a s t  book fu r th e r  i l lu s tra te s  Hobbes's u se  o f  m etaphoric  language
and his co n ce p t o f p o litic a l vision.
Section  One:
The RihTiral Them e o f  Leviathan
Of a l l  th e  im ag es  which w ere availab le  to  Thom as Hobbes to  convey his 
p o litic a l m essage t o  th e  ed u ca ted  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  re a d e r  h e  chose 
t h a t  o f  th e  L eviathan, th e  m ythological m onster o f Hebrew p o e try  b e s t 
known from  i t s  d escrip tion  in  th e  Old T e s tam en t books o f  Job , Psalm s 
and Isa iah . I t  is  an  odd m etaphor. The nam e, perhaps com ing from
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A rabic origins, r e fe r s  to  som ething  tw is te d , co iled  o r  having folds. 
The book o f Jo b  r e fe r s  to  th e  L ev iathan  in  tandem  w ith t h a t  o f 
B ehem oth, w hich w as rep u te d  to  be  i t s  c o u n te rp a rt. T ogether, 
L ev iathan  and  Behem oth w ere said to  be c re a te d  by God a t  th e  sam e tim e
a s  th e  c re a tio n  o f man ["Behold now behem oth , which I  m ade w ith
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th e e " ] . The tw o  m onsters w ere th u s  p a r t  o f  n a tu re , God's grand 
design: th e  L ev iathan  th e  lo rd  o f th e  seas, B ehem oth t h a t  o f  th e  land . 
The L ev iathan  is  som etim es re fe r re d  to  a s  a  s e a  se rp en t, a  crocodile , 
a  dragon, and even  a  g r e a t  w hale; i t  has th e  ab ility  to  swallow up th e
day, eclipsing  th e  sun and s ta r s  ["By h is b re a th  th e  heavens becom e
b rig h t...." ] . The B ehem oth, on th e  o th e r  hand, was sa id  to  resem b le  a  
4
hippopotam us.
W hat is  occasionally  missed by co m m en ta to rs  on Hobbes's grand 
m etaphor is  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  L eviathan , a lthough  c re a te d  by God, is  
also s e t  a g a in s t God in  o rd e r to  fu lfill His prom ise t o  th e  people o f 
Is rae l. In  Isa iah  we a re  to ld  o f  t h a t  day  when God's judgm ent w ill 
b e fa ll man:
'Tn t h a t  day th e  Lord w ith his hand and g r e a t  s trong  sw ord w ill 
punish th e  L eviathan  th e  flee ing  se rp en t, L ev iathan  th e  tw isting  
se rp en t, and he will s lay  th e  dragon th a t  is  in  th e  sea." 5 
In  th e  book o f  Jo b  Jehovah  co n fron ts  Jo b  w ith th e  fo rc e s  o f  n a tu re  and 
o f  ev il, sym bolized by L eviathan  and B ehem oth, and in v ite s  him to  ta k e  
com m and o f  th e se  c re a tu re s . The m oral o f th e  s to ry  is  t h a t  Job  
obviously c a n n o t co n fro n t th e s e  m onsters, i s  hum bled b efo re  th e  tw in
pow ers which only God can  co n tro l ["Who th e n  is  he  t h a t  ca n  s tan d
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b efo re  m e?"]. The im ag es  o f th e  L eviathan  and  B ehem oth a re  th e re fo re  
asso c ia ted  w ith th e  b ru te  fo rc e  o f  n a tu re  and  w ith unchecked eviL In  
th e  Old T es tam en t th e  L eviathan , an  enem y o f God, is  also  th e  n a tu ra l
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enem y o f man.
T here is  no c o u n te rp a r t to  th e  im age o f th e  L ev iathan  in  th e  New
T es tam en t -  t h a t  is , i f  one d iscounts th e  wild im aginings o f  John  on 
th e  3sLe o f Patm os. The only n e a r  resem b lan ce  is  w ith  S atan 's
te m p ta tio n  o f  C h ris t on M ount H erm on. H ere Satan , t h a t  f i r s t  an g e l o f
c rea tio n , a s se r ts  h is a u th o rity  ov er th e  m a te ria l w orld by o ffering
th e  Son o f  Man a  m ultitide o f  e a r th ly  rich es, b u t  we a lre ad y  know how
th e  s to ry  is  going to  end: Je su s  re fu ses , and Satan , in  th e  l a s t  book
o f  th e  New T estam en t, is  im prisoned in  th e  e a r th  fo r  a  thousand  years
ju s t  a s  Jehovah  had sLayed th e  L ev ia than  to  fu lf i ll  h is prom ise to  th e
Is ra e lite s  in  Isaiah . I t  would be absurdly unth inkab le th e n , given
th is  New T es tam en t com parison, fo r  Hobbes t o  nam e h is philosophical
work "Satan" o r  th e  "Whore o f  Babylon" b u t th is  is  e x ac tly  w hat is
conjured fo r th  by th e  Old T es tam en t im age o f th e  L eviathan: th e
L eviathan  which is  s e t  ag a in s t God, which th re a te n s  man in  h is w odd,
and which only th e  Lord can  ta m e .
During th e  Middle Ages and th e re a f te r ,  th e  im age o f th e  L eviathan  
had lo s t  i t s  te e th .  G radually i t  becam e le ss  o f  a  sym bol o f  n a tu ra l 
ev il and o f  e a r th ly  pow er which God would u ltim a te ly  sm ite  on th e  day 
o f judgm ent. A ccording to  th e  OED, in  1555 Eden, th e  au th o r o f 
D ecades, m erely  r e fe r s  to  th e  m onster a s  " the  g r e a t  se rp e n t o f  th e  sea  
L eu iathan  to  have such  dom inion in  th e  O cean . " 7 In  th e  sam e vein 
M ilton in  P arad ise  L ost ca lled  th e  B ehem oth " the  b ig g est b o m  o f 
e a rth "  and i t s  com panion th e  "L eviathan , H ugest o f  liv ing  C rea tu res , 
on th e  Deep S tre tc h t  lik e  a  P rom ontrie ."  Spencer re n d e rs  th e  
L ev iathan  even  m ore innocuously: th e  Old T es tam en t sym bol o f  worldly 
ev il becam e, in  th e  p o e t's  hand, "The huge L euiathan , dam e N atu res 
wonder." The L eviathan, d isassoc ia ted  from  i t s  connec tion  w ith  evil,
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becam e a  descrip tion  o f  anyth ing  th a t  w as sim ply big, even  a t  tim e s  
only a  hum an. Around 1630 Sanderson re p o rte d ly  serm onized  ag a in st 
pow erfu l men calling  them  "g re a t.. .lev ia th an s o f th e  world." And 
M iddleton in  1624 used  th e  word to  describe  n e ith e r  a  b e a s t n o r a  man, 
b u t a  rag ing  con troversy : "This lev ia th a n -sc an d a l t h a t  l ie s  ro lling
Upon th e  c ry s ta l  w ate rs  o f  d ev o tio n ...." The b e s t known usage o f  th e
word is , o f course , Hobbes's, b u t th e  p o in t is  t h a t  by th e  t im e  o f 
Hobbes's w riting  o f  th e  book in  th e  middle o f  th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  
th e  ev o ca tiv e  Old T es tam en t m etaphor had becom e a  w atered-dow n im ag e , 
app licab le  to  ju s t  ab o u t any th ing  which seem ed  la rg e r  th a n  life , 
a lb e it slightLy m enacing.
The w idely-held view t h a t  th e  L ev iathan  was Hobbes's m etaphor fo r  
th e  s ta t e  th u s  req u ire s  qualifica tion . A lthough Hobbes r e fe r s  t o  th e  
book o f Jo b  w here he says he g o t th e  t i t l e  o f his book, th e  language 
and  usage which he in h e rite d  was m ore t h a t  o f  a  d e-n a tu red
m etapho rica l b eas t. So th e  m eaning o f th e  im ag e  o f  th e  L ev iathan  has
a l te re d  th ro u g h o u t th e  ages, from  t h a t  o f  th e  "L eviathan  th e  fLeeing 
serpen t"  o f Isa iah  t o  th e  m ore m odem  day  re fe re n c e  to  th e  g r e a t  Dr. 
Johnson a s  " the  L ev iathan  o f  L ite ra tu re ."  As te s tim o n y  t o  th e  
changing m eaning o f th e  m etaphor in  Hobbes's own tim e  one need  only to  
be  rem inded  t h a t  Hobbes, even  though  he was o f te n  accused  o f being an 
a th e is t, w as seldom , i f  ev er, accused  o f em ploying an  im ag e  fo r  his
philosophical work which was a g a in s t th e  pow er o f  God, a  com pla in t
which c e r ta in ly  would have been  le v e led  a g a in s t him i f  th e  L eviathan  
had  m ain tained  i t s  Old T es tam en t m eaning. P u t sim ply, Hobbes was ab le  
to  rem ak e  th e  m etaphor in  his own im age.
In  sp ite  o f i t s  prom inence in  th e  t i t l e  Hobbes seldom  re fe r s  to  
th e  im age i ts e lf ,  and in  th o se  few  passages in  which he re s u r re c ts  th e
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im age  he does so ch iefly  by alluding to  w h at he considered  w ere i t s  
synonym ous im ages. The L eviathan  was th u s  com pared  by Hobbes to  a  
"m o rta l god" (which o f course is  y e t  an o th e r im age) o r  t o  t h a t  o f th e  
"a rtific ia l man" which enab les Hobbes to  m ake an  e la b o ra te  com parison
g
betw een  an  a rtif ic ia l hum an body and th e  com m onw ealth . Thus we find  
th e  L ev iathan 's  im age  is  n o t com m ented  upon by Hobbes; i t s  po tency  
lie s  in  i t s  ab ility  to  spaw n o th e r, seem ing ly  m ore in s tru c tiv e , 
im ages. This should n o t su rp rise  since  by th e  t im e  o f th e  sev en teen th  
cen tu ry  th e  im age was a t  th e  very  le a s t  p a r tia lly  worn, a  m etaphor 
which was in  d anger o f  being ta k e n  to  be l i te ra l ly  t r u e  a s  th e  nam e o f 
anyth ing  which had im m ense s ize . Why th e n  did Hobbes n o t  choose th e  
a l te rn a te  im ag es o f  th e  m o rta l god o r  th e  a r t i f ic ia l  m an f o r  his 
m etaphoric  t i t l e ,  seeing  how th e se  o th e r  d escrip tions had  also
cap tu red  his im  agination?
I t  was Hobbes's be lie f, a s  he argued  in  th e  l a s t  book o f  th e  
L ev iathan  e n title d  "The Kingdom o f D arkness," t h a t  a l l  im ag es  m ust 
f i r s t  be sanctioned  by God. I f  God H im self w as n o t  th e  c re a to r  o f
im ag es th e n  th e i r  e s tab lish m en t could only be  p erce iv ed  a s  id o la try  on
th e  p a r t  o f i t s  c re a to r  -  t h a t  is , by man. Hobbes d efin es  id o la try  in
L ev iathan  a s  th e  c re a tio n  o f  an  im age "by p riv a te  au th o rity , and  n o t
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by th e  au th o rity  o f them  t h a t  a re  our sovereign  pasto rs."  Only i f  God
o r  His re p re se n ta tiv e s  on e a r th  com m anded t h a t  an  im ag e  b e  c re a te d
would th e n  th e  use o f t h a t  im ag e  be ju s tif ied . In  f a c t  Hobbes ta k e s
v e ry  seriou riy  -  and  li te ra lly  -  Jehovah 's  com m andm ent t o  Moses on th e
c rea tio n  o f im ages:
" ...th e  words o f th e  second com m andm ent, th o u  sh a ft n o t
make t o  th y  s e lf  any g raven  im ag e , & c ., d istinguish  betw een
th e  im ages  t h a t  God com manded to  be s e t  up, and th o se  t h a t  we s e t
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up ourselves. "
Hobbes's r a th e r  len g th y  com m entary  on id o la try  in  L ev iathan  tu rn s  on
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w hether th e  au th o r o f th e  c re a te d  im age is  God o r  a  man. Since th e
law  a s  handed down to  Moses fo rb ids th e  c re a tio n  and  b e lie f  in
m an-m ade im ages, th e n  only th o se  im ag es  which a re  a lre ad y  provided  in
th e  Old and New T estam en ts  a re  p e rm itte d . C learly  th e n  th e  more
e la b o ra te  im age  o f  th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man and i t s  a t te n d a n t com parisons
which a re  m ade th ro u g h o u t th e  L ev iathan  be tw een  hum an anatom y  and  th e
workings o f  th e  com m onw ealth  was n o t  a  su ita b le  m etaphoric  t i t l e  fo r
Hobbes to ,  a s  T.S. E lio t com plained, "peg o r  to  hang every  question  o f 
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philosophy...." Since th e  a r tif ic ia l man is  c re a te d , a s  Hobbes
explains, by man r a th e r  th a n  by God, and since  th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man
obviously does n o t make an  appea rance  in  th e  Bible, th e n  by h is own
stan d ard s  Hobbes would have l e f t  h im self open to  th e  ch arg e  o f
id o la try  by using i t  a s  a  sym bol fo r  h is work. Although th e  keen  eye
o f a  m ore c r i t ic a l  re a d e r  m ight r e c a ll  t h a t  th e  L ev iathan  was once a
sym bol fo r  ev il, by choosing an  Old T es tam en t se a  m onster which was
d ire c tly  c re a te d  by God a s  a  m etaphor fo r  so c ie ty , Hobbes was 
im p lic itly  s ta tin g  t h a t  h is im age  o f  th e  s ta t e  was sanc tioned  by God.
The m ore e la b o ra te  and m ore ex tensive ly  used  im ag es  o f th e  m o rta l god
and  th e  a r tif ic ia l man could n ev er have m ade th e  sam e c la im .
By tra d itio n  th e  law  a s  handed down to  Moses on to p  o f  Mt. sinai
co n s titu te d  f o r  th e  Jew s a  v e rb a l c o n tra c t  be tw een  Yahweh and
them selves. The c h a ra c te r is t ic  t r a i t  o f  Jew ish  re v e la tio n  w as t h a t
th e i r  God was alw ays h eard  and  n ev er seen . However, t h a t  which was
fo r  th e  H ebrews a  v e rb a l c o n tra c t  becam e fo r  Hobbes ex p lic itly  v isual,
a s  i f  th e  Jew ish  aud ito ry  tra d itio n  had  been  subsum ed under th e
C hristian  fa i th  w here th e  C h ris t fig u re  w as alw ays re p re se n te d  by
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v isu a l im ages. In  Hobbes's t r e a tm e n t  o f  th e  Bible, seeing  and  hearing  
a r e  so m etim es confused  a s  i f  th e y  sprung from  th e  sam e sense.
A ccording to  Hobbes,
" .. . i t  is  n o t d ec la red  in  w hat co n sis te th  th e  p ree  m inence o f th e  
m anner o f God's speaking t o  Moses, above t h a t  o f his speaking to  
o th e r  p rophets, a s  to  Sam uel, and to  A braham , to  whom he also
spake by vo ice  ( th a t i s  by vision), un less th e  d iffe re n c e  consist
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in  th e  d e a rn e s s  o f th e  vision."
In  Hobbes's in te rp re ta tio n  th e n , hearing  th e  vo ice  o f  God becom es
m easured by " the  d e a rn e s s  o f vision," an  equation  which would have
s tru c k  th e  Old T es tam en t p ro p h e ts  a s  being blasphem ous. I t  is  n o t 
d ifficu lt, how ever, t o  understand  why Hobbes could have confused  th e
sense  o f hearing  fo r  seeing  since  Hobbes was liv ing  in  a  W estern
tra d itio n  which valued  th e  sense  o f s ig h t o v e r th e  sense o f sound a s
th e  ro ad  which b e s t le d  to  know ledge. Thus in  th e  sam e passage Hobbes
suggests  t h a t  th e  know ledge o f  God's rev e la tio n  to  th e  Old T es tam en t
p ro p h e ts  may w ell have been  v isu a l since  "face  to  fa c e , and  mouth to
m outh, can n o t be l i te ra l ly  understood  o f in fin iten ess , and
14incom prehensib ility  o f  th e  Devine n a tu re ."  Since w hat we a re  dealing 
w ith  is  th e  A lm ighty, in  o th e r  words, i t  would seem  absurd  to  ascribe  
d iv ine rev e la tio n  a s  only t o  t h a t  which th e  sense  o f  hearing  could 
grasp . Even w ith divine rev e la tio n , th e  im age can  be said  to  be all-
in  arguing  along  th e  lin e s  o f  th e  m ore v isu a l C hristian  tra d itio n  
Hobbes was echoing a  way o f  perceiv ing  th e  w orld t h a t  s ta r te d  w ith  th e  
G reeks -  a  curious com bination  o f bo th  Platonism  and A risto te lian ism .
As C.S. Lewis arg u es  in  The D iscarded Im age, th e  re v iv a l o f Platonism  
in  th e  Middle Ages le d  many t o  believe t h a t  th e  im ages which in h ab ited
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th e  heavens could q u ite  reasonab ly  be m irrored  h e re  on e a r th , o r  a t
l e a s t  t h a t  th e re  was no a p r io r i reaso n  why th is  should n o t b e  th e
15case . T h a t th e re  ex isted  in  th e  heavens a  m ore p e r f e c t  c o u n te rp a r t
fo r  every th ing  on th e  e a r th  -  a  C hristian  version  o f  th e  P la ton ic  
Form s -  is  a lso  one o f  Hobbes's ju s tif ic a tio n s  in  th e  L ev iathan  fo r
th e  c itiz e n s  t o  ow e th e i r  a lleg ian ce  t o  th e i r  sovereign . In  h is  long
com m entary  on w hat e x a c tly  c o n s titu te s  an  im ag e , Hobbes arg u es  th a t:
" ..tin  th e  la rg e r  sense  o f th e  word [an] im age  is  con ta ined
also , any re p re sen ta tio n  o f one th in g  by ano ther. So an  e a rth ly
sovereign  may be ca lled  th e  im ag e  o f God: and an  in fe r io r
16m ag is tra te , th e  im age o f th e  e a rth ly  sovereign."
A part from  th e  s tro n g  m e tapho rica l defin itio n  o f  a  re lig ious im ag e  as  
"any rep re se n ta tio n  o f  one th in g  by ano ther,"  Hobbes also  seem s to  be 
saying  th a t  th e re  is  a  correspondence b e tw een  th e  im ag es  o f  heaven  and 
e a r th  and  t h a t  th e  e a rth ly  im ag es  a re  sanc tioned  by God. So even  
though  th e  Old T es tam en t L ev iathan  is  s e t  ag a in s t God and man, th e  
new er, m ore C hristian ized  version  o f  th e  b e a s t  is  p ro o f o f  God's 
d i r e c t  sanction ing  and guidance o f  a  p o litic a l system  which i s  b u ilt 
upon such im ages. "This is  th e  g en era tio n  o f  th e  g r e a t  Leviathan," 
Hobbes d ec la res , and  a s  i f  we w ere in  any  d oub t o f  th e  d ire c t  
correspondence be tw een  th e  im ag es  o f heaven  and  th o se  o f  th e  e a r th , 
Hobbes quickly  adds, "or ra th e r ,  to  speak  m ore re v e re n tly , o f  t h a t  
m o rta l god, t o  which we owe under th e  im m o rta l God, ou r p eac e  and 
defense ."  17
This le a v e s  som e room  to  sp ecu la te  on w hether Hobbes in ten d ed  to  
v isually  supp lan t C hristian ity , to w ard s  which he was t o  a  la rg e  e x te n t 
an tag o n is tic , w ith  a  m ore c iv il re lig ious im ag e , o r  w as he  m erely 
p lay ing  ic f f  fa m ilia r  b ib lica l im ag es  in  o rd e r  to  b o ls te r  h is own
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arg u m en ts  ab o u t th e  n a tu re  o f th e  s ta te .  P erhaps th e re  is  room  to  
ag ree  w ith bo th  positions. C erta in ly  Hobbes would n o t have com plained 
to o  b it te r ly  i f  C hristian ity , a t  le a s t  o f  th e  form  p rac tised  by th e  
C atho lic  Church and  various P u ritan  se c ts , sim ply fo lded  up and  l e f t  
tow n. On th e  o th e r  hand, a s  M ichael O akesho tt po in ts  o u t in  Hobbes on 
C ivil A ssociation, many o f  th e  e lem en ts  in  th e  L ev iathan  a re  b u t a  
re-w ork ing  o f  th e  C hristian  c re a tio n  m yth, w ith  th e  d o c trin e  o f
orig inal sin  n ece ss ita tin g  t h a t  th e  sovereign  p ro te c t  th e  people from
18 . 
one ano th er. H ere th e n , Hobbes is  n o t  31s t  rep lac ing  th e  im ag es  o f
C hristian ity  b u t building upon th o se  v ery  sam e im ag es  and m yths which
speak  d ire c tly  to  h is p o litic a l philosophy. I t  should be  added  th a t
in  doing so  Hobbes was borrow ing from  th e  s tan d a rd  p ra c tic e  of
u tiliz in g  w ell known biblical im ag es in  o rd e r to  sco re  political,
po in ts. Even in  Hobbes's own life tim e , f o r  exam ple, i t  was n o t
uncom m on to  find  t h a t  th e  b ib lica l im ag e  o f  King David had  been
ap p ro p ria ted  by th e  fo llow ers o f  Crom well, a s  seen  in  M arvell's la te
p o e try , and also by th o se , lik e  Dryden, who p o rtray ed  C harles H  in  
19
th e  sam e m anner.
I f  Hobbes's use o f  th e  im age o f  th e  L eviathan  echoed  th e  
C hris tian  P la to n is ts , th e n  h is th e o ry  o f  th e  im p o rtan ce  o f  im ag es in  
th e  l i f e  o f th e  mind w as d is tin c tly  A risto te lian . F or A ris to tle , and 
in d e ed  fo r  a  g r e a t  many philosophers up u n ti l  r a th e r  re c e n tly , th e  
a c tiv ity  o f th ink ing  was com prised  ch ie fly  o f  seeing  a  s e r ie s  o f 
im ag es  in  th e  mind. A ccording to  A risto tle  in  De Anima:
"Since i t  see  ms th a t  th e re  is  nothing ou tside and se p a ra te  in  
ex isten ce  from  sensib le  s p a tia l  m agnitudes, th e  o b jec ts  o f 
th o u g h t a re  in  sensib le fo rm s, v iz ., bo th  th e  a b s tr a c t  o b jec ts  
and  a l l  s ta te s  and a ffe c tio n s  o f  sensib le th in g s. Hence no one
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can  le a rn  o r  understand  anything in  th e  absence o f sense, and 
when th e  mind is  ac tiv e ly  aw are  o f anyth ing  i t  is  necessarily
aw are  o f  i t  along w ith an  im ag e ; fo r  im ag es  a re  lik e  sensuous
20c o n ten ts  e x c e p t t h a t  th e y  co n ta in  no m a tte r."
A ris to tle , lik e  Hobbes, believed  t h a t  sense  w as th e  m other o f  a l l  
know ledge. Since words n a tu ra lly  a t ta c h  th em se lv es  t o  im ages, th inking  
was a  m a tte r  o f  organizing th e  im ag es  in  th e  mind.
I f  we w ere to  expand th e  G reek concep tion  o f  logos to  include 
im ages, th e re fo re , we m ight a lso  w an t t o  inc lude a  d efin ition  o f 
"co h eren t im ages" along w ith t h a t  o f  "co h eren t speech ." In  p re se n t 
day te rm s , th ink ing  in  th is  way can  be likened  to  a  r e e l  o f  film  
playing in  th e  mind and w here each  word is  re p re se n te d  by a  single 
fra m e  o f  t h a t  film . So p re v a le n t was .th is  view  in  th e  long h isto ry  o f 
W estern philosophy, t h a t  i t  w as only u n til  r a th e r  re c e n tly  t h a t  i t  has 
been  p u t  in to  question. I t  was W ittgenstein 's r a th e r  com m onsense 
o b jec tion  t o  th is  tra d itio n , fo r  in s ta n c e , t h a t  when a  person  uses,
say, th e  word "blue" in  a  sen ten c e  he d o esn 't necessarily  has  an  im age
21o f "blueness" in  h is mind when he is  say ing  i t .  F requen tly  th e  words
we use when we speak  a re  d ivorced  from  th e ir  im ages, and such is  th e
obviousness o f  W ittgenstein 's observation  t h a t  i t  perhaps needs no
fu r th e r  illu s tra tio n .
T h a t Hobbes, a  philosopher who o therw ise  displays a  com m onsense
th e o ry  o f  language t h a t  is  som etim es rem ark ab le  fo r  i t s  m odem
day-sounding insigh ts, n ev e rth e less  had  also  th o u g h t along s im ilar
lin e s  t o  A ris to tle  te s t i f ie s  t h a t  i t  w as th e  p red o m in an t view  in
W estern philosophy th a t  im ages and words w ere in e x trica b ly  bound. F or 
Hobbes, th e  mind was n ev er w ithou t cogn itive im ages. In  th e  L eviathan
Hobbes defines  w h at he m eans by th e  word "im age": in  th e  s t r ic te s t
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sense  o f th e  word, Hobbes dec la res , an  im age
"...is  th e  resem hLence o f som ething v isib le: in  which sense th e
p h a n ta s tic a l fo rm s, apparitions, o r  seem ing o f v isib le  bodies to
22th e  s igh t, a re  only im ag es ...."
B ut in  th e  much la rg e r  sense  o f  th e  word, Hobbes explains, an  im ag e  is
sim ply th e  " rep resen ta tio n  o f  one th in g  by ano ther" w hether r e a l  o r
im agined . In  his E lem ents o f Law Hobbes is  m ore ex p lic it ab o u t how
im ages and th ink ing  a re  connected :
"For th e  understanding  o f w h at I  m ean by th e  pow er cogn itive , we
m ust rem em b er and acknow ledge t h a t  th e re  be in  our minds
continually  c e r ta in  im ages o r  concep tions o f th in g s  w ithou t us,
insom uch t h a t  i f  a  man could be a live , and a l l  th e  r e s t  o f th e
world ann ih ila ted , he should n ev erth e less  re ta in  t h r  im age
th e re o f , and a l l  th o se  th in g s  which he had seen  o r perce ived
in  i t ;  every  one by his own experience knowing, t h a t  th e  absence
o r d es tru c tio n  o f th in g s  once im agined  do th  n o t cause absence
o r d es tru c tio n  o f  th e  im ag ination  i ts e lf .  This im age  and
rep re se n ta tio n s  o f th e  q u a litie s  o f th e  th in g  w ithout, is  t h a t
we c a ll our conceptions, im ag in a tio n , id eas, n o tice  o r  
know ledge o f th e m ; and th e  fa c u lty  o r pow er by which we a re
capab le  o f such know ledge, is  t h a t  I  h e re  c a ll cognitive
23pow er, o r  conception , th e  pow er o f knowing o r conceiving."
We "continually" see  c e r ta in  im ages, in  o th e r  words, and reg a rd less  o f 
w hether th e se  th in g s  re a lly  e x is t o r  n o t, ou r p ercep tio n  o f them  is  
w hat c o n s titu te s  ou r th o u g h t p rocesses. Now in  L eviathan  Hobbes 
h im se lf m akes th e  connection  to  th e  G reek philosophers by s ta tin g  t h a t  
" th ese  a re  th e  im ages, which a re  o rig inally  and  m ost p roperly  ca lled  
id e as , and ido ls, and  derived  from  th e  language  o f  th e  G recians, w ith
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who m th e  word eido s ig m fie th  to  s e e .”
The im p o rtan ce , th e n , fo r  Hobbes o f  estab lish ing  th e  im age  o f  th e
L eviathan  from  around which his p o li tic a l philosophy could  revo lve
can n o t be o v e rs ta ted . F o r th e  re a d e r  t o  s e e  th e  im ag e  o f th e
L eviathan  m ean t t h a t  th e  id e a  t h a t  th e  L ev iathan  re p re se n te d  would
alw ays be  in  h is mind, "sec re tly  in s tru c tin g "  and convincing him o f
th e  t r u th  o f  w h at was being argued. N o t t o  have an  im ag e  driving th e
d iscourse  o f  th e  book would le a v e  h is  philosophical work im poverished.
Since th e  re a d e r  can  only th in k  in  te rm s  o f  im ages, th e n  i t  w as up  to
Hobbes t o  provide him w ith th o se  im ages which would have, w hat Hobbes
called , th e  "cognitive power" to  guide him th rough  th e  t r e a t is e .  The
b ib lica l im ag e  o f  th e  L eviathan  holds such  a  pow er fo r , a s  F rancis
Bacon po in ted  ou t, c e r ta in  "abstractions" w ill alw ays be ab le  to  
"seduce and fo rc ib ly  d is tu rb  th e  judgem ent." Hobbes un leashed  th e
"abstrac tion" o f a  m ythological b e a s t upon th e  world, using i t  a s  a
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guiding m etaphor fo r  h is p o litic a l philosophy. A lthough th e  co n ten ts  
o f th is  work ended  up provoking a  g r e a t  d e a l o f  con troversy  during his
own life tim e , th e  ap tn ess  o f  h is im age  was seldom  e v e r  in  d ispu te .
Section  Two:
The T itle  Page
Broadly speaking, th e  im ag es  o f  L ev iathan  o ccu r in  tw o  se p a ra te  
form s: th e  v e rb a l o r  m e taphorica l im ages em bedded in  th e  t e x t  and th e  
p ic to r ia l  il lu s tra tio n  on th e  t i t l e  page o f  th e  book. Each is  m ean t 
to  re in fo rc e  th e  o th e r. When Hobbes s ta te s  t h a t  th e  L ev iathan  is  like  
a  m o rta l god o r  an  a r t i f ic ia l  man th e  r e a d e r  can  tu rn  t o  th e  t i t l e  
page and see  an  il lu s tra tio n  o f  t h a t  which is  being described . This 
m ay s tr ik e  som e a s  a  com m on occu rrence  -  many books a re  adorned  w ith
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ev o ca tiv e  covers which a re  m ean t to  in t im a te  o r  re v e a l t h a t  which is
enclosed . W hat d istingu ishes L ev iathan  from  o th e r  books is  th e  f a c t
t h a t  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  sense  p ercep tion , a s  shown in  c h a p te r  four,
d o v e ta ils  in to  h is la rg e r  th e o ry  o f judgm ent, so  t h a t  th e  uniqueness
o f th e  im ag es  which adorn  Hobbes's t i t l e  page t o  L eviathan
illu s tra te s , bo th  li te ra l ly  and  fig u ra tiv e ly , Hobbes's th e o ry  o f 
know ledge and o f judgm ent.
The id e n tity  o f  th e  a r t i s t  who engraved  th e  f i r s t  ed itio n  o f  th e  
L ev iathan  is  d ispu ted . I t  has vaiiousLy been  a t tr ib u te d  t o  Abraham
Bosse, William F aithhom , and to  WencesLaus H ollar, am ong o th e rs  -  a l l
o f  whom w ere m aste r en g ravers  a t  th e  tim e  and whose a r t is t ry  suggests 
t h a t  th e y  w ere capab le  o f such  an  engrav ing . 26 Since th e  t i t l e  page
it s e l f  was unsigned (which was n o t an  uncom m on occurrence) i t s  
a ttr ib u tio n  has rem ained  a  m ystery . W hat does seem  c e r ta in  i s  t h a t
th e  design o f th e  t i t l e  page was done by th e  au th o r, which was also  a  
com m on occu rren ce , since th e  illu s tra tio n  re v e a ls  a  com p le te  know ledge 
o f th e  book's co n ten ts  to  a  d eg ree  which only Hobbes could have had. 
Many o f Hobbes's works w ere published w ith an  engraved  t i t l e  page; th e  
only m ajor work o f  h is t h a t  was published which d id  n o t co n ta in  a  
co v er il lu s tra tio n  w as B ehem oth and th is  anom aly  w as probably  due to  
i t s  being published a f te r  Hobbes's d ea th  and  also  a t  a  tim e , 1681, 
when th e  tra d itio n  o f having an  engraved  t i t l e  page to  a  book was 
beginning to  d ie  o u t .27
A second, perhaps m ore com pelling, a rg u m en t poin ting  to  th e  
p robab ility  o f  Hobbes's designing th e  t i t l e  page h im se lf has to  do 
w ith th e  uniqueness o f th e  c e n tra l  fig u re  in  th e  p ic tu re . On th e  to p  
h a lf  o f  th e  page overlooking a  cdty and  i t s  surrounding coun tryside  is
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th e  fig u re  o f a  man, rep u te d  to  resem b le  e i th e r  C rom w ell o r  C harles I  
(and so m etim es even  considered  to  be Hobbes h im self), w ith  arm s 
o u ts tre tc h e d  and  holding a  sw ord in  his r ig h t  hand and  a  bishop's 
c rook  in  h is l e f t ,  which re sp ec tiv e ly  sym bolize c iv il and 
e c c le s ia s tic a l au th o rity . His to rso  is  com posed o f  th e  popula tion  o f 
th e  com m onw ealth , a l l  o f  whom a re  d ep ic ted  a s  fac in g  him and  with 
th e ir  backs to w ard  us. This im age o f a  m onarch who is  sym bolically  
m ade up o f  th e  bodies o f  h is su b jec ts  is  surprising  ch iefly  because  i t  
occurs  now here e lse  -  t h a t  is , w ith  one m ajor excep tion . Hanging in  
th e  Louvre in  1647 was a  pain ting  o f  C ard inal R ichelieu which 
F a ith o m  had described  as
"...p resen ting  to  th e  com mon Beholder a  m ultitude o f l i t t l e  
fa c e s , (the fam ous an cesto rs  o f th a t  nobLe man); a t  th e  sam e
tim e , to  him th a t  looks th rough  a  P e rsp ec tiv e , th e re  appea rs
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only a  single p o r tr a i t  in  g re a t  o f th e  C hancellor h im self."
The p o in t o f th e  im age  p resen ted , accord ing  to  F a ith o m  w as in
"dem onstra ting  how th e  Body P o litick  is  com posed o f  m any N atu ra l
29Ones." Since Hobbes w ro te  th e  L ev iathan  when he was resid ing  in  P aris  
a t  t h a t  tim e , i t  is  possible he  m ay have draw n h is in sp ira tio n  fo r  th e  
design o f th e  t i t l e  page from  R ichelieu 's p o r tra it , th u s  suggesting  
an o th e r a rg u m en t in  fav o u r o f a ttib u tin g  th e  t i t l e  page 's  design to  
H obbes
On th e  bo ttom  h a lf  o f th e  t i t l e  page a re  th re e  long  panels, th e  
middle o f which con ta in s  th e  t i t l e  o f th e  work: "LEVIATHAN Or The 
M atter, Form e, and Pow er o f  A Comm on W ealth E cc lesiastica l! and Civil 
by Thom as Hobbes o f  M almesbury." F lanked on both  sides o f  th e  middle 
p an e l a re  a  se rie s  o f  p ic tu re s  which d e p ic t various a sp e c ts  o f  c iv il 
and e c c le s ia s tic a l au th o rity . On th e  l e f t  p an e l a re  fiv e  sm a ll im ages
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o f c iv il pow er. The to p  im age is  o f a  c a s tle  on a  h ill, sym bolizing
th e  hom e o f  c iv il au th o rity . Below t h a t  a  p ic tu re  o f  a  crow n,
sym bolizing th e  au th o rity  o f th e  m onarch. Below th a t  is  a  s ile n t 
cannon, sym bolizing p eac e  th rough  s tre n g th . Fourth ly  ap p ea rs  a
co llec tio n  o f  w eaponry s tack e d  to g e th e r  and  presum ably  read y  fo r  use, 
and  fina lly  th e  l a s t  p ic tu re  is  o f a  rag ing  b a t t le  w ith  bo th  sides 
bearing  w h at appears to  be  a lm o st id e n tic a l s tandards, which sym bolize 
th e  s ta t e  o f  n a tu re  a s  a  w ar o f men ag a in s t men. On th e  r ig h t  sided 
p an e l ap p ea rs  th e  im ag es  o f  i t s  e c c le s ia s t ic a l c o u n te rp a rt. Again, 
th e  to p  p ic tu re  p o rtray s  a  c a th e d ra l o r  a  church , th e  hom e o f 
re lig ious au th o rity . Below t h a t  is  o f  a  bishop's h a t  sym bolizing th e  
au th o rity  o f th e  bishop. B eneath  t h a t  is  a  cloud em ittin g
thunderbo lts , showing, perhaps, th e  re lig ious au th o rity 's  pow er o f
excom m unication . F ourth ly  we have th e  weapons o f  th e  church: th re e -  
and tw o-pronged  sp ea rs  sym bolizing th e  divisions w ithin th e  church . 
The w riting  on each  prong re a d s  "syl-," "logis-," "m e," "Spiritual," 
"D irect,"  "Indirect," "Tem poral," "Real," and 1In te n tio n a l." The 
sp ea rs  a re  co n n ec ted  by a  p a ir  o f  horns which a re  la b e led  "D ilem m a." 
F inally , on th e  bottom  p ic tu re , is  an  illu s tra tio n  o f a  church  council 
debating  a  d o c trin a l d ispu te  -  th e  re lig ious c o u n te rp a r t to  a  c iv il
w ar.
C learly  th e se  im ag es  a re  m ean t to  be m etaphorical. A lthough each  
illu s tra tio n  is  o f  a  c o n c re te  ob jec t, th e i r  m eaning is  a lso  a b s tra c t. 
M oreover, th e i r  exp lanato ry  pow er re s id es  in  th e i r  re la tio n  to  one 
an o th er, which is  why th e y  a re  p resen ted  in  such  a  p rec ise  o rd e r  o f 
appearance .
As m entioned e a rlie r , Hobbes believed  t h a t  we a re  co n s tan tly  
being bom barded by im ages, som e t r u e  and som e fa lse  w ith no m ethod o f
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sep a ra tin g  which from  which. His th e o ry  o f op tics  in fo rm s u s  t h a t  th e  
o b je c t t h a t  we p e rce iv e  sends o u t  po ises which a re  c ap tu red  by th e  
hum an eye  and  which a re  th e n  in te rp re te d  by th e  brain . The heart* in  
tu rn , sends o u t i t s  own pu lses so  t h a t  th e  b ra in  is  th e n  s tim u la ted  
(which is  th e  m eaning behind Hobbes's m etaphor t h a t  th e  "bra in  is  th e  
fo u n ta in  o f  a l l  sense"). Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  o p tics  n e c e ss ita te s  t h a t  
ob jects , o r a t  le a s t  ou r p erce p tio n  o f  ob jec ts , be alw ays in  motion. 
W hat th e  hum an eye is  re g is te rin g  is  th e  f a c t  t h a t  o b je c t 'A ' has 
moved from  position  1 and is  now a t  position  2 , and so  on. I t  is  a s  
i f  ou r ro le  o f  film  im ages which m etaphorically  p lay  in  our mind w ere 
to  advance sLowly fra m e  by fra m e . The judgm en t which i s  th e  end 
p ro d u c t o f th is  m otion is  d ep en d en t upon th e  change which has  occu rred  
and which th e  eye has re g is te re d . The judg m en t t h a t  i s  g leaned , in  
o th e r  words, from  eac h  single im ag e  o r  fra m e  does n o t  re s id e  in  th e  
im age i ts e lf  b u t is  derived  from  i t s  asso c ia tio n  w ith w h at has com e 
b e fo re  i t  and th a t  which com es a f te r .  As Hobbes po in ts  ou t,
"For by sense, we com monly understand  th e  ju d g m en t we make of 
o b jec ts  by th e i r  phantasm s; nam ely, by com paring  th e  
distinguishing th o se  phantasm s; which we could n ev er do, i f  t h a t  
m otion in  th e  organ, by  which t h a t  phantasm  is  m ade, d id  n o t
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rem a in  th e re  fo r  som e tim e , and make th e  sam e phantasm  re tu rn ."
Since ou r m em ory allow s us t o  r e ta in  w h at has com e b efo re  th e  im age,
we a re  ab le  t o  d istinguish  th e  p rog ress o r  change which th e  im ag e  has
m ade. Judgm ent, a s  we m ight re c a ll,  is  defined  by Hobbes a s  th e
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ab ility  to  sense  th e  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  th ings.
Now i f  we tu rn  t o  th e  titL e page o f  Hobbes's L ev iathan  we a re  
given a  p e r fe c t  il lu s tra tio n  o f  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  judgm en t upon sense 
p ercep tio n . Each im age d ep ic ted  (the fiv e  p ic tu re s  o f c iv il au th o rity
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and th e  f iv e  o f e c c le s ia s tic a l au thority ) s tan d s  in  re la tio n  to  one
an o th e r. T here is  a  lin e a r  progression  in  each  panel. The eye moves
from  one im ag e  to  th e  nex t, reg is te rin g  w h at th e  im age  p o rtray s , and
distinguishing one im ag e  from  th e  o th e r. The judgm en t o f th e  meaning
o f e ac h  p a n e l only becom es d e a r  once th e  ey e  h as  re g is te re d  and
understood  a l l  th e  im ag es in  th e i r  re la tio n  t o  one an o th er. The
m ovem ent o f  d v d l a u th o rity  betw een , say , position  1 and  position  2
and  position  3 ( th a t is  t o  say , be tw een  weapons being used  in  com bat,
being s tack e d  to g e th e r  w aiting  to  be  used, and sim ply stand ing
s ilen tly  a l l  by them selves) re v e a ls  to  th e  re a d e r  th e  o v e ra ll meaning
o f th e  engraving. Man r is e s  from  th e  dep th s o f  a  s ta t e  o f n a tu re ,
which is  one o f p e rp e tu a l co n flic t, t o  th e  apex  o f se c u rity  and p eace .
And only by reg is te rin g  each  im age in  th is  m ovem ent, lik e  a rgum en ts
p iled  on a  page, do we com e to  understand  w hat is  being sa id  to  us.
We can  say , th e re fo re , t h a t  in  th e  t i t l e  page o f L ev iathan  Hobbes
th e o ry  o f  judgm ent, im ages, o p tics  and  even  h is highly v isu a l th e o ry
o f know ledge a re  rep re sen ted , each  il lu s tra te d , li te ra l ly , by th e
design o f th e  au th o r and th e  hand o f th e  engraver.
S ection  Three:
The Soul o f  th e  Artif ic ia l Man
Knowledge o f hum an anatom y in  B rita in  w as ju s t  developing when Hobbes 
w ro te  th e  L ev iathan  in  1651. In  th e  s ix te en th  cen tu ry  v e ry  few  works
on anatom y  ex isted  in  th e  vern acu la r, w ith  th e  main ex cep tio n  being
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John  B anister’s  The h is to ric  o f man published in  1578. The explosion 
o f in fo rm atio n  on hum an anatom y did  n o t  o ccu r in  B rita in  u n til  w ell 
in to  th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  (as opposed t o  f a r  e a r l ie r  on th e  
C ontinent) and to  give som e ind ica tio n  o f th e  e x te n t  o f th e  s c ie n tif ic
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work being c a rried  o u t a t  th is  t im e  i t  is  in s tru c tiv e  to  n o te  t h a t  
b e tw een  1600 and  1650 only f i f ty  books w ere published in  B rita in  on
33anatom y, b u t be tw een  1650 and 1700 t h a t  num ber had  in c re a se d  t o  230.
The to p ic s  o f  th e se  te x ts  ran g ed  from  th e  c irc u la to ry  system  and  bone
s tru c tu re  to  th e  design o f muscles. P erhaps th e  m ost in f lu e n tia l o f
th e se  was William H arvey's De Motu cord is e t  sanguines, published in
1628, which s e t  o u t to  o f fe r  a  p ro o f o f  th e  w orkings o f  th e  
c irc u la to ry  system  -  a  proof, r a th e r  th a n  a  d iscovery , based  upon th e
sc ie n tif ic  m ethod o f  hypothesis, observation , te s t in g  and
v e rifica tio n . As n o ted  e a r lie r , Hobbes was g re a tly  im pressed  w ith
H arvey's m ethod. This explosion o f  an a to m ic a l in fo rm atio n  o f  th e  s o r t
t h a t  H arvey in tro d u ced  provided Hobbes w ith a  read y -m ad e  m etaphor fo r
his work, an  e la b o ra te  com parison be tw een  a  n a tu ra l and an  a r t i f ic ia l
body which he used  n o t only a s  a  rh e to r ic a l dev ice  to  com m unica te  h is
34id e a s  b u t as  th e  sc ie n tif ic  underpinning fo r  his p o litic a l though t.
P revious com parisons o f hum an anatom y  w ith th e  s ta t e  had  o f 
course been  m ade. One o f th e  m ore fam ous is  John  o f Salisbury 's 
tw e lf th  cen tu ry  indenti.fica tio n  o f th e  s ta te  a s  com prised  o f  a  king as
th e  head  o f  a  hum an body, th e  c lergy  a s  i t s  arm s, th e  people a s  i t s
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sto m ach , and th e  arm y  a s  i t s  f e e t .  Gcang back  fu r th e r  one encoun ters  
th e  e a r ly  C hristian  tra d itio n  o f  inden tify ing  th e  body o f C h ris t w ith 
th e  com m unity  o f believers , and  even  fu r th e r  back  th a n  t h a t  one finds
t h a t  th e  f i f th  cen tu ry  B.C. G reek concep tion  o f  th e  h ea lth  o f  th e
36p clis  was o f te n  c o n tra s te d  w ith t h a t  o f  th e  h ea lth y  individual. 
H owever, th e se  e a r l ie r  an a to m ic a l com parisons w ere n o t sc ie n tif ic  in  
th e  sam e way t h a t  Hobbes's was: while th e y  w ere based  on a  ra th e r  
naive and  som ew hat su p erfic ia l understanding  o f hum an anatom y , Hobbes 
could b o a s t t h a t  h is co n ce p t o f  ana tom y  ac tu a lly  m irrored  p rec ise ly
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w hat was sc ien tif ic a lly  known ab o u t th e  hum an body. Indeed , anything 
new t h a t  was d iscovered  ab o u t th e  body could sim ply re in fo rc e  Hobbes's
o v e ra ll argum en t, especia lly  since  i t ,  to o , w as founded upon and
designed from  sc ie n tif ic  p rincip les.
A ubrey te l ls  us t h a t  w hilst Hobbes was in  P aris  -  p resum ably  ju s t
b e fo re  w riting  th e  L eviathan  -  he "studied  V esailius1 A natom y." "This
I  am su re  was b e fo re  1648," A ubrey says, " fo r t h a t  S ir William
37P e tty . . .stud ied  and  d issec ted  w ith  him ." F resh  from  h is an a to m ica l
s tud ies, Hobbes w ro te  L ev iathan  heav ily  borrow ing from  th e  s tudy  o f 
hum an anatom y. Now th e  m etaphoric im age  o f  th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man is  s e t  
o u t by Hobbes in  th e  f i r s t  parag raph  o f th e  L ev iathan . As i t  i s  t h a t  
God is  th e  au th o r o f  n a tu re , man may consider h im se lf to  be th e  au th o r 
o f a l l  t h a t  he c re a te s  "by th e  a r t  o f  man." A ll l i f e  is  b u t a  m otion 
o f  th e  lim bs, Hobbes in fo rm s us, and th e  m ovem ent is  d ire c te d  from  
w ithin, in  th e  sam e m anner t h a t  a  w atch  moves by i t s  in te rn a l  m otions 
o f  i t s  springs and  wheels. In  bo th  cases, w hether i t  be man o r
m an-m ade m achine, th e  "p rincipal p a rt"  is  th e  h e a r t  "fo r w h at i s  th e
h e a r t ,  b u t  a  spring; and th e  nerves, b u t so  many s trings; and  th e
jcdnts, b u t so many w heels, giving m otion to  th e  w hole body, such  a s
3 8was in ten d ed  by th e  a r tif ic e r ."  Hobbes s ta te s  fu r th e r  t h a t  th is  " a r t  
o f man" is  m ore im p o rta n t th a n  th a t  o f God fo r  man can  c re a te  h is from  
a  ra t io n a l  design. This, th e n , is  one o f  th e  d iffe re n ces  betw een  
Hobbes's im ag e  o f  th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man and John  o f  Salisbury 's body 
p o litic : th e  le t t e r 's  is  re f le c tiv e  o f  God's c rea tio n ; th e  king i s  th e
head  because  i t  corresponds t o  a  n a tu ra l o rd e r  o f  th in g s  which is  
devinely  insp ired . Hobbes's m etaphor, on th e  o th e r  hand, i s  n e ith e r
n a tu ra l n o r devinely  insp ired ; s ince  i t  is  based  upon a  ra tio n a l
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co n stru c tio n  o f  man's own making, th e n  th is  p a r tic u la r  " a r t  goes y e t  
fu r th e r , im ita tin g  t h a t  ra tio n a l and m ost ex c e lle n t work o f  n a tu re , 
m an."
A t th is  p o in t Hobbes p re sen ts  us w ith w h at he considers to  be  th e  
crux  o f  th e  im age o f  th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man, an  im age which p lays i ts e lf  
o u t in  various ways th ro u g h o u t th e  r e s t  o f th e  book:
"For by a r t  is  c re a te d  t h a t  th e  g r e a t  L ev iathan  ca lled  a
Com m onw ealth, o r  a  S ta te , in  L atin  C ivitas, which is  b u t an
a r ti f ic ia l  man; though  o f a  g re a te r  s te n g th  th a n  th e  n a tu ra l, fo r
whose p ro te c tio n  and d efence  i t  was in tended ; and in  which th e
sovereign ty  is  an  a rtif ic ia l soul, as  giving l i f e  a  m otion to
th e  whole body; th e  m ag is tra te s , and o th e r  o ff ic e rs  o f th e
judicatLve and execu tive , a r tif ic ia l jo in ts; rew ard  and
punishm ent, by which fa s ten e d  to  th e  s e a t  o f th e  sovereign ty
every  jo in t and m em ber is  moved to  perform  his du ty , a re  th e
nerves, t h a t  do th e  sam e in  th e  body n a tu ra l; th e  w ealth  and
rich es  o f a l l  p a r tic u la r  m em bers, a re  th e  s tren g th ; salus
populi (the people 's safe ty ) i t s  business; counsellors, by who m
a l l  th in g s  n eed fu l fo r  i t  t o  know a re  suggested  un to  i t ,  a re  th e
memory; eq u ity , and law s, an  a r tif ic ia l reaso n  and will; concord,
hea lth ; sed ition  and sickness; and c iv il w ar, d ea th . L astly , th e
p a c ts  and covenants, by w hich th e  p a r ts  o f th e  body p o litic  w ere
a t  f i r s t  m ade, s e t  to g e th e r , and  un ited , resem b le  t h a t  f ia t ,  o r
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th e  l e t  us make man, pronounced by God in  th e  c rea tion ."
Each p a r t  o f  th e  a r t i f ic ia l  body corresponds t o  t h a t  o f  th e  a r tif ic ia l 
c iv il so c ie ty  a s  ou tlined  th rough  th e  rem a in d er o f  th e  book. B efore 
show ing how som e o f th e se  e lem en ts  o f  hum an anatom y fu n c tio n  in  th e  
work, how ever, I  w an t to  b rie fly  fo cu s  on th e  ro le  p layed  by th e  soul. 40
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In  Hobbes's L atin  version  o f L ev iathan  th e  word sou1, a s  i t  
ap p ea rs  in  th e  above passage, i s  tra n s la te d  a s  "anim a" [ 'In  quo is ,
qu i sum m am  h a b e t p o te s ta te m , p ro  anim a  e s t ,  corpus to tu m  v iv iflcan te
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e t  m ovente"]. C rucially , th is  i s  n o t th e  anim a  o f P la to  w here th e  
sou l is  divided be tw een  passion and reaso n  (the  m yth o f th e  c h a rio te e r  
in  Phaedrus) o r  is  d is tin c t from  th e  body (as seen  in  th e  Phaedo, 
T im aeus and o th e r  dialogues). 42 Hobbes's anim a  is  thoroughly  
A risto te lian . A ris to tle 's  t r e a t i s e  De Anim a  m akes i t  q u ite  c le a r  t h a t  
th e  so u l is  com posed o f  b o th  sensa tions and o f th e  fa c u lty  o f
m ovem ent; w ithou t th e  soul, A ris to tle  con tends, th e re  would be
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n e ith e r. This anim a  i s  th e  sou l o f  Aquinas's f i r s t  m over, giving 
m otion to  a l l  l i f e  and y e t  n o t being a  p ro d u c t o f  m otion its e lf .  Now 
Hobbes s im ila rly  re fu se s  to  divide th e  soul, claim ing, fo r  in s ta n c e , 
t h a t  a s  th e re  can  only be one sou l in  a  single body, th e re  is  likew ise 
only one sou l in  th e  com m onw ealth . Hobbes a rg u es  t h a t  th e  sou l can n o t
be divided, a s  in  C hristian  th o u g h t, in to  a  th r e e  -  in to  -  one e n tity
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fo r  t h a t  would only b reed  con ten tion . F o r Hobbes, th e  sou l "nourishes
th e  body” a s  w ell a s  enab les i t  t o  function :
"For th e  sovereign  is  th e  public soul, giving li f e  and m otion 
to  th e  com m onw ealth; which expiring, th e  m em bers a re  governed
by i t  no m ore, th a n  th e  c a rc a se  o f a  man, by his d ep a rted , though
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im  m o rta l souL"
W ithout th e  soul, th e  body p o litic  is  b u t  a  ca rcass . Hobbes's so u l o f
th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man is  th e  an im a to r o f a l l  po litica l li fe .
Now Hobbes's descrip tion  o f  th e  a r tif ic ia l man a s  com prising th e  
anim a  o f th e  e n tire  c iv il so c ie ty  w as in  d ir e c t  r e b u t ta l  to  th e  
G rotian , c o n tra c te ria n , th e o ry  o f n a tu ra l law  -  a  th e o ry  which cla im ed  
t h a t  i t  was possible fo r  th e  popula tion  to  m ake a  c o n tra c t  w ith  th e
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sovereign  which would be binding to  bo th  th e  people and th e  sovereign.
As G rottos argued  in  h is De lu re  Belli a c  Pacds, a l l  ag en ts  o f  th e
s ta te  a re  su b je c t to  th e  sam e law s a s  th e  "observance o f th e se  th in g s
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is  binding upon a l l  Kings, even  though th e y  have m ade no prom ise."
GrotLus in itia lly  sh ared  w ith  Hobbes th e  A ris to te lian  observation  th a t  
som e men a re  bo m  slaves, o r, a s  G rotins observed, "m en make 
th em se lv es  su b je c t to  th e  ru le  and pow er o f  ano ther."  4 7 B ut fo r  Hobbes 
th is  m ean t t h a t  th e  sovereign  had com p le te  a u th o rity  o v e r his
sub jec ts , de term in ing  th e  com m onw ealth 's law s and leg is la tin g  th e  very  
vocabu lary  o f  th e  so c ie ty . The only th in g  t h a t  th e  Hobbesian ru le r
could n o t do was to  ta k e  th e  l i f e  o f th e  m em bers o f th e  com m onw ealth  
since  t h a t  would in v a lid a te  th e  sovereign 's  prom ise to  p ro te c t  his
sub jec ts . 48
In  th e  s tan d ard  c o n tra c te r ia n  p o litic a l th e o ry  o f th e  com m unity,
how ever, th e  sovereign  o f  t h a t  com m unity  had an o th e r bodily
sign ifica tion . When John  o f Salisbury re fe r re d  to  th e  im ag e  o f  th e  
body p o litic  he d ec la red  t h a t  th e  sovereign  was th e  "head" o f  th e
body, n o t th e  souL The sovereign  com prised ju s t  one e le m e n t o f  th e
com m onw ealth; indeed , in  Salisbury 's m etaphor w ithou t th e  head  th e re
could s t i l l  be a  body po litic , a lb e it one t h a t  w as no lo n g e r governed
from  above. In  G rotian  n a tu ra l law  th e o ry  th e  sovereign  is  likew ise
th e  'head ' o f th e  com m onw ealth . F o r GrotLus, th e  binding c o n tra c t
be tw een  th e  sovereign  and  h is su b jec ts  d id  n o t t r a n s la te  in to  a
sovereign  having com ple te , lim itle s s  c o n tro l over h is people. All
m em bers o f  th e  com m onw ealth  should have an  eq u a l say  in  th e  running o f
th e  c iv il so c ie ty  based  upon n a tu ra l law , according  to  GrotLus. "H
is  m anifestly  unfair,"  G rotins com plained when re fe rr in g  to  th e
com peting  r ig h ts  o f th e  m inority  and th e  m ajority  in  th e  com m onw ealth ,
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" th a t  th e  m ajority  should be ru led  by th e  m inority." The m ajority ,
G rotins con tinued , "has th e  sam e r ig h t a s  th e  e n tire  body, i f  due
excep tio n  is  made o f  ag ree m en ts  and law s which p rescribe  th e  form  o f
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conducting  business." In  o th e r  words, fo r  Salisbury and G rotins (one
could inc lude John  Locke a s  well) th e  body p o litic  was n o t  an im ated
from  one single , unifying fo rc e  o r  anim a  b u t was com posed o f  sev era l,
se lf-an im atin g  e lem en ts  which had ag reed  to  be jo ined to g e th e r .
This was th e  im p e tu s  behind Hobbes's g rand  body m etaphor o f  th e
s ta te :  to  show t h a t  i t  w as im possib le fo r  th e  com m onw ealth  to  e x is t
w ithou t th e  sovereign  which was i t s  anim a . Hobbes is  th e re fo re
im p lic itly  inva lida ting  th e  e a r l ie r  c o n tra c ta r ia n  th e o rie s  o f  th e  body
p o litic . Indeed , even  w ell b e fo re  L ev iathan  Hobbes had w ritten  in  De
Cive t h a t  head  o f th e  body p o litic  was n o t th e  lo cu s  o f his au th o rity .
The o ff ice  o f  th e  head  is  to  counsel," Hobbes p rocla im ed , "of th e  soul
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to  com m and." I t  is  th e  so u l which allow s l i f e ,  p o litic a l and
o the rw ise , to  function ; w ithou t th e  anim a  th e re  is  b u t a  p o litic a l 
carcass .
S ection  Four:
The Functions o f  th e  Body P o litic
Hobbes argued  t h a t  th e  w ilfu l com bining o f  unlike o b je c ts  was an
absurd ity . One can n o t in te llig e n tly  speak  o f  a  round quadrangle, fo r
e x a m p le .51 A lthough Hobbes does n o t  expressly  s ta te  i t ,  i t  is  d e a r  
t h a t  th e  d iffe re n ce  be tw een  th e  co n ce p t o f  a  round  quadrang le (which 
Hobbes considers to  be absurd) and  an  a r t i f ic ia l  man (which Hobbes 
b e lieves  to  b e  in s tru c tiv e ) i s  t h a t  th e  l a t t e r  can  be im ag ined  o r 
understood by th e  sense  o f v ision w hils t th e  fo rm e r canno t. The 
m etaphoric  tr a n s fe r  o f  th e  p ro p e rtie s  o f  roundness w ith th e  p ro p e rtie s
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o f a  quadrang le is  a  ca teg o ry  m istake because  i t  can n o t be g rasped  by
th e  senses. Hobbes's im ag e  o f  th e  a r tif ic ia l man, how ever, is  n o t a  
ca teg o ry  m istake -  ie .  i t  i s  n o t  an  absu rd ity  -  because  th e  im age does
ex is t, a lb e it  only in  th e  im ag ination . To view  Hobbes's im age  a s  only
an  analogy, th e n , i s  to  devalue i t s  cu rrency . In  an  analogy, ju s t  a s
in  a  ca teg o ry  m istake, w henever expressing  one th in g  in  te rm s  of
highlighting an  a s p e c t o f  som eth ing  e lse , one is  aw are  t h a t  i t  i s  th e
p rim ary  ite m , ca teg o ry  'A ', which is  being com pared  to  a  secondary
ite m , ca teg o ry  'B'. B u t in  Hobbes's co m plica ted  m etaphor we a re
co n stan tly  aw are  t h a t  th e  la rg e r- th a n -life  a r t i f ic a l  man and th e  s ta te
a re  one and th e  sam e th in g . To r e c a ll  th e  discussion o f  K arl Popper's
defin itio n  o f s c ie n tif ic  d escrip tions in  c h a p te r  one, th e  p ro p e rtie s
o f Hobbes's s ta t e  and  th o se  o f th e  hum an body com bine th e m se lv es  in to
a  single e n tity . Hobbes's m etaphor is  p a r t  nom inalist, p a r t
e ssen tia lis t, describ ing  th e  behav ior o f  th e  s ta te  and w h at i t  m eans
to  b e  a  s ta te .  F a r  from  being simpLy an  analogy, th e n , th e
a r t i f ic ia l  man is  an  im ag e  which is  so pervasive  and s tro n g , so
in s tru m e n ta l in  understanding  so c ie ty , t h a t  when Hobbes r e fe r s  to  i t
on th e  very  l a s t  parag raph  o f his book he ca lls  i t  n e ith e r  an  im ag e  o r
52an  analogy o r  an  allusion, b u t  a  "d o c tn n e ."  Hobbes in ten d ed  th e
a rtif ic ia l man to  be a  "doctrine" p rec ise ly  because  i t  n o t  only
c a p tu re s  th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  know ledge o f  and a t t i tu d e  to w ard  
h ea lth  and  hum an anatom y, b u t  a lso  because  i t  i l lu s tra te s  so  fu lly
Hobbes's an a to m ica l construc tion  o f  th e  S ta te .
I t  should also  be  po in ted  o u t a t  th is  s ta g e  t h a t  th e  in te rn a l
workings o f  Hobbes's a r t i f ic ia l  man r e f le c t  th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry
53understanding o f bodily h ea lth  and d isease . Today d isease  is  o ften  
seen  a s  som eth ing  "ou t-the re"  which in je c ts  i t s e l f  in to  ou r ind iv idual
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physiologies. G erm s a re  sa id  to  Inv ad e ' us, v iruses a re  sa id  to
54'a t ta c k ' th e  hum an body. To th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  re a d e r  th e se  
m etaphors would have made l i t t l e  sense. Illness was n o t  v iew ed a s  an  
e x te rn a l invasion  o f  th e  hum an body b u t a s  an  in te g ra l,  a lm o st 
ho listic , e v e n t in  th e  l i f e  o f  th e  individual. Then, th e  dom inan t
m etaphor fo r  h ea lth  was t h a t  o f  ba lance and  equilibrium , which was 
seen  a s  th e  reg u la to ry  fo rc e  n o t only o f  th e  indiv idual's co n s titu tio n  
b u t o f  so c ie ty 's  a s  welL Thus good h ea lth  was ob ta ined  th ro u g h  a  
p ro p er d ie t  and even  a  balanced  reg u la tio n  o f  one's passions.55 So when 
one rev iew s th e  in te rn a l  con stru c tio n  o f th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man,
th e re fo re , w h at one sees  is  a  fin e ly  tu n ed , in te r-co n n ec tin g  system  o f 
le v e rs  and  pulleys, m uscles and nerves, a l l  working in  co-ord ination . 
And consequently , w henever one e le m e n t o f th e  a r ti f ic ia l  body fa ils  to  
c a rry  o u t i t s  assigned  fun c tio n , th e  com m onw ealth  cease s  t o  function  
p roperly  and, lik e  a  hum an body, i s  made ilL
The a rtif ic ia l man is  a  con stru c tio n  which is  based  upon Hobbes's
b e lie f t h a t  th e re  a re  tw o  ty p e s  o f  motion: vo lun tary  and invo lun tary .
The organ  o f  invo lun tary  m otion is  th e  h e a r t . In  De C orpore Hobbes 
a rgues t h a t  th e  h e a r t  is  th e  "orig inal o f life ,"  i t s  invo lun tary
pum ping causes a  "vital m otion" which can  e i th e r  le a d  to  p leasu re  o r
56to  pain. S im ilarly , m  th e  L ev iathan  we a re  to ld  t h a t  th e  h e a r t  o f 
th e  com m onw ealth  in fu ses  m otion to  th e  m em bers o f  t h a t  body. H arvey, 
whose work Hobbes considered  to  be "infallib le," also  suggested  t h a t  
th e  hum an h e a r t  o p e ra ted  lik e  th e  so u rce  o f  p o litic a l pow er. "The
h ea rt,"  H arvey s ta te d , "like th e  p rince  in  a  kingdom in  whose hands 
lie  th e  ch ie f and  h ig h est au th o rity , ru le s  over a ll; i t  i s  th e  
original and foundation  from  which a l l  pow er is  derived , on which a l l
2 0 0
pow er depends in  th e  an im al body ."57 Hobbes, o f  course , in  his im ag e  o f  
th e  a r t i f ic ia l  m an w as t o  draw  upon th e  sam e im ag ery  a s  Harvey. And 
y e t  in  add ition  to  th is  invo lun tary  "v ita l m otion," Hobbes's 
a r t i f ic ia l  man also  is  com posed o f  th e  vo lun tary  re la tio n sh ip  be tw een  
i t s  p a rts ; an  o rganic whole whose h ea lth  is  derived  from  a  p ro p er 
ba lance and equilibrium  am ong i t s  m em bers. The m etaphors o f  th e  
L ev iathan  th u s  f a l l  in to  tw o  m ain ca teg o ries : th e  invo lun tary  and th e  
vo lun tary . The invo lu n ta ry  language is  based  upon th e  p re c e p ts  o f 
ra tionalism  and sc ien ce , w hilst th e  v o lun tary  language is  based upon 
an  agreed-upon  co m p ac t am ong men.
Within th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man, th e  language o f  th e  invo lun tary  o r 
m echanical im ag ery  becom es th e  h e a r t ,  ne rv es  and jcdnts which 
correspond t o  th e  springs, s tr in g s  and  w heels o f  a  w atch  t h a t  give i t  
i t s  v i ta l  m otion. I t  i s  once th is  invo lu n ta ry  m otion i s  s e t  in  p lace , 
in  th e  sam e way t h a t  Hobbes's a rgues t h a t  once God in itia lly  s e ts  th e  
un iverse in  m otion, t h a t  a l l  e lse  th e n  follow s by th e  m utual a r ti f ic e  
and concord  o f  men. Thus th e  analysis o f  sovereign ty , m ag istra tes, 
rew ard  and punishm ent, w ealth  and rich es , sed itio n  and  c iv il w ar, law s 
and covenan ts, a l l  a re  a  p a r t  o f  an  o rgan ic  construc tion . Each 
e lem en t, a s  in  a  hum an body f re e  from  d isease , works in  a  s ta t e  o f 
balance and  equilibrium . As in  a  hum an body, when one e le m e n t is  
missing th e  organ ic  con stru c tio n  fa lls  a p a r t .
An a rg u m en t m igh t be  m ade t h a t  th e se  allusions to  th e  o rgan ic  body a re
m erely  expressions which adorn  Hobbes's philosophy -  a  lingu istic  
dev ice  carry ing  no m ore w eigh t th a n  th e i r  l i te r a l  in te rp re ta tio n .
However, Hobbes is  q u ite  conscious o f  th e  m etaphoric  im ag e  he  is
providing. Indeed, i t  is  a lm o s t im possib le  to  se p a ra te  th e  m ethod
Hobbes em ploys t o  in s tru c t  th e  re a d e r  from  th e  c o n te n t o f  t h a t
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in s tru c tio n . In  c h a p te r  tw en ty -tw o , fo r  in s ta n c e , he s ta te s  t h a t  "in
th e  l a s t  c h a p te r  I  have spoken o f th e  s im ila r p a r ts  o f  a  com m onw ealth:
in  th is  I  sh a ll speak  o f  th e  p a r ts  o rgan ical, which a re  public
58
m inisters." These m e tapho rica l com parisons a re  d e a f ly  a
self-conscious dev ice . I t  is  due t o  th e  e lab o ra te  im ag ery  t h a t  Hobbes 
is  ab le  to  explain  w hat th e  re la tio n sh ip s  be tw een  th e  m em bers o f  th e  
body p o litic  a re , th e re b y  showing th e i r  v i ta l  functions. Hobbes, 
continuing  in  th e  sam e c h a p te r , observes t h a t  " th is kind o f public
m in isters resem hLeth th e  nerves, and ten d o n s t h a t  move th e  se v e ra l
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lim bs o f  th e  body n a tu ra l." The com parison w ith th e  hum an body, f a r  
from  adorning h is prose, a c tu a lly  convinces th e  re a d e r  o f th e  
co rre c tn e ss  o f  h is observations. "These public m inisters," Hobbes 
continues, "w ith  th e  au th o rity  from  th e  sovereign  pow er, e i th e r  to
in s tru c t,  o r  judge th e  people, a re  such  m em bers o f th e  com m onw ealth ,
60as  may f i t ly  be com pared  to  th e  organs o f vo ice in  th e  body n a tu ra l."
We a re  p a rtia lly  convinced o f  th e  im p o rtan ce  o f  th e  ro le  o f  public
m in isters p a r tly  because  o f th e  ap tn ess  o f  th e  im ag ery  in  which th e y  
a re  described .
Hobbes's language o f  m etaphoric  im ag ery  is  th e re fo re  one which 
p o rtray s  th e  fu nction , pow er, and au th o rity  o f th e  sovereign  and  his
m inisters. I t  is  a  language which no o th e r  form  o f lin g u is tic  device 
can  convey o r  ca p tu re  q u ite  a s  read ily . F o r in s ta n c e , when th e  
m ag is tra te s  perform  th e ir  du ty , Hobbes explains, th e n  "every  a c t  th e y
do by such  au th o rity , i s  th e  a c t  o f  th e  com m onw ealth ; and  th e ir
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se rv ice , answ erab le  t o  t h a t  o f th e  hands, in  a  body na tu raL " Again, 
th e  co h e re n t s tru c tu re  o f  th e  body m etaphor n o t  only p ersuades th e  
re a d e r  b u t re in fo rc e s  Hobbes's very  c la im s fo r  th e  au th o rity  and 
fu n c tio n  o f th e  soveriegn  and his a tte n d a n ts .
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The re a d e r  may r e c a ll  th e  discussion in  c h a p te r  th re e  o f  Hobbes's 
d is tin c tio n  be tw een  n a tu ra l and  po litica l vision. N a tu ra l vision 
follow s from  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f  sense  p ercep tion ; p o litic a l vision 
follow s from  an  im ag in a tiv e  re -o rd e rin g  o f th e  o b jec ts  one perce ives
and th e  deriv ing  o f  conclusions which a re  o f te n  n ecessary  in  th e
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d efen ce  o f  th e  s ta te .  In  th e  L ev iathan  Hobbes, expanding upon a  
s im ila r th e m e , m akes th is  connection  be tw een  vision and public  well­
being ev en  m ore ex p lic it. When a  rep resen ta tiv e  o f  th e  sovereign  is  
abroad , Hobbes argues, he becom es "a m in ister o f th e  com m onw ealth ; and
may be  com pared  t o  an  eye in  th e  body n a tu ra l. And th o se  t h a t  a re  
appoin ted  to  rece iv e  th e  p e titio n s  o r  o th e r  in fo rm atio n s  o f  th e
people, and  a re  a s  i t  w ere th e  public e a r , a r e  public m inisters, and
63re p re se n t th e i r  sovereign  in  t h a t  o ff ic e .” The m in isters  a c t  a s  
sco u ts , who, by keeping th e ir  e a r  to  th e  ground a s  i t  w ere, o r by 
observing w ith th e ir  eyes, becom e necessary , a s  Hobbes says e lsew here, 
to  " the  defense  o f  th e  s ta te ."  T heir vision, bo th  n a tu ra l and 
p o litic a l, a re  th e  re g is te rs  o f  in fo rm atio n  ou tside th e  com m onw ealth .
As i t  is  t h a t  th e  body p o litic  is  an  o rgan ic  whole, and  a s  i t  is  
t h a t  in  th e  sev en te en th  cen tu ry  th e  body's h ea lth  depends upon th e  
ba lance  and  equilibrium  o f i t s  working p a r ts , th e n  a  ju s t  d ispensation  
o f th e  law s o f  th e  com m onw ealth  in  acco rdance  w ith th e  know ledge o f 
hum an anatom y  becom es c ru c ia l fo r  th e  body's w ell-being. Hobbes's 
descrip tion  o f  ju s tic e  i s  t h a t  o f  a  ba lance  be tw een  au th o rity  and 
fo rc e , and in ju s tic e  an  im b a lace  o r  co n trad ic tio n  bew teen  th e  m em bers 
o f th e  body. A ccording to  Hobbes, "The tw o  arm s o f th e  com m onw ealth  
a re  fo rc e  and ju s tice ; th e  f i r s t  w hereof is  in  th e  king; th e  o th e r 
deposited  in  th e  hands o f th e  p arliam en t. As i f  a  com m onw ealth  could 
consist, w here th e  fo rc e  w ere in  any hand, which ju s tic e  had  n o t th e
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au th o rity  to  com m and and govern ." 64 A ju s t  co n s titu tio n  o f th e  body and 
o f  th e  law s req u ire s , in  o th e r  words, a  ba lance. Hobbes th e n  
continues:
" it  is  n o t t h a t  ju ris  p ru d en tia , o r wisdom o f subord inate  judges; 
b u t th e  reaso n  o f th is  ou r a r t i f ic ia l  man th e  com m on w ealth , and 
his com mand, t h a t  m aketh  law : and th e  com m on w ealth  being in  th e ir  
re sp re se n ta tlv e  b u t one person, th e re  can n o t easily  a rise  any 
co n trad ic itlo n  in  th e  law s.. J n  a l l  co u rts  o f ju s tic e , th e
sovereign , which is  th e  person  o f th e  com m on w ealth , is  he t h a t
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judgeth."
In  th is  way Hobbes t r e a t s  th e  id e a  o f ju s tic e  in  th e  com m onw ealth  a s  a
m a tte r  o f  th e  in te rn a l  re la tionsh ips  in side  th e  a r tif ic ia l man.
F orce , wisdom, au th o rity , and pow er a re  m easured ag a in s t each  o the r.
Where th e re  is  a  "con trad ic tion" th e  body b reak s  down and ju s tice
can n o t n o t be dispensed. The sev en te en th  cen tu ry  c o n ce p t o f w h at is
n ecessary  to  m ain tain  a  h ea lth y  body th e n  applies equally  w ell to  a
h ea lth y  body and th e  ju s t  soc ie ty .
Perhaps now here is  th e  m etaphor o f th e  body's h ea lth  more
a p p a re n t th a n  in  c h a p te r  24 o f  th e  L ev iathan  which is  e n title d  "O f th e
N utrition , and  P ro c rea tio n  o f th e  Com m onw ealth." H ere, Hobbes plays
upon th e  connection  be tw een  th e  c ircu la tio n  o f  blood in  th e  hum an body
and th e  c ircu la tio n  o f  money bo th  in side  th e  com m onw ealth  and  outside.
The c ircu la tio n  o f money inside  th e  com m onw ealth  is  likened  by Hobbes
to  " th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man [who] m ain tains h is resem b lan ce  w ith  th e
n a tu ra l; whose veins rece iv ing  th e  blood from  th e  se rv e ra l p a r ts  o f 
th e  body, c a rry  i t  t o  th e  h e a r t; w here being m ade v ita l ,  th e  h e a r t  by
th e  a r te r ie s  send  i t  o u t again , to  enliven, and enab le  fo r  m otion a l l
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th e  m em bers o f  th e  sam e." In  a  s im ila r m anner, we m ight say  t h a t  th e
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su b jec ts  o f th e  com m onw ealth  pay ta x e s  to  th e  sovereign , who, in  tu rn , 
th e n  re d is tr ib u te s  th e  money fo r  th e  g re a te r  h ea lth  o f a l l  concerned . 
O utside th e  com m onw ealth , Hobbes suggests, money enab les th e  s ta t e  to  
" s tre tc h  o u t  th e i r  a rm s, when need  is , in to  fo re ig n  countries."
Hobbes r e fe r s  to  th is  p ro cess  a s  th e  "sanguification" o f  money which
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"nounsheth  by th e  way every  m em ber o f th e  body o f  man."
The com m onw ealth , th e n , is  com posed o f public persons a c tin g  in  
th e  nam e o f th e  s ta t e  and  w ithin th e i r  cap a c ity  a s  m em bers o f a  single
body po litic . In  c h a p te r  tw en ty -tw o  Hobbes expands th e  scope o f  th e
body p o litic  to  inc lu d e  a l l  persons who a c t  in  th e i r  own se lf
in te re s t .  T here a re  th u s  bo th  p o litic a l persons and p r iv a te  persons
p a rtic ip a tin g  w ithin th e  com m on w ealth:
"P o litica l, o therw ise  ca lled  bodies po litic , and persons in  law , 
a re  th o se , which a re  made by au th o rity  from  th e  sovereign  pow er 
o f th e  com m onw ealth. P riv a te , a re  th o se , which a re  co n s titu te d  
by su b jec ts  am ongst th em selves...no  a u th o rity  derived  from
foreign  pow er, w ithin th e  dom inion o f ano th er, i s  public th e re ,
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b u t p riv a te ."
The p u b lic /p riv a te  d ichotom y m ight seem  to  e n ta il  t h a t  th e re  a re  som e 
m em bers o f  so c ie ty  t h a t  a c t  ou tside i t s  p re ro g a tiv e . Could i t  be
possible t h a t  th e  im ag e  o f th e  a r tif ic ia l man, in  re g a rd s  t o  th e se
p riv a te  persons, has no d ir e c t  correspondence to  th e i r  in te re s ts?
Could th e  im age  o f th e  a rtif ic ia l man, th e n , be sa id  to  be  incom ple te?
In  f a c t  th e  im ag e  is  all-encom passing . Public and  p r iv a te  a re
sim ply th e  tw o  h a ts  t h a t  individuals w ear. Hobbes e ra se s  th is
d is tin c tio n  sim ply because i t  ' i s  in  everyone 's  p riv a te  in te r e s t  t h a t
public a c ts  be ca rr ied  o u t in  acco rdance  to  th e  sovereign 's  d ic ta te s .
In  a  body p o litic , Hobbes argues,
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" ...if  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e  be one man, w hatsoever he does in  th e
person  on th e  body, which is  n o t w arran ted  in  h is le t te r s ,  nor by
law s, in  his own a c t ,  and n o t in  th e  a c t  o f th e  body, no r o f any
o th e r  m em ber th e re o f  beslded h im self: because fu r th e r  th a n  h is
le t te r s ,  o r  th e  law s l im it, he re p re se n te th  no man's person, b u t
his own." 69
In  o th e r  words, when a  man is  n o t  ac tin g  in  th e  public 's in te re s t ,  he
is  dcing so  in  h is own. "But," Hobbes con tinues, "w hat he does
accord ing  to  th e se , is  th e  a c t  o f  every  one ." 70 The reaso n  why p riv a te
persons can  a lso  be  considered  to  be m em bers o f th e  public body o f th e
a r ti f ic ia l  man is  t h a t
" ...o f th e  a c t  o f th e  sovereign  every  one is  au th o r, because  he 
is  th e ir  re p re se n ta tiv e  unlim ited ; and th e  a c t  o f him th a t
re c e d e s  n o t from  th e  le t te r s  o f th e  sovereign , is  th e  a c t  o f th e
sovereign , and th e re fo re  every  m em ber o f th e  body is  th e  au th o r
o f it ."  71
The m etaphoric  im ag e  o f  th e  a r tif ic ia l man, th e re fo re , is  one t h a t  
b inds th e  p o lity  to g e th e r , bo th  th e  p r iv a te  and  public. The 
sovereign 's pow er is  "unlim ited" in  th is  reg ard : w ithou t th e  sovereign 
so c ie ty  would be sim ply con ten tious  bundles o f  p riv a te  in te re s ts ,  b u t 
when th e  sovereign  does a c t  he does so in  a l l  men's public  in te re s t,  
th u s  binding th em  to g e th e r  f o r  a  public purpose. When an  ind iv idual 
a c ts  in  h is own in te re s ts  he  does so  n a tu ra lly , follow ing his own 
n a tu ra l a p p e tite s  and  aversions; when h e  a c ts  on th e  public 's 
in te re s ts  he  does so  in  th e  nam e o f  a r tif ic ia lly  co n stru c ted  
com m onw ealth , responding in  th e  m anner a s  th e  nerv es  and sinew s move 
th e  a rtif ic ia l man.
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These a re  ju s t  a  few  o f th e  ways t h a t  th e  im ag e  o f th e  a r tif ic ia l man
is  p layed  o u t in  L eviathan . More can  be sa id  ab o u t how Hobbes's
im ag ery  inc ludes  th e  functioning  o f th e  c iv il law s and ju s tic e , rew ard
and  punishm ent, and p a c ts  and  covenan ts  -  indeed , th e  im agery  o f  th e
a rtif ic ia l man m an ifests  i t s e l f  in  a lm o s t every  c h a p te r  -  y e t  space 
and tim e  (and f e a r  o f  rep e titio n ) p rec lude  delving fu r th e r  in to  th e se
stim  uLating co m parisons.
Section Five:
Liberty and th e  Ties That Bind
P erhaps now here is  Hobbes's use o f m etaphor a s  illum inating  a s  in  
c h a p te r  tw en ty -o n e  o f L eviathan , e n tit le d  "Of th e  L iberty  o f
Subjects." T hroughout th is  c h a p te r  Hobbes speaks o f l ib e r ty  and 
ob ligation  in  te rm s  o f  chains o r  binding. N a tu ra l lib e r ty  i s  nothing 
o th e r  th a n  th e  absence o f chains, Hobbes a rgues -  t h a t  is , one is  
li te ra l ly  f re e  to  walk o u t o f  a  room . But, n o t surprisingLy, Hobbes 
has  a  second use o f th e  word lib e r ty  and t h a t  is  o f m etapho rica l
chains -  t h a t  is , we can  a g ree  to  be bound by obligations and  th u s
lo se  our lib e r ty , bu t, again , only i f  we a re  l i te ra l ly  f r e e  to  do so.
Thus Hobbes's a rg u m en t on lib e r ty  and obligation  -  one t h a t  is  c e n tra l 
to  th e  t e x t  -  tu rn s  on th e  m e tapho rica l use o f words t h a t  Hobbes 
in s is ts  should only be ta k e n  lite ra lly .
L iberty , d ec la re s  Hobbes a t  th e  s t a r t  o f  th e  ch ap te r, i s  ach ieved  
when th e re  i s  no e x te rn a l im ped im en ts to  m otion, "F or w hosoever is  so 
ty e d , o r  environed, a s  i t  c a n n o t move, b u t w ith in  a  c e r ta in  space ...w e 
say  i t  h a th  n o t  lib e r ty  t o  go fu r th e r . " 72 Any o th e r  use  o f  th e  word 
lib e r ty , Hobbes in s is ts , is  an  in c o rre c t  usage. "B ut when th e  words 
F ree , and L iberty , a re  applyed t o  any  th in g  b u t Bodies, th e y  a re
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73abused," he argues. Hobbes's con ten tio n  i s  t h a t  w henever a  
philosopher d iscourses upon lib e r ty  he freq u en tly  and erroneously  is  
using th e  te rm 's  m e tapho rica l s ign ifica tion , which i s  to  say, he is  
engaging in  an  equ ivocation  o f te rm s .
The co n ce p t o f  lib e r ty , o f  course , can  ta k e  on many form s, b u t 
fo r  Hobbes a l l  sh a re  in  th e  sam e l i te r a l  deno ta tio n , t h a t  o f having no 
e x te rn a l im ped im en t. C.B. M acpherson, fo r  exam ple, suggests  t h a t  
Hobbes's c o n ce p t o f  lib e r ty  springs from  econom ic la is se r-fa ire  
cap ita lism ; a  suggestion  which, i f  we ta k e  lib e r ty  to  m ean sim ply th e  
absence  o f  bonds, seem s p lausib le  enough . 74 P lausib ility  on th is  p o in t
dim inishes, how ever, when we r e c a ll  t h a t  in  Tudor and S tu a r t  England
75
no such  econom ic liberty* e v e r  ex isted . I t  tu rn s  o u t t h a t  th e
B ritish  sovereigns which Hobbes supposedly cham pioned a t  one t im e  o r 
an o th e r, fo r  in s ta n c e  C haries I, freq u en tly  had  th e i r  f in g ers  in  a l l
so r ts  o f  econom ic p ies, and th e re  is  no reaso n  to  assum e t h a t  his 
im ag inary  L ev iathan  would n o t do ex ac tly  th e  sam e. Indeed , p a r t  o f 
th e  discussion on n u tr itio n  in  c h a p te r  tw e n ty -fo u r  o f L eviathan  tu rn s
on th e  sovereign 's  pow er t o  re g u la te  th e  d is tru b u tio n  o f food  and
7 6land . M oreover, in  th e  L atin  version  o f L ev ia than , such re fe re n c e s  to
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econom ic la is se r-fa ire  lib e r ty  a re  o m itte d  en tire ly . So i t  would seem  
th a t  p a r t  o f  Hobbes's discussion o f lib e r ty  i s  n o t  in ten d ed  to  be 
ta k e n  li te ra lly , o r, t o  p u t th e  m a tte r  in  a n o th e r  way, Hobbes's
in s is ten ce  t h a t  th e  co n ce p t o f  lib e r ty  be  ta k e n  only l i te ra l ly  is  
so m etim es i ts e lf  only a  h y p o th e tica l proposal.
A fte r  defin ing  lib e r ty  a s  l i te ra l ly  th e  absence o f bonds, Hobbes 
th e n  goes on to  claim  t h a t  a l l  l ib e r ty  springs from  necessity . J u s t  
a s  w a te r  n ecessarily  flow s dow n-hill, Hobbes s ta te s ,  so to o  does 
lib e r ty  necessarily  move in  one d ire c tio n . 76 I t  is  a  s tran g e  argum en t,
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b u t one t h a t  is  c ru c ia l t o  Hobbes's d o c trin e . Hobbes is  unab le to
sim ply claim  t h a t  we should a l l  be f re e  from  e x te rn a l t i e s  f o r  t h a t
would m ean t h a t  we would a l l  be f re e  to  m ake w h atever decisions t h a t  
s tr ik e  ou r fan cy . To do t h a t  would p u t ou r co llec tiv e  judgm ent in  
jeopardy , making th e  likelihood o f ou r vo lun ta rily  opting  fo r  th e
L ev ia than  m ore p rob lem atic . Hobbes th e re fo re  re sc u e s  his l i te r a l  
c o n ce p t o f  lib e r ty  by suggesting  th a t ,  a lthough f r e e ,  we a l l
n ev e rth e less  have t o  m ake th e  sam e decisions. The c o n ce p t o f 
necess ity , th e n , is  ren d ered  m etaphorically : th e  in e lu c ta b le  "chains"
o f  n ecess ity  fo rc e  u s  t o  fre e ly  choose th e  sam e course o f  ac tio n . As 
Hobbes s ta te s ,
" ...because  every  a c t  o f mans will, and every  desire , and 
in c lin a tio n  p ro ceed e th  from  som e cause, and t h a t  from  an o th e r 
cause , which causes in  a  co n tinuall chaine (whose f i r s t  link  in  
th e  hand o f God th e  f i r s t  o f a l l  causes) p roceed  from  necessity .
So th a t  to  him t h a t  could see  th e  connection  o f th o se  causes,
th e  n ecess ity  o f a l l  mens vo lun tary  ac tions , would app ea r
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m anifest."
Our "voluntary  actions,"  o r  lib e r ty , becom es m etaphorically  t ie d  to  
th e  chains o f  causa tion . Hobbes's lib e ra lity  o f  lib e r ty  is  th u s  
purchased  by rendering  th e  co n c e p t o f  cau sa tio n  m etaphoricaL  As 
u su a l w ith H obbeslan m etaphors, such  n ecess ity  is  a p p a re n t only "to  
him t h a t  could see  th e  connection ." This vision, to o , is  
m etaphoricaL
The follow ing p arag raph  is  even  m ore b rea th -tak in g , considering
Hobbes's l i te r a l  in s is te n ce  o f lib e r ty , f o r  he  th e n  a rg u es  t h a t  th e re
a re  "a r tif i c ial! chains, ca lled  C ivill Laws" which a re  "fastened" onto  
th e  m em bers o f  th e  com m onw ealth . "These bonds," Hobbes con tinues, 'in
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th e ir  own n a tu re  b u t w eak, may n everth lesse  be made to  hold, by th e
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danger, though  n o t by th e  d iff ic u lty  o f  break ing  th e m ."  This 
d iscrip tion , o f  course , is  pu re  m etaphor. Hobbes w ants to  have i t  
bo th  ways; a lthough  w ords should be  used  li te ra l ly  th e y  a re  to  be 
shrouded in  m etap h o rica l concep ts . M oreover, we a re  only f re e  to  do 
one th ing ; to  follow  th e  d ic ta te s  o f th e  sovereign . "The L iberty  o f a
Subject," Hobbes re p e a ts , 'Tyeth th e re fo re  only in  th o se  th ings, which
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m  reg u la tin g  th e i r  ac tio n s , th e  Sovereign h a th  p rae te rrru tte d ."  As 
th e  sou l o f th e  sovereign  d e te rm in es  a l l  bodily m otion, th e  sovereign  
h im se lf re g u la te s  a l l  bodily lib e r ty . So, in  o th e r  words, we lo se  our 
lib e r ty  when we have no sovereign  to  t e l l  us w h at n e c e ss ita te s  
lib e rty . As Hobbes, echoing th e  id e a  o f  A ris to te lian  an im a discussed 
e a r lie r , s ta te s ,
"The Sovereignty  is  th e  Soule o f th e  Com m on-w ealth; which once
d ep arted  from  th e  Body, th e  m em bers doe no more re c e iv e  th e ir
m otion from  it ."  02
When we subm it un to  th e  sovereign, we n o t only rece iv e  our lib e r ty  b u t
a lso  ou r obligaton  to  follow  h is decisions. This obligation  only
becom es void when th e  body o f  th e  com m onw ealth  o r  a r t i f ic ia l  man
becom es a  ca rcass , o r  when th e  sovereign  a t te m p ts  to  deprive us o f our 
n a tu ra l r ig h t  to  l ife .
Since w ithou t th e  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  sovereign  we would e x is t  in  a
s ta t e  o f p e rp e tu a l w ar, we m ust f re e ly  o b liga te  ourselves by covenan t
to  th e  sovereign. This ob ligation  e i th e r  is  expressed  verbally  (as
Hobbes explains in  c h a p te r  fo u rteen ) o r  by a  "defence ag a in s t a  com m on
enem y," in  which ca se  we have no cho ice b u t to  be "obliged" to  follow
83su it. In  e i th e r  ev en t, w henever Hobbes d iscusses th e  co n ce p t of 
lib e r ty  o r  causa tion  o r ob ligation  he does so  by f i r s t  s tip u la tin g
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t h a t  only th e  l i t e r a l  meaning o f  each  word applies, fo llow ed by a  
d iscussion o f  th e  l i te r a l  word w ithin a  highly m e tapho rica l con tex t. 
To p u t i t  generousLy, th is  is  a  highly confused m ethod o f 
a rg u m en ta tio n . So when Hobbes concludes h is m e tapho rica l discussion 
o f chains, bonds, lib e r ty  and  th e  lik e  a t  th e  end  o f  ch a p te r  
tw en ty -o n e , he fa lls  back  upon th e  l i te r a l  m eaning a s  i f  th e re  w ere no 
inconsistency  involved. I f  a  sovereign  is  held  p risoner by an o th e r 
pow er, Hobbes concludes, "or have n o t th e  lib e r ty  o f  h is own Body; he 
is  n o t  understood  t o  have given aw ay th e  R ight o f  Sovereignty; and 
th e re fo re  h is Subjects a re  obliged to  y ie ld  obedience to  [his]
m a g is tra te s ....” 84
Section  Six:
The Kingdom o f D arkness
Less o f te n  re a d  is  th e  second h a lf  o f L ev iathan  which concerns i ts e lf
w ith th e o lo g ica l m a tte rs . When th e  book w as orig inally  published th is
second h a lf  w as w h at had  caused  th e  b ig g e st con troversy ; today ,
how ever, i t  ra re ly  p iques even  our in te re s t .  Hobbes begins th e  th ird
book o f th e  L eviathan  "Of a  C hristian  Com m onwealth" w ith  th e
adm onition  t h a t  we should n ev er "renounce our Senses" when com ing to
te rm s  w ith  th e  n a tu re  o f C hris tian ity , fo r  t h a t  w as th e  s in  o f  th e
"schoolm en" and  o th e rs  o f  th e ir  ilk  who n eg lec ted  th e  w odd  o f  sensory
experience  in  fav o u r o f e x tre m e  th e o lo g ica l ra tionalism  and o th e r
85f lig h ts  o f  fan cy . In  th e  fo u rth  and  f in a l book, "O f th e  Kingdom of
Darkness," we a re  le d  along th e  sam e p a th  o f  v isu a l m etaphors to w ard s
a  c o r re c t  understanding  o f sc rip tu re . The m isin te rp re ta tio n  o f 
s c rip tu re  is  re fe r re d  to  a s  a  "sp iritu a l darkness," w h ilst th e  c o r re c t  
in te rp re ta tio n  — one t h a t  re s u r re c ts  sensory  experience  — is  likened
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to  t h a t  o f seeing  th e  t r u e  sp ir itu a l 'lig h t."  The connec tion  be tw een
lig h t and  darkness w ith t h a t  o f  t r u th  and  fa lsehood  has  a  p a r tic u la r
resonance  w ith  Hobbes, fo r  Hobbes's th e o ry  o f op tics , and hence his
th e o ry  o f  g eo m etry  (and, m ore im p o rtan tly , one m ight a lso  inc lude  his
th e o ry  o f knowledge) springs from  th e  c o r re c t  understanding  o f  how
lig h t tr a v e ls  th ro u g h  th e  a i r  and i s  rec e iv e d  by th e  eye. D arkness is
th e re fo re , in  Hobbes's though t, eq u a ted  w ith t o t a l  ign o ran ce .
In  th e  C hristian  tra d itio n , th is  equation  o f darkness w ith
com p le te  ig no rance  is  n o t a s  pronounced a s  Hobbes's, fo r  th o se  who
dw ell in  "darkness" do have a  c e r ta in  kind o f  know ledge: i t  i s  th e
know ledge o f th is  w orld ov er which Satan  has  dom inion. H owever, in
Hobbes's hands, "darkness" inc ludes  an  igno rance  o f  th is  world a s  w ell
a s  th e  an tic ip a te d  world to  follow . "A C onfederacy  o f  D eceivers,"
Hobbes a rgues, a t te m p ts  to
" ...o b ta in  dom inion over men in  th is  p re se n t worLd, endeavor by
dark , and erroneous D octrines, to  extinguish  in  them  th e  Light,
bo th  o f N atu re , and o f th e  Gospell; and so to  d is-p rep are  them
86fo r  th e  Kingdom o f God to  com e."
The phrase  "both  o f  N ature, and  o f th e  Gospell" signals to  u s  t h a t
l ig h t and  dark  b a t t le  over th e  minds o f men bo th  in  th is  world and th e  
n ex t, ov er m a tte rs  o f e a r th ly  know ledge ("N ature") and o f s c r ip tu ra l 
("Gospell"). W ithout lig h t th e re  can  be  no vision, no understanding
o f op tics, no geom etry , and  th e re fo re  no know ledge w hatsoever, 
includ ing  th e  know ledge o f th e  d iv ine.
As w ith  th e  se c u la r  kingdom , ignorance o r  darkness in  th e  church 
le a d s  to  a  c iv il w ar. The in a b ility  t o  se e  is  m arked down by Hobbes 
in to  tw o  causes: th e  f i r s t  being "m en [who] a re  u t te r ly  deprived  from  
th e i r  N ativ ity , o f  th e  lig h t o f  th e  bodily Eye, have no Id ea  a t  a ll,
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o f any such ligh t"  and  th e  second consisting  o f  th o se  men who a re  bom
w ith s ig h t b u t who n ev erth e less  do n o t acknow ledge a  v ision  which is
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beyond th e ir  n a tu ra l c ap a c ity  o f "understanding." In  o th e r  words, 
ju s t  a s  th e re  a re  tw o  kinds o f  v ision which can  be lab e lle d  as
"natural"  and "political" -  a s  ou tlined  in  c h a p te r  th re e  -  th e re  a re
tw o  fo rm s o f  blindness, which a re , again , "natural"  and  'th eo lo g ica l."  
And a s  in  th e  fo rm e r  in s ta n c e  w ith  p o litic a l vision, i t  is  th e
p o litic a l o r  sp ir itu a l blindness which drives Hobbes's main argum ent. 
Specifically , i t  is  due t o  th is  sp ir itu a l blindness, Hobbes m aintains,
t h a t  c iv il w ars have ta k e n  p lace  w ithin th e  church:
"W hence i t  com es, t h a t  in  C hristendom e th e re  has been , a lm o s t 
from  th e  tim e  o f th e  A postles, such  justJing o f  one an o th er o u t 
o f th e ir  p laces, bo th  by fo rra ign , and C ivil War? such stum bling 
a t  every  l i t t l e  a sp e rity  o f  th e ir  own fo rtu n e , and every  l i t t l e  
em inence o f t h a t  o f o th e r  men? and such d iv e rs ity  o f ways in
running to  th e  sam e m ark, F e lic ity , i t  i t  be n o t N ight am ongst
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us, o r a t  le a s t  a  Mist? wee a re  th e re fo re  y e t  in  th e  Dark."
In  th is  passage th e  co u n te rp o in t o f  e c c le s ia s tic a l a u th o rity  w ith t h a t
o f c iv il a u th o rity  could n o t be m ore d e a r ,  and even  s tren g th en s  th e  
p ic to r ia l  im ages  which il lu s tra te  on th e  t i t l e  page  o f  th e  Leviathan:
sp ir itu a l darkness is  th e  cause  o f  d isunity , com petition , and cavil
w ar w ithin th e  church . The reaso n  why th is  is  so  is  t h a t  m en do n o t 
"see" th e  l ig h t  o f  t r u th  which governs th e i r  v e ry  n a tu re . They a re
blinded to  th e  p resen ce  o f  " fe lic ity"  — t h a t  c o n s ta n t m otion in h e re n t 
in  a l l  men t h a t  y earn s  fo r  "pow er a f te r  pow er, t h a t  c e a se th  only in  
d ea th ."  J u s t  a s  in  c iv il au th o rity , e c c le s ia s tic a l fe lic ity  covers 
th e  l ig h t  o f day  w ith a  "N igh t am ongst us, o r  a t  le a s t  a  m ist," and 
since  i t  rem a in s  la rg e ly  unacknow ledged, "wee a re  th e re fo re  y e t  in  th e
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Dark."
Hobbes m aintains t h a t  a  second form  o f th e  "darkness" o f n ig h t 
hovers ov er th e  church . As we have ju s t  seen , Hobbes has argued  th a t  
th o se  men who do n o t know th e i r  own n a tu re s  a re  blind and th e re fo re  
in g n o ran t o f  th e  t r u th  which only l ig h t  can  reveaL  Y e t th e  fo u rth  
book o f  th e  L eviathan  is  a lso  ab o u t th e  darkness o f  m isin terp re ta tion : 
l i te ra l ly  th e  m isreading o f  sc rip tu re . The e v il w rought by th e  church
is  p a rtia lly  due t o  i t s  co n cea lm en t o f  th e  t r u e  m eaning o f  th e
gospels. The church  monopoly o v e r biblical in te rp re ta tio n  has  le d  to  
a  co rrup tion  o f th e  t r u e  m eaning o f  th e  word o f God. By n o t using our 
sensory  judgm en t in  divining sc rip tu re  we a re  th u s  ren d ered  blind.
T here a re  se v e ra l e r ro rs  o r  abuses, Hobbes argues, which a re  
caused  by th e  church  and t h a t  have le d  t o  th e  "kingdom o f darkness" in  
which we now dwelL The f i r s t  concerns th e  b e lie f  t h a t  th e  church 
consists  only o f i t s  o ff ic e rs  r a th e r  th a n  is  made up o f  th e  people. 
The Pope and  h is m in isters have erroneously  ta k e n  on th e  church  fo r  
th em se lv es  and, because  o f  th e ir  n a tu ra l fe lic ity , have fa lle n  in to  "a 
D arkness o f  mind, a re  made to  f ig h t one ano th er, w ithou t d iscern ing  
th e ir  enem ies from  th e ir  friends , under th e  co n d u c t o f  m ass am bition."
J u s t  a s  th e  L ev iathan  o r  a r tif ic ia l man is  m ade up o f  th e  m em bers o f
th e  com m onw ealth , so  to o  should be  th e  po lity  o f  th e  church , Hobbes 
in s is ts .
The second abuse which le a d s  to  "darkness" i s  th e  m isuse o f 
language , and  i t  is  h e re  t h a t  we a re  t r e a te d  to  a  condem nation  o f 
m etaphor in  th e  nam e o f m etaphor. A ccording to  Hobbes, when C h ris t 
sa id  "This is  my body" while o ffe rin g  th e  b read  o f th e  l a s t  supper, i t  
was m ean t a s  a  fig u re  o f speech . To ta k e  such a  m etaphor a s  li te ra l ly  
t r u e  is , f o r  Hobbes, an  absu rd ity  o f  church  d o c trin e . Hobbes's
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d o c trin e  o f th e  E u ch a ris t is , o f course , u ltra -P ro te s ta n t . "The 
words, This i s  my Body," Hobbes com plains, "are  eq u iv a len t t o  th e se ,
This sign ifies, o r  re p re se n ts  my Body; and i t  is  an  o rd inary  fig u re  o f
90
Speech; b u t to  ta k e  i t  l i te ra l ly  is  an  abuse." B ut a t  th e  sam e tim e ,
accord ing  t o  Hobbes, i t  is  due t o  such abuses t h a t  we a re  le d  in to
"th e  kingdom o f  darkness," which is  y e t  an o th e r m etaphor. How th e n
does one reco n c ile  th is  seem ing inconsistency  in  Hobbes's argum ent?
If  th e  'body in to  b read ' m etaphor is  absurd  th e n  a re  n o t th e  m etaphors
t h a t  know ledge is  lig h t' and 'ignorance is  darkness' equally  absurd?
The answ er is  to  r e c a ll  th e  p rocess o f  v ision  a s  understood by
Hobbes. A p iece  o f  b read  and a  hum an body a re  n o t th e  sam e th ing ,
th e y  li te ra lly  do n o t in h a b it th e  sam e c a teg o ry  o r c la ss  o f  o b je c t fo r
Hobbes, and th e re fo re  to  eq u a te  th e  tw o  is  a n  absurd ity . I t  is  an
absu rd ity  p rim arily  because  th e  tw o  do n o t com bine th em se lv es  in to  any
sensory  phenom enon, ju s t  a s  w ith th e  e a r l ie r  exam ple o f a  round
quadrangle. RevealingLy, Hobbes suggests  t h a t  th is  e r ro r  o f assum ing
th a t  C hrist's  body and b read  w ere one and th e  sam e was due in  p a r t  to
th e  com m union b read  being s tam p ed  w ith th e  fig u re  o f  C h ris t on i t ,
th u s  deceiving ig n o ra n t people ab o u t w h at i t  was e x ac tly  t h a t  th e y
w ere d igesting . In  o th e r  words, th e  body and  b read  confusion is
absurd  because  i t  can n o t be reco n c iled  w ith sense  experien ce , and th e
e a r ly  b e lie f  in  th is  absu rd ity  w as due to  an  a t te m p t  t o  im p a r t  a  
v isua l im age  on to  th e  b read , th u s  deceiv ing  th e  w orshippers. Hobbes's
analysis o f  th is  absu rd ity , th e n , does n o t in te r f e re  w ith  th e
L eviathan 's m etaphoric  im ag es  o f  l ig h t  and  darkness. In  th e  l a t t e r
case , th e  v isu a l ex p erience  o f  l ig h t  and  darkness is  com m on to  alL
J u s t  a s  w ith h is im ag e  o f th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man, Hobbes's m etaphors o f
l ig h t and darkness a re  in s tru c tiv e  r a th e r  th a n  deceiving, a p t  r a th e r
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th a n  absurd.
On th e  f i r s t  page o f  th e  L ev iathan  th e  re a d e r  is  g re e te d  w ith  a  
p o w erfu l im ag e  -  one t h a t  is  lig u is tica lly  b u ilt  upon th e  re a d e r 's  
p a r t ia l  understand ing  o f  theo logy  and  o f  an a to m ic a l sc ience: th e
L eviathan  s e a  m onster, o r  m ore exp lic itly , th e  a r tif ic ia l man. 
O pposite t o  th is  e la b o ra te  lig u is tic  s tru c tu re  o f th e  m etaphoric  im ag e  
o f  th e  a rt-i fin a l m an th e  re a d e r  a lso  en co u n te rs  a  p ic to r ia l  
il lu s tra tio n  on th e  t i t l e  page, echoing bo th  th e  co n te n ts  o f th e  work 
and  Hobbes's sev en te en th  cen tu ry  understanding  o f w hat i t  m eans to  
"see" som ething . Words p a in t p ic tu res , im ag es  dance  in  one's head , a  
v iv id  m etaphor a r re s ts  th e  s ta r t le d  m em ory, and  a l l  lead in g  one to  
m ake p o litic a l and philosophical judgm ents ab o u t th e  t r u e  n a tu re  and  
o rd e r o f th e  com m onw ealth . On th e  l a s t  page o f  th e  L eviathan  Hobbes
te l ls  us t h a t  his so le  "design" in  w riting  th e  book w as " to  s e t  b e fo re
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mens eyes" th e  t r u e  n a tu re  o f  th e  com m onw ealth . C onfident t h a t  th e  
in ten d ed  im age has  been  cap tu red  by us, Hobbes le t s  th e  c a t  o u t o f  th e  
bag, a s  i t  w ere: w hat we have been  e n te rta in in g  was n o t  a  m ere 
m e tapho rica l im ag e  a t  a l l  b u t, indeed , th e  "doctrine" o f  th e  
a r t i f ic ia l  man. The im ag e  -  th e  word -  h as  been  m ade flesh  y e t  once 
again . I t  is  a  fa c e  s ta rin g  s tra ig h t  a t  us, i t s  d istinguished  head  
bearing  a  noble crow n, a rm s o u ts tre tc h e d , one hand holding a  sw ord, 
th e  o th e r  a  bishop's crook, th e  to rso  com posed o f a  w orshipful 
m ultitude which we, th e  beholders o f  th e  im ag e , can n o t help  b u t to  
find  ourselves a s  y e t  ad d itio n a l m em bers o f  th is  congregation . And 
w hat is  more, no in te ll ig e n t man can  shy aw ay from  th e  im ag e 's  tr u th ,  
" fo r tru th ,"  Hobbes fin a lly  concludes in  th e  l a s t  lin e , "as opposeth  
no mans p ro f it , no r p leasu re , is  t o  a l l  men w elcom e." The
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o u ts tre tc h e d  arm s a re  m ean t to  be our in v ita tio n , also.
B etw een th e  f i r s t  and  th e  l a s t  page o f  th e  L eviathan  th e  nerves,
m uscles, a r te r ie s , h e a r t  and  so u l a re  woven in to  th e  fa b ric  o f  th e
com m onw ealth . I t  is  a  ta p e s try  so  co m ple te  in  d e ta il, so  balanced  in
proportion , t h a t  ev ery  fu n c tio n  o f th e  s ta te ,  bo th  cLviL and
e cc le s ia s tic a l, is  c le a rly  d ep ic ted  fo r  th e  re a d e r  t o  se e  fo r  h im self
and from  which to  le a rn . The sovereign  i s  th e  soul, th e  cu rren cy  is
th e  life-b lood , th e  m in isters th e  eyes and  e a rs , and so  on, u n ti l  a l l  
have been  acco rded  a  p lace  t h a t  f i t s  bo th  w ith in  th e  n a tu ra l o rd e r o f
th in g s  and  w ithin th e  m an-m ade o rd e r o f  sc ien ce  and ra tio n a lity . All,
t h a t  is , e x c e p t fo r  th e  clergy , fo r  be tw een  th e  im ag e  o f  John  o f
Salisbury and  t h a t  o f  Thom as Hobbes, th e  anatom y  o f  th e  body p o litic
has curiously  found i ts e lf  de-frocked .
To borrow  from  Dryden, Hobbes's su ccess  was in  t h a t  he was ab le 
to  m ore fu lly  " s c a tte r  his m aker's im age  th rough  th e  land ." Man, o r 
m ore to  th e  po in t, Hobbes is  th e  au th o r o f  th e  im ag es con ta ined  in  th e  
L ev iathan , and  a l l  o f l i f e  -  p o litic a l, re lig ious, so c ia l and 
ph ilosophical -  is  to  be found w ithin  th o se  illu s trio u s  and 
m e tapho rica l pages, challenging us to  see  and judge fo r  ou rselves th e  
t r u th  o f  w hat is  w ritten .
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CHAPTER SEX:
METAPHOR, POETRY, AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF 
POLITICAL IMAGINATION
M etaphor is  n ev er in n o cen t. —Jacq u es Derrida
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W hat does i t  m ean to  have an  im age? Many philosophers from  P la to  
onw ards have answ ered  th is  question  w ith varying re su lts . F or P la to , as
we saw in  c h a p te r  one, philosophic language c e n te re d  around th e  tw in
p illa rs  o f  m im esis (im itation) and im ag ination . By im ita tin g  th e  world
o f th e  Form s P la to  f e l t  t h a t  t r u e  know ledge could be ob ta ined . For
sc ien ce , th e  im ag e  en cap su la tes  a  new way o f  looking a t  th e  physical
world, p a r t  e ssen tia lis t, p a r t  nom inalist, lending  in s ig h t w here none
had b e fo re  ex isted . F or th e  ro m an tics , th e  im ag ination  was a  p ro jec tion
o f th e  p o e t in to  his world; p o e tic  language reco rd ed  th e  im ag es  th e  p o e t
envisaged  and  th e  em otions t h a t  he f e l t  a s  he  en coun tered  experience.
F or A ris to tle , language when p roperly  used  m irrored  sense  experience ,
b u t th is  was an  experience  t h a t  fo rsook  th e  Form s in  fa v o r o f an
esse n tia lis t d escrip tion  o f  th e  P la ton ic  w orld o f  appearances. The
in s ig h t t h a t  th e  m etaphoric  im ag e  provoked, fo r  A risto tle , was a  work o f
genius. W hat we have so fa r ,  in  o th e r  words, is  an  understanding  o f
im ag es a s  i f  th e y  m irrored  th e  sc ie n tif ic  o r ph ilosophical e n tit ie s  in
th e  world around us, o r  o f ou r ro m an tic  e la tio n  o f being in  th e  world.
H ere holding an  im ag e  tra n s la te s  in to  re f le c tin g  in  our m en ta l w orld th e
world t h a t  surrounds us.
Now th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry  has w itnessed  a  renew ed  e f f o r t  to  
understand  ou r im ages. F or th in k e rs  lik e  W ittgenstein  and Ryle, our 
im ag es can  only be s tud ied  from  th e  p ersp ec tiv e  o f how we speak  ab o u t 
th e m , which th u s  sheds som e lig h t onto  w hat i t  m eans fo r  u s  t o  'see ' 
som ething. The m anner m  which we express w h at we see  te l ls  us ab o u t 
our p e rcep tio n  o f  th e  world and, in  tu rn , th e  behav io r o f  th e  hum an 
mind. Mary W amock, who has  w ritte n  o f th e o rie s  o f im ag ination  from  
Hume to  th e  p re se n t tim es , a lso  describes im ag ination  in  te rm s  o f  th is  
p rocess o f "perception" which, again , en ta ils  an  acc o u n t o f  m im etic
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im ag ina tion . Even th e  d eco n stru c tio m sts  use  th e  co n ce p t o f  m im esis in  
p e rc e p tu a l language a s  a  to o l  to  u n rav e l philosophic d iscourse. 
D errida, fo r  exam ple, a rg u es  t h a t  th e  philosopher's a t te m p t  t o  m irror in
language th e  im ag es  which p re se n t th em se lv es  t o  him le a d  to  "a te x tu a l
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la b y rin th  panelled  in  m irrors." There is  no p resen ce  in  d iscourse -  th e  
myth th e  "logocentrism " -  and th u s  th e re  can  be no r e a l  p resence  in  th e  
language  which m irror th e  im ag es t h a t  com pete  fo r  ou r a tte n tio n . When 
D errida tu rn s  to  P la to 's  Philebus he finds t h a t  th e  language th e re  is  
"organized  by th is  re la tio n  o f  re p e titio n , resem blance , doubling, 
dup lication , th is  s o r t  o f sp ecu la r p rocess and p lay  o f  re f le c tio n s  w here
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th in g s  (onta), speech  and w riting  com e to  r e p e a t  and m irror each  o ther."  
When Richard R orty  w rites  o f  th e  co n ce p t o f  im ag in a tiv e  mim esis in  
philosophic d iscourse in  h is Philosophy and  th e  M irror o f N ature he,
to o , n o tices  t h a t  "philosophers a re  s t i l l  working o u t th e  consequences,
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analyzing th e  problem s [ th a t]  i t  c rea ted ."
W hat I  w an t to  do in  th is  l a s t  c h a p te r  is  t o  su rren d er th e  ground 
o f  philosophic and o p tic a l m im esis to  th e  above th in k ers . W ittgenstein, 
Ryle and  W amock m ight be c o r re c t  in  saying t h a t  re p o r ts  o f  our im ages, 
m etaphoric  and  o therw ise , t e l l  us m ore ab o u t how we perce ive  th in g s  th a n  
ab o u t th e  im ag es  them selves; D errida and  R orty  a re  probably  equally  
c o r re c t  in  surm ising t h a t  th e  m im etic q u a litie s  o f  philosophic discourse 
le a d  t o  th e  ev e n tu a l underm ining o f  th e  te x t .  B ut th is  is  to  tell, us 
v ery  l i t t l e  ab o u t po litica l im ag ination . A fte r  a ll, m im etic im ag ina tion  
te l ls  us nothing ab o u t Hobbes's im ag e  o f  th e  L ev iathan  o r  how th is  f i t s  
in to  h is th e o ry  o f percep tio n . T here a re  no sea  m onsters p re se n t in  th e  
world upon which Hobbes m irrored  his te x t .  S im ilarly , a  c ritiq u e  o f th e  
language  o f m im esis in  Hobbes's t e x t  would t e l l  u s t h a t  i t  was
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hopelessly ensconced  in  o p tic a l m etaphors, b u t th is , also , i s  to  say  
l i t t l e  t h a t  we did  n o t a lread y  know. The question  asked  above, "w hat 
does i t  m ean to  have an  im age?" m ust th e re fo re  be asked  o f p o litic a l 
th in g s.
I t  i s  argued  h e re  t h a t  th e  answ er to  th is  question  i s  bo th  
illum inating  and y e t  a t  th e  sam e tim e  d isqu ie ting . When exam ining th e  
h is to ry  o f  p o litic a l th o u g h t i t  i s  p o litic a l im ag ina tion , r a th e r  th a n  
m im esis, t h a t  f i r s t  ca lls  our a tte n tio n . B ut th is  im ag ination , which in  
many ways i s  en ligh ten ing , may also  prove to  be dangerous. The p rocess 
o f  p o litic a l o r  m etaphoric  im ag ina tion  is , in  many ways, a  double-edged 
sw ord, lik e  th e  one Hobbes's M ortal God holds in  his r ig h t hand on th e  
t i t l e  page t o  L eviathan.
S ection  One:
Promethean Imagination
A ris to tle  w arns us t h a t  we should n o t  co m m it th e  e r ro r  o f confusing
im ag es  w ith im ag ination . Our sensory  ab ility  t o  perce iv e  o b jec ts  which
surround us and our cap a c ity  fo r  im ag in a tio n  in h a b it tw o  d is tin c t a re a s
o f hum an understanding, A risto tle  c la im ed , a lthough  to d a y  th e  m eans by
which th e se  tw o  a re a s  m ight be connec ted  rem ain s  fo r  us a  m ystery. Some
philosophers, lik e  Locke and  B erkeley, have solved th is  p a r tic u la r
d ilem m a by c rea tin g  a  w orld o f  id e a s ' th rough  which p e rcep tio n  plays a
double ro le : t h a t  o f  sensing an  o b je c t which m ight be  b e fo re  us, and 
th a t  o f  th ink ing  ab o u t an  o b je c t which may n o t even  be p re se n t befo re
our eyes. Id eas , th e se  th in k e rs  have c la im ed , a re  bo th  sensory  and
im ag in a tiv e . This i s  a  r a th e r  confusing m uddle, and i t  shows up th e
dangers o f  s tray in g  to o  f a r  from  A ris to tle 's  sound advice. In  h is Essay
Concerning Human U nderstanding, fo r  exam ple, Locke in fo rm s us t h a t
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"ideas" sh a re  th e  sam e meaning a s  "phantasm s," "notions," and 
"species," and  in  h is P rincip les o f Human Knowledge B erkeley unhappily
C
re p e a ts  Locke's e rrro r . A t th e  very  s t a r t  o f  h is t r e a t is e  B erkeley
c la im s t h a t  i t  is  ev id en t t o  everyone who has s tu d ied  th e  problem  t h a t
"ideas" a re  " ...a c tu a lly  im p rin te d  on th e  senses" and t h a t  th e y  a re
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subsequen tly  " ...fo rm ed  by help  o f  m em ory and  im ag ina tion ...."  F o r both
Locke and B erkeley, having id e a s  and having p ercep tio n s  a re  one and th e
sam e th in g  -  a  b e lie f  which one m ight say  w as a  clum sy, i f  n o t an
u n fo rtu n a te , s t a r t  to  a  p rospective  th eo ry  o f know ledge.
Hobbes's own so lu tion  to  th e  problem  o f  senso ry  p ercep tio n  and
im ag ina tion  is  perhaps m ore illum inating  fo r  m im esis has a  lim ite d  ro le
t o  p lay . In  Hobbes's program  im ag in a tio n  p a rtia lly  in fo rm s his
understanding  and  th e o ry  o f o p tics  a s  w ell a s  h is s ta r tin g  p o in t fo r  his
th e o ry  o f  know ledge, a s  we have seen . B ut w ithou t rep ea tin g  to o  much
w h at has been  argued  in  th e  prev ious ch ap te rs , i t  is  w orthw hile noting
t h a t  although  Hobbes's s ta t e  o f  n a tu re  is  depressingLy b leak , he does
m anage to  aw ard  man w ith th e  fa c u lty  o f im ag ination  and speech  in  a
p re -p o litic a l world t h a t  could b o as t o f  l i t t l e  e lse . What, exac tly ,
does Hobbes mean by im agination? Well, in  L eviathan  he te l ls  us t h a t
"The com pressions make on th e  organs o f S igh t...p roduceth  in  living
C rea tu res , in  whom God ha th  p laced  such organs, an  im ag ination  o f
th e  O bject...w hich Im agination  is  ca lled  Sight; and seem e th  n o t to
Q
bee a  m eer Im agination , b u t th e  Body i t  se lfe  w ithou t us."
I t  would seem , th e re fo re , t h a t  Hobbes was making th e  sam e m istake as  
Locke and  B erkeley in  arguing t h a t  a l l  p e rcep tio n  was m im etic
im ag ina tion , b u t  Hobbes n ea tly  avoids Locke's and B erkeley 's e r ro r  by
claim ing t h a t  a l l  v ision is , a t  ro o t, im ag in a tiv e , and th e re fo re  we 
would be  poor th in k e rs  ind eed  i f  we confuse seeing  fo r  believing.
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Hobbes re scu es  us from  our ra m p a n t im ag inations by dec laring  th a t  
language , when a c c u ra te ly  used  and  understood, could re g u la te  ou r fau lty  
conceptions. This was th e  basis fo r  Hobbes's o f t  re p e a te d  warnings 
a g a in s t absurd  speech  and th e  m etaphoric  equ ivocation  o f te rm s . 
A bsurdity, t h a t  c a teg o ry  m istake o f un learned  men, th u s  o ccu rs  only in
language . "N a tu ra ll sense  and im ag ina tion ," Hobbes rev ea lin g  observes,
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"are  n o t su b je c t to  absurdity ."
There is  no such  th in g  a s  an  absurd  im age; th e re  is  no m en ta l
p ic tu re  t h a t  is  ou tside  th e  bounds o f rea so n  (reason only com es a f te r
when we use  th e  language). F u rth erm o re , m im etic im ag ina tion  holds 
l i t t l e  cu rren cy  in  th e  pu rchase  o f  p o litic a l s tab ility . The fa n c ifu l
im ag e  o f  th e  HobbesLan a r tif ic ia l man rid ing a to p  th e  A risto te lian
g o a t-s tag e , a  com pounding o f  im age  upon im ag e , is  beyond th e  c r i te r ia  o f
m ere t r u th  and falsehood. The m etaphoric im ag e , th e  "com posit concept"
th a t  th e  G reeks and th e  L atins had spoken o f, can n o t be d isallow ed even
in  Hobbes's m ean-sp irited  world o f  th e  s ta t e  o f n a tu re . As even  th e
sc e p tic s  rem ind  us, our im  m ediate sense experience  v a rie s  and, in  fa c t ,
te l l s  us nothing defin itive ly  ab o u t th e  world around us. One o f  th e
"diseases" o f th e  com m onw ealth , Hobbes in fo rm s us, is  " th a t  every
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p riv a te  man is  Judge  o f  Good and E vill ac tions."  L e t u s  m ake a  
co llec tiv e  judgm en t th e re fo re , Hobbes says -  a  judgm en t upon our 
super-sensory  experience  which would m ean t h a t  a l l  ou r fu tu re  judgm ents 
would be ta k e n  c a re  of. The need  fo r  us t o  co llec tiv e ly  se e  and  judge 
th e  n ecess ity  o f  exchanging our r ig h ts  fo r  p eac e  and se c u rity  req u ires  
t h a t  we im ag ine a  h y p o th e tica l s ta t e  o f  n a tu re ; i t  n e c e ss ita te s  t h a t  we 
im ag inative ly  and m etaphorically  envision a  s t a t e  o f  a f fa ir s  o th e r  th a n  
to  which our im m ed ia te  senses la y  claim . We im ag ine a  L eviathan , a  
M ortal God, an  A rtif ic ia l Man who w ill ta k e  c a re  o f  u s  and re g u la te  our
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speech  and fu tu re  ac tions. The sou l o f th e  a r t i f ic ia l  man becom es th e
judge o f  a l l  fu tu re  sense. And in  o rd e r t o  m ake th is  in itia l judgm ent
we c a n n o t be le d  by a rg u m en t alone; we need  "fancy" to  adorn  our prose, 
"secreteLy in s tru c tin g "  our judgm ent a s  i f  w hat is  being spoken o f was
b efo re  our very  eyes.
Scepticism , lik e  i t s  a t te n d a n t d o c trin e  n ih ilism , a t te m p ts  t o  reac h  
a  p o in t w here no com m on m eaning can  e x is t  am ong men. I t  begins by 
posit in g t h a t  a l l  our values d if fe r , t h a t  a l l  ou r com m on concep tions a re  
re a lly  m isconceptions. To Vico's observation  in  h is New Science t h a t  
"Com m on sense  is  judgm ent," th e  sc e p tic  and th e  n ih ilis t in s is t  t h a t  
th e re  is  nothing o u t th e re  which we can  com m only judge .11 Vico conn ec ts  
th is  "com m on sense" d ire c tly  t o  th e  p o litic a l com m unity , fo r  our com m on
judgm ent is , accord ing  to  Vico, "shared  by an  e n tire  c lass, an  e n tire
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people, and e n tire  na tion , o r  th e  e n tire  hum an ra c e ."  This is  a  highly 
im ag in a tiv e  v en tu re  fo r  we could n ev er la y  d a im  to  th e  sam e judgm ent, 
th e  sc e p tic  rep lies . We can  only have our sense  experience  to  guide us, 
an  experience  t h a t  only ends up ind iv iduating  us, tu rn in g  th e  co n ce p t o f 
th e  "p o litica l com m unity" in to  an  im possible one. I f  we can n o t have th e  
sam e conceptions, we can n o t re n d e r  th e  sam e judgm ents, and th e  id e a  o f 
co llec tiv e ly  holding c e r ta in  p o litic a l o r  m oral values becom es nearLy 
im possible. Hobbes's answ er to  th e  scep tic s , th e re fo re , begins by
a r tic u la tin g  a  h y p o the tica l concep tion  ( th a t o f th e  s ta t e  o f  natu re), 
inv iting  u s  to  sh a re  in  th is  im age o f  man, and th e n  positing  t h a t  we a ll  
should sh a re  in  holding th e  sam e re g a rd  fo r  p eace  and secu rity .
I t  was m entioned in  c h a p te r  tw o  t h a t  th e  ap rio riza tio n  o f th e  im age 
m ight be a  dangerous c o n ce p t and, indeed , Hobbes shows u s  w here th is
very  dan g er lies . We can , a f te r  a ll, im ag ine  a l l  so r ts  o f  s ta te s  o f
a f fa ir s  and  th e n  w ith our so -ca lled  reaso n  show th e  n ece ss ity  fo r
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engaging in  r a th e r  a b h o rren t p o litic a l p ra c tic e s , p ra c tic e s  which m ight 
be  g en ero u d y  ca lled  illib e ra l. I f  our im ag e  o f  man is  com posed o f 
fe a r , res tle ssn ess , con ten tion , sed ition , and an  unceasing q u e s t fo r  
pow er, th e n  i t  would be  lo g ic a l fo r  u s  to  o p t  f o r  an  au th o rita rian , 
p erhaps even  to ta li ta r ia n , sovereign  who w ill p ro te c t  u s from  ourselves
-  b u t only i f  we s t a r t  from  th is  bLeak p ic tu re  o f  mankind. Y et equally  
ou r p o litic a l im ag ina tion  h as  th e  m arked ab ility  to  save u s  r a th e r  th a n  
enslave us. Im agination  can  f re e  u s  from  th e  s tubborn  ra tionalism  th a t
has com e to  be  th e  hallm ark  o f  il lib e ra l reg im es. This is  w hat 
ro m an tic s , like  Shelley, suggested  was th e  saving g race  o f im agination ; 
th e  unconquerable im ag ination  t h a t  w ill fo re v e r  oppose ty ran n y . E x trem e 
ra tio n a lism , fo r  in s ta n c e , te l ls  u s  t h a t  man and his env ironm ent can  be 
sy stem a tize d , t h a t  th e  o b jec ts  in  th e  w orld can  be used a s  a  re so u rce  
to w ard s  som e given end. And in  th e  p u rsu it o f  t h a t  ra tio n a lis tic  end,
man h im self becom es ju s t  an o th e r expendable re so u rce . I t  is  im agination , 
th e  R om antics t e l l  us, which saves u s  from  being tu rn e d  in to  ra tio n a l, 
expendable m achines, o r  from  echoing w hat th e  com p u ter HAL says in  
S tanely  Kubrick's 2001: 'Tm using a l l  my c a p a c itie s  to  th e  maximum,"
HAL rep lie s  when asked  how he is  fee lin g , "w h a t m ore could a  ra tio n a l 
e n t i ty  w ant?"
Now w h at I  w an t to  do in  th e se  l a s t  few  pages is  to  b rie fly  exam ine 
th is  double edged sw ord o f p o litica l, non-m im etic  im ag ination .
In  th e  world o f  p o litic a l philosophy im ag ina tion  is  n o t so  much m im etic
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a s  i t  i s  P rom ethean . This is  th e  n o rm ativ e  d im ension o f  p o litic a l 
th o u g h t a s  opposed to  th e  descrip tive ; i t  i s  concerned  w ith how we ough t 
t o  liv e  r a th e r  th a n  how we do liv e . The w ell-known s to ry  o f  P rom etheus, 
has many im p lica tio n s  fo r  p o litic a l im ag ination . A P rom ethean
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im ag ina tion  is  one which springs from  c re a tiv ity  -  an  im ag inative
re-com bin ing  o f  th e  o b jec ts  in  th e  world, a  m etap h o rica l t r a n s fe r  of
words, id eas, and im ag es which propels us fo rw ard  in to  a  new m oral and
p o litic a l o rd er. W hatever e lse  P rom ethean  po litica l im ag in a tio n  may be,
i t  c e rta in ly  is  n o t m im etic.
T here a re  s e v e ra l d iffe rin g  m yths surrounding P rom etheus, a lthough
in  a lm o s t a l l  legends th e  G reek dem igod ap p ea rs  a s  a  frien d  to  th e  hum an
ra c e . When in  Hesiod's Theogony Zeus den ies th e  g i f t  o f  f ire  to  mankind
i t  is  P rom etheus who s te a ls  i t  from  m ount Olympus and o ffe rs  i t  to  man.
In  o th e r  m yths P rom etheus tr ic k s  th e  gods o u t o f ob ta in ing  th e  b e s t m eat
in  th e ir  sac rif i ces  and, again, he ends up giving th is  m e a t t o  mankind.
When Aeschylus t r i e s  h is hand th e  leg en d  P rom etheus is  p o rtray e d  a s
s e c re t ly  knowing t h a t  th e  son o f  Zeus w ill u ltim a te ly  d es tro y  him.
R ath er th a n  re v e a l w h at he knows to  Zeus, P rom etheus is  chained  to  a
ro ck  w here during th e  day a  v u ltu re  pecks a t  his liv e r, and  w here a t
n ig h t his liv e r  grow s back  only to  be consum ed again  th e  follow ing day.
When P la to  speaks o f th e  myth o f P rom etheus in  th e  P ro tag o ras  he has a
s ligh tly  d if fe re n t s to ry  t o  te lL  I t  seem s t h a t  when Zeus had  d ecreed
th a t  various g if ts  and ta le n ts  be a llo ca ted  to  th e  an im a l kingdom a t  th e
beginning o f  c re a tio n  one o f h is se rv an ts , E pim etheus, m ade an  erro r:
a l l  th e  g if ts  had  m istakenly been  a llo ca ted  t o  th e  b ru te s  b u t w ith
noth ing  l e f t  fo r  man. A ccording to  P la to ,
"While he was puzzling ab o u t th is , P rom etheus cam e to  in sp e c t th e
work, and found th e  o th e r an im als w ell o ff  fo r  every th ing , b u t man
naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarm ed, and a lread y  th e  appoin ted  day 
had com e, when man to o  was to  em erge  from  w ithin th e  e a r th  in to  th e
daylight." 14
This is  man in  th e  P rom ethean  s ta t e  o f  n a tu re : "naked, unshod, unbedded
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and unarm ed." I t  i s  a t  th is  p a in t P rom etheus s to le  th e  f ir e  which th e  
gods k e p t on Mount Olympus, bu t, ju s t a s  im p o rtan tly , along w ith f ire  he 
also  s to le  " th e  g i f t  o f  sk ill in  th e  a rts"  and bestow ed i t  upon mankind. 
"In th is  way," P la to  observes, "m an acqu ired  su ff ic ie n t re so u rces  to
keep  h im self a live , but," P la to  th e n  adds, man u n fo rtu n a te ly  "had no
15po litica l wisdom." B ecause m en possessed no p o litic a l sk ill o r  wisdom 
Zeus was fo rced  to  add one m ore qua lity  to  mankind in  o rd e r to  p re v e n t 
m en from  killing one ano ther: nam ely, "a sense  o f  ju s tice ."  Sim ilarly, 
in  h is P rom etheus Bound Aeschylus te l ls  u s  t h a t  th e  P rom ethean  g if t  o f
f ire  and  th e  a r ts  (" tech n e") enabled  man t o  have a  "new m astery  o f
1Bthough t."  Thus th e  a r ts ,  according t o  A eschylus, which w ere kindled by
th e  im ag in a tio n  and te c h n e , enabled  man, when com bined w ith th e  "sense
of ju s tice ,"  to  estab lish  a  new m oral p o litic a l o rder.
The nam e P rom etheus in  G reek m eans "fore-sigh t"  -  which is  th e
ab ility  to  im agine w h at w ill happen in  th e  fu tu re  -  b u t th e  P rom ethean
m yth also  sym bolizes th e  rebellion  ag a in s t th e  n a tu ra l o rd e r o f th ings.
P rom etheus b reaks Zeus's com m andm ent in  th e  sam e way t h a t  Adam and  Eve
broke Yahweh's n o t to  e a t  o f th e  fo rb idden  f ru it ,  b u t in  th e  G reek myth 
th is  rebellion  had th e  fu r th e r  consequence o f in s tig a tin g  a  w ar am ongst
men, a  w ar t h a t  could only be s e t t le d  once th e  c o n ce p t o f ju s tice  could
be es tab lished . The P rom ethean  g if t  o f  im ag ina tion , th e re fo re , appears
to  b e  highly am biguous. I t  is  th e  re v o lt  ag a in s t a  tra n sc e n d e n t o rder
which th e n  le ad s  t o  th e  founding o f  a  new p o litic a l com m unity , and  y e t
i t  e s tab lish es  p o litic a l o rd e r a t  th e  c o s t o f  tran sg ress in g  th e  law s of
n a tu re . By P rom ethean  im ag ina tion  th e  a r t  o f  God becom es th e  a r ti f ic e
o f  man. I t  is  an  a r t i f ic e  which enab les man t o  be  se lf-su ffic ie n t; so
long a s  he  m ain tains h is a r ti f ic e  and  a  "sense o f  ju stice"  he w ill n ev e r
f a l l  back  in to  th e  unhappy s ta te  o f  n a tu re . A lthough in  P la to 's  hands
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th e  P rom ethean  m yth is  p a r tly  m im etic  -  by th e  g if ts  o f th e  a r ts ,  f ire ,
and  a  sense  o f  ju s tic e  man is  abLe t o  m irro r th e  d ivine o rd e r  -
n ev erth e less  th e  P rom ethean  m yth also  shows u s  th e  consequences o f 
p o litic a l im ag ination : a  reb e llio n  ag a in s t p re -ex istin g  law s, th e
l i te r a l  "fo re-sigh t"  o f  th e  way th in g s  m ight b e , and  usually  coupled 
w ith a  pun ishm ent fo r  such  a  heavy transg ress ion . This am bigu ity  o f  th e  
P rom ethean  im  ag ination  is  heigh tened , a s  Shelley cla im ed  in  his
P rom etheus Unbound, when one re a liz e s  t h a t  th e  m yth spoke t o  unsw erving 
need  fo r  man to  re v o lt  ag a in s t ty ran n y . We may be  punished fo r  our
d isobedience, th e  R om antics re a d  in to  th e  m yth, b u t lik e  P rom etheus we 
know t h a t  our cause  is  a  ju s t  one.
The P rom ethean  im ag ination  c e r ta in ly  has  p o litic a l overtones, b u t i t  is  
a lso  s tr ik in g  how much th is  m yth has in  com m on w ith th e  HobbesLan myth 
o f th e  s ta te  o f  n a tu re  and  p o litic a l so c ie ty . As in  th e  P rom ethean  
m yth, HobbesLan man ex is ts  in  a  m ean-sp irited  s ta te  o f  n a tu re , indeed , 
i t  is  a  s ta te  o f  t o t a l  anarchy. W hat man does possess in  Hobbes's world 
is  th e  g if t  o f  im ag ination , b u t th is  ta le n t  is  no b u ffe r  ag a in s t th e  
com peting  a p p e tite s  o f men which le a d  to  p e rp e tu a l co n flic t. HobbesLan 
man possesses th e  cap a c ity  o f  sense , im ag ination , and speech , b u t u n til
he has a  "sense o f  ju stice"  he can  have no secu rity  o r  p eace  and  hence 
no p o litic a l so c ie ty . Only when once g ran te d  th is  p o litic a l o rd e r will 
every th ing  e lse  follow : com m erce , th e  a r ts ,  sc ien ce , educa tion , e tc .
Y et th is  new political, so c ie ty  i s  in  p a r t  a  rebe llion  a g a in s t th e
e x is te n t m oral o rder. The a r t  o f God's design is  fo rsaken  in  fa v o r  o f
m an's a r t i f ic e .  Hobbes's L ev iathan  usurps God's a u th o rity  and im p lan ts  
th e  sovereign 's w ill in  i t s  p lace .
Now on a  b ro ad er sc a le  th e  P rom ethean  analogy also speaks to  th e
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agenda o f  th e  p o litic a l philosopher. The p o litic a l th e o r is t  ta k e s  th e
o b je c ts  and  im ag es which a re  availab le  t o  him and  im ag ina tive ly
re -com bines th e m . When th e  th e o r is t  reb e ls  ag a in s t o r  even  sligh tly
am ends th e  e x is te n t p o litic a l o rd e r -  a s  he o f te n  does o r  e lse  he would 
n o t be saying any th ing  o f much im p o rtan ce  -  he is  using his 'fo re -s ig h t'
by a r tic u la tin g  w hat m ight be i f  such  and such  a  s itu a tio n  w ere t o  ta k e
p lace . He is  n o t using his m im etic  sense  experience  -  h is "vision
n a tu ra l"  a s  Hobbes would say  -  b u t h is p o litic a l vision, borne from
com m on concep tions which a re  th e n  im ag in a tiv e ly  engaged in  th e  p u rsu it
o f  a  new vision  o f  po litic s. Like P rom etheus, we should a lso  add,
h is to rica lly  th e  p o litic a l th e o r is t  som etim es h as  a  heavy p rice  to  pay
fo r  th is  insubord ination .
I  do n o t  wish to  be labo r th e  comparisLon fo r  a t  som e p o in t a ll 
analog ies m ust necessarily  b reak  down. The p o in t is  n o t t o  show t h a t
p o litic a l th e o ris ts  a re  in  re a li ty  Pro m e th e a n -s ty le  heroes, b u t t h a t  i t  
is  o f te n  n o t th e  m im etic q u a litie s  t h a t  concern  us when read in g  a  
p a r tic u la r  p o litic a l th e o ris t,  r a th e r  i t  is  his P rom ethean  im ag in a tio n  
t h a t  s e ts  him a p a r t  from  o th e r  th in k ers . I t  is  in s tru c tiv e , fo r  
in s ta n c e , t h a t  when Bishop Bra m hall denounced Hobbes's L ev iathan  he 
argued  t h a t  Hobbes th e o ry  fa ils  p rec ise ly  because  h is vision d id  n o t 
m irro r th e  t r u e  world. "A p rincip le  cause  o f his e rro rs ,"  Bra m h a ll 
observed,
"is fancy ing  to  h im self a  g en e ra l s ta te  o f N atu re  which is  so f a r
from  being genera l, t h a t  th e re  is  no in s ta n c e  to  be found o f i t
in  th e  n a tru e  o f th ings, w here mankind w as a lto g e th e r  w ithou t law s
17and  w ithou t govem ours..."
S im ilar com plain ts have been  lev e lled  a g a in s t a  m ultitude o f o th e r  
th e o ris ts  from  P la to  to  Marx who have equally  fa iled  to  pass th e
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' mim etic test' of political im agination.
The n o tab le  fe a tu re  o f  po litica l im ag ination , th e n , is  n o t i t s  
m im etic  q u a lity  b u t i t s  in h e re n t P rom ethean  in s ta b ility . To v isualize a  
w orld o th e r  th a n  how i t  ap p ea rs  to  be t o  th e  p rim ary  senses is  
im  m ediate ly  t o  in v ite  scepticism  and d is tru s t, and  hence th e  highly 
rh e to r ic a l  flav o r o f  po litica l d iscourse which seek s  t o  overcom e such 
obstac les. The in s ta b ility  o f  p o litic a l im ag ina tion  res ides , a s  th e  
P rom ethean  m yth po in ts  to ,  in  i t s  dangerous overthrow  o f  th e  s ta tu s  quo 
in  fa v o r  o f  a  new , u n te s ted , m oral order. The com m on concep tions t h a t  
p o litic a l rh e to r ic  estab lish es  goes som e way t o  a lle v ia te  th e  qualm s o f 
th e  sp e c ta to rs , b u t th e se  im ag es can  n ev e r f irm ly  e ra se  th e  unease t h a t  
one fe e ls  when knowing t h a t  th e y , to o , a re  only te m p o ra ry  and t h a t  th e  
im ag es  borne from  a n o th e r p o litic a l im ag in a tio n  w ill even tua lly  ta k e  
th e i r  p lace . When Jaco b  B urckhard t r e fe r s  to  th e  myth in  his 
R eflections on H istory he asks "How would th e  th o u g h ts  o f  th e  P rom etheus 
o f  A sechylus sound in  philosophy?" His answ er, approp ria te ly , was t h a t
'Tn th e ir  p o e tic  p resen ta tio n , a t  any  r a te ,  th e y  aw aken in  us th e  sense
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o f  th e  trem endous."  In  pol.iri.cal im ag ination  we a re  ce rta in ly  o ffe red  a  
lltrem endous" im age  o f  th e  world, b u t th is  vision can  c u t  bo th  ways: 
trem en d o u s a s  in  "aw e-inspiring" and  trem en d o u s a s  in  "fearfuL "
W hat I  w an t to  exam ine n e x t a re  tw o  decidedly  d if fe re n t and 
con tem porary  a t te m p ts  t o  com e to  te rm s  w ith  th e  "trem endous" o f 
p o litic a l im ag ination . They bo th  r e f e r  t o  th e  im ag es  and language th a t  
th e  p o e t con jures fo r th . When we lis te n  to  th e  voice o f  p o e try  we a re  
g iven an  in s ig h t to  th e  v ir tu e  and dangers  o f  po liti c a l  im agination. 
The v ir tu e  o f p o e try , Hobbes in fo rm s us, is  t h a t  i t  g ives g lory  t o  g re a t  
deeds and  s e ts  them  firm ly  in  p o s te rity  (so, to o , we m ight add, w ith 
P rom ethean  im  ag ination). B ut th e re  is  an  underside t o  th e  po e tic
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im ag ina tion , a s  w ith  i t s  p o litic a l c o u n te rp a rt, and unless we ta k e  heed
o f  th e  d a rk e r  side o f ou r im ages -  m etaphoric  and o therw ise  -  our
p o litic a l im ag ination  may prove to  be le ss  th a n  lib e ra tin g .
Section Two:
The Im age in  th e  Conversation o f  Mankind
N ot v ery  long  ago th e  w orld's c u rre n t reign ing  chess cham pion, G arry
K asparov, p layed  a  m atch  ag a in s t w h a t is  a t  th e  p re se n t t im e  th e  world's
m ost pow erfu l chess com puter, which has been  ch ris ten ed  w ith th e  nam e 
"D eep Thought." Now th e  a d v en t o f chess m asters  playing chess com puters  
has grow n q u ite  com m onplace and, fo r  th e  m ost p a r t ,  i t  is  n o t a lw ays th e  
chess m aste r who is  th e  w inner, although i t  was in  th is  in s ta n c e  w ith 
K asparov d e fea tin g  th e  com pu ter handily. W hat is  w orth noting , how ever, 
is  th e  reaso n  t h a t  K asparov gave fo r  h is easy  v ic to ry : th e  com puter, 
K asparov d ec lared , "sim ply has no im ag ination ."  From th is  we can  ta k e  
K asparov's s ta te m e n t to  m ean t h a t  i t  is  th e  a c t  o f im ag ination , am ong 
o th e r  th ings, which m akes us hum an.
To th e  many descrip tions o f man which a re  philosophically  
fash ionab le -  t h a t  is , man a s  an  ag en t, an  a c to r , th e  se lf , o r  th e  
coqjfo  -  we can  inc lude one o ther: m an a s  an  im age  making anim al. The 
G reek c o n ce p t o f  th ink ing  (nous) and  o f  reason ing  w ith words (logos) 
help  inform  a  p a r tia l  understanding o f  man a s  an  an im a l who possesses 
im ag ina tion , one who is  ab le  t o  c re a te  m en ta l im ag es  from  th e  s to c k  o f 
o b je c ts  which a re  b efo re  him . K an t d e fin e s  im ag in a tio n  in  ju s t  th is  
way: " the  fa c u lty  o f  in tu itio n  e v e r  w ithou t th e  p resen ce  o f  an  ob ject,"
or, in  o th e r  words, th e  afaHty to  c re a te  and  assem ble in  th e  mind w h at
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is  only  p re se n t ou tside  th e  mind. Hobbes, a s  we have seen , has a
s im ila r descrip tio n  o f  im ag ina tion  b u t  h e  th e n  re le g a te s  th e  o b jec ts  o f
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our im ag in a tio n  to  th e  w orld o f  w h at he ca lls  "fancy," m eaning t h a t  th is
is  only ou r concep tion  o f  th e  o b je c t and  should n ev e r be ta k e n  fo r  th e
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re a l i ty  o f  th e  o b je c t i ts e lf .  In  e i th e r  case , w h a t th e  philosophical
ta lk  o f  im ag ination  seem s to  have in  com m on is  th e  understand ing  th a t
th e  w orld is  made up o f o b jec ts  t h a t  a re  th e  im ag es  which we perce ive
and  o f  ourselves, th e  im ag iners  (for w an t o f  a  b e t te r  expression) who
a re  ab le  t o  co n tem p la te , s if t ,  o rd e r and  fin a lly  a r t ic u la te  upon th e
o b jec ts  which a re  around o r w ithin us.
J u s t  a s  we have distinguished  th e  m im etic  from  th e  P rom ethean
q u a litie s  o f  po litica l im ag ination , we m ight a lso  w an t fu r th e r  t o  divide
th e  p rocess o f  im ag ination  in to  tw o  halves: th e  mode o f  im ag ination
which is  m ade up o f  con tem pla ting  upon im ag es  and  th ink ing  o r  reasoning
w ith them  in  an  unusual way -  p a r t  o f w h at th e  G reeks considered  to  be
th e  li f e  o f  th e  v ita  con te  m plativa -  and we m ight w an t to  consider th e
a c tiv ity  o f  c rea tin g  new im ag es from  our im ag ination  in  th e  d im ensional
world o f  sp ace  and  tim e : c re a tin g  a  scu lp tu re  o r a  dance o r  a  d ram a, fo r
in s ta n ce , which can  be sa id  t o  in h a b it th e  w orld o f th e  v ita  a c t iv a .
B ut upon c lo se r  exam ination  we find  t h a t  th e  v ita  co n tm p la tiv a  and th e
v ita  a c tiv a , a t  le a s t  when i t  com es to  th e  a c t  o f  im ag ina tion , a re  n o t
tw o  e n tire ly  d if fe re n t  rea lm s. Even though  i t  m ight be  possible to
ponder upon som e m a th em a tic a l fo rm u la  w ith o u t p u ttin g  i t  to  use, o r  even
though  i t  m ight be  possible im ag in a tiv e ly  to  c re a te  a  p ie ce  o f  a rtw o rk
w ithou t consciously con tem p la ting  upon w h at one i s  doing, th e re  seem s to
be a  c lo se  re la tio n sh ip  be tw een  th e  a c tiv ity  o f  th ink ing  a b o u t an  o b jec t
in  a  n o v e l way and th e  a c tiv ity  o r 'p erfo rm an ce ' o f  ou r im ag ination .
P la to , t o  draw  from  a  w ell known exam ple, m ade no d is tin c tio n
betw een  th e  a c tiv ity  o f  knowing w h at was good from  th e  p erfo rm ance  o f
t h a t  v e ry  sam e good. To know th e  good was n ecessarily  to  do good and in
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th e  w orld o f  p o litic a l e th ic s , a s  described  in  th e  G orqias, such
know ledge was ta n ta m o u n t t o  a  p erfo rm ance . The G reek concep tion  o f
te c h n e  is  an o th e r exam ple. I f  we chose to  t r a n s la te  th e  G reek te ch n e  a s
"skill" th e n  th is  im p lies  t h a t  th e re  a re  tw o  d if fe re n t  kinds o f  skill:
th e re  is  th e  sk ill o f  th e  philosopher in  fo rm u la tin g  propositions, which
brings u s  back  to  th e  world o f  th e  v ita  con tem p la tiv a , and th e re  is  th e
sk ill o f th e  a r t i s t  o r  c ra ftsm a n  which in h a b its  th e  w orld o f  th e  v ita
a c t iv a . Y et i f  we in s te a d  t r a n s la te  te c h n e  to  m ean a  "c ra ft"  in  th e
a r ts ,  a s  in  th e  P rom ethean  g i f t  o f  te c h n e  which helps estab lish  th e
p o litic a l o rd er, and n o t a s  a  " s k i l l /  th e n  I  th in k  t h a t  we can  have
som e understanding  o f w h at th e  a c tiv ity  o f w riting  p o e try  o r  p o litic a l
philosophy is  abou t. W riting p o e try  o r  p o litic a l philosophy is  a
te c h n e , i t  is  a  c r a f t  -  t h a t  is , i t  req u ire s  an  a c tiv ity  o r  perfo rm ance  
on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  th in k e r. A poem , fo r  exam ple, is  som eth ing  which is
m ade, lik e  a  scu lp tu re , o r  a  building, o r  a  sp eech , and th e  a c tiv ity  o f
c ra f tin g  p o e tic  im ages is  th e re fo re  p a r t  o f  th e  world o f  th e  v ita
a c tiv a . W hat th e  poem sh ares  w ith th e  w orld o f  th e  v ita  a c tiv a  is  th e
f a c t  t h a t  i t  is  p rim arily  v isual. In  th e  w orid o f  th e  v ita  a c tiv a  we
see  th e  im ag es  t h a t  a re  m ade; we p a r tic ip a te  physically  in  th e  worid
which we in h ab it; and  when we e n te r  in to  th e  worid th is  e n tra n c e  becom es
a  perfo rm an ce  in  which we a re  a c to rs  and  o th e rs  see  u s  a c t .  Even when
we only consider th e  worid o f con tem p la tion , o f  th e  v ita  co n te  m plativa,
we fin d  t h a t  th is , to o , is  p rim arily  v isual; ou r m en ta l language s tem s
from  th e  a c t  o f  im agin ing  th e  o b jec ts  which a re  around us. The p o e t's
c ra f t ,  lik e  th e  p o litic a l th e o ris t 's , is  th u s  one o f th e  w rite r
im ag in a tiv e ly  using th e  im ages which he se e s  and  th e n  in v itin g  u s  to
sh a re  in  his vision. As Theseus says in  A Midsum m er-N iqht's D ream ,
"The p o e ts  eye , in  a  fine  fren zy  ro lling ,
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do th  g lance from  heaven  to  e a r th , from  e a r th  to  heaven,
and a s  im ag ination  bodies fo r th
th e  fo rm s o f th in g s  unknown, th e  p o e t's  pen
tu rn s  them  to  shape, and  gives to  a iry  nothing
21a  lo c a l  h ab ita tio n  and a  nam e."
To sum m arize  th e n , th e  w riting  o f  a  poem o r a  p ie ce  o f  p o litic a l 
p rose can  be an  im ag in a tiv e  perfo rm an ce . I t  is  th e  making o f  a
s ta te m e n t  ab o u t th e  world and n o t ju s t  th e  co n tem p la tion  o f  i t ,  and,
m oreover, th e  s ta te m e n t which th e  th in k e r  con jures fo r th  o u t o f  "airy
nothing" is  a  public s ta te m e n t and n o t ju s t  a  p riv a te  one. When th e
p o e t c re a te s  a  poem , when th e  philosopher engages in  a  P rom ethean ,
p o litic a l im ag ination , he is  en te rin g  in to  th e  w orld o f th e  v ita  a c tiv a
in  th e  sam e way a s  a  b rickbuilder o r  a  s ta te sm a n  does, using h is la b o r
and his im ag ination .
W hat I  w an t to  do is  to  show t h a t  th e re  is  a  link  betw een  th e  p o e tic  and 
P rom ethean  p o litic a l im ag ination . This link, I  believe , can  be found by 
focussing on tw o  d is tin c t and  p rom inen t th e o rie s  o f p o e try  which have
ap peared  in  th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry : M ichael O akesho tt's  essay  "The Voice 
o f P o e try  in  th e  C onversation o f Mankind" and  M artin H eidegger's own 
"H olderlin  and  th e  Essence o f P oetry ."  F irs tly , I  w ill ana lyze th e  
c o n te n t o f th e i r  re sp e c tiv e  th e o rie s  o f  p o e tic  im ag ination  and  b rie fly
sk e tch  w hat I  th in k  to  be th e  ch ie f  lim ita tio n s  o f  each  view . Secondly, 
I  w ill h igh ligh t som e o f th e  p o litic a l im p lica tio n s  o f  each  th e o ry  -  and 
in  p a r tic u la r  H eidegger's which, I  believe , has g rave  consequences fo r  
th e  a r t  o f p o litic a l im ag ination . H eidegger's exam ple should be a  
w arning to  u s  a l l  t o  m odera te  p o litic a l im ag ination  l e s t  we risk  
aw akening th e  sense o f th e  "trem endous" in  our p o litic a l thought.
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A "conversation" fo r  M ichael O akesho tt is  a  m eeting  p lace  w here 
d if fe re n t  vo ices a re  spoken, and  am ong th e  m ost p ro m in en t vo ices in  th e  
conversation  a re  th o se  o f  p ra c t ic a l  a c tiv ity , th e  sc ie n tif ic , and  th e  
p o e tic . O akesho tt considers th e  vo ice  o f  philosophy n o t t o  belong in  
th is  realm  fo r  philosophy is  ju s t  p a ra s it ic  upon th o se  v o ices a lread y  
nam ed . The philosopher can  th u s  r e f le c t  upon th e  vo ice  o f  sc ien ce  o r  of 
po e try , b u t he c a n n o t co n trib u te  t o  th o se  v o ices in  any  way. In  his
E xperience and  I ts  Modes O akesho tt t e l l  u s  t h a t  philosophy is  th e  only
22s e lf -c r i t ic a l  d iscip line a s  i t  i s  alw ays underm ining i t s  own beliefs . 
C onsequently  in  h is  essay  "Voice o f P o e try  in  th e  C onversation o f
Mankind" O akesho tt te l ls  us t h a t  philosophy has no body o f know ledge 
which could be s tu d ied  lik e  th e  o th e r  d isc ip line?-, and  t h a t  when th e  
vo ice o f philosophy speaks in  a  conversation  i t  does so  only from  th e  
m argins.
The m ain vo ices h eard  in  O akeshott's  conversation , a s  ju s t
m entioned, a re  th e  vo ices o f  p ractical*  sc ie n tif ic , and p o e tic  a c tiv ity . 
W hat O akesho tt m eans by th e  p o e tic  vo ice  is  th o se  a c tiv it ie s  which
inc lu d e  "painting, scu lp ting , ac tin g , dancing, singing, l i te ra ry  and
23m usical com position." The vo ice  o f p o e try , th e re fo re , speaks in  th e
idiom  o f  th e se  a c tiv itie s , and  th e  purpose o f  p o e try , O akesho tt a ffirm s,
24is  to  g ive u s  im ag es  fo r  contem platLon and to  d e lig h t us. P oetry , we 
a re  to ld , de ligh ts  our senses w hilst th e  o th e r  vo ices in  th e  
conversation  seek  to  inform  us, t o  persuade , to  ed u ca te , o r  to
physically  move us in  som e way -  in  sh o rt, t o  do som eth ing  o th e r  th a n  
sim ply e n te r ta in  us, which is  p o e try 's  obligation , fo r  O akesho tt has a
p a r tic u la ry  HobbesLan acc o u n t o f  w hat words should do: one o f th e  main 
purposes o f p o e tic  language, accord ing  to  Hobbes, "is to  p lease  and 
d e lig h t ourselves, and  o th e rs , by playing w ith ou r words, fo r  p leasu re
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o r  o rnam en t, innocen tly ."
T here a re  tw o  serious ob jections to  O akeshott's  a cc o u n t o f  po e try , 
and, to  begin  w ith perhaps th e  le s s e r  o f  th e  tw o  objections, i t  is  
perhaps b e s t  to  c a l l  to  mind w h at w as suggested  a t  th e  s t a r t  o f  th is  
sec tio n : t h a t  man is  an  im age-m aking  an im al, and  t h a t  when he o rgan izes 
o r uses th e se  im ages he is  exerc ising  his im ag ination . And y e t  when we 
con tinue from  th is  sim ple p rem ise  we a re  le d  to  th e  conclusion t h a t  th e  
only th in g  sep a ra tin g  O akeshott's  d isourses o f  sc ien ce , o f p ra c t ic a l 
a c tiv ity , and  o f  p o e try  a re  th e  c a te g o rie s  in  which th e  im ages 
a t tr ib u te d  to  each  a re  housed. In  o th e r  words, th e re  a re  im ages  which 
ap p ea r in  one kind o f  d iscourse and y e t  n o t in  o th e rs . The sc ie n tif ic  
im age  o f  m olecular biology, fo r  exam ple , occu rs  only in  th e  d iscip line 
o f  m olecular biology and n o t, so f a r  t h a t  I  am aw are  o f, in  p o e tic  
d iscourse. Like A ris to tle  and  Hobbes, O akesho tt believes t h a t  th e  
vocabu lary  one uses in  each  form  o f u tte ra n c e  is  p a r tic u la r  t o  t h a t  
medium. We know, how ever, t h a t  th is  is  n o t n ecessarily  alw ays th e  case . 
I t  was n o t uncom m on to  find  in  th e  th i r te e n th  cen tu ry  a  p o e tic  tra d itio n  
which re lie d  heav ily  upon th e  P to lem aic  concep tion  o f  th e  universe as  
th e  im ag es which sc ien ce  and p o e try  used  had  been  shared , n o r was i t  
uncom m on to  find  in  th e  e ig h teen th  and  n in e teen th  cen tu ry  a  ro m an tic  
p o e try  which was in fo rm ed  by th e  organ ic  m odels o f  sc ien ce  which had 
been  infLuental a t  th e  tim e . I f  we looked hard  enough no d oub t we would 
find  o th e r  exam ples o f  where th e  d iscourse o f  th e  sc ie n tif ic  com m unity  
and o f  th e  p o e tic  com m unity sh a re  in  th e  sam e im ag e . One need  only to  
re c a ll th e  use  o f  m etaphoric  m odels in  th e  so c ia l and  physical sc ien ces  
(as b rie fly  ou tlined  in  th e  f i r s t  chap ter) to  re a liz e  th e  e x te n t  to  
which m etaphoric im ages  cross-p o llin a te  over d iffe rin g  d isc ip linary  
fie lds.
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O akeshott, perhaps an tic ip a tin g  th is  ob jec tion  in  his essay, 
responds by say ing  t h a t  th e  s tan d ard s  fo r  eva lua ting  e a c h  d iscourse in  
th e  conversa tion  a re  d iffe re n t. Thus, from  th e  d iscourse o f sc ien ce  we
can  in q u ire  w hether i t  is  a  f a c t  o r  n o t a  f a c t ,  O akesho tt claim s.
26However, we can n o t ask  th e  sam e question  o f  a  work o f  poetry . B ut I  
th in k  t h a t  th is  is  t o  m isrep resen t th e  im ag es  t h a t  th e  s c ie n tis t uses. 
The s c ie n t is t  n ev e r asks h im self w hether th e  m etaphoric  im ages  t h a t  he 
uses a re  t r u e  o r  n o t t r u e ,  o r  i f  th e y  a re  f a c tu a l  o r  f ic tio n a l. R ather, 
th e  s c ie n t is t  knows th a t  th e  models he works w ith a re  ju s t  th a t ,  im ages 
o r  m etaphoric  m odels, and  t h a t  th e  only th in g  he can  ask  o f th em  is,
g iven th e  am o u n t o f in fo rm atio n  t h a t  he has, w h e th er o r  n o t  th e se
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m etaphoric  im ages a re  a p t. S im ilarly , we find  t h a t  th e  p o e t m akes th e  
sam e ca lcu la tio n  in  his work; th e  p o e t does n o t  in q u ire  w hether th e  
im ag es  he  works w ith  a re  f a c ts  (we can  s tip u la te  t h a t  on som e personal 
le v e l th e  p o e t ta k e s  his im  ages t o  be  t r u e  to  his vision, b u t th is  is  
n o t  th e  sam e thing) b u t w hether th e y  a re  a p t  expressions fo r  h is p o e tic  
vision.
T here is  a  second, perhaps s tro n g e r ob jec tion  to  be made w ith
O akesho tt's  concep tion  o f  p o e tic  im ag ination , and  i t  i s  h e re  t h a t  we
begin  to  see  p o e try 's  p o litic a l overtones. O akesho tt's  agenda is  to
s e p a ra te  one mode o f  d iscourse from  an o th e r, t o  show t h a t  which is  
d is tin c tiv e  to  t h a t  p a r tic u la r  form  o f u tte ra n c e . The problem  is  n o t
t h a t  we do n o t le a rn  anything from  O akeshott's  divisions o f  conversation
-  indeed , som e c ru c ia l d is tinc tions  a re  h ighlighted  by th em  -  b u t t h a t
when we look  a t  som e sp ec ific  exam ples o f  p o e tic  language  we find  th a t
th e  vo ice  o f  p o e try  in  ou r conversation  does n o t  f i t  so  n ea tly  in to  th e
co m p artm e n t which O akeshott has p rep a red  fo r  i t .
In  fa c t ,  co n tra ry  to  w hat m any m ight be lieve , p o e try  has had a  long
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and distinguished  c a re e r  in  giving vo ice  to  p o litic a l m a tte rs . R ather 
th a n  deligh ting  aud iences we find  t h a t  p o e try  has had much t o  say  ab o u t 
th e  va lue  o f  p o litic a l m essages (to  say  noth ing  o f re lig ious m a tte rs), 
and  we so m etim es even  fin d  p o e try  i t s e l f  co n tribu ting  to  th e  p o litic a l 
d eb a te , in c itin g  people t o  ta k e  p a r t  in  a  p o litica l agenda. P o e try  in  
th is  re g a rd  does n o t sim ply f l i r t  w ith  th e  public, b u t can  and  does t r y  
to  le a d  th e  people to  do c e r ta in  th ings. We fo rg e t  t h a t  many o f  th e  
g r e a t  Roman and  R enaissance po litic ian s  w ere, in  th e i r  sp a re  tim e , th e  
p o e ts  o f th e ir  age .
As s ta te d  e a r lie r , a  poem , a lthough  f i r s t  s tem m ing  from  th e  p riv a te
th o u g h ts  o f th e  p o e t (or th e  v ita  co n te  m p la tiv a ) e n te rs  in to  th e  v ita
a c tiv a  by joining in  public d iscourse, and th is  is  c e rta in ly  t r u e  o f
p o e try  which exh ib its , w h at can  be ca lled , "p o litica l sen sib ilitie s ."
By p o litic a l sen sib ilitie s  I  m ean a  poem which has had i t s  im p e tu s  from  
a  p o litic a l ev en t, o r  is  in  response to  a  g iven p o litic a l s itu a tio n .
The poem which re su lts  from  o r  exh ib its  p o litic a l sen sib ilitie s  is  no
le ss  p o litic a l th a n  a  new spaper r e p o r t  o r  a  p o litic ian 's  speech  b efo re
P arliam en t. A poem w ith p o litic a l sen sib iltie s , a lthough  choosing to
swim in  m etaphoric  o r  opaque language , is  a s  much a  public p erfo rm ance
u tte ra n c e  a s  anything which can  be a t tr ib u te d  to  th e  v ita  a c tiv a . What
we a re  som etim es p resen ted  w ith  is  sim ply a  p o litic a l d iscourse
in h ab itin g  a n o th e r  fo rm , b u t one t h a t  i s  nonethe less a  p o litic a l
response  to  a  given p o litic a l s itu a tio n .
One o f  th e  b e s t exam ples o f  a  poem w ith p o litic a l sen s ib ilitie s  is
to  be  found in  D ryden's poem "Absalom and  A chitophel," published in
26N ovem ber o f  1681. In  March o f  t h a t  y e a r  th e  Whigs had in tro d u ced  a  b ill 
b e fo re  p a rliam e n t ca lled  "The Third Exclusion Bill," whose purpose was 
t o  p re v e n t Ja m es  S tu a rt, th e  Duke o f York, from  succeed ing  C harles H.
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A s ta le m a te  th u s  ensued be tw een  C harles and p a rliam e n t, w ith  C harles
responding  by im prisoning th e  le a d e r  o f  th e  Whig p a rty , th e  EarL o f
Shaftsbury , in  th e  Tow er o f  London so  t h a t  he could  be t r ie d  fo r  tre a so n
and th e n  ex ecu ted . Now Dryden was th e  P o e t L au rea te  a t  th e  t im e  and
also th e  h is to rian  to  th e  c o u r t o f  C harles H  so we should n o t  be  to o
su rp rised  t o  le a rn  t h a t  D ryden backed  th e  king in  h is  p o litic a l
s tru g g le . The poem we know a s  "Absalom and A chiriphel," which is  
re g a rd e d  a s  one o f  Dryden's b e s t, i s  a c tu a lly  a  p o litic a l t r a c t  a im ed  to
bring  ab o u t th e  conviction  and execu tion  o f  th e  le a d e r  o f  a  p o litic a l
p a r ty .
A few  m ore exam ples m ight be o ffe red  to  s tren g th en  th is  po in t. One 
can  a rg u e  t h a t  S hakespeare 's R ichard HI was a  p o e tic  d ram a which 
succeeded  in  fu r th e r  d iscred iting  th e  House o f  York in  fa v o r  o f  th e  
House o f  L ancaster; o r  t h a t  M easure fo r  M easure is  a  d ram a tic  poem on 
th e  n a tu re  o f  ju s tic e  and morality? o r t h a t  V irgil's Aeneid was an  ep ic  
poem in ten d ed  to  le n d  le g itim acy  to  th e  Roman s ta te .  Or, c lo se r t o  our 
own tim e s , we have th e  poem s o f W.B. Y eats, in  p a r tic u la r  "E as te r 1916" 
and  "The Rose T ree." In  th e  l a t t e r  poem , th e  dialogue be tw een  th e  tw o  
Irishm en inc ludes th e  following stan za :
" 'B ut w here can  we draw w ater,'
Said P earse  to  Connolly,
'When a l l  th e  w ells a re  parched  away?
0  p la in  a s  p la in  can  be
T here 's nothing b u t our own re d  blood
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Can make a  r ig h t Rose Tree.'"
The "red  blood" m entioned in  th e  poem re fe r s  t o  th e  d ea th  o f  f if te e n  
Irishm en k illed  by th e  B ritish in  1916, which w as th e  basis o f  Y eats 's 
poem "E as te r 1916." As Conor C ruise O 'Brien has rem ark ed , Y eats 's
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w riting  and  publishing o f th e se  tw o  poem s w ere bo th  p o litic a l a c ts , and
30
probably  th e  b ra v e s t o f  Y eats 's d istinguished c a re e r .
Now M ichael O akesho tt is  a  v e ry  c le v e r and  profound th in k e r, and 
presum ably  he would n ev er deny t h a t  th e  above a re  valid  exam ples o f 
p o litic a l p o e try , so why does he  b o th e r  t o  in s is t  t h a t  th e  d iscourse o f 
th e  p o e t i s  d is tin c t from  th e  o th e r  modes in  th e  conversation  o f 
mankind? The answ er, I  be lieve , lie s  p a r tly  w ith th e  double-edged sw ord 
o f  p o litic a l im ag ination . O akesho tt sp ec ifica lly  w ants t o  avoid th e  
dangerous gam e o f  arguing t h a t  one form  o f d iscourse is  p riv ileged  over 
o th e rs . J u s t  a s  th e  aprLorizatLon o f th e  im ag e  can  le a d  t o  a rtic u la tin g  
perilous d o ctrines , th e  ap rio riza tio n  o f p o e tic  im ag ination  would 
inexo rab ly  le a d  t o  th e  claim  t h a t  t r u th  is  housed in  p o e tic  language, 
and, o f course , th is  lie s  a t  th e  h e a r t  o f  O akesho tt's  a t ta c k  upon 
ra tio n a lism , which a lso  c la im s a  p riv ileged  position  a s  a  m ethod o f
inquiry . T here can  be p o e tic  ra tio n a lis ts  ju s t  a s  th e re  can  be 
philosophical and  p o litic a l ra tio n a lis ts , and th e re  is  no reaso n  to
assum e t h a t  th e  poet-k ing  would be any  le ss  il lib e ra l th a n  th e
philosopher-king. O akesho tt could have focussed  on w hat i s  com m on to  
a l l  th e  vo ices in  th e  conversation  o f  mankind; how ever, he chose in s te ad  
t o  ta c k le  th e i r  d iffe ren ces . Y e t in  doing so  he  l e f t  h im se lf open to  
th e  charge  t h a t  he m arginalizes a  mode o f  th ink ing  which is  strik ing ly  
im ag in a tiv e , and  th u s  fu n d am en ta l to  a t  l e a s t  a  p a r t  o f  th e  hum an
condition. Surely p o e try  does m ore fo r  u s  th a n  provide im ag es  fo r
"delight" and  "con te  m plation," and , u n fo rtu n a te ly , i t  i s  O akeshott's  
a c c o u n t o f p o e try  which, p a r tly  fo r  p o li tic a l reasons, re fu se s  to
sp ecu la te  on ju s t w hat th o se  o th e r  com ponents o f p o e try  a re .
To sum m arize  th u s  fa r ,  th e n , we can  say  t h a t  p o e try  springs from
th e  a c t  o f im ag ination , and y e t  i t  is  n o t  so  v e ry  d if fe re n t from  o th e r
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fo rm s o f im ag ination ; nam ely, th e  sc ien tif ic , th e  h is to rica l, th e
philosophical, o r, in d eed , th e  political, im ag ina tion  w ith which th is  
c h a p te r  began. T here a re  tim e s  when th e  p o e tic  im ag es  and th e  im ag es  o f 
o th e r  d iscourses m erge in to  one, and  so  th e  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  p o e try  
and o th e r  vo ices  in  th e  conversation  begins to  co llapse. F inally, we 
can  say  th u s  f a r  t h a t  th e  tra d itio n a l ph ilosophical d is tin c tio n  be tw een  
th e  p o e tic  and th e  p o litic a l vo ice  needs t o  be rev ised . W riting and 
publishing a  poem w ith p o litic a l sen sib ilitie s  is  a  po litica l a c t ,  and
i t  is  fo lly  t o  re a d  such poem s a s  i f  th e i r  only purpose w ere to  d e lig h t 
and e n te r ta in  us.
M artin  H eidegger, on th e  o th e r  hand, co m m its  th e  very  e r ro r  t h a t
O akesho tt w ants to  avoid. While O akesho tt seek s t o  se p a ra te  th e  
fun c tio n  o f p o e try  (perhaps even  m arginalizing it)  from  th e  o th e r
d iscip lines, H eidegger suggests  t h a t  a l l  th o u g h t springs from  p o e tic  
im ag ination . These rem ark s  ab o u t H eidegger's co n ce p t o f  p o e try  stem  
from  tw o  o f h is published essays, "The R em em brance o f  th e  Poet" and
"H olderlin  and th e  Essence o f Poetry" which w ere bo th  w ritten  in  th e
31m id -n in e teen -th irties . The connection  which I  wish to  m ake h e re  is  
be tw een  H eidegger's concep tion  o f  p o e tic  im ag in a tio n  and his dalliance  
in  th e  1930's w ith N ational Socialism . This connection , I  believe , is  
a p p a re n t fo r  a t  le a s t  tw o  reasons: th e  f i r s t  sim ply because  H eidegger's 
w ritings on p o e try  co incide chronologically  w ith  h is  asso c ia tio n  w ith 
N azi Germ any. Secondly, th e re  is  no thing in  Being and Time (w ritten  in  
1927) t h a t  should spec ifica lly  link  H eidegger w ith  such  an  unappetizing  
reg im e, and y e t  th e re  is  much in  H eidegger's a cc o u n t o f p o e tic
im ag in a tio n  which does. I f  th is  is  c o r re c t ,  th e n  w hat we have ju s t
il lu s tra te d  is  p rec ise ly  th e  in h e re n t d an g er in  holding a  p o e tic  o r
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p o litic a l im ag ination , o f  assum ing t h a t  one vo ice  in  th e  conversa tion  o f 
m ankind should be  p riv ileged  a s  speaking th e  t r u th  o v e r o th e rs . 
H eidegger's a cc o u n t o f  p o e try  i s  highly P rom ethean  in  c h a ra c te r  and  is  
in  keeping w ith th e  n egative  P rom ethean  e lem en ts  so m etim es asso c ia ted  
w ith  p o litic a l im  ag ination , espec ia lly  th e  kind o f  p o litic a l im ag in a tio n  
a s  p rac ticed  by e lem en ts  o f th e  Third Reich. Indeed , fo r  H eidegger th e  
p o e t is  th e  philosopher-king w rit la rg e .
Both H eidegger and  O akesho tt be lieve  t h a t  th e  m odel fo r  
understanding  th e  vo ice  o f  p o e try  is  t o  found in  a  conversation . Echoing 
O akesho tt's  p ronouncem ents, H eidegger te l ls  u s  t h a t  "we -  mankind -  a re  
a  conversation . The being o f  man is  founded in  language. B u t th is  only
becom es a c tu a l in  conversation" [a ll em phases in  quo tes a re  H eidegger's
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own]. O akesho tt would also  ag ree  t h a t  being unfolds i t s e l f  in  
conversation , and t h a t  p o e try  in fo rm s one o f  th e  basic  e le m e n ts  o f  th is  
conversation , b u t  H eidegger h as  som eth ing  e lse  in  mind h e re . For 
H eidegger, man is  fo re v e r  "housed in  language" and t h a t  language  i t s e lf
"is n o t  a  m ere too l"  a s  any no m in a lis t would claim , r a th e r  language
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encloses th e  possib ility  o f  a  world. Only when th e re  is  language  is
th e re  a  world, and only in  th e  w orld o f  language can  m an e x is t
h is to rica lly . Thus a  conversation  ta k e s  on an  added sign ificance  fo r
H eidegger s in ce  a  conversation  i s  th e  lo c u s  o f  m an's being. F or
O akesho tt a  conversation  is  la rg e ly  one w here d iffe rin g  v o ices a re  
spoken, b u t H eidegger s tre sse s  t h a t  th is  i s  only one h a lf  o f  th e
equation . A conversation  m ust a lso  be lis te n e d  to ,  and  lis ten in g  to  th e
vo ice o f  p o e try , fo r  in s ta n ce , is  ju s t  a s  much an  en g ag em en t in  th e
conversa tion  a s  th e  w riting o f  p o e try . "The ab ility  t o  speak,"
34H eidegger w rites , " and  th e  ab ility  t o  lis te n  a re  equally  fundam ental."  
Thus th e  fu ll  on to log ica l s ign ificance o f  language  goes beyond w hat
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O akesho tt would envisage; one w here th e  conversation  o f  mankind is
c o n s titu e n t o f  man's being, w here th e  possib ility  o f  being is  only t o  be 
found in  language, and w here a  conversation  is  th e  e sse n tia l a c tiv ity , 
bo th  speaking and listen ing , o f being in  th e  world.
Now th e re  is  a n o th e r s im ila rity  t h a t  bo th  philosophers in itia lly
sh a re : t h a t  o f constru ing  th e  a c tiv ity  o f  w riting  p o e try  a s  being
"innocent." E a rlie r  we saw how O akesho tt cla im ed  t h a t  p o e try  m erely 
"delights" an  aud ience, and  th is  is  s im ila r t o  w hat H eidegger in itia lly  
says a b o u t p o e try , fo r  H eidegger s ta te s  t h a t  "w riting  p o e try  ap p ea rs  in  
th e  m odest guise o f  play. U n fe tte red , i t  in v e n ts  i t s  world o f im ag es  and
rem a in s  im m ersed  in  th e  realm  o f th e  im ag ined ... w riting  p o e try  is
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com p le te ly  harm less." Having argued  t h a t  "w riting  p o e try  is  th e  m ost
in n o c en t o f a l l  occupations" H eidegger goes on to  question  w hat, th e n ,
is  th e  essence  o f poetry?  and  i t  is  a t  th is  p o in t t h a t  H eidegger's
philosophy begins to  d iverge rad ica lly  from  O akeshott's, and th u s
illum inating  fo r  us th e  dangerousness o f  th e  ap rio riza tio n  o f  th e  im age. 
Unlike O akeshott, H eidegger a rgues t h a t  p o e try , lik e  language, is
n o t  ju s t  a  to o l  o f  man no r a  c la ss ific a tio n  o f a  c e r ta in  form  o f
d iscourse, b u t has an  essence a l l  i t s  own which rev ea ls  w h at i t  m eans to
be hum an. B ecause man has a  language he is  ab le  to  s itu a te  his being in
te rm s  o f a  p a s t, a  p resen t, and a  fu tu re , and th is  m eans t h a t  man is
ab le  to  e x is t h is to rica lly . "Ever since  t im e  arose ,"  H eidegger argues,
"we have ex isted  h isto rica lly . Both -  ex is ten ce  a s  a  single conversation
and  h is to r ic a l ex isten ce  -  a re  a lik e  a n c ien t, th e y  belong to g e th e r  and
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a re  th e  sam e th ing ." So, co n tra ry  to  O akeshott, H eidegger a rgues th a t  
" ...p o e try  is  n o t an  o rnam en t accom panying ex isten ce , n o t m erely a  
te m p o ra ry  enthusiasm  o r nothing b u t an  in te r e s t  and am usem ent.
P o e try  is  th e  foundation  which supports h is to ry , and th e re fo re  i t
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is  n o t  a  m ere appearance  o f cu ltu re , and abso lu te ly  n o t th e  m ere
'expression1 o f a  'cu ltu re  souL'" 37
Our ex is ten ce , H eidegger continues, i s  th e re fo re  "fundam entally  poetic ."
The d iffe re n c e  from  O akeshott could n o t be m ore d e a r .
A paradox ensues from  th is  l a t t e r  a rg u m e n t fo r  how can  p o e try
rem a in  th e  harm less and in n o c en t en te rp rise  which H eidegger te l l s  u s  i t
is  and  y e t  a t  th e  sam e tim e  be th e  foundation  o f  being, w hich m ust
entail, som e am oun t o f  danger since  i t  is  so  im p o rta n t to  ex isten ce . The
answ er to  th is  paradox  is  t h a t  H eidegger's concep tion  o f th e  p o e t is  o f
th e  person  who s tan d s  a p a r t  from  th e  world and  o ffe rs  nam es f o r  th e
essen ces  o f  th e  im ag es which th e  p o e t th e n  encoun ters . The p o e t is  th e
f i r s t  one t o  nam e th in g s, and in  th is  schem e i t  is  p o e try  which com es
b efo re  language and  n o t th e  o th e r  way around. Since th e  p o e t is  th e
f i r s t  to  en co u n te r and  nam e im ag es he  does so  uncorrup ted  by language,
he is  an  in n o c en t o f  th e  world, in  o th e r  words, and hence H eidegger
c la im s t h a t  "poetry  n ev e r ta k e s  language  a s  th e  raw  m a te ria l read y  to
3Bhand, r a th e r  i t  is  p o e try  which f i r s t  m akes language possible."
H eidegger be lieves t h a t  th is  a c tiv ity  o f p o e tic  nam ing is  th e  
"nam ing o f th e  gods," fo r  i t  is  th e  gods o f  th is  w orld which language 
ca lls  in to  being. The p o e t, th e re fo re , th e  one who s tan d s  a p a r t  from
so c ie ty  and g ives nam es to  th e  essences  o r  t o  th e  im ag es t h a t  he 
en co u n te rs , s tan d s  be tw een  th e  gods and  th e  people. The p o e t "is th e
39one who has been  c a s t  o u t -  o u t o f  th e  B etw een, be tw een  gods and  men."
I t  i s  f o r  th is  reaso n  t h a t  H eidegger finds p o e try  dangerous a s  w ell a s  
in n o c en t fo r  th e  p o e t m ust e x is t  "betw een" th e  tw o  rea lm s  -  th e  essences 
and  th e  world -  and  is  th e re fo re  l e f t  dangerousLy exposed. This 
exposure is  lik e  an  iso la tio n , and can  be  perilous t o  th e  p o e t  because 
i t  c a n  le a d  t o  m adness a s  i t  d id  w ith H eidegger's fav o u rite  poet,
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H olderiin.
To sum m arize  b rie fly  th e n  w h at th e  vo ice  o f p o e try  en ta ils  fo r  
H eidegger, we can  say  t h a t  i t  is  th e  p o e t who f i r s t  nam es th e  im ages  and
th e  essen ces  o f  th e  world, and t h a t  th is  nam ing enab les language to  ta k e
p la ce . T herefo re , i t  is  th e  p o e t who f i r s t  m akes h is to ry  possible fo r
h is to r ic a l man can  only e x is t  in  th e  language which th e  p o e t has ca lled
fo r th ,  and  Being, o r  fo r  H eidegger "D asein," can  only be  possible once
th is  language has been  a r tic u la te d  from  th is  p o e tic  vision.
C learly  H eidegger goes beyond any  s tan d a rd  OakeshottLan conception  
o f p o e try  h ere , and one m ight w an t to  add  t h a t  his id e a  o f  p o e try  has 
much in  com m on w ith th e  G erm an R om antic m ovem ent exem plified  by H erder, 
Shelling, G oethe, and o th e rs . Indeed, H eidegger's exp lica tion  o f p o e try  
is  n o t so  much a  descrip tion  a s  a  m etaphysics o f  p o e try  -  and one th a t  
is  d if f ic u lt to  ta k e  ob jection  to  w ithou t in troducing  ob jections from  
o u tside  i t s  own d iscourse. The e a s ie s t  and m ost com pelling com pla in t to  
m ake ag a in s t H eidegger's m etaphysics o f p o e try  is  t h a t  fo r  i t  t o  succeed  
th e re  m ust be  r e a l  essences in  th e  worid which can  be a c c u ra te ly  nam ed 
only by th e  p o e t, lik e  P la to 's  philosopher is  th e  only one who can  know 
th e  Form s. F or P la to , obviously, th e  Form s can  only be seen  by th e  
philosopher, likew ise  fo r  H eidegger th e y  can  only be seen  by th e  p o e t -  
H eidegger's p o e t and  P la to 's  philosopher th u s  perfo rm  th e  sam e job. But 
th e y  can  also le a d  in  th e  sam e d irec tio n . P la to 's  philosopher is  th e  
d ic ta to r  o f  th e  Republic. Since only th e  P la ton ic  phflosopher-king can 
v isualize  o r  know th e  t r u th  th e n  i t  is  th e  rem a in d e r o f  th e  population 
who a re  fo rc e d  to  d e fe r  t o  h is  a u th o rita r ia n  p ronouncem ents. In  f a c t ,  
P la to  banishes th e  p o e ts  f ro  m h is Republic because  th e y  re p re s e n t a  
t h r e a t  to  th e  om nisc ien t voice o f th e  philosopher.
H eidegger does n o t  t e l l  us w h at s o r t  o f s ta t e  we w ill be l e f t  w ith
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i f  e v e r  th e  p o e t becom es th e  acknow ledged le g is la to r  o f language, b u t we 
can  c e rta in ly  guess. T here a re  som e who hold th e  view  th a t  H eidegger's 
f l i r ta tio n  w ith  Nazism in  th e  1930's s tem m ed  from  his yearn ing  fo r  a  
c h a rism a tic  figu re  (ie. H itler), b u t I  th in k  t h a t  th is  is  only t o  t e l l
p a r t  o f  th e  s to ry . H eidegger's ap rio riza tio n  o f  p o e tic  language and th e  
im ag es  t h a t  th e  p o e t  apprehends -  a  th e o ry  which he  a r tic u la te d  in  
con junction  to  th e  r is e  o f  N ational Socialism -  also , I  believe, p a r tly  
exp lains h is unappealing p o litic a l b e lie fs  and  p ra c tic e s . A t th e  very  
le a s t  we would say  t h a t  his c o n ce p t o f  p o e try  is  n o t  in c o n s is te n t w ith 
such  p o litic s . And a t  th e  v e ry  m ost, we would a lso  say , O akeshott's  
dim inish m en t o f th e  p o e tic  vo ice  saves  u s  from  follow ing in  th e
fo o ts te p s  o f H eidegger's own debacle .
This alone m ight n o t  be th e  only c ritic ism  o f H eidegger's a cc o u n t 
o f  p o e tic  im ag ina tion , fo r  we should also  ta k e  in to  a cc o u n t w h at was 
said  a t  th e  beginning o f th is  paper: nam ely , t h a t  th e  world, fo r  a ll
in te n ts  and  purposes, is  div ided b e tw een  th e  o b jec ts  which surround us 
and th o se  o f  u s  who possess th e  im ag ination  to  c o lle c t and o rd e r th e se  
im ag es  in  our mind. I t  is  im ag ination  -  p o litica l, p o e tic , o r o therw ise
-  i f  one reca lls , which m akes u s  hum an ra th e r  th a n  chess playing
m achines.
Now in  P la to 's  w orid o f th e  Form s i t  m ight seem  r ig h t  fo r  th e
philosopher to  be th e  only one to  glim pse th e  t r u e  n a tu re  o f th e  worid,
fo r  in  th is  in s ta n c e  th e  philosopher i s  m erely  th e  re c ip ie n t o f th e
vision  and  n o t th e  vision 's c re a to r . One m ight even  im ag ine  a
phiL osopher-as-orade p r ie s t  w ith in  whom th e  vo ice  o f  t r u th  speaks lik e  
a  con d u it passes on e le c tr ic ity . P oetry , how ever, is  a  d if fe re n t  m a tte r  
a lto g e th e r . The p o e tic  vo ice , i f  i t  is  to  be found anyw here, springs 
from  im ag ination , a s  O akesho tt so  rig h tly  rem inds us a t  th e  beginning o f
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his essay . However, H eideggers p o e t n ev e r uses his im ag ination , he 
sim ply nam es th e  im ag es t h a t  he sees . The p o e t s tan d s  alone in  a
c lea rin g  -  th e  c learing  which we understand  to  be H eidegger's holy p lace
o f  Being -  and  he  nam es th e  im ag inary  essences which we w ill th e n  use in
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our conversation . The problem  is  t h a t  H eidegger's p o e t n ev e r to u c h es  
us, n ev e r engages in  th e  conversation  o f  mankind. More s in is te rly , a s  
an  o rac le  o f t ru th ,  H eidegger's p o e t n ev e r g e ts  i t  wrong.
The p o e tic  im ag ina tion  which is  being suggested  h e re  is  n e ith e r  
wholly O akeshottian  n o r wholly H eideggerian b u t  a  p a r t ia l  com posite  o f 
th e  tw o . W hat is  sa lvageab le  from  O akesho tt's  concep tion  o f  p o e try  is
his s itu a tin g  th e  p o e tic  voice firm ly  in  th e  world o f  im ag ination ; b u t 
w here he e r r s  is  in  th e n  te llin g  u s  t h a t  i t  is  an  im ag in a tio n  which is
com ple te ly  d if fe re n t from  any o th e r  -  t h a t  i t  i s  a  p o e tic  im ag ination
which sim ply deligh ts  us r a th e r  th a n  in fo rm s us, o ffe rs  u s  im ag es  fo r  
co n tem p la tion  b u t n ev er persuades u s  t h a t  th e se  im ag es  a re  w orthw hile o r 
o f  any  use  in  p ra c t ic a l a c tiv ity . In  o rd e r to  avoid th e  ap rio riza tio n
o f th e  im age and o f one p a r tic u la r  mode o f  d iscourse -  and hence avoid
an  il lib e ra l s ta te  ru n  by H eideggian p o e ts  -  O akeshott's  p o e try  shows
its e l f  to  be devoid o f  any p o litic a l and h is to r ic a l co n ten t; his p o e tic
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im ag ination  is  a  mask w ithou t a  fa c e .
W hat is  sa lvageab le  from  H eidegger's m etaphysics o f  p o e try  is  his
re fu s a l to  su rren d er th e  vo ice o f p o e try  to  th e  realm  o f  th e  costum e
d ram a. His p o e tic  im ag ination  h as  som eth ing  fu n d am en ta l to  say  to  us.
The p o e t speaks in  a  tongue  o f  th e  in n e r  vo ice  o f our being, te llin g  us 
who we a re  and w h at i t  is  t h a t  we a re  doing. I f  we c a n n o t allow
ourselves t o  a c c e p t H eidegger's w orld o f  p o e tic  im ages, o r  o f  essences
and o f gods, o r  o f  t r u th  spoken th rough  o rac les  in  a  c lea rin g , th e n  a t
l e a s t  we can  say  along w ith H eidegger t h a t  th e  te llin g  o f  h is to ry  began
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w ith p o e try , and t h a t  th e  b e s t p o e try  i s  a  kind o f  h is to ry , i f  only a
h is to ry  o f  our im ag ination . As Ja c o b  B urckhard t su cc in c tly  p u ts  i t ,
"h isto ry  finds in  p o e try  n o t only one o f  th e  m ost im p o rtan t, b u t one o f
i t s  p u re s t  and  f in e s t  sources." A ccording to  B urckhard t th e re  a re  tw o
reaso n s  why th e  vo ice  o f  p o e try  is  fu n dam en ta lly  a  h is to r ic a l one: th e
f i r s t  because  i t  p rov ides an  in s ig h t in to  hum an n a tu re , th e  second
because  i t  illu m in a tes  th e  h is to ric a l consciousness o f  th e  tim es . For
th e  h is to r ic a l observer, B urckhard t observes, p o e try  "is th e  im ag e  o f
th e  e te rn a l  in  i t s  te m p o ra l and  n a tio n a l expression; hence , in s tru c tiv e
in  a i l  i t s  a sp e c ts  and, m oreover, o f te n  th e  b e s t  o r  only th in g  to
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survive."
A ris to tle 's  con tribu tion  to  th e  su b je c t has aU  b u t been  fo rg o tte n
in  th is  d eb a te  fo r  he te l ls  u s  in  h is P o e tic s  t h a t  midway be tw een
4  *-5philosophy and  h is to ry  th e re  is  p o e try . P o e try  th u s  occupies c e n te r
s ta g e  w ith h is to ry  on i t s  l e f t ,  a s  i t  w ere, and philosophy on i t s  r ig h t
tugg ing  p o e tic  im  ag ination  in  e i th e r  d irec tio n . I f  we can  keep  in  mind
w hat A ris to tle  says in  h is P o e tics  (and igno re  w hat he says in  th e
R heto ric ) th e n  I  th in k  th a t  th is  f i t s  in to  w h at I  have been  saying so
f a n  t h a t  th e  im ag es con ta ined  in  th e  vo ice  o f  p o e try  a re  n o t
n ecessarily  concerned  w ith d if fe re n t im ag es  th a n  is  sc ien ce  o r  h is to ry
o r  philosophy o r  po litic s; a l l  d iscu rsive  u tte ra n c e s  req u ire  th e  a c t  o f
im ag in a tio n  so  we should n o t be  suprised  t o  find , when in v estig a tin g
w hat sc ien ce  o r  h is to ry  has t o  say , t h a t  th e  vo ice o f  p o e try  has reac h ed
th e re  f ir s t .
W hat d if fe re n tia te s  th e  vo ice o f  p o e try  from  th e  o th e r  vo ices is  
n o t th e  w h at o f  p o e tic  d iscourse ( th a t  is , w h a t is  th e  su b je c t which is  
being spoken of), b u t th e  how o f  d iscourse  -  how p o e try  chooses to  
exp ress i t s e l f  and how th is  m ight d if fe r  fro m , say , th e  philosophers
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chosen m ethod o f expression  and I  th in k  t h a t  A ris to tle 's  d is tin c tio n  
m entioned above b e s t cap tu re s  th is  mood.
By concern ing  ourselves w ith th e  how o f th e  p o e tic  vo ice r a th e r
th a n  w ith th e  w hat, we find  t h a t  i t  does n o t a lw ays pay to  m ain tain  th e
c a lc if ied  d is tin c tio n s  t h a t  philosophers have e re c te d  since P la to  -  t h a t
is , t h e  d is tin c tio n  m ade be tw een  th e  d iscourse  o f  th e  p o e t and t h a t  o f
th e  philosopher. T here can  be p o litic a l poem s ju s t  a s  th e re  a re
h is to r ic a l poem s ju s t  a s  th e re  a re  philosophical poem s and to  m ain tain
o therw ise  is  senseless. All fo rm s o f  u tte ra n c e  stem  from  th e  sam e
im ag in a tiv e  im pulse, and a l l  a r e  th u s  bo m  from  th e  v ita  con tem p la tiva .
B ut having been  bo m  from  th e  v ita  co n te  m plativa th e se  im agin ings e n te r
in to  an o th e r  rea lm , t h a t  o f th e  conversation  o f  th e  v ita  a c tiv a , th e
p lace  w here s ta te m e n ts  ab o u t th e  worLd e f f e c t  our understanding o f th e
world and o f  ourselves; where a l l  u tte ra n c e s  a re  a  public p e rfo rm an ce  o f
som e s o r t  ab o u t a  s ta t e  o f a ffa irs ; w here th e  a c tiv ity  o f speaking and
lis ten in g  to  a  public conversation  -  th e  conversation  o f  m ankind -  is
one o f engaging in  a  p o litic a l a c tiv ity .
Secondly, we m ust m aintain  a  philosophic v ig ilance  over th o se  who 
would su g g es t t h a t  one mode o f  im ag ina tion  necessarily  has p rio rity  o v e r 
o th e rs . F or im ages, lik e  words, can  be dangerous to o ls  a s  w ell a s  
fo rc e s  fo r  lib e ra tio n . I t  is  a  te n sio n  t h a t  bo th  language and im ag es  
sh a re ; a  sense  o f  th e  "trem endous," a s  B urckhard t observed, o r  le ss  
p rosaica lly , an  understanding  t h a t  th e  sw ord can  c u t  b o th  ways.
S ection  Three:
Some Concluding Remarks
F or th e  sam e reaso n  t h a t  P la to  banished th e  p o e ts  from  his id e a l  s ta te ,  
th e  em p ero r V espasian d ec reed  t h a t  a l l  philosophers should be  banished
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from  Rome. The p o e t and  philosopher, though  o fte n tim e s  arguing t h a t
th e i r  d iscip lines a re  m utually exclusive, freq u en tly  speak  in  th e  a lm o s t
id e n tic a l, conversational, m ythic v o ice , vdeing fo r  th e  sam e e a r  o f  th e
populace. I t  is  n o t  surprising , th e n , t h a t  "when P la to  and  A risto tle  
w an t t o  g ive us th e  co re  o f  th e i r  philosophy," Huizinga observes, "and
exp ress i t  in  th e  p ith ie s t  way th e y  choose th e  m yth-form ." F or P la to ,
Huizinga po in ts  ou t, th e  m yth we a re  g iven  is  t h a t  o f th e  soul; fo r
A ris to tle  i t  is  "of th e  lo v e  t h a t  a l l  th in g s have fo r  th e  unm oved m over 
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o f th e  world." C onversely, p o litic a l philosophy’s  fre q u e n t u se  o f th e  
p o e tic  form  has a lso  b rough t w ith i t  condem nation . When Spinoza 
c r it ic iz e s  philosophers fo r  n o t  a tten d in g  to  th e  descrip tio n  o f  th e  
p ra c tic a l ,  m im etic  w orld -  o r  in  o th e r  words, when th e y  u se  th e i r  
im ag ination  a t  th e  expense o f re a l i ty  -  he c la im s t h a t  th e y  a re  l i t t l e  
d if fe re n t  from  th e  po e ts . According to  Spinoza,
"...philosophers have n ev er conceived  a  p o litic a l system  which can  
be applied  in  p ra c tic e , b u t have produced o th e r  obvious fan ta s ie s , 
o r schem es t h a t  could only have been  p u t in to  e f f e c t  in  U topia, o r
th e  p o e t's  golden age, when, o f course, th e re  was no need  o f th em
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a ta lL "
To th e  P rom ethean  p o litic a l th e o r is t  th is  c ritic ism  c a rr ie s  l i t t l e
cu rren cy . P la to  self-consdousL y em barks upon th e  Laws w ith th e  com m en t
46' l e t  us begin by try in g  to  im ag ine th e  foundation  o f  th e  a ty ."  In  th e  
Republic; he a rg u es  t h a t  th is  im ag in ary  foundation  need  n o t  be o f  th e  
m im etic  s o r t  fo r, P la to  says, "perhaps th e re  is  a  p a t te rn  o f  i t  la id  up
in  heaven  fo r  him who w ishes t o  c o n tem p la te  i t  and  so  beholding to
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c o n s titu te  h im self a s  c itizen ."
The consequence o f  p o litic a l im ag ination  is  n o t d issim ilar to  t h a t  
o f  th e  p o e tica l, a t  l e a s t  i f  we allow  our im ag inations t o  ru n  r io t  over
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p ru d e n t judgm ent. Indeed, fo r  Hobbes th e  vo ices o f  p o e try , philosophy 
and h is to ry  had th is  much in  com m on: th e re  a re  tim e s  when th e y  speak  as 
one vo ice , in s tru c tin g , n a rra tin g  and persuading th e  l is te n e r  a l l  a t  th e  
sam e  tim e . In  h is rep ly  to  Thom as W hite's De Mundo, fo r  exam ple, Hobbes 
te l ls  us t h a t  th e  fu n c tio n  o f  p o e try  is  to  n a r ra te  g r e a t  deeds so  th e y  
can  b e  tra n s m itte d  fo r  p o s te rity . This is  w hat Hobbes ca lled  "heroic
poetry ."  I f  one w ants t o  be a  hero ic  p o e t, Hobbes po in ts  ou t, th e n  he 
"m ust n o t  onely be  a  p o e t .. .b u t a lso  th e  Philosopher, t o  fu rn ish  and
square  his m a tte r , t h a t  is , t o  make bo th  body and soule, co lour and
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shaddow o f  h is Poe me o u t o f  h is owne s to re ... ."  O ver fo r ty  y ea rs  la te r ,  
when he t r ie d  his hand a t  tra n s la tin g  Hom er, Hobbes te l ls  u s t h a t  one o f 
th e  ch ie f v ir tu e s  o f hero ic  p o e try  lie s  in  i t s  ab ility  t o  p a in t
p ic tu res . "For a  p o e t is  a  p a in ter,"  Hobbes observes,
" ...and  should p a in t ac tio n s  to  th e  understanding  w ith th e  m ost
d e c e n t words, a s  p a in te rs  do persons and bodies w ith th e  ch o ices t
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colours, to  th e  eye ...."
Of course  Hobbes w as a  p ro d u c t o f  his tim es , and  th e  b e lie f  t h a t  
v a rie d  d iscip lines can  n ev erth e less  sh a re  in  p o e tic  im ages was n o t 
lim ite d  only to  him . In  his D efence o f  P o e try  Sir Philip  Sidney also 
rem a rk s  upon th e  cross-pollinatLon o f th e  im ag e  am ong th e  d iscip lines, 
m ost n o tab ly  be tw een  p o e try  and philosophy. A ccording to  Sidney,
"Now do th  th e  peerless  p o e t perform  both : fo r  w hatsoever th e  
philosopher sa ith  should be done, he  g ive th  a  p e r fe c t  p ic tu re  o f 
i t  in  som eone by whom he presupposeth  i t  was done, so a s  he 
coup le th  th e  g en e ra l notions w ith th e  p a r tic u la r  exam ple. A 
p e r fe c t  p ic tu re  I  say , fo r  he y ie ld e th  to  th e  pow ers o f th e  
mind an  im age  o f t h a t  w hereof th e  philosopher b u t a  wordish 
descrip tion , which doeth  n e ith e r  s tr ik e , p ie rc e , no r possess th e
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s ig h t o f th e  sou l so much a s  t h a t  o th e r  doth."
The im ag e , in  o th e r  words, by providing th e  mind w ith "a p e r fe c t  
p ic tu re ,"  can  do w h at no m ixture o f philosophical words could e v e r  do: 
i t  can  "strike ,"  "p ierce" and  "possess th e  s ig h t o f  th e  soul," like  
Hobbes's so u l was possessed by th e  cap tiv a tin g  im ag es  o f  g eo m etry  which 
w ere i l lu s tra te d  in  th e  pages o f  Euclid. F o r Sidney, th e  au th o r o f  such 
persuasive  im ag es  w as th e  p o e t, b u t  a s  Hobbes w ell knew , th e  
philosopher, th e  rh e to ric ia n , th e  h is to rian , and even  th e  geom etric ian  
could a l l  m aste r th is  devious and  pow erfu l dev ice . Devious because  in  
th e  wrong hands th e  im ag e  can  m islead th e  populace; pow erfu l because  in  
th e  r ig h t  hands -  lik e  Hobbes's -  th e  ap p ro p ria te  im ag e  can  help  le a d  
d ire c tly  t o  know ledge.
A t th e  h e a r t  o f  th e  p o e tic  vo ice , fo r  Hobbes, is  i t s  a b ility  to  
p a in t a  p ic tu re  o r  o f fe r  up  a  m etaphoric  o r  fa n c ifu l im ag e  fo r  
in spection . "An im age," Hobbes w rite s  in  his P re face  to  H om er, "is 
a lw ays a  p a r t,  o r  r a th e r  a  ground o f th e  p o e tic a l co m paris ion ...fo r
51exam ple, when V irgil would s e t  b efo re  ou r ey es  th e  f a l l  o f T roy...." 
Som etim es Hobbes is  a t  pains t o  d istinguish  p o e try  from  th e  o th e r
discip lines. O thertim es, a s  in  h is tra n s la tio n  o f  Hom er, he a rg u es  t h a t
52"poem s...a re  b u t so  many h is to rie s  m  verse ."  This occasional b lurring 
o f th e  d is tin c tio n  am ong p o e try , h is to ry , and  philosophy occurs  in  each  
s ta g e  o f  Hobbes's in te l le c tu a l  developm ent, from  A nti-W hite (1641) to  
H om er (1674), and is  even  to  be found in  De Homine (1658). In  th e  
l a t t e r  work, Hobbes com m en ts t h a t  "L e tte rs  [fan c ifu l la n g u ag e ]...a re
usefu l, to o , esp ec ia lly  h is to ries; fo r  th e se  supply in  abundance th e
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ev idence on which r e s ts  th e  sc ien ce  o f causes...."
Hobbes begins L ev ia than  by poin ting  o u t t h a t  'T speak n o t o f men,
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b u t, in  th e  a b s tra c t,  o f  th e  s e a t  o f  pow er." These a re  h y p o th e tica l men
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liv ing in  an  im ag inary  s ta te  o f n a tu re . This is  w h a t Sheldon Wolin
r e f e r s  t o  a s  Hobbes's ep ic  political, philosophy, an  e la b o ra te  inven tion
o f th e  mind "...p laying upon a  world, which, in  m en ta l te rm s  a t  le a s t ,
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possesses som e m easure o f  p la s tic ity ."  The ep ic  po litica l th e o r is t  and
th e  ep ic  p o e t, fo r  Wolin (following th e  lin e  o f  B urckhard t and  Huizinga)
occupy th e  sam e sp ace , nudging u s  t o  behold a  world t h a t  does n o t 
d ire c tly  correspond to  th e  one which we in h a b it, b u t  a  w orld in  which 
p o litic a l possib ilities flourish .
F o r Hobbes, p o e tic  and  p o litic a l im ag ina tion  a re  n o t so  f a r  a p a r t
a s  one would suppose. "For a s  tru th ,"  Hobbes w rites  in  h is P re face  
B efore G ondtbert (w ritten  a b o u t th e  sam e tim e  a s  L ev ia than), "is th e
bound o f h is to rica l, so  th e  resem b lan ce  o f  t r u th  is  th e  u tm o s t l im it  o f
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p o e tic a l lib e rty ."  Hobbes, to o , believed  t h a t  p o e try  and t ru th ,  fan cy  
and  philosophy, can  jo in  fo rces , can  c re a te  a  m yth, which would guide
men in to  new w orld s  According to  Hobbes,
" A l l th a t  is  b e a u tifu l o r  defensib le  in  building, o r m arvellous 
in  engines and in s tru m en ts  o f m otion, w hatsoever com modify men 
re c e iv e  from  observations o f th e  heavens, from  th e  descrip tions
o f th e  e a r th , from  th e  a c c o u n t o f tim e ...a n d  w hatever th e  c iv ility
o f Europe from  th e  b a rb a rity  o f A m erican  savages, is  th e  w orkm an-
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sh ip  o f fancy , b u t guided by th e  p re c e p ts  o f tr u e  philosophy."
The e x te n t  to  which mankind can  progress, in  o th e r  words, is  due to  th e  
c o r re c t  app lica tion  o f  im ag ina tion  o r  "fancy" to  philosophy.
Im ag ination  may orig inally  b e  noth ing  b u t an  o p tica l fan cy  fo r  
Hobbes, y e t  a t  th e  sam e tim e  p o litic a l im ag in a tio n  l ie s  a t  th e  h e a r t  o f 
Hobbes's ep ic , philosophical endeavor. RevealingLy, Hobbes held  both  
v iew s sim ultaneously . Again, in  h is P re face  B efore G ondibert (1651) he 
speaks o f th e  "m arvellous e f fe c ts "  t h a t  fan cy  produces in  a
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philosophical work. Im agination , Hobbes w rites , does n o t  e n tire ly  
co n s is t o f  m otion b u t 'in  copious im ag ery  d isc re e tly  o rdered , and 
p e rfe c tly  re g is te re d  m em ory; which m ost men under th e  nam e o f philosophy 
have a  glim pse o f, and  is  p re ten d ed  to  by many, t h a t  grossly  m istaking 
her, em b race  co n ten tio n  in  h e r  p lace ."  In  o th e r  words, philosophical 
im ag in a tio n  is  a  to o l  and  can  be bo th  educationally  in s tru c tiv e  and  y e t  
also  p o litic a lly  con ten tious. "But," Hobbes quickly  adds, "so f a r  fo r th  
a s  th e  fan cy  o f  man h as  t r a c e d  th e  ways o f  t r u e  philosophy, so  f a r  i t
C  Q
h a th  produced very  m arvellous e f fe c ts  to  th e  b e n e f it o f mankind."
A poem , Hobbes in fo rm s h is  re a d e rs , chiefLy consists  o f  tw o
e lem en ts: " to  know w ell, t h a t  is , t o  have im ag es  o f n a tu re  in  th e  m emory
d is tin c t and d e a r " ;  and  " to  know much" which " ...p ro ceed e th  th e  
adm irab le  v a r ie ty  and novelty  o f  m etaphors which a re  n o t possib le to  be
59lig h ted  on in  th e  com pass o f  narrow  know ledge." When p o e try  fa ils  -  
w hat Hobbes ca lls  th e  "indecencies" o f p o e try  -  i s  when m etaphors
"can n o t com e in to  m en's though ts" -  o r  in  o th e r  words, when m etaphors
60fa i l  t o  spark  any im ag es in  th e  mind. More im p o rtan tly  fo r  Hobbes a re
th e  various "indescretions" o f  th e  p o e t which m ight le a d  t o  th e
61"d istu rbace  o f  th e  com m onw ealth ." A lthough fan cy , when jcdned w ith 
philosophy, can  le a d  mankind to  c re a te  new worlds, Hobbes w arns us in
G ondibert t h a t  an  undisciplined fan cy  can  le a d  to  "cruelty ,"  "discord,"
62"fraud ," "tum ult" and "con troversy ." The p rog ress  o f  mankind o r  th e  
d e s tru c tio n  o f  th e  com m onw ealth  -  th e se  a re  th e  tw o  sides o f  ou r 
im ag ination .
As an  A ris to tle  o r  even  a  Noam Chomsky would t e l l  us, man is  bom  
w ith  c a p a c ity  fo r  speech , an  in -b u ilt  d isposition  in  le a rn in g  to  
a r tic u la te  m eaningful sounds. B ut man i s  also  bo m  w ith th e  cap a c ity  
f o r  sen se . In  th e  s t a t e  o f  b ir th , ju s t  a s  in  th e  HobbesLan s ta t e  o f
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n a tu re , sense  and speech  a re  th e  tw o  g if ts  bestow ed upon man. From
P la to  onw ards, philosophers have sought, e i th e r  th rough  language o r  from
sense p e rcep tio n , to  derive  th e  fo rm u la  fo r  know ledge and  th e  p ro p er
judgm en t upon experience . Hobbes's con tribu tion  was in  arguing th a t
unbrid led  language com bined w ith im ag ination  will le a d  only to  sedition ,
and  y e t  i f  we can  c o n tro l our language we can  th u s  harness th e  pow er o f
th e  im ag e , even tu a lly  arriv ing  a t  a  com m on sensory  judgm en t upon tru th ,
know ledge, p eace , and p o litic a l obligation.
M etaphor, D errida in fo rm s us, i s  n ev e r inn o cen t. In  a
ph ilosophical work tru m p e tin g  lo g ic a l reason ing , m etaphor only b e tra y s  
th e  te x t .  Our lin g u is tic  u tte ra n c e s  a re  borrow ed cu rren c ies  so  nothing
we say  is  fresh ly , orig inally  m inted. To many d eco n stru c tio n is t 
c r it ic s , in  th e  t e x t  o f  l i f e  th e re  i s  no single au tho r, no original,
w ordsm ith who c re a te s  from  whole d o th  a  b rand new te x t .  A uthorship and 
m eaning f a l l  in to  an  in f in ite  re g re ss  o f p rio r  te x ts ,  whose p rincip le
foundation  is  com posed o f  e ffa c e d  m etaphors. This has been  erroneously  
ta k e n  to  m ean, how ever, t h a t  th e  so -ca lled  d e a th  o f  th e  au th o r en ta ils
th e  d ea th  o f  im ag ination . P o litica l, m e taphorica l im ag ination  does n o t 
d ie , b u t  is  bo m  anew each  r im e  a  p o litic a l th e o r is t  ta k e s  up a  pen. 
Words may describe  im ages b u t th e y  a re  n o t  th e  sam e th in g  a s  im ages, 
th e y  do n o t fu f il l  th e  sam e function . The au th o r o f  im ag in a tio n  is  
a liv e  and  w ell, im  ag ina tive ly  c re a tin g  and  re -c re a tin g , a s  e ac h  o f  us
does, m en ta l im ag es  from  th e  s to ck  o f  o b je c ts  surrounding us, and
tra n s la tin g  our m en ta l d iscourse in to  v erb a l.
I t  was p a r tly  by th e  "genius" o f m etaphor, a s  A ris to tle  described  
i t ,  t h a t  Hobbes was ab le  successfu lly  to  a r t ic u la te  a  co h eren t,
persuasive  p o litic a l and philospohical d o c trin e . T here was l i t t l e  o r  no 
in co n sisten cy  is  Hobbes's use o f th e  m etaphoric im age; fo r  som eone who
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cla im ed  t h a t  im ages " se c re te ly  in s tru c t  th e  reader*' Hobbes was am azingly  
o v e r t  when i t  cam e t o  using th em  fo r  h im self. Y e t even  Hobbes re a liz e d  
th a t  th e  consequence o f  m etaphor and  p o litic a l im ag ination  may n o t  be 
wholly advan tageous. We should n ev e r be c a rr ied  aw ay w ith our im ages  o r 
phan tasm s, Hobbes argued; r a th e r  we should seek  to  apply our m etaphoric  
im ag es  t o  d iscourse only i f  th e y  a re  a p t  to  th e  su b je c t a t  hand. Hobbes 
was, indeed , fu lly  co g n izan t o f  th e  pow er t h a t  th e  m etaphoric  im ag e  
m ight hold.
256
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42. G ilbert Ryle, The C oncep t o f Mind (H arm ondsw orth, Penguin Books,
1949), 153.
43. L ev iathan , 116-117; EW HE, 36-37.
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45. E p istle  D edicatory , E lem en ts o f  Law, E W IV.
46. D escartes , Philosophical Works, I, 92.
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M etaphors We Live By (Chicago: U niversity  o f  Chicago P ress, 1980),
69-76.
48. EW I, 79.
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b e lie f t h a t  language can  be added  and su b tra c te d  to  re v e a l know ledge 
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C hap ter Five: THE IMAGES OF LEVIATHAN
1. One e x ce lle n t, a lthough  unpublished, th e s is  d e ta ilin g  th e  
m etaphoric  language o f  Hobbes's L ev iathan  is  R aia Prokhovnik's The 
R hetoric and  Philosophy o f Hobbes's L eviathan , Ph.D th e s is , U niversity  
o f  London, 1981.
2. The Book o f Job , 40:15 -  41:35.
3. Jo b ., 40:15.
4. Job , 26:13. F o r an  exegesis o f  th e  sym bol o f L ev iathan  and 
B ehem oth se e  The Book o f Job: With N otes, In tro d u ctio n  and Appendix by 
A.B. Davidson (Cam bridge: CUP, 1962), espec ia lly  321-32; R obert
P fe iffe r 's  In tro d u c tio n  to  th e  Old T es tam en t (New York: H arper &
B rothers Publishers, 1948).
5. Isa iah , 27:1.
6. Job , 41:11.
7. Oxford English D ictionary, 2nd ed ition  (Oxford: C larendon Press,
1989, 676.
8 . L ev ia than , 81; EW HE, ix -x .
9. L ev ia than , 672; EW HE, 653.
10. L eviathan, 676; EW HE, 657.
11. L ev iathan , 670 -681; EW HE, 654-663.
12. T.S. E lio t, Essay on "John BramhaH" in  Essays: A ncien t and 
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13. L eviathan, 725; EW HE, 710.
14. Thid.
15. C.S. Lewis, The D iscarded Im age (C am bridge; C am bridge U niversity  
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16. L ev ia than , 669; EW HE, 650.
17. L ev iathan  227; EW HE, 158.
18. M ichael O akeshott, Hobbes on C ivil A ssociation (Berkeley: 
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Jam es  A nderson Winn's John D ryden and His World (New Haven: Yale 
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20. A ris to tle 's  De Anim a, 432a3-9.
21. Ludwig W ittgenstein , The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell* 1958, re p r in te d  1989), 171.
22. L ev iathan , 668 ; EW HE, 648.
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24. L ev ia than , 668 ; EW HE, 648.
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was th e  en g rav e r fo r  bo th  works.
30. EW I, 393.
31. EW I, 399; EW HI, 57; EW IV, 55.
32. K .F.Russell, ed ito r, B ritish  A natom y (London: S t. P au l 
Bibliography, 1987), 6-7.
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41. Hobbes, O pera L atina, HE, 1.
42. P la to 's  Phaedrus, 246; Phaedo, 80, 81, 94; U m aeus, 34c, 87d.
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48. L ev iathan , 269; EW HE, 204-5.
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62. EW H, 169-170.
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67. L eviathan, 300; EW HE, 238.
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70. Thid.
71. Thid,
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76. A ccording to  Hobbes, "The D istribu tion  o f  M aterials o f  th is
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to  say , in  one word P ro p rie ty ; and belongeth  in  a l l  kinds o f 
Com m on-w ealth  to  th e  Sovereign Power" L eviathan, 295-6; EW HE, 233.
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86 . L ev ia than , 627-28; EW 111,603.
87. Ibid.
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C h ap te r Six: METAPHOR, POETRY AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF POLITICAL 
IMAGINATION
1. See G ilb e rt Ryle, The C oncep t o f  Mind (Harm ondsw orth: Penguin 
Books, 1949), 190-263; Ludwig W ittgenstein , Philospohical 
In v estiga tions (Oxford: Basil B lackw ell, 1953).
2. Mary W amock, Im agination  (London: F aber and Faber, 1976), 
13-34, 131- 195.
3. Jacq u es  D errida, "The Double Session" in  D issem ination, (London: 
A thlone P ress, 1981), 195.
4. Ib id ., 187.
5. R orty , Philosophy and th e  M irror o f N atu re  (Oxford: Basil 
B lackw ell, 1980), 38.
6 . B erkeley, Of th e  P rincip les o f Human., Knowledge, Philosophical 
Works, ed ited  Dy M.R. A yers (LunJun: E verym airs L ibrary, I9 7 5t, I n  --------
7. Ibid.
8 . L ev ia than , 657; EW HI, 637.
9. L eviathan , 106; EW HE, 25.
10. L ev ia than , 365; EW m , 310.
11. Vico, The New Science o f G iam a ttis ta  Vico, 3rd ed ., tra n s la te d  
by Bergin and F isch (Hhica: C ornell U niversity  P ress, 1948), 142.
12. Ib id .
13. A genera l, non-po litica l, d iscoussion o f P rom ethean  im ag in a tio n  
can  be  found in  R ichard K earney 's The Wake o f Im agination  (London: 
H utchinson, 1988), 79-86.
14. P la to 's  P ro tagoras, 321c.
15. Ib id ., 32Id .
16. Aeschylus, P rom etheus Bound in  The C om plete P lays o f  Aeschylus, 
t r a n s .  by G ilbert M urray (London: G eorge Allen and Unwin, 1952), 41.
17. Bishop B ram hall, quo ted  in  John  Bowie's Hobbes and His C ritic s  
(New York: B arnes and  Noble, 1969), 127.
18. Ja c o b  B urckhardt, R eflections on H istory  (Indianapolis: L iberty  
C lassics, 1979), 99.
19. Im m anuel K ant, "Anthropologie," no. 28. W erke, v o l VUE (Berlin: 
1922), 466.
20. L ev ia than , 90; EW HE, 7.
21. S hakespeare, A M idsummer's N ight D ream , A c t V, scene 1.
22. M ichael O akeshott, E xperience and I ts  Modes (London: C am bridge 
U niversity  P ress, 1933), 297. F or a  fu lle r  discussion o f th e  
d evelopm en t o f  O akeshott's  p o e tic  vo ice se e  John  W endell C oates' 
"M ichael O akesho tt a s  L ib era l T heorist,"  in  th e  C anadian Jo u rn a l o f 
P o litica l Science, VoL 18, no. 4, D ecem ber 1985), 773-787. Unless 
o therw ise  s ta te d , a l l  re fe re n c e s  t o  O akesho tt a r e  t o  h is "The Voice o f 
P o e try  in  th e  C onversation  o f Mankind" in  Rationalism  in  P o litics  
(London: M etheun and Co., L td ., 1962).
23. O akesho tt, Rationalism  in  P o litics , 216. My critic ism  o f 
O akesho tt h e re  app lies only to  h is t r e a tm e n t  o f  p o e try  in  th is  essay , 
and  n o t to  any o th e r  work in  which h e  may have am ended h is th e o ry .
24. Ib id ., 234.
25. EW IV, 452.
26. O akeshott, Rationalism  in  P o litics , 217.
27. See th e  dicussion o f m etaphoric  m odels in  sc ien ce  in  c h a p te r
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one.
. 28. F o r an  e x c e lle n t overview  o f p o litic a l p o e try ,, see, Tom Paulin 's 
in tro a u c tio n  to  The F ab er Book of P o lit ic a l v erse  (London: F aber an a
F aber, L td ., 1984), 15-32.
29. C ited  in  Paulin , Ib id ., 339.
30. Conor C ruise 0*brien, "Passion and Cunning" in  Passion and  
Cunning and  o th e r  Essays (London: WeidenfeLd and  Nicolson, 1988), 
28-29.
31. AH H eideggerian quo tes  a re  ta k e n  from  "R em brance o f  th e  Poet" 
and  "H olderlin  and th e  Essence o f  Poetry" in  E xistence and  Being, 
tra n s la te d  by Douglas S c o tt (Chicago: G atew ay P ress, 1949).
H eidegger’s  o th e r  p o e tic  essays a re  usefu lly  com piled  in  P oetry , 
Language, Thought, tra n s la te d  by A lb e rt H o fstad te r (New York: H arper 
and  Row, 1971). F or an  overview  o f Heddeggerian po e tics , p a rtic u la rly  
in  Being and T im e, see  David H alliburton 's P o e tic  Thinking: An
A pproach to  H eidegger (Chicago: U niversity  o f  Chicago P ress, 1981) and 
Eugene F. K aelin 's A rt and E x istence: A Phenom enological A esth e tic
(New Je rsey : BuckneH U niversity  P ress, 1970), 234-280. From a  w ealth  
o f books on how H eideggerian p o e tic s  f i t s  in to  philosophy in  g en era l, 
s e e  S teven  Binde m an's H eidegger and W ittgenstein : th e  p o e tic s  o f
s ilence  (W ashington, D.C.: U niversity  o f A m erica, 1981); and
H eidegger's in flu en ce  on post-m odern  p o e try  is  th e  su b je c t o f  P au l 
Bove's DeconstructLve Poetics: H eidegger and M odem A m erican P o e try
(G uildford: Colum bia U niversity  P ress, 1980).
32. H eidegger, E xistence and Being, 277.
33. Ib id ., 276.
34. Ib id ., 275.
35. Ib id ., 272.
36. Ib id ., 279.
37. Ib id ., 283.
38. Ibid.
39. Ib id ., 288.
40. J e re m y  Conway, review  a r tic le  in  th e  In te rn a tio n a l Philosophical
Q uarterly , VoL XXIV (1984), 98-112. Accoding to  Conway, one o f  th e  
ch ie f  d iff ic u ltie s  o f  H eidegger's p o e t is  " th a t  th e re  ex is ts  a  
fu n d am e n ta l sep a ra tio n  betw een  th e  p o e t and th e  com munity" [114].
41. Howard Davis, "P oetry  and th e  Voice o f  M ichael O akeshott" in  th e  
B ritish Jo u rn a l o f A esthe tics , Vol., XV, no. 1 (W inter, 1974), 59-68.
"One o f  th e  problem s is  p rec ise ly  t h a t  O akesho tt seem s to  be im posing 
a  single form  o f  experience  on such  he terogeneous and expanding 
'ob jec ts ' o f a r t  -  whose meaning c a n n o t be considered  chronologically  
sp ec if ic , anyw ay, b u t w ill change w ith  g e n e ra l sensib ility . T here fo re , 
in  te rm s  o f  th e  'philosophy o f a r t , ' h is view is  lik e ly  t o  be 
considered  inad eq u a te"  [6 6 ].
42. B urckhard t, R eflections on H istory , 107.
43. A risto tle 's  P oetics , 1451a37-1451b8.
44. H uizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study o f  th e  P lay E lem en t in  C u ltu re  
(London: Paladin , 1949), 153.
45. Spinoza, T ra c ta tu s  P o llticus in  P o litic a l Works, tra n s . by A.G. 
W emham (Oxford: C larendon P ress, 1958), 261.
46. P la to 's  Laws, 702e.
47. P la to 's  Republic, 591a-592b.
48. Hobbes, Thom as W hite's De Mundo Exam ined, tra n s la te d  by H arold 
W hitm ore Jo n es  (London: B radford U niversity  P ress, 1976), 50.
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49. EW X, vi.
50. Sidney, A D efence o f P o e try , ed ited  by J .A . Van D orsten (London: 
Oxford U niversity  P ress, 1966), 32.
51. EW X, vL
52. Ibid.
53. De Ho m ine, a s  tr a n s la te d  in  Man and  C itizen , B ernard G ert, ed. 
(G arden C ity , New York: DouhLeday, 1972), 50.
54. Hobbes, L ev iathan , 75? EW m , i i .
55. Wolin, Hobbes and th e  Epic T rad ition  o f P o litic a l Theory (Los 
Angeles: U niversity  o f  C alifornia P ress, 1970), 34.
56. EW IV, 451-2.
57. Ib id ., 449-50.
58. Ibid. Also c ite d  in  Wolin, Hobbes and  th e  Epic T rad ition , 38-9.
59. EW IV, 453 and  455.
60. EW IV, 455.
61. Ib id ., 448.
62. Ibid.
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